second line defense in New Jersey

1997Subjective good faith nevertheless remains available to a public employee as a second line of defense, which he may raise at trial even if he was not acting reasonably. [ 217 N.J.Super. at 622 , 526 A.2d 737 .] The claim of the DYFS defendants that their actions were objectively reasonable might at first seem inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s criticisms in the termination litigation.

1997Subjective good faith nevertheless remains available to a public employee as a second line of defense, which he may raise at trial even if he was not acting reasonably. [ 217 N.J.Super. at 622 , 526 A.2d 737 .] The claim of the DYFS defendants that their actions were objectively reasonable might at first seem inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s criticisms in the termination litigation.

2005The Appellate Division, citing Fielder v. Stonack, 141 N.J. 101, 132 , 661 A.2d 231 (1995), and Leopardi v. Tp. of Maple Shade, 363 N.J.Super. 313, 332 , 832 A.2d 943 (App.Div.2003), ruled that Officers Novakowski and Labianca “are still entitled to raise their subjective good faith as a second line of defense to plaintiffs federal claims under § 1983.” DelaCruz v. Borough of Hillsdale, supra, 365 N.J.Super. at 151 , 838 A.2d 498 .

2005The Appellate Division, citing Fielder v. Stonack, 141 N.J. 101, 132 , 661 A.2d 231 (1995), and Leopardi v. Tp. of Maple Shade, 363 N.J.Super. 313, 332 , 832 A.2d 943 (App.Div.2003), ruled that Officers Novakowski and Labianca “are still entitled to raise their subjective good faith as a second line of defense to plaintiffs federal claims under § 1983.” DelaCruz v. Borough of Hillsdale, supra, 365 N.J.Super. at 151 , 838 A.2d 498 .

2005The Appellate Division, citing Fielder v. Stonack, 141 N.J. 101, 132 , 661 A.2d 231 (1995), and Leopardi v. Tp. of Maple Shade, 363 N.J.Super. 313, 332 , 832 A.2d 943 (App.Div.2003), ruled that Officers Novakowski and Labianca “are still entitled to raise their subjective good faith as a second line of defense to plaintiffs federal claims under § 1983.” DelaCruz v. Borough of Hillsdale, supra, 365 N.J.Super. at 151 , 838 A.2d 498 .

2005The Appellate Division, citing Fielder v. Stonack, 141 N.J. 101, 132 , 661 A.2d 231 (1995), and Leopardi v. Tp. of Maple Shade, 363 N.J.Super. 313, 332 , 832 A.2d 943 (App.Div.2003), ruled that Officers Novakowski and Labianca “are still entitled to raise their subjective good faith as a second line of defense to plaintiffs federal claims under § 1983.” DelaCruz v. Borough of Hillsdale, supra, 365 N.J.Super. at 151 , 838 A.2d 498 .

2005"To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a public employee need not establish his subjective, i.e., actual, good faith if his conduct was objectively reasonable." Moreover, a public employee can use subjective good faith as a second line of defense at trial, regardless of whether he or she was acting reasonably. [ Mesgleski v. Oraboni, 330 N.J.Super. 10, 25 , 748 A. 2d 1130 (App.Div.2000) (quoting Brayshaw v. Gelber, 232 N.J.Super. 99, 100 , 556 A. 2d 788 (App. Div.1989)).] Additionally, "[w]hether probable cause exists in a given case is essentially a decision for the trial judge who mus

2005"To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a public employee need not establish his subjective, i.e., actual, good faith if his conduct was objectively reasonable." Moreover, a public employee can use subjective good faith as a second line of defense at trial, regardless of whether he or she was acting reasonably. [ Mesgleski v. Oraboni, 330 N.J.Super. 10, 25 , 748 A. 2d 1130 (App.Div.2000) (quoting Brayshaw v. Gelber, 232 N.J.Super. 99, 100 , 556 A. 2d 788 (App. Div.1989)).] Additionally, "[w]hether probable cause exists in a given case is essentially a decision for the trial judge who mus

2005"To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a public employee need not establish his subjective, i.e., actual, good faith if his conduct was objectively reasonable." Moreover, a public employee can use subjective good faith as a second line of defense at trial, regardless of whether he or she was acting reasonably. [ Mesgleski v. Oraboni, 330 N.J.Super. 10, 25 , 748 A. 2d 1130 (App.Div.2000) (quoting Brayshaw v. Gelber, 232 N.J.Super. 99, 100 , 556 A. 2d 788 (App. Div.1989)).] Additionally, "[w]hether probable cause exists in a given case is essentially a decision for the trial judge who mus

2005"To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a public employee need not establish his subjective, i.e., actual, good faith if his conduct was objectively reasonable." Moreover, a public employee can use subjective good faith as a second line of defense at trial, regardless of whether he or she was acting reasonably. [ Mesgleski v. Oraboni, 330 N.J.Super. 10, 25 , 748 A. 2d 1130 (App.Div.2000) (quoting Brayshaw v. Gelber, 232 N.J.Super. 99, 100 , 556 A. 2d 788 (App. Div.1989)).] Additionally, "[w]hether probable cause exists in a given case is essentially a decision for the trial judge who mus

2005The Appellate Division, citing Fielder v. Stonack, 141 N.J. 101, 132 , 661 A.2d 231 (1995), and Leopardi v. Tp. of Maple Shade, 363 N.J.Super. 313, 332 , 832 A.2d 943 (App.Div.2003), ruled that Officers Novakowski and Labianca “are still entitled to raise their subjective good faith as a second line of defense to plaintiffs federal claims under § 1983.” DelaCruz v. Borough of Hillsdale, supra, 365 N.J.Super. at 151 , 838 A.2d 498 .

2005The Appellate Division, citing Fielder v. Stonack, 141 N.J. 101, 132 , 661 A.2d 231 (1995), and Leopardi v. Tp. of Maple Shade, 363 N.J.Super. 313, 332 , 832 A.2d 943 (App.Div.2003), ruled that Officers Novakowski and Labianca “are still entitled to raise their subjective good faith as a second line of defense to plaintiffs federal claims under § 1983.” DelaCruz v. Borough of Hillsdale, supra, 365 N.J.Super. at 151 , 838 A.2d 498 .

1984As a second line of defense, defendants take the position that even if plaintiff is governed by 12 U.S. C.A. § 24 ¶ 4, the state law sections invoked do not conflict with that federal provision; they argue that where there is no conflict, the state law still applies to plaintiff and bars the instant suit. 5 In support of their premise that there is no conflict, defendants cite Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Gonzalez, 114 Misc. 2d 1007 , 452 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (Civ.Ct.1982).

1984As a second line of defense, defendants take the position that even if plaintiff is governed by 12 U.S. C.A. § 24 ¶ 4, the state law sections invoked do not conflict with that federal provision; they argue that where there is no conflict, the state law still applies to plaintiff and bars the instant suit. 5 In support of their premise that there is no conflict, defendants cite Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Gonzalez, 114 Misc. 2d 1007 , 452 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (Civ.Ct.1982).