11 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 2003–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Azar v. Prudential Insurance Co. of Americagreen2 sentences2026Co. of Am., 16 2003-NMCA-062, ¶ 28 , 133 N.M. 669 , 68 P.3d 909 ; see State v. Candelaria, 2019- 17 NMCA-032, ¶ 22, 446 P.3d 1205 (applying the general public interest exception 18 because the case presented “an issue of law that is likely to recur in the Second 19 Judicial District Court, and perhaps elsewhere”). 1 {24} The federal law regarding motor vehicle emission standards is in flux. 2026Co. of Am., 16 2003-NMCA-062, ¶ 28 , 133 N.M. 669 , 68 P.3d 909 ; see State v. Candelaria, 2019- 17 NMCA-032, ¶ 22, 446 P.3d 1205 (applying the general public interest exception 18 because the case presented “an issue of law that is likely to recur in the Second 19 Judicial District Court, and perhaps elsewhere”). 1 {24} The federal law regarding motor vehicle emission standards is in flux. | 1 | 4 |
O'Neel v. USAA Insurancegreen2 sentences2015Co., 2002-NMCA-028 , 8 ¶ 32, 131 N.M. 630 , 41 P.3d 356 (declining to consider unpreserved arguments on 9 appeal where there was no basis to apply the general public interest exception). 10 {10} The five preserved arguments that the Lichas renew in their brief in chief are 11 whether: (1) There were disputed issues of material fact regarding whether Flagstar 12 was the holder of the note and the mortgage; (2) The Lichas have standing to 13 challenge the validity of the assignment of the note and mortgage; (3) The DeNiro 14 affidavit should not have been stricken; (4) The district court should 2015Co., 2002-NMCA-028 , 8 ¶ 32, 131 N.M. 630 , 41 P.3d 356 (declining to consider unpreserved arguments on 9 appeal where there was no basis to apply the general public interest exception). 10 {10} The five preserved arguments that the Lichas renew in their brief in chief are 11 whether: (1) There were disputed issues of material fact regarding whether Flagstar 12 was the holder of the note and the mortgage; (2) The Lichas have standing to 13 challenge the validity of the assignment of the note and mortgage; (3) The DeNiro 14 affidavit should not have been stricken; (4) The district court should | 1 | 3 |
State v. Candelariagreen2 sentences2026Co. of Am., 16 2003-NMCA-062, ¶ 28 , 133 N.M. 669 , 68 P.3d 909 ; see State v. Candelaria, 2019- 17 NMCA-032, ¶ 22, 446 P.3d 1205 (applying the general public interest exception 18 because the case presented “an issue of law that is likely to recur in the Second 19 Judicial District Court, and perhaps elsewhere”). 1 {24} The federal law regarding motor vehicle emission standards is in flux. 2026Co. of Am., 16 2003-NMCA-062, ¶ 28 , 133 N.M. 669 , 68 P.3d 909 ; see State v. Candelaria, 2019- 17 NMCA-032, ¶ 22, 446 P.3d 1205 (applying the general public interest exception 18 because the case presented “an issue of law that is likely to recur in the Second 19 Judicial District Court, and perhaps elsewhere”). 1 {24} The federal law regarding motor vehicle emission standards is in flux. | 1 | 1 |
Vigil v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co.green2 sentences2007Ry., 28 N.M. 581, 590 , 215 P. 971, 974 (1923) (holding that counsel waived any alleged error as to an interpreter’s presence during deliberations by waiting to object until after the interpreter entered the jury room), overruled on other grounds by Dunleavy v. Miller, 116 N.M. 353 , 356 n. 1, 862 P.2d 1212 , 1215 n. 1 (1993); cf. State v. Escamilla, 107 N.M. 510, 515 , 760 P.2d 1276, 1281 (1988) (finding that a defendant waives his right to trial by a fair and impartial jury by waiting to object to jury qualifications until after the verdict is rendered). {11} What remains is our discretion u 2007Ry., 28 N.M. 581, 590 , 215 P. 971, 974 (1923) (holding that counsel waived any alleged error as to an interpreter’s presence during deliberations by waiting to object until after the interpreter entered the jury room), overruled on other grounds by Dunleavy v. Miller, 116 N.M. 353 , 356 n. 1, 862 P.2d 1212 , 1215 n. 1 (1993); cf. State v. Escamilla, 107 N.M. 510, 515 , 760 P.2d 1276, 1281 (1988) (finding that a defendant waives his right to trial by a fair and impartial jury by waiting to object to jury qualifications until after the verdict is rendered). {11} What remains is our discretion u | 1 | 1 |
State v. Escamillagreen2 sentences2007Ry., 28 N.M. 581, 590 , 215 P. 971, 974 (1923) (holding that counsel waived any alleged error as to an interpreter’s presence during deliberations by waiting to object until after the interpreter entered the jury room), overruled on other grounds by Dunleavy v. Miller, 116 N.M. 353 , 356 n. 1, 862 P.2d 1212 , 1215 n. 1 (1993); cf. State v. Escamilla, 107 N.M. 510, 515 , 760 P.2d 1276, 1281 (1988) (finding that a defendant waives his right to trial by a fair and impartial jury by waiting to object to jury qualifications until after the verdict is rendered). {11} What remains is our discretion u 2007Ry., 28 N.M. 581, 590 , 215 P. 971, 974 (1923) (holding that counsel waived any alleged error as to an interpreter’s presence during deliberations by waiting to object until after the interpreter entered the jury room), overruled on other grounds by Dunleavy v. Miller, 116 N.M. 353 , 356 n. 1, 862 P.2d 1212 , 1215 n. 1 (1993); cf. State v. Escamilla, 107 N.M. 510, 515 , 760 P.2d 1276, 1281 (1988) (finding that a defendant waives his right to trial by a fair and impartial jury by waiting to object to jury qualifications until after the verdict is rendered). {11} What remains is our discretion u | 1 | 1 |
Gracia v. Bittnergreen2 sentences2003Co., 2002-NMCA-028, ¶ 22 , 131 N.M. 630 , 41 P.3d 356 (declining to review unpreserved challenge to the trial court’s award of pre-arbitration attorney fees, concluding that the issue did “not have the far-reaching impact necessary to invoke the general public interest exception to our general preservation requirements”); Gracia v. Bittner, 120 N.M. 191, 196 , 900 P.2d 351, 356 (Ct.App.1995) (concluding that jury instruction issues raised for first time on appeal do not involve general public interest because they “are not likely to affect a large number of cases or litigants”). {29} In this c 2003Co., 2002-NMCA-028, ¶ 22 , 131 N.M. 630 , 41 P.3d 356 (declining to review unpreserved challenge to the trial court’s award of pre-arbitration attorney fees, concluding that the issue did “not have the far-reaching impact necessary to invoke the general public interest exception to our general preservation requirements”); Gracia v. Bittner, 120 N.M. 191, 196 , 900 P.2d 351, 356 (Ct.App.1995) (concluding that jury instruction issues raised for first time on appeal do not involve general public interest because they “are not likely to affect a large number of cases or litigants”). {29} In this c | 1 | 1 |
State v. Doegreen2 sentences2003See, e.g., Pineda v. Grande Drilling Corp., 111 N.M. 536, 540 , 807 P.2d 234, 238 (Ct.App.1991); State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 572, 574 , 566 P.2d 121, 123 (Ct.App.1977); cf. O’Neel v. USAA Ins. 2003See, e.g., Pineda v. Grande Drilling Corp., 111 N.M. 536, 540 , 807 P.2d 234, 238 (Ct.App.1991); State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 572, 574 , 566 P.2d 121, 123 (Ct.App.1977); cf. O’Neel v. USAA Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Pineda v. Grande Drilling Corp.green2 sentences2003See, e.g., Pineda v. Grande Drilling Corp., 111 N.M. 536, 540 , 807 P.2d 234, 238 (Ct.App.1991); State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 572, 574 , 566 P.2d 121, 123 (Ct.App.1977); cf. O’Neel v. USAA Ins. 2003See, e.g., Pineda v. Grande Drilling Corp., 111 N.M. 536, 540 , 807 P.2d 234, 238 (Ct.App.1991); State v. Doe, 90 N.M. 572, 574 , 566 P.2d 121, 123 (Ct.App.1977); cf. O’Neel v. USAA Ins. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Pacheco
green
2 sentences2021Although the general public interest exception “should be used sparingly,” State v. Pacheco, 2007-NMSC- 009, ¶ 11, 141 N.M. 340 , 155 P.3d 745 , we invoke it here in order to provide guidance on the interpretation of administrative agency materials that are not promulgated pursuant to the State Rules Act. 2. 2021Although the general public interest exception “should be used sparingly,” State v. Pacheco, 2007-NMSC- 009, ¶ 11, 141 N.M. 340 , 155 P.3d 745 , we invoke it here in order to provide guidance on the interpretation of administrative agency materials that are not promulgated pursuant to the State Rules Act. 2. | 2 | 2010–2021 |
State v. Franklin
green
1 sentence2020Although we could overlook this omission under the exception to the preservation rule that allows for review of an unpreserved issue if the issue involves the general public interest, fundamental error, or the fundamental rights of a party, see Rule 12-321(B)(2); State v. Franklin, 2018-NMSC- 015, ¶ 10, 413 P.3d 861 (reviewing an unpreserved equal protection claim under the general public interest exception), Defendant does not attempt to show that this issue falls into any of those categories. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. JASON F.
green
2 sentences2020He thus waived this issue, see State v. Jason F., 1998-NMSC-010, ¶ 10 , 125 N.M. 111 , 957 P.2d 1145 (deeming a party’s objection waived where it was not raised in the children’s court and none of the preservation-rule exceptions were argued on appeal), and we will not review it. 2020He thus waived this issue, see State v. Jason F., 1998-NMSC-010, ¶ 10 , 125 N.M. 111 , 957 P.2d 1145 (deeming a party’s objection waived where it was not raised in the children’s court and none of the preservation-rule exceptions were argued on appeal), and we will not review it. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Dunleavy v. Miller
green
2 sentences2007Ry., 28 N.M. 581, 590 , 215 P. 971, 974 (1923) (holding that counsel waived any alleged error as to an interpreter’s presence during deliberations by waiting to object until after the interpreter entered the jury room), overruled on other grounds by Dunleavy v. Miller, 116 N.M. 353 , 356 n. 1, 862 P.2d 1212 , 1215 n. 1 (1993); cf. State v. Escamilla, 107 N.M. 510, 515 , 760 P.2d 1276, 1281 (1988) (finding that a defendant waives his right to trial by a fair and impartial jury by waiting to object to jury qualifications until after the verdict is rendered). {11} What remains is our discretion u 2007Ry., 28 N.M. 581, 590 , 215 P. 971, 974 (1923) (holding that counsel waived any alleged error as to an interpreter’s presence during deliberations by waiting to object until after the interpreter entered the jury room), overruled on other grounds by Dunleavy v. Miller, 116 N.M. 353 , 356 n. 1, 862 P.2d 1212 , 1215 n. 1 (1993); cf. State v. Escamilla, 107 N.M. 510, 515 , 760 P.2d 1276, 1281 (1988) (finding that a defendant waives his right to trial by a fair and impartial jury by waiting to object to jury qualifications until after the verdict is rendered). {11} What remains is our discretion u | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.