consider certain factors in New York

2004In determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) instructs the court to consider certain factors, including whether (1) an infant is involved, (2) the movant has demonstrated a reasonable excuse for failing to serve a timely notice of claim, (3) the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within 90 days from its accrual or a reasonable time thereafter, and (4) the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in maintaining its defense on the merits (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Matter of

2003In determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) instructs the court to consider certain factors, including whether (1) an infant is involved, (2) the movant has demonstrated a reasonable excuse for failing to serve a timely notice of claim, (3) the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within 90 days from its accrual or a reasonable time thereafter, and (4) the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in maintaining its defense on the merits (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Matter of

2011General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) requires the court to consider certain factors in determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, including whether (1) the petitioner demonstrated a reasonable excuse for failing to serve a timely notice of claim, (2) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within 90 days from its accrual or a reasonable time thereafter, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in maintaining a defense on the merits (see Matter of Wright v City of New York, 66 AD3d 1037 [2009]; Matte

2009General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) requires the court to consider certain factors in determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, including whether (1) the petitioner demonstrated a reasonable excuse for failing to serve a timely notice of claim, (2) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within 90 days from its accrual or a reasonable time thereafter, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in maintaining a defense on the merits (see Matter of Wright v City of New York, 66 AD3d 1037 [2009]; Matte

2011Protection, 66 AD3d 1027 [2009]; Matter of Korman v Bellmore Pub.

2009Protection, 66 AD3d 1027 [2009]; Matter of Korman v Bellmore Pub.

2007Ctr., 6 NY3d 531 [2006]; Matter of Ramirez v County of Nassau, 13 AD3d 456 [2004]; Matter of Flores v County of Nassau, 8 AD3d 377 [2004]).

2005General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) instructs the court to consider certain factors, including whether (1) an infant is involved, (2) the movant has demonstrated a reasonable excuse for failing to serve a timely notice of claim, (3) the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within 90 days from its accrual or a reasonable time thereafter, and (4) the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in maintaining its defense on the merits (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Matter of Ramirez v County of Nassau, 13 AD3d 456 [2004]; Matter of Flores v Coun

2005Ctr., 13 AD3d 363, 364 [2004]; Matter of Flores v County of Nassau, 8 AD3d 377 [2004]; Matter of Cotten v County of Nassau, 307 AD2d 965 [2003]).

2004In determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) instructs the court to consider certain factors, including whether (1) an infant is involved, (2) the movant has demonstrated a reasonable excuse for failing to serve a timely notice of claim, (3) the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within 90 days from its accrual or a reasonable time thereafter, and (4) the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in maintaining its defense on the merits (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Matter of

2002Here, the respondents did not demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the delay, in that there was no nexus between the injured respondent’s infancy and the delay in serving the notice (see Matter of Brown v County of Westchester, supra; Matter of Knightner v City of New York, 269 AD2d 397 ; Matter of Cuffee v City of New York, 255 AD2d 440 ).

2002The “infancy of the injured petitioner, standing alone, [does] not compel the granting of an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim” (Matter of Knightner v City of New York, 269 AD2d 397 ).

2023General Municipal Law § 50-e(5) requires the court to consider certain factors in determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, including whether (1) the petitioner demonstrated a reasonable excuse for failing to serve a timely notice of claim, (2) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within 90 days from its accrual or a reasonable time thereafter, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in maintaining a defense on the merits ( see id. ; Matter of D'Agostino v City of New York , 146 AD3d 880 ;

2023General Municipal Law § 50-e(5) requires the court to consider certain factors in determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, including whether (1) the petitioner demonstrated a reasonable excuse for failing to serve a timely notice of claim, (2) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within 90 days from its accrual or a reasonable time thereafter, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in maintaining a defense on the merits ( see id. ; Matter of D'Agostino v City of New York , 146 AD3d 880 ;

2023General Municipal Law § 50-e(5) requires the court to consider certain factors in determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, including whether (1) the petitioner demonstrated a reasonable excuse for failing to serve a timely notice of claim, (2) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within 90 days from its accrual or a reasonable time thereafter, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in maintaining a defense on the merits ( see id. ; Matter of D'Agostino v City of New York , 146 AD3d 880 ;

2007Ctr., 6 NY3d 531 [2006]; Matter of Ramirez v County of Nassau, 13 AD3d 456 [2004]; Matter of Flores v County of Nassau, 8 AD3d 377 [2004]).

2004General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) instructs the court to consider certain factors, including whether (1) an infant is involved, (2) the movant has demonstrated a reasonable excuse for failing to serve a timely notice of claim, (3) the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within 90 days from its accrual or a reasonable time thereafter, and (4) the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in maintaining its defense on the merits (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Matter of Flores v County of Nassau, 8 AD3d 377, 378 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 606

2003In determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) instructs the court to consider certain factors, including whether (1) an infant is involved, (2) the movant has demonstrated a reasonable excuse for failing to serve a timely notice of claim, (3) the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within 90 days from its accrual or a reasonable time thereafter, and (4) the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in maintaining its defense on the merits (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Matter of

2002In determining whether to grant an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim, General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) instructs the court to consider certain factors, including whether (1) the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days from its accrual or a reasonable time thereafter, (2) the claimant was an infant or was mentally or physically incapacitated, (3) the movant has demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the delay in serving a notice of claim, and (4) the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in maintaining

2002Here, the respondents did not demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the delay, in that there was no nexus between the injured respondent’s infancy and the delay in serving the notice (see Matter of Brown v County of Westchester, supra; Matter of Knightner v City of New York, 269 AD2d 397 ; Matter of Cuffee v City of New York, 255 AD2d 440 ).

2002In determining whether to grant an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim, General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) instructs the court to consider certain factors, including whether (1) the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days from its accrual or a reasonable time thereafter, (2) the claimant was an infant or was mentally or physically incapacitated, (3) the movant has demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the delay in serving a notice of claim, and (4) the delay would substantially prejudice the municipality in maintaining