second enumeration error in Georgia

2018State v. McNeill , 234 Ga. 696 , 217 S.E.2d 281 (1975).

2018State v. McNeill , 234 Ga. 696 , 217 S.E.2d 281 (1975).

1997The second enumeration of error was that the evidence was not sufficient to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). *561 The evidence showed that appellant in his description of the fictitious armed robbery of himself described, in great detail, how the armed robbery occurred on Padrone; appellant had possession of Padrone’s rental car, driver’s license, and check; appellant had been in the Navy and the perpetrator had told Padrone that he had served in the Navy; Padrone saw appellant with a gun, as did Cobb; Pa

1983Although not argued, we have considered the sufficiency of the evidence and find the requirements of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) were met.

2019At oral argument, AIKG confirmed that it had abandoned that enumeration. 2 Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U. S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). 3 Prior to the recess, the trial court heard arguments on AIKG's Batson challenge to Marshall's strikes, which the trial court denied. 4 Although the trial court referred to Juror 33, it appears that the trial court misspoke and meant to reference Juror 23. 5 In Georgia v. McCollum , 505 U.S. 42 , 112 S.Ct. 2348 , 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992), the United States Supreme Court extended Batson to challenges made by the government, and prohibited criminal d

2019At oral argument, AIKG confirmed that it had abandoned that enumeration. 2 Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U. S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). 3 Prior to the recess, the trial court heard arguments on AIKG's Batson challenge to Marshall's strikes, which the trial court denied. 4 Although the trial court referred to Juror 33, it appears that the trial court misspoke and meant to reference Juror 23. 5 In Georgia v. McCollum , 505 U.S. 42 , 112 S.Ct. 2348 , 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992), the United States Supreme Court extended Batson to challenges made by the government, and prohibited criminal d

2019At oral argument, AIKG confirmed that it had abandoned that enumeration. 2 Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U. S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). 3 Prior to the recess, the trial court heard arguments on AIKG's Batson challenge to Marshall's strikes, which the trial court denied. 4 Although the trial court referred to Juror 33, it appears that the trial court misspoke and meant to reference Juror 23. 5 In Georgia v. McCollum , 505 U.S. 42 , 112 S.Ct. 2348 , 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992), the United States Supreme Court extended Batson to challenges made by the government, and prohibited criminal d

2019At oral argument, AIKG confirmed that it had abandoned that enumeration. 2 Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U. S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). 3 Prior to the recess, the trial court heard arguments on AIKG's Batson challenge to Marshall's strikes, which the trial court denied. 4 Although the trial court referred to Juror 33, it appears that the trial court misspoke and meant to reference Juror 23. 5 In Georgia v. McCollum , 505 U.S. 42 , 112 S.Ct. 2348 , 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992), the United States Supreme Court extended Batson to challenges made by the government, and prohibited criminal d

2019McCarthy, who is pro se, has been particularly litigious following his divorce from Annie Ashment.1 In the present appeal, McCarthy raises 13 enumerations of error, which this Court will address in turn.2 For the following reasons, we affirm. 1 See McCarthy v. Ashment-McCarthy, 295 Ga. 231 ( 758 SE2d 306 ) (2014); McCarthy v. Ashment, 338 Ga. App. 858 ( 790 SE2d 651 ) (2016). 2 McCarthy identifies 13 numbered errors in his brief on appeal, however, he does not support the second enumeration of error by citation of authority or argument in the brief, nor by specific reference to the record or t

2019McCarthy, who is pro se, has been particularly litigious following his divorce from Annie Ashment.1 In the present appeal, McCarthy raises 13 enumerations of error, which this Court will address in turn.2 For the following reasons, we affirm. 1 See McCarthy v. Ashment-McCarthy, 295 Ga. 231 ( 758 SE2d 306 ) (2014); McCarthy v. Ashment, 338 Ga. App. 858 ( 790 SE2d 651 ) (2016). 2 McCarthy identifies 13 numbered errors in his brief on appeal, however, he does not support the second enumeration of error by citation of authority or argument in the brief, nor by specific reference to the record or t

2019McCarthy, who is pro se, has been particularly litigious following his divorce from Annie Ashment.1 In the present appeal, McCarthy raises 13 enumerations of error, which this Court will address in turn.2 For the following reasons, we affirm. 1 See McCarthy v. Ashment-McCarthy, 295 Ga. 231 ( 758 SE2d 306 ) (2014); McCarthy v. Ashment, 338 Ga. App. 858 ( 790 SE2d 651 ) (2016). 2 McCarthy identifies 13 numbered errors in his brief on appeal, however, he does not support the second enumeration of error by citation of authority or argument in the brief, nor by specific reference to the record or t

2019McCarthy, who is pro se, has been particularly litigious following his divorce from Annie Ashment.1 In the present appeal, McCarthy raises 13 enumerations of error, which this Court will address in turn.2 For the following reasons, we affirm. 1 See McCarthy v. Ashment-McCarthy, 295 Ga. 231 ( 758 SE2d 306 ) (2014); McCarthy v. Ashment, 338 Ga. App. 858 ( 790 SE2d 651 ) (2016). 2 McCarthy identifies 13 numbered errors in his brief on appeal, however, he does not support the second enumeration of error by citation of authority or argument in the brief, nor by specific reference to the record or t

2018Division 2 of Hightower , 224 Ga. App. at 704 -705 , 481 S.E.2d 867 , states, in its entirety, as follows: In the second enumeration of error, the appellant contends that "the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury that the state had the burden to prove that someone other than the appellant committed the crime." Pretermitting the fact that, in Division 1, this Court held the defendant did not present any evidence to raise the defense of alibi, it is only affirmative defenses that the state has the burden of disproving beyond a reasonable doubt.

2018Division 2 of Hightower , 224 Ga. App. at 704 -705 , 481 S.E.2d 867 , states, in its entirety, as follows: In the second enumeration of error, the appellant contends that "the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury that the state had the burden to prove that someone other than the appellant committed the crime." Pretermitting the fact that, in Division 1, this Court held the defendant did not present any evidence to raise the defense of alibi, it is only affirmative defenses that the state has the burden of disproving beyond a reasonable doubt.

2000“The superior court may issue an interlocutory injunction to maintain the status quo until a final hearing if, by balancing the relative equities of the parties, it would appear that the equities favor the party seeking the injunction. [Cits.]” Outdoor Advertising Assn. of Ga. v. Garden Club of Ga., 272 Ga. 146 (1) ( 527 SE2d 856 ) (2000).

2000“The superior court may issue an interlocutory injunction to maintain the status quo until a final hearing if, by balancing the relative equities of the parties, it would appear that the equities favor the party seeking the injunction. [Cits.]” Outdoor Advertising Assn. of Ga. v. Garden Club of Ga., 272 Ga. 146 (1) ( 527 SE2d 856 ) (2000).

1999Using the language of OCGA § 24-4-6, the trial court charged that “[t]o warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proven facts must not only be consistent with the theory of guilt, but must exclude every other reasonable theory other than the guilt of the accused.” Defendant argues that the use of the italicized phrase from the statute does not comport with the rationale of Robinson v. State, 261 Ga. 698 ( 410 SE2d 116 ), which is often cited for the rule announced therein that where the State’s case depends, in whole or in part, on circumstantial evidence, a charge on the law of ci

1999Using the language of OCGA § 24-4-6, the trial court charged that “[t]o warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proven facts must not only be consistent with the theory of guilt, but must exclude every other reasonable theory other than the guilt of the accused.” Defendant argues that the use of the italicized phrase from the statute does not comport with the rationale of Robinson v. State, 261 Ga. 698 ( 410 SE2d 116 ), which is often cited for the rule announced therein that where the State’s case depends, in whole or in part, on circumstantial evidence, a charge on the law of ci

1997OCGA §§ 40-5-55; 40-5-67.1; 40-5-153; 40-6-392 (a) (3); see Lufburrow v. State, 206 Ga. App. 250 ( 425 SE2d 368 ) (1992); Rawl v. State, supra; Modlin v. State, 176 Ga. App. 83 ( 335 SE2d 312 ) (1985); Huff v. State, 144 Ga. App. 764 ( 242 SE2d 361 ) (1978). “[T]he State has the right to have its test performed before the defendant’s right to take a test attaches because a refusal to take the test constitutes a waiver of the right to an independent test.” (Emphasis supplied.) State v. White, 188 Ga. App. 658, 659 ( 373 SE2d 840 ) (1988); accord Duckett v. State, 206 Ga. App. 651 ( 426 SE2d 271

1997OCGA §§ 40-5-55; 40-5-67.1; 40-5-153; 40-6-392 (a) (3); see Lufburrow v. State, 206 Ga. App. 250 ( 425 SE2d 368 ) (1992); Rawl v. State, supra; Modlin v. State, 176 Ga. App. 83 ( 335 SE2d 312 ) (1985); Huff v. State, 144 Ga. App. 764 ( 242 SE2d 361 ) (1978). “[T]he State has the right to have its test performed before the defendant’s right to take a test attaches because a refusal to take the test constitutes a waiver of the right to an independent test.” (Emphasis supplied.) State v. White, 188 Ga. App. 658, 659 ( 373 SE2d 840 ) (1988); accord Duckett v. State, 206 Ga. App. 651 ( 426 SE2d 271

1997OCGA §§ 40-5-55; 40-5-67.1; 40-5-153; 40-6-392 (a) (3); see Lufburrow v. State, 206 Ga. App. 250 ( 425 SE2d 368 ) (1992); Rawl v. State, supra; Modlin v. State, 176 Ga. App. 83 ( 335 SE2d 312 ) (1985); Huff v. State, 144 Ga. App. 764 ( 242 SE2d 361 ) (1978). “[T]he State has the right to have its test performed before the defendant’s right to take a test attaches because a refusal to take the test constitutes a waiver of the right to an independent test.” (Emphasis supplied.) State v. White, 188 Ga. App. 658, 659 ( 373 SE2d 840 ) (1988); accord Duckett v. State, 206 Ga. App. 651 ( 426 SE2d 271

1997OCGA §§ 40-5-55; 40-5-67.1; 40-5-153; 40-6-392 (a) (3); see Lufburrow v. State, 206 Ga. App. 250 ( 425 SE2d 368 ) (1992); Rawl v. State, supra; Modlin v. State, 176 Ga. App. 83 ( 335 SE2d 312 ) (1985); Huff v. State, 144 Ga. App. 764 ( 242 SE2d 361 ) (1978). “[T]he State has the right to have its test performed before the defendant’s right to take a test attaches because a refusal to take the test constitutes a waiver of the right to an independent test.” (Emphasis supplied.) State v. White, 188 Ga. App. 658, 659 ( 373 SE2d 840 ) (1988); accord Duckett v. State, 206 Ga. App. 651 ( 426 SE2d 271

1996See Spence v. Hilliard, 260 Ga. 107 , 389 S.E.2d 753 (1990); Jacobsen v. Haldi, 210 Ga.App. 817 , 437 S.E.2d 819 (1993).

1996See Spence v. Hilliard, 260 Ga. 107 , 389 S.E.2d 753 (1990); Jacobsen v. Haldi, 210 Ga.App. 817 , 437 S.E.2d 819 (1993).

1995This requirement that the contemnor be allowed to speak prior to summary imposition of punishment was incorporated into Georgia law by Dowdy v. Palmour, 251 Ga. 135 ( 304 SE2d 52 ), citing Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U. S. 488 (94 SC 2697, 41 LE2d 897).

1995This requirement that the contemnor be allowed to speak prior to summary imposition of punishment was incorporated into Georgia law by Dowdy v. Palmour, 251 Ga. 135 ( 304 SE2d 52 ), citing Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U. S. 488 (94 SC 2697, 41 LE2d 897).

1995This requirement that the contemnor be allowed to speak prior to summary imposition of punishment was incorporated into Georgia law by Dowdy v. Palmour, 251 Ga. 135 ( 304 SE2d 52 ), citing Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U. S. 488 (94 SC 2697, 41 LE2d 897).

1993However, covenants against competition in employment contracts are considered in partial restraint of trade, and they are enforceable if strictly limited in time and territorial effect, and if they are otherwise reasonable considering the business interests of the employer sought to be protected and the effect on the employee.’ [Cit.]” Koger Properties v. Adams-Cates Co., 247 Ga. 68 ( 274 SE2d 329 ) (1981).

1993However, covenants against competition in employment contracts are considered in partial restraint of trade, and they are enforceable if strictly limited in time and territorial effect, and if they are otherwise reasonable considering the business interests of the employer sought to be protected and the effect on the employee.’ [Cit.]” Koger Properties v. Adams-Cates Co., 247 Ga. 68 ( 274 SE2d 329 ) (1981).

1989Wright v. State, 253 Ga. 1 (3) ( 316 SE2d 445 ) (1984). 4.

1989Wright v. State, 253 Ga. 1 (3) ( 316 SE2d 445 ) (1984). 4.

1988Wyatt v. State, 179 Ga. App. 327 (1), 328 ( 346 SE2d 387 ). 3.

1988Wyatt v. State, 179 Ga. App. 327 (1), 328 ( 346 SE2d 387 ). 3.