Frye-Reed test in Maryland

2021Under prior state law, trial courts were required to consider whether an expert’s methods were “generally accepted” in the relevant scientific field under the Frye-Reed standard—named after Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.D.C. 1923), and Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 (1978)—as well as whether the expert’s testimony satisfied the criteria in Rule 5-702.

2021Under prior state law, trial courts were required to consider whether an expert’s methods were “generally accepted” in the relevant scientific field under the Frye-Reed standard—named after Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.D.C. 1923), and Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 (1978)—as well as whether the expert’s testimony satisfied the criteria in Rule 5-702.

2021Under prior state law, trial courts were required to consider whether an expert’s methods were “generally accepted” in the relevant scientific field under the Frye-Reed standard—named after Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.D.C. 1923), and Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 (1978)—as well as whether the expert’s testimony satisfied the criteria in Rule 5-702.

2021Under prior state law, trial courts were required to consider whether an expert’s methods were “generally accepted” in the relevant scientific field under the Frye-Reed standard—named after Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.D.C. 1923), and Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 (1978)—as well as whether the expert’s testimony satisfied the criteria in Rule 5-702.

2024In [Rochkind, 471 Md. at 1 ], the Supreme Court of Maryland held that all Maryland courts were to interpret Rule 5-702 according to the [Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 ] analysis in lieu of the previous[ly] prevailing Frye-Reed test.

2023Under the previous Frye-Reed standard, trial courts determined whether an expert’s methodology was “generally accepted in the scientific community.” Id. at 12–13, 236 A.3d at 637 ; Matthews, 479 Md. at 307 , 277 A.3d at 1008 (“[P]rior to . . .

2022As explained in Rochkind v. Stevenson, 471 Md. 1 (2020), the analytical gap issue in Blackwell “was whether the Frye-Reed test applied ‘to the analysis undertaken by an expert where the underlying data and methods for gathering this data are generally accepted in the scientific community but applied to support a novel theory’ of medical causation.” Id. at 17 (quoting Blackwell, 408 Md. at 596 ). 10 injuries and the accuracy of clinical neurosensory testing for nerve injuries, and a chapter from a textbook, Clinical Evaluation of Nerve Injuries.

2022As explained in Rochkind v. Stevenson, 471 Md. 1 (2020), the analytical gap issue in Blackwell “was whether the Frye-Reed test applied ‘to the analysis undertaken by an expert where the underlying data and methods for gathering this data are generally accepted in the scientific community but applied to support a novel theory’ of medical causation.” Id. at 17 (quoting Blackwell, 408 Md. at 596 ). 10 injuries and the accuracy of clinical neurosensory testing for nerve injuries, and a chapter from a textbook, Clinical Evaluation of Nerve Injuries.

2017In Wilson v. State, we- applied the Frye-Reed analysis to expert testimony opining that there was a one-in-four-million chance that both the defendant’s children had died from Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (“SIDS”). 370 Md. at 200 , 803 A.2d 1034 .

2017In Wilson v. State, we- applied the Frye-Reed analysis to expert testimony opining that there was a one-in-four-million chance that both the defendant’s children had died from Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (“SIDS”). 370 Md. at 200 , 803 A.2d 1034 .

2020For example, in Clemons v. State, we defined a Frye-Reed standard that “makes evidence emanating from a novel scientific process inadmissible absent a finding that the process is generally accepted by the relevant scientific community.” 392 Md. 339, 344, 365 (2006) (emphasis added).

2020For example, in Clemons v. State, we defined a Frye-Reed standard that “makes evidence emanating from a novel scientific process inadmissible absent a finding that the process is generally accepted by the relevant scientific community.” 392 Md. 339, 344, 365 (2006) (emphasis added).

2023Under the previous Frye-Reed standard, trial courts determined whether an expert’s methodology was “generally accepted in the scientific community.” Id. at 12–13, 236 A.3d at 637 ; Matthews, 479 Md. at 307 , 277 A.3d at 1008 (“[P]rior to . . .

2023Under the previous Frye-Reed standard, trial courts determined whether an expert’s methodology was “generally accepted in the scientific community.” Id. at 12–13, 236 A.3d at 637 ; Matthews, 479 Md. at 307 , 277 A.3d at 1008 (“[P]rior to . . .

2021As the State explains, § 10-915 was enacted to allow “DNA profile evidence to be admitted without reevaluation of the [DNA analysis] technique’s general reliability,” thereby obviating the need for a “Frye-Reed hearing to prove that the technique has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.” Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 57 (1996).22 Thus, Justice Thomas might well conclude that a report’s invocation of the 22 In Rochkind v. Stevenson, 471 Md. 1 (2020), we replaced the Frye-Reed framework with the Supreme Court’s standard for expert testimony admissibility under Daubert

2021As the State explains, § 10-915 was enacted to allow “DNA profile evidence to be admitted without reevaluation of the [DNA analysis] technique’s general reliability,” thereby obviating the need for a “Frye-Reed hearing to prove that the technique has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.” Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 57 (1996).22 Thus, Justice Thomas might well conclude that a report’s invocation of the 22 In Rochkind v. Stevenson, 471 Md. 1 (2020), we replaced the Frye-Reed framework with the Supreme Court’s standard for expert testimony admissibility under Daubert

2012Inc. v. Miller, 159 Md.App. 123, 187 , 858 A.2d 1025 (2004) (discussing what constitutes a "new and novel scientific technique” as contemplated by the Frye-Reed test); Carter v. Shoppers Food Warehouse, 126 Md.App. 147, 155 , 727 A.2d 958 (1999) (Frye-Reed test not relevant where testimony involved an opinion on safety measures, not a new and novel scientific technique). .

2012Inc. v. Miller, 159 Md.App. 123, 187 , 858 A.2d 1025 (2004) (discussing what constitutes a "new and novel scientific technique” as contemplated by the Frye-Reed test); Carter v. Shoppers Food Warehouse, 126 Md.App. 147, 155 , 727 A.2d 958 (1999) (Frye-Reed test not relevant where testimony involved an opinion on safety measures, not a new and novel scientific technique). .

2021Indeed, it would be a grave injustice were we to reverse the judgment and vacate the verdict, and then the trial court, after a Frye-Reed hearing, determined properly that [the expert’s] testimony was generally accepted within the scientific community.” Id. at 336 ; see also Abruquah v. State, 471 Md. 249, 250 (2020) (remanding “for the Circuit Court to consider whether, in light of [the Court of Appeals’] decision in Rochkind v. Stevenson, . . . the Circuit Court would reach a different conclusion concerning the admission of firearm and toolmark identification testimony . . . .”).

2021Indeed, it would be a grave injustice were we to reverse the judgment and vacate the verdict, and then the trial court, after a Frye-Reed hearing, determined properly that [the expert’s] testimony was generally accepted within the scientific community.” Id. at 336 ; see also Abruquah v. State, 471 Md. 249, 250 (2020) (remanding “for the Circuit Court to consider whether, in light of [the Court of Appeals’] decision in Rochkind v. Stevenson, . . . the Circuit Court would reach a different conclusion concerning the admission of firearm and toolmark identification testimony . . . .”).

2020Instead, in a footnote in the petition for a writ of certiorari, Petitioner stated that, if this Court replaced the Frye-Reed standard with the Daubert standard in Rochkind, here, “it could evaluate the reliability of the methodology using Daubert.” (Citing Savage v. State, 455 Md. 138 , 175 n.1, 166 A.3d 183 , 204 n.1 (2017) (Adkins, J., concurring)).

2020Instead, in a footnote in the petition for a writ of certiorari, Petitioner stated that, if this Court replaced the Frye-Reed standard with the Daubert standard in Rochkind, here, “it could evaluate the reliability of the methodology using Daubert.” (Citing Savage v. State, 455 Md. 138 , 175 n.1, 166 A.3d 183 , 204 n.1 (2017) (Adkins, J., concurring)).

2021Co. v. Chesson, 399 Md. 314 , 331–36 (2007), a trial court neglected to hold a Frye-Reed hearing, but because the issues of scientific acceptance and a method’s reliability were collateral to substantive trial issues, a limited remand under Rule 8-604(d) was appropriate.

2021Co. v. Chesson, 399 Md. 314 , 331–36 (2007), a trial court neglected to hold a Frye-Reed hearing, but because the issues of scientific acceptance and a method’s reliability were collateral to substantive trial issues, a limited remand under Rule 8-604(d) was appropriate.

1996In Keirsey , the Court of Special Appeals held that the Frye-Reed test was inapplicable to the methods of calculating population genetics statistics, stating that "the Frye-Reed test ... is applicable only when an essential component of the expert's opinion is a scientific test result ‘controlled by inexorable, physical laws.'” 106 Md.App. at 575 , 665 A.2d at 712 (quoting State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 98 , 517 A.2d 741, 745 (1986)).

1996In Keirsey , the Court of Special Appeals held that the Frye-Reed test was inapplicable to the methods of calculating population genetics statistics, stating that "the Frye-Reed test ... is applicable only when an essential component of the expert's opinion is a scientific test result ‘controlled by inexorable, physical laws.'” 106 Md.App. at 575 , 665 A.2d at 712 (quoting State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 98 , 517 A.2d 741, 745 (1986)).

2012We held that the court correctly declined to conduct a Frye-Reed hearing because Dr. Shoemaker performed “certain tests” that were “not so unorthodox that would warrant subjecting them to a Frye-Reed analysis____” Id. at 569 , 907 A.2d 873 .

2012We held that the court correctly declined to conduct a Frye-Reed hearing because Dr. Shoemaker performed “certain tests” that were “not so unorthodox that would warrant subjecting them to a Frye-Reed analysis____” Id. at 569 , 907 A.2d 873 .

2024In [Rochkind, 471 Md. at 1 ], the Supreme Court of Maryland held that all Maryland courts were to interpret Rule 5-702 according to the [Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 ] analysis in lieu of the previous[ly] prevailing Frye-Reed test.

2023In that decision, which was issued after Mr. Abruquah’s second conviction while his appeal was pending, we abandoned the Frye-Reed standard for admissibility of expert testimony in favor of the standard set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and its progeny.

2007In distinguishing the facts of Myers from a case that would invoke a Frye-Reed analysis, we explained that the fact that ‘exposure to asbestos may cause cancer ... is not a novel or controversial assertion, nor is it a conclusion personal to Dr. Schepers.’ Id. at 458, 594 A.2d 1248 .

2007In distinguishing the facts of Myers from a case that would invoke a Frye-Reed analysis, we explained that the fact that ‘exposure to asbestos may cause cancer ... is not a novel or controversial assertion, nor is it a conclusion personal to Dr. Schepers.’ Id. at 458, 594 A.2d 1248 .

2010The trial judge also concluded that the proffered testimony failed the Frye-Reed test 3 because the defense failed to present evidence showing that the expert testimony on eyewitness identification “has general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.” Id. at 179 , 512 A.2d at 1063 .

2010The trial judge also concluded that the proffered testimony failed the Frye-Reed test 3 because the defense failed to present evidence showing that the expert testimony on eyewitness identification “has general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.” Id. at 179 , 512 A.2d at 1063 .

2012See Wilson v. State, 370 Md. 191 , 201 n. 5, 803 A.2d 1034 (2002) (“Appellate review of a trial court’s decision regarding admissibility under Frye-Reed is de novo .... ”); see also Clemons v. State, 392 Md. 339, 364 , 896 A.2d 1059 (2006) (“If the trial court determines that the test is admissible, on appellate review, this Court must independently apply the Frye-Reed test to the scientific techniques at issue.”); Fleming v. State, 194 Md.App. 76, 100 (2010) (“This Court reviews de novo the admission of expert evidence under Frye-Reed.”) (emphasis added); Wagner v. State, 160 Md.App. 531, 547

2012See Wilson v. State, 370 Md. 191 , 201 n. 5, 803 A.2d 1034 (2002) (“Appellate review of a trial court’s decision regarding admissibility under Frye-Reed is de novo .... ”); see also Clemons v. State, 392 Md. 339, 364 , 896 A.2d 1059 (2006) (“If the trial court determines that the test is admissible, on appellate review, this Court must independently apply the Frye-Reed test to the scientific techniques at issue.”); Fleming v. State, 194 Md.App. 76, 100 (2010) (“This Court reviews de novo the admission of expert evidence under Frye-Reed.”) (emphasis added); Wagner v. State, 160 Md.App. 531, 547

2020Notably, in Stevenson I, id. at 295 , 164 A.3d at 265 , because we concluded that Dr. Hall-Carrington’s ADHD causation testimony should have been excluded under Maryland Rule 5-702, we declined to reach the issue of whether the circuit court should have held a Frye-Reed hearing as to Dr. Hall-Carrington’s general causation testimony.

2020Notably, in Stevenson I, id. at 295 , 164 A.3d at 265 , because we concluded that Dr. Hall-Carrington’s ADHD causation testimony should have been excluded under Maryland Rule 5-702, we declined to reach the issue of whether the circuit court should have held a Frye-Reed hearing as to Dr. Hall-Carrington’s general causation testimony.

2020App. 676, 707-08 , 182 A.3d 874, 892 , cert. denied, 460 Md. 1 , 188 A.3d 917 (2018): “[O]ur jurisprudence . . . has ‘drift[ed]’ toward the Daubert standard, in that the Court of Appeals 1) has used the Frye- Reed test ‘not only to evaluate scientific methods, but also to assess scientific conclusions’; and 2) has applied the Frye-Reed test to established, as well as novel, scientific methods.” (Quoting Savage v. State, 455 Md. 138, 187, 180-81 , 166 A.3d 183, 212, 208-09 (2017) (Adkins, J., concurring)) (second alteration in original). -3- In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987), th

2020App. 676, 707-08 , 182 A.3d 874, 892 , cert. denied, 460 Md. 1 , 188 A.3d 917 (2018): “[O]ur jurisprudence . . . has ‘drift[ed]’ toward the Daubert standard, in that the Court of Appeals 1) has used the Frye- Reed test ‘not only to evaluate scientific methods, but also to assess scientific conclusions’; and 2) has applied the Frye-Reed test to established, as well as novel, scientific methods.” (Quoting Savage v. State, 455 Md. 138, 187, 180-81 , 166 A.3d 183, 212, 208-09 (2017) (Adkins, J., concurring)) (second alteration in original). -3- In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987), th

2017In Dixon v. Ford Motor Co., 433 Md. 137 , 70 A.3d 328 (2013), for example, we stated that a Frye-Reed analysis is required “only when the proposed expert testimony involves a ‘novel scientific method.’ ” 5 Id. at 149-50 , 70 A.3d 328 .

2017In Dixon v. Ford Motor Co., 433 Md. 137 , 70 A.3d 328 (2013), for example, we stated that a Frye-Reed analysis is required “only when the proposed expert testimony involves a ‘novel scientific method.’ ” 5 Id. at 149-50 , 70 A.3d 328 .

2020Rochkind v. Stevenson, 229 Md.

2020Rochkind v. Stevenson, 229 Md.

2018See Kelley v. State, 288 Md. 298, 302 (1980) (applying Frye-Reed general acceptance test to hold that “testimony which directly or indirectly conveys the results of [a polygraph] test[] should not be admitted”); State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670 (1983) (applying Frye-Reed test to hold that expert opinion about -33- hypnotically enhanced witness testimony is inadmissible); U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 336 Md. 145 , 182–83 (1994) (applying Frye-Reed test to hold that surface dust sampling to determine asbestos contamination levels is a generally accepted technique); Schult

2008See also Montgomery Mutual Insurance Company v. Chesson, 399 Md. 314, 333 , 923 A.2d 939, 950 (2007) (holding that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a Frye-Reed hearing before admitting expert testimony on "sick building syndrome" in a workers' compensation matter); Aventis Pasteur, Inc. v. Skevofilax, 396 Md. 405 , 430 n. 18, 914 A.2d 113 , 128 n. 18 (2007) (noting that expert testimony on the link between vaccines and autism would have to pass the Frye-Reed test before it could be admitted into evidence); U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 336 Md. 145, 182 , 64

2018See Kelley v. State, 288 Md. 298, 302 (1980) (applying Frye-Reed general acceptance test to hold that “testimony which directly or indirectly conveys the results of [a polygraph] test[] should not be admitted”); State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670 (1983) (applying Frye-Reed test to hold that expert opinion about -33- hypnotically enhanced witness testimony is inadmissible); U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 336 Md. 145 , 182–83 (1994) (applying Frye-Reed test to hold that surface dust sampling to determine asbestos contamination levels is a generally accepted technique); Schult

1986Our own use of what we denominate as the Frye-Reed test has been confined to “voice-prints” in Reed and to hypnosis, State v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 681 , 464 A.2d 1028, 1034 (1983).