11 Ohio opinions name it 1 courts 1987–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Toney v. Berkemergreen2 sentences2026The granting of a default judgment “‘is a harsh remedy which should only be imposed when the actions of the faulting party create a presumption of willfulness or bad faith.’” Estate of Kuzda v. PRF Ents., 2017-Ohio-4185, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), quoting Toney v. Berkemer, 6 Ohio St.3d 455, 458 (1983). 2008The propriety of the sanction imposed should be evaluated after considering the history of the case, the facts and circumstances surrounding the noncompliance, including the number of opportunities and the length of time within which the faulting party had to comply with the discovery or the order to comply, what efforts were made to comply, the ability or inability of the faulting party to comply, and any other appropriate factors." Id. at ¶ 19, quoting Toney v. Berkemer (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 455 , 458-459 ; Russo v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. (1987), 36 Ohio App.3d 175 , 179 . | 1 | 2 |
Estate of Kuzda v. PRF Enters., Inc.green1 sentence2026The granting of a default judgment “‘is a harsh remedy which should only be imposed when the actions of the faulting party create a presumption of willfulness or bad faith.’” Estate of Kuzda v. PRF Ents., 2017-Ohio-4185, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), quoting Toney v. Berkemer, 6 Ohio St.3d 455, 458 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Whipple v. Estate of Prentissgreen1 sentence2026Likewise, in Lively v. Ruehlbach, 2023-Ohio-613 (8th Dist.), this court held that “‘the harsh remedy of dismissal with prejudice is reserved for cases in which a party has repeatedly, deliberately and without explanation, failed to comply with the trial court’s orders.’” Id. at ¶ 16, quoting Whipple v. Estate of Prentiss, 2020-Ohio-2825, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Russo v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
green
2 sentences2022However, the granting of a default judgment, analogous to the granting of a dismissal, is a harsh remedy that should only be imposed when “the actions of the faulting party create a presumption of willfulness or bad faith.” Russo v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 36 Ohio App.3d 175, 179 , 521 N.E.2d 1116 (9th Dist.1987). 2022However, the granting of a default judgment, analogous to the granting of a dismissal, is a harsh remedy that should only be imposed when “the actions of the faulting party create a presumption of willfulness or bad faith.” Russo v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 36 Ohio App.3d 175, 179 , 521 N.E.2d 1116 (9th Dist.1987). | 8 | 1990–2022 |
Lively v. Reulbach
green
1 sentence2026Likewise, in Lively v. Ruehlbach, 2023-Ohio-613 (8th Dist.), this court held that “‘the harsh remedy of dismissal with prejudice is reserved for cases in which a party has repeatedly, deliberately and without explanation, failed to comply with the trial court’s orders.’” Id. at ¶ 16, quoting Whipple v. Estate of Prentiss, 2020-Ohio-2825, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Haddad v. English
green
1 sentence2005Also, "the granting of a default judgment, analogous to the granting of a dismissal, is a harsh remedy that should be imposed only when `the actions of the faulting party create a presumption of willfulness or bad faith.'" Id. {¶ 10} "It is exclusively within the trial court's discretion to determine the particular sanction to be imposed for the particular infraction committed. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Nakoff v. Fairview General Hospital
green
1 sentence2000Hosp. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 254 , 256 , that "[i]t is well established that a trial court has broad discretion to impose sanctions against a party violating the discovery rules, and this court will not reverse the trial court's determination on this issue absent an abuse of discretion." This court further noted that "the granting of a default judgment * * * is a harsh remedy which should only be imposed when `the actions of the faulting party create a presumption of willfulness or bad faith.'" Fester at 2 , quoting Marten v. Casgar (June 30, 1994), Lake App. No. 93-L-115, unreported at 4, citi | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas
green
1 sentence1987Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas *180 (1909), 212 U.S. 322 , and Furcello v. Klammer (1980), 67 Ohio App. 2d 156 , 21 O.O. 3d 454, 426 N.E. 2d 187 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales, S. A. v. Rogers
green
1 sentence1987Although there are constitutional limits on the power of the trial court to dismiss an action, even in aid of its own valid purposes, Societe Internationale v. Rogers (1958), 357 U.S. 197, 209 , the use of the sanction of dismissal for a failure to comply with a discovery order has been held valid where the actions of the faulting party create a presumption of willfulness or bad faith. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Furcello v. Klammer
neutral
2 sentences1987Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas *180 (1909), 212 U.S. 322 , and Furcello v. Klammer (1980), 67 Ohio App. 2d 156 , 21 O.O. 3d 454, 426 N.E. 2d 187 . 1987Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas *180 (1909), 212 U.S. 322 , and Furcello v. Klammer (1980), 67 Ohio App. 2d 156 , 21 O.O. 3d 454, 426 N.E. 2d 187 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |