state hereby waives immunity in Ohio

2005In Reynolds v. State (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 68 , 14 OBR 506, 471 N.E.2d 776 , at paragraph one of the syllabus, however, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the state’s consent to be sued preserved the state’s immunity “for its legislative or judicial functions or the exercise of an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion.” Accordingly, with respect to actions of ODOT, Ohio courts have since held: “The issue of whether an act constitutes a mandatory duty or a discret

2005In Reynolds v. State (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 68 , 14 OBR 506, 471 N.E.2d 776 , at paragraph one of the syllabus, however, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the state’s consent to be sued preserved the state’s immunity “for its legislative or judicial functions or the exercise of an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion.” Accordingly, with respect to actions of ODOT, Ohio courts have since held: “The issue of whether an act constitutes a mandatory duty or a discret

2021The Ohio Supreme Court explained in Cleveland that “the classification of a claim for restitution as either equitable or legal depends on the traceability of the funds the plaintiff seeks to -5- recover.” Pivonka v. Corcoran, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3476 , __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 34, citing Cleveland at ¶ 11, 16 . {¶ 10} Mahle Behr’s and CPC Parts’ complaints each assert two claims.

2021The statutory waiver of immunity is broad: “The state hereby waives its immunity from liability * * * and consents to be sued, and have its liability determined, in the court of claims created in this chapter in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private parties * * *.” R.C. 2743.02(A)(1). {¶ 9} As a general matter, whether the Court of Claims or a court of common pleas has jurisdiction over a claim depends on “whether the claim is legal or equitable.” Cleveland, 159 Ohio St.3d 459 , 2020-Ohio-337 , 152 N.E.3d 172, at ¶ 10 .

2021The statutory waiver of immunity is broad: “The state hereby waives its immunity from liability * * * and consents to be sued, and have its liability determined, in the court of claims created in this chapter in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private parties * * *.” R.C. 2743.02(A)(1). {¶ 9} As a general matter, whether the Court of Claims or a court of common pleas has jurisdiction over a claim depends on “whether the claim is legal or equitable.” Cleveland, 159 Ohio St.3d 459 , 2020-Ohio-337 , 152 N.E.3d 172, at ¶ 10 .

2005In Reynolds v. State (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 68 , 14 OBR 506, 471 N.E.2d 776 , at paragraph one of the syllabus, however, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the state’s consent to be sued preserved the state’s immunity “for its legislative or judicial functions or the exercise of an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion.” Accordingly, with respect to actions of ODOT, Ohio courts have since held: “The issue of whether an act constitutes a mandatory duty or a discret

2005In Reynolds v. State (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 68 , 14 OBR 506, 471 N.E.2d 776 , at paragraph one of the syllabus, however, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the state’s consent to be sued preserved the state’s immunity “for its legislative or judicial functions or the exercise of an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion.” Accordingly, with respect to actions of ODOT, Ohio courts have since held: “The issue of whether an act constitutes a mandatory duty or a discret

2002Assn. v. Ohio Dept. of Human Services (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 97 , 103 , 579 N.E.2d 695 . {¶ 26} The Court of Claims has exclusive and original jurisdiction over all money suits brought against the State of Ohio: {¶ 27} "The court of claims is a court of record and has exclusive, original jurisdiction of all civil actions against the state permitted by the waiver of immunity contained in section 2743.02 of the Revised Code, * * *.

2002Assn. v. Ohio Dept. of Human Services (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 97 , 103 , 579 N.E.2d 695 . {¶ 26} The Court of Claims has exclusive and original jurisdiction over all money suits brought against the State of Ohio: {¶ 27} "The court of claims is a court of record and has exclusive, original jurisdiction of all civil actions against the state permitted by the waiver of immunity contained in section 2743.02 of the Revised Code, * * *.

1999No insurer or other person is entitled to bring a civil action under a *40 subrogation provision in an insurance or other contract against a state university or college with respect to such benefits.” (Emphasis added.) Relying on R.C. 3345.40(B)(2) and Patton v. Diemer (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 68 , 518 N.E.2d 941 , defendant contends that the Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs claim- against defendant.

1999No insurer or other person is entitled to bring a civil action under a *40 subrogation provision in an insurance or other contract against a state university or college with respect to such benefits.” (Emphasis added.) Relying on R.C. 3345.40(B)(2) and Patton v. Diemer (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 68 , 518 N.E.2d 941 , defendant contends that the Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs claim- against defendant.

1998Racing Guild of Ohio, Local 304 v. State Racing Comm. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 317 , 28 OBR 386, 503 N.E.2d 1025 .

1998R.C. 2743.02(A)(1) states: “The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and consents to be sued, and have its liability determined, in the court of claims created in this chapter and in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private parties * * This section goes on to state that “[t]o the extent that the state has previously consented to be sued, this chapter has no applicability.” Thus, “the Court of Claims was not to have exclusive, original jurisdiction over claims from which the state was not immune prior to the effective date of the Act.” Friedman v. Joh

1998R.C. 2743.02(A)(1) states: “The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and consents to be sued, and have its liability determined, in the court of claims created in this chapter and in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private parties * * This section goes on to state that “[t]o the extent that the state has previously consented to be sued, this chapter has no applicability.” Thus, “the Court of Claims was not to have exclusive, original jurisdiction over claims from which the state was not immune prior to the effective date of the Act.” Friedman v. Joh

1998Racing Guild of Ohio, Local 304 v. State Racing Comm. (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 317 , 28 OBR 386, 503 N.E.2d 1025 .

1986To the extent that the state has previously consented to be sued, this chapter has no applicability.” As interpreted by the Supreme Court, this statute “* * * does not create a new right of action against the state, but places the state upon the same level as any private party * * *.” McCord v. Div. of Parks & Recreation (1978), 54 Ohio St. 2d 72, at 74 , 8 O.O. 3d 77, at 79, 375 N.E. 2d 50, at 52 ; see, also, Devoe v. State (1975), 48 Ohio App. 2d 311 , 2 O.O. 3d 300, 357 N.E. 2d 396 .

1986To the extent that the state has previously consented to be sued, this chapter has no applicability.” As interpreted by the Supreme Court, this statute “* * * does not create a new right of action against the state, but places the state upon the same level as any private party * * *.” McCord v. Div. of Parks & Recreation (1978), 54 Ohio St. 2d 72, at 74 , 8 O.O. 3d 77, at 79, 375 N.E. 2d 50, at 52 ; see, also, Devoe v. State (1975), 48 Ohio App. 2d 311 , 2 O.O. 3d 300, 357 N.E. 2d 396 .

1984Co. v. Eriksson Engineering Ltd. (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 31 , at paragraph two of the syllabus, states in pertinent part: “* * * no tort action will lie against a municipal corporation for those acts or omissions involving the exercise of a legislative or judicial function or the exercise of an executive or planning function involving the making of a basic policy decision which is characterized by the exercise of a high degree of official judgment or discretion.