11 Oregon opinions name it 1 courts 1983–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Armatta v. Kitzhabergreen1 sentence2019See Armatta, 327 Or at 287-88 (focusing on vindication of important rights applying to all citizens as opposed to “vindicating individualized and different inter- ests” or any pecuniary or special interest of the plaintiff’s own “aside from that shared with the public at large” (inter- nal quotation marks and citations omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Patton v. Yountgreen1 sentence2005Id. at 1029, 1038-39 . | 1 | 1 |
Guard Publishing Co. v. Lane County School District No. 4Jgreen2 sentences1997See Guard *91 Publishing Company Co. v. Lane County School Dist., 310 Or 32 , 791 P2d 854 (1990).” (Emphasis defendant’s.) Plaintiffs respond that revealing that an employee has been absent on sick leave for more than 240 hours is a disclosure of personal information that either the employee or a loved one has been ill and that, in our society, such information is considered private. 1997See Guard *91 Publishing Company Co. v. Lane County School Dist., 310 Or 32 , 791 P2d 854 (1990).” (Emphasis defendant’s.) Plaintiffs respond that revealing that an employee has been absent on sick leave for more than 240 hours is a disclosure of personal information that either the employee or a loved one has been ill and that, in our society, such information is considered private. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Coopergreen1 sentence1996Accord [State v.] Cooper, 78 Or App [237, 241-42, 715 P2d 504 (1986)].” (Emphasis defendant’s.) Defendant contends that, because the indictment here does not allege the relationship among the predicate offenses, one cannot tell whether the state intends to prove that relationship by showing “one, or all six, or on some number in between.” The state responds that defendant’s reasoning is not supported by legal authority. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Romig
green
2 sentences1996It argues that the indictment, meets the criteria set forth in case law interpreting ORICO: The statutory language sufficiently apprises defendant of the offense, see State v. Vermaas, 116 Or App 413, 417 , 841 P2d 664 (1992), rev den 316 Or 142 (1993) (rejecting argument that indictment that provided details of predicate offenses was insufficient to apprise defendant of “unlawful enterprise”); it alleges the predicate offenses with particularity, State v. Romig, 73 Or App 780, 788-89 , 700 P2d 293 , rev den 299 Or 663 (1985), and it tracks the language of the ORICO statute. 1996It argues that the indictment, meets the criteria set forth in case law interpreting ORICO: The statutory language sufficiently apprises defendant of the offense, see State v. Vermaas, 116 Or App 413, 417 , 841 P2d 664 (1992), rev den 316 Or 142 (1993) (rejecting argument that indictment that provided details of predicate offenses was insufficient to apprise defendant of “unlawful enterprise”); it alleges the predicate offenses with particularity, State v. Romig, 73 Or App 780, 788-89 , 700 P2d 293 , rev den 299 Or 663 (1985), and it tracks the language of the ORICO statute. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Vermaas
green
2 sentences1996It argues that the indictment, meets the criteria set forth in case law interpreting ORICO: The statutory language sufficiently apprises defendant of the offense, see State v. Vermaas, 116 Or App 413, 417 , 841 P2d 664 (1992), rev den 316 Or 142 (1993) (rejecting argument that indictment that provided details of predicate offenses was insufficient to apprise defendant of “unlawful enterprise”); it alleges the predicate offenses with particularity, State v. Romig, 73 Or App 780, 788-89 , 700 P2d 293 , rev den 299 Or 663 (1985), and it tracks the language of the ORICO statute. 1996It argues that the indictment, meets the criteria set forth in case law interpreting ORICO: The statutory language sufficiently apprises defendant of the offense, see State v. Vermaas, 116 Or App 413, 417 , 841 P2d 664 (1992), rev den 316 Or 142 (1993) (rejecting argument that indictment that provided details of predicate offenses was insufficient to apprise defendant of “unlawful enterprise”); it alleges the predicate offenses with particularity, State v. Romig, 73 Or App 780, 788-89 , 700 P2d 293 , rev den 299 Or 663 (1985), and it tracks the language of the ORICO statute. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Schultz v. City of Grants Pass
green
2 sentences1995And, to the extent that they are unconstitutional, such exactions cannot be competent evidence in a jury trial to determine just compensation.” (Emphasis defendants.) Defendants also rely on our decision in Schultz v. City of Grants Pass, 131 Or App 220 , 884 P2d 569 (1994). 1995And, to the extent that they are unconstitutional, such exactions cannot be competent evidence in a jury trial to determine just compensation.” (Emphasis defendants.) Defendants also rely on our decision in Schultz v. City of Grants Pass, 131 Or App 220 , 884 P2d 569 (1994). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Faber v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co.
green
1 sentence1994The herbicide labels could have been received subject to the condition the plaintiffs later prove that a violation of the labels’ directives caused [the plaintiffs’] damage.’ (Emphasis defendant’s.)” 106 Or App at 607 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Chiles v. Robertson
green
2 sentences1991Consequently, plaintiffs’ claim for breach of fiduciary duty against these defendants, acting as shareholders of CDS, was properly dismissed.” (Emphasis defendants’.) We agree with defendants that only an individual or a small group of shareholders who own a majority of the voting shares, or shareholders who, for other reasons, have domination or control, owe fiduciary obligations to the minority. 2 See Zidell v. Zidell, Inc. (24128), 277 Or 413, 418 , 560 P2d 1086 (1977), and authorities there cited; Chiles v. Robertson, 94 Or App 604, 619-23 , 767 P2d 903 , modified 96 Or App 658 , 774 P2d 5 1991Consequently, plaintiffs’ claim for breach of fiduciary duty against these defendants, acting as shareholders of CDS, was properly dismissed.” (Emphasis defendants’.) We agree with defendants that only an individual or a small group of shareholders who own a majority of the voting shares, or shareholders who, for other reasons, have domination or control, owe fiduciary obligations to the minority. 2 See Zidell v. Zidell, Inc. (24128), 277 Or 413, 418 , 560 P2d 1086 (1977), and authorities there cited; Chiles v. Robertson, 94 Or App 604, 619-23 , 767 P2d 903 , modified 96 Or App 658 , 774 P2d 5 | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Chiles v. Robertson
green
2 sentences1991Consequently, plaintiffs’ claim for breach of fiduciary duty against these defendants, acting as shareholders of CDS, was properly dismissed.” (Emphasis defendants’.) We agree with defendants that only an individual or a small group of shareholders who own a majority of the voting shares, or shareholders who, for other reasons, have domination or control, owe fiduciary obligations to the minority. 2 See Zidell v. Zidell, Inc. (24128), 277 Or 413, 418 , 560 P2d 1086 (1977), and authorities there cited; Chiles v. Robertson, 94 Or App 604, 619-23 , 767 P2d 903 , modified 96 Or App 658 , 774 P2d 5 1991Consequently, plaintiffs’ claim for breach of fiduciary duty against these defendants, acting as shareholders of CDS, was properly dismissed.” (Emphasis defendants’.) We agree with defendants that only an individual or a small group of shareholders who own a majority of the voting shares, or shareholders who, for other reasons, have domination or control, owe fiduciary obligations to the minority. 2 See Zidell v. Zidell, Inc. (24128), 277 Or 413, 418 , 560 P2d 1086 (1977), and authorities there cited; Chiles v. Robertson, 94 Or App 604, 619-23 , 767 P2d 903 , modified 96 Or App 658 , 774 P2d 5 | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Zidell v. Zidell, Inc.
green
2 sentences1991Consequently, plaintiffs’ claim for breach of fiduciary duty against these defendants, acting as shareholders of CDS, was properly dismissed.” (Emphasis defendants’.) We agree with defendants that only an individual or a small group of shareholders who own a majority of the voting shares, or shareholders who, for other reasons, have domination or control, owe fiduciary obligations to the minority. 2 See Zidell v. Zidell, Inc. (24128), 277 Or 413, 418 , 560 P2d 1086 (1977), and authorities there cited; Chiles v. Robertson, 94 Or App 604, 619-23 , 767 P2d 903 , modified 96 Or App 658 , 774 P2d 5 1991Consequently, plaintiffs’ claim for breach of fiduciary duty against these defendants, acting as shareholders of CDS, was properly dismissed.” (Emphasis defendants’.) We agree with defendants that only an individual or a small group of shareholders who own a majority of the voting shares, or shareholders who, for other reasons, have domination or control, owe fiduciary obligations to the minority. 2 See Zidell v. Zidell, Inc. (24128), 277 Or 413, 418 , 560 P2d 1086 (1977), and authorities there cited; Chiles v. Robertson, 94 Or App 604, 619-23 , 767 P2d 903 , modified 96 Or App 658 , 774 P2d 5 | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Pitman v. Bump
green
2 sentences1991Defendant cites McLaughlin v. Hoover, 1 Or. 31 (1853), for the proposition that a "new statute applies if the plaintiff/petitioner actually had a reasonable period after the effective date in which to file the action." (Emphasis defendant's.) First, as defendant appears to concede, later cases, including Reynolds Metals Co. v. State Tax Comm., supra ; Fullerton v. Lamm, supra ; and Pitman v. Bump, supra , have rendered McLaughlin an "historical curiosity." In any event, the case is distinguishable. 1991Defendant cites McLaughlin v. Hoover, 1 Or 31 (1853), for the proposition that a “new statute applies if the plaintiff/petitioner actually had a reasonable period after the effective date in which to file the action.” (Emphasis defendant’s.) First, as defendant appears to concede, later cases, including Reynolds Metals Co. v. State Tax Comm., supra; Fullerton v. Lamm, supra; and Pitman v. Bump, supra, have rendered McLaughlin an “historical curiosity.” In any event, the case is distinguishable. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
McLaughlin v. Hoover
green
2 sentences1991Defendant cites McLaughlin v. Hoover, 1 Or. 31 (1853), for the proposition that a "new statute applies if the plaintiff/petitioner actually had a reasonable period after the effective date in which to file the action." (Emphasis defendant's.) First, as defendant appears to concede, later cases, including Reynolds Metals Co. v. State Tax Comm., supra ; Fullerton v. Lamm, supra ; and Pitman v. Bump, supra , have rendered McLaughlin an "historical curiosity." In any event, the case is distinguishable. 1991Defendant cites McLaughlin v. Hoover, 1 Or 31 (1853), for the proposition that a “new statute applies if the plaintiff/petitioner actually had a reasonable period after the effective date in which to file the action.” (Emphasis defendant’s.) First, as defendant appears to concede, later cases, including Reynolds Metals Co. v. State Tax Comm., supra; Fullerton v. Lamm, supra; and Pitman v. Bump, supra, have rendered McLaughlin an “historical curiosity.” In any event, the case is distinguishable. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
School District No. 1 v. Multnomah County
green
1 sentence1987No. 1 v. Multnomah County, supra, 9 OTR at 377 .] An obvious flaw in this approach, not discussed by the court, is the presence of the word ‘particular’; there could hardly be a clearer indication that the Legislature intended that ‘municipal corporation’ not be pluralized.” (Emphasis defendants’.) With or without the rule of construction which the tax court employed, there is little to be said for defendants’ argument. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
B & D Investment Corp. v. Petticord
green
2 sentences1983However, as defendants note: “The plaintiff may proceed on quantum meruit or implied contract only if the complaint states a cause of action for labor performed or materials supplied. * * *” (Emphasis defendants’.) See B&D Investment v. Petticord, 48 Or App 345, 348 , 617 P2d 276 , rev den 290 Or 302 (1980), and authorities there cited. 1983However, as defendants note: “The plaintiff may proceed on quantum meruit or implied contract only if the complaint states a cause of action for labor performed or materials supplied. * * *” (Emphasis defendants’.) See B&D Investment v. Petticord, 48 Or App 345, 348 , 617 P2d 276 , rev den 290 Or 302 (1980), and authorities there cited. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Deras v. Myers
green
1 sentence1983Instead, Article I, section 8 supports a higher standard than the minimum standard of negligence required by Gertz.” (Emphasis defendants.) Deras v. Myers, supra, and State v. Robertson, supra, dealt with the constitutionality of statutes prohibiting or criminalizing communicative activity. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.