name-clearing hearing in New York

2017Petitioner was not entitled to a name-clearing hearing because, as the petitioner conceded, she did not allege dissemination or likely dissemination of the allegedly false charge of infliction of excessive corporal punishment on a student (see Matter of Swinton v Safir, 93 NY2d 758, 763-765 [1999]).

2016Petitioner was not entitled to a name-clearing hearing because she presented no evidence to refute the statements of respondent’s director of employee relations that the code placed on petitioner’s file was for internal use only, and therefore she failed to show a likelihood of dissemination of the stigmatizing material (see Matter of Swinton v Safir, 93 NY2d 758, 764-765 [1999]).

2012The expiration of the petitioners’ terms of office does not, however, preclude the petitioners from exercising their right to seek a name-clearing hearing upon a showing that Fitzpatrick created and disseminated a false and defamatory impression about them in connection with their removal (see Matter of Lentlie v Egan, 61 NY2d 874, 875 [1984]).

2012The expiration of the petitioners’ terms of office does not, however, preclude the petitioners from exercising their right to seek a name-clearing hearing upon a showing that Fitzpatrick created and disseminated a false and defamatory impression about them in connection with their removal (see Matter of Lentlie v Egan, 61 NY2d 874, 875 [1984]).

2010It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, the petition is granted, and the matter is remitted to Supreme Court, Monroe County, for further proceedings in accordance with the following memorandum: Petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 seeking, inter alia, a judgment directing respondents to hold a name-clearing hearing with respect to allegations associated with the termination of petitioner from his probationary position with respondent school district (see generally Board of Regents of State Colleges v

1987Although the petitioner alleged a deprivation of liberty, she has not requested a name-clearing hearing (see, Board of Regents v Roth, supra), and has failed to allege facts sufficient to show that she is entitled to such a hearing (see, Bishop v Wood, supra; Mitchell v Town Bd., supra).

1999Order modified, etc. * The sole purpose of a name-clearing hearing is to afford the employee an opportunity to prove that the stigmatizing material in the personnel file is false (see, Codd v Velger, 429 US 624, 627-628 ).

1984(Morgan Servs. v Lavan Corp., 59 NY2d 796 .) With regard to petitioner’s claim for a name-clearing hearing, “[o]nly if the [public] employer creates and disseminates a false and defamatory impression about the employee in connection with his termination is such a hearing required.” (Codd v Velger, 429 US 624, 628 [emphasis added]; see, also, Matter of Thomas v New York Temporary State Comm, on Regulation of Lobbying, 56 NY2d 656 .) While the law of defamation requires but one communication to a single person (Ostrowe v Lee, 256 NY 36, 38 ), a discharged employee’s entitlement to a due process

1998Petitioner has also failed to establish his entitlement to a name-clearing hearing (see, Bishop v Wood, 426 US 341 ; Matter of Lentlie v Egan, 61 NY2d 874 ).

1987Although the petitioner alleged a deprivation of liberty, she has not requested a name-clearing hearing (see, Board of Regents v Roth, supra), and has failed to allege facts sufficient to show that she is entitled to such a hearing (see, Bishop v Wood, supra; Mitchell v Town Bd., supra).

2008Petitioner, a probationary employee who was terminable without a hearing and without a statement of the reason for his dismissal, failed to demonstrate that his termination was in bad faith, unlawful, or for an impermissible reason (see Matter of York v McGuire, 63 NY2d 760 [1984]; Matter of Johnson v Kelly, 35 AD3d 297 [2006]).

2007Since the petitioner was a provisional employee, she could be demoted to her former position of associate staff analyst, without a hearing, in the absence of a showing that her demotion was in bad faith, or for a constitutionally impermissible purpose, or otherwise in violation of law (see Matter of Swinton v Safir, 93 NY2d 758, 762-763 [1999]; Matter of Preddice v Callanan, 69 NY2d 812 [1987]; Matter of York v McGuire, 63 NY2d 760, 761 [1984]; Matter of Smith v Kingsboro Psychiatric Ctr. [KPC], 35 AD3d 751, 751-752 [2006]; Matter of Miggins v City of New York, 286 AD2d 258 [2001]).

1998We also agree with the court that petitioner was not entitled to a name-clearing hearing since she failed to allege public dissemination of the reasons for her termination (see, Matter of Thomas v New York Temporary State Commn. on Regulation of Lobbying, 56 NY2d 656 ).

1995The plaintiff has failed to allege public dissemination, and has thus failed to state a cause of action for a name-clearing hearing (see, Matter of Thomas v New York Temporary State Comm. on Regulation of Lobbying, 56 NY2d 656, 658-659 ; Supan v Michelfeld, 97 AD2d 755 ).

2013While a plaintiff must establish that the defamatory statement was made public (see generally Guerra v Jones, 421 Fed Appx at 18 ), actual dissemination is not required to trigger his or her right to a name-clearing hearing; the Court of Appeals has held that a likelihood of dissemination is sufficient (see Matter of Swinton v Safir, 93 NY2d at 765 ; see generally People v David W., 95 NY2d 130, 137-138 [2000]).

2013While a plaintiff must establish that the defamatory statement was made public (see generally Guerra v Jones, 421 Fed Appx at 18 ), actual dissemination is not required to trigger his or her right to a name-clearing hearing; the Court of Appeals has held that a likelihood of dissemination is sufficient (see Matter of Swinton v Safir, 93 NY2d at 765 ; see generally People v David W., 95 NY2d 130, 137-138 [2000]).

2002Their argument was that three Federal Circuit Courts insisted upon actual public disclosure: Ortega-Rosario v Alvarado-Ortiz (917 F2d 71, 74-75 [1st Cir 1990]), Copeland v Philadelphia Police Dept. (840 F2d 1139, 1148 [3d Cir 1988]), and Olivieri v Rodriguez ( 122 F3d 406, 408 [7th Cir 1997]).

1999Three Circuits have insisted upon actual public disclosure before a discharged employee’s liberty interest in a name-clearing hearing can be invoked (see, Ortega-Rosario v Alvarado-Ortiz, 917 F2d 71, 74-75 [1st Cir]; Copeland v Philadelphia Police Dept., 840 F2d 1139, 1148 [3d Cir]; Olivieri v Rodriguez, 122 F3d 406, 408 [7th Cir]).

1995It is well settled that there is no entitlement to a name-clearing hearing where there has been no public disclosure of any allegations affecting the plaintiff’s good name or reputation (Matter of Bonacci v Quinones, 124 AD2d 659 ; Matter of Lentlie v Egan, 61 NY2d 874 ; Matter of Petix v Connelie, 47 NY2d 457 ).

1984Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to a name-clearing hearing, inasmuch as the reason for dismissal was not of a stigmatizing nature (Matter of Petix v Connelie, 47 NY2d 457 ).

1983Since petitioner failed to show that he has been stigmatized or that adverse recommendations have been made to future employers, there is no entitlement to a name-clearing hearing (see Matter of Lentlie v Egan, 94 AD2d 839 , supra; Matter of Carter v Murphy, 80 AD2d 960, 961 ).

1981Similarly, while petitioner asserted that his “termination has reflected adversely on his reputation and position as an attorney” and “done substantial damage to his career both as a lawyer and government employee”, he failed to allege public dissemination by respondents of the reasons for his dismissal and this failure was fatal to his claim for a name-clearing hearing (cf. Prasad v Merges, 65 AD2d 663 , app dsmd 46 NY2d 939 , cert den 444 US 861 ; see, also, Matter of Carter v Murphy, 80 AD2d 960 ).

2007Further, the petitioner failed to demonstrate his entitlement to a name-clearing hearing (see Matter of Swinton v Safir, 93 NY2d 758, 763 [1999]; Matter of Rivera v Department of Educ., City of N.Y., 25 AD3d 559, 560 [2006]; Matter of Cardo v Murphy, 104 AD2d 884, 885 [1984]).

2006Further, she failed to demonstrate entitlement to a name-clearing hearing (see Matter of Swinton v Safir, 93 NY2d 758 [1999]; Matter of Cardo v Murphy, supra).

2023Plaintiff's request for a name-clearing hearing is unpreserved for our review, as she failed to request such a hearing in her article 78 petition, before Supreme Court, or in opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss ( see Matter of Ragone v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y. , 194 AD2d 731, 732 [2d Dept 1993]).

2015We dismiss defendants’ appeals from both Supreme Court’s order modifying the proposed judgment and its order partially granting defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict because the right to appeal from those interlocutory orders terminated upon entry of the final judgments (see Doherty v Schuyler Hills, Inc., 55 AD3d 1174, 1175 [2008]; Dubray v Pratt, 283 AD2d 869, 869 [2001]).

2015School Dist., 75 AD3d 1166, 1167 [2010] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see 107 AD3d at 1131).

2015Thereafter, certain of plaintiff’s causes of action were dismissed upon defendants’ motion to dismiss ( 74 AD3d 1558 [2010]), defendants were granted partial summary judgment dismissing additional causes of action and this Court converted the federal due process cause of action into a CPLR article 78 proceeding ( 107 AD3d 1127 [2013]).

2015School Dist., 75 AD3d 1166, 1167 [2010] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see 107 AD3d at 1131).

2015We dismiss defendants’ appeals from both Supreme Court’s order modifying the proposed judgment and its order partially granting defendants’ motion to set aside the verdict because the right to appeal from those interlocutory orders terminated upon entry of the final judgments (see Doherty v Schuyler Hills, Inc., 55 AD3d 1174, 1175 [2008]; Dubray v Pratt, 283 AD2d 869, 869 [2001]).

2010Furthermore, in the absence of any evidence or, indeed, any allegation by respondents that special circumstances would render an award of attorney’s fees unjust, we further agree with petitioner that the court should have granted that part of the petition seeking reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 USC § 1988 (b) (see generally Matter of Johnson v Blum, 58 NY2d 454, 457-458 [1983]).