newly-discovered facts exception in Pennsylvania

2026In Bennett, for example, we held that the Superior Court erred by relying upon Yarris to require a petitioner to establish the merits of the underlying claim in order to establish the newly discovered facts exception.97 We held that none of the requirements of the underlying after-discovered evidence claim, including consideration of the impact of the evidence had it been introduced, “exist in § 9545(b)(1)(ii).”98 A petitioner’s satisfaction of the newly discovered facts exception does not in any way depend upon the merits of the underlying claim. 99 96 Id. at 592. 97 Bennett, 930 A.2d at 1271

2026Id. at 1271-72. 98 Id. at 1271 (“While the additional requirements [of Section 9543(a)(2)(vi)] are consistent with a Brady claim, . . . none of these requirements exist in § 9545(b)(1)(ii).”). 99 Id. [J-56-2025] - 33 The newly discovered facts exception “is not so narrow as to limit itself to only claims involving ‘after-discovered evidence.’”100 A petitioner may satisfy the timeliness exception even if his or her underlying, substantive claim turns out to be meritless.

2025However, these are distinct analyses; our Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that “the newly-discovered facts exception to the time limitations of the PCRA, as set forth in [Section] 9545(b)(1)(ii), is distinct from the after-discovered evidence basis for relief delineated in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2).” Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017).

2025Our Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that “the newly-discovered facts exception to the time limitations of the PCRA, as set forth in [Section] 9545(b)(1)(ii), is distinct from the after-discovered evidence basis for relief delineated in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2).” Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017).

2025Abraham, Office before I was tried for murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.” Id. at 4. -4- J-S19040-25 The newly-discovered facts exception requires the petitioner “to demonstrate he did not know the facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015).

2023Compare Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1272 (Pa. 2007) (remanding for a hearing where the PCRA petition included details of the facts that were unknown to the petitioner and what specific steps he took to learn them), with Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 178 (Pa.Super. 2015) (affirming dismissal of petition without a hearing where the petitioner failed to allege how he exercised due diligence). - 10 - J-S42006-22 Accordingly, the PCRA court properly ruled that Appellant’s petition failed to sufficiently allege the newly-discovered-facts exception to the PCRA’s one-year time bar.

2025See Cox, supra; Boyd, supra. After a careful review of the petition, amended petitions, responses, and hearings in this matter, we are constrained to conclude that the PCRA court erred in determining that Yates had satisfied the newly-discovered facts exception.

2024See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221, 227 (Pa. 2016). -4- J-S16007-24 On appeal, Appellant argues that the instant petition is timely under the newly-discovered facts exception, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).

2025To satisfy the requirements of the newly discovered facts exception, a petitioner must establish that “there were ‘facts’ that were ‘unknown’ to him and that he could not have ascertained those facts by the exercise of ‘due diligence.’ The focus of the exception is on the newly discovered facts, not on -9- J-S30044-25 a newly discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.” Marshall, 947 A.2d at 720 (citations, brackets, and some quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original).

2025Our Supreme Court has explained that the newly discovered facts exception “focuses on facts, not on a newly[]discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.” Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 721 (Pa. 2008) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

2023Thus, the information Appellant attempts now to proffer is more than 40 years old and cannot qualify as newly - 10 - J-S36014-22 discovered facts to establish a timeliness exception to the PCRA.7 To the extent Appellant believes that Small itself constitutes a “fact” for purposes of the newly-discovered facts exception, our caselaw also does not support Appellant’s argument, as “subsequent decisional law does not amount to a new “fact” under section 9545(b)(1)(ii) of the PCRA.” See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 987 (Pa. 2011).

2022In this limited circumstance, where previous PCRA counsel’s ineffective assistance constituted a “fact” for purposes of the newly-discovered fact exception, the Bennett Court explained, the petitioner was still required to “prove that the facts were ‘unknown’ to him and that he could not uncover them with the exercise of ‘due diligence’.” Id. at 1274 ; see also Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 984 (Pa. 2011) (stating, “when a petitioner claims he was abandoned on appeal by former counsel, he may successfully invoke [the newly-discovered facts exception pursuant to Section] 9545(b)(1)(ii) if

2026It is well-established that, except in limited circumstances where counsel’s ineffectiveness resulted in a complete deprivation of appellate review, “counsel’s ineffectiveness may not be invoked as a newly-discovered ‘fact’ for purpose of invoking the [Section] 9545(b)(1)(ii) exception.” Commonwealth v. Peterson, 192 A.3d 1123, 1129 (Pa. 2018), citing Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780 (Pa. 2000) and its progeny; see also Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1273 (Pa. 2007).16 Pennsylvania jurisprudence addressing ineffective assistance of __________________________________________

2024Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780 , 785 (Pa. 2000) (holding that, an ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel claim layered on top of a claim involving trial counsel’s ineffectiveness does not satisfy the newly-discovered facts exception to the PCRA jurisdictional time-bar); see also Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178 , 186 (Pa. 2016) (stating that, couching a petitioner’s claim in terms of ineffectiveness will not save an ____________________________________________ 22 Section 9545(b)(1)(i) provides a timeliness exception when a petitioner establishes that “the failure to raise th

2021See Shannon, supra; see also Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (stating that a newly willing source for previously known facts cannot satisfy the newly-discovered facts exception).

2020See Commonwealth v. Shannon, 184 A.3d 1010, 1017 (Pa. Super. 2018) (discussing Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 173 A.3d 617 (Pa. 2017), and finding that “the majority of our Supreme Court believes that[,] while we need not find a ‘direct connection’ between the newly-discovered facts and the claims asserted by a petitioner, the statutory language requires there be some relationship between the two.”) (emphasis added). -8- J-S39003-20 Accordingly, because Hawkins has failed to show any connection between the underlying claims and his newly-discovered facts, we are unable to conclude that he has establi

2022Moreover, a plain-reading of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) suggests a limiting-approach whereby only those facts which are relied upon to establish the newly-discovered facts exception to the jurisdictional time-bar may then be proffered in support of after-discovered evidence claims. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) (stating, the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence (emphasis added)); see also Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491 , 507 n.14 (Pa. Super. 2016) (suggesting that, a PCRA court has jurisdic

2021Our inquiry here focuses upon whether a newspaper article triggers the newly-discovered facts exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement. -8- J-S13013-21 exercise of due diligence, including an assessment of the petitioner's access to public records.” Id. (citation omitted).

2023“Due diligence requires neither perfect vigilance nor punctilious care, but rather it requires reasonable efforts by a petitioner, based on the particular circumstances, to uncover facts that may support a claim for collateral relief.” Commonwealth v. Burton, 121 A.3d 1063, 1071 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc).

2023“Due diligence requires neither perfect vigilance nor punctilious care, but rather it requires reasonable efforts by a petitioner, based on the particular circumstances, to uncover facts that may support a claim for collateral relief.” Commonwealth v. Burton, 121 A.3d 1063, 1071 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc). ____________________________________________ 8 Because Nichols discovered that his petition for allowance of appeal was denied, at the earliest, in November or December 2021, he filed the instant petition within one year of the time the claim of abandonment could have been presented. 42 Pa.

2026It is well-established that, except in limited circumstances where counsel’s ineffectiveness resulted in a complete deprivation of appellate review, “counsel’s ineffectiveness may not be invoked as a newly-discovered ‘fact’ for purpose of invoking the [Section] 9545(b)(1)(ii) exception.” Commonwealth v. Peterson, 192 A.3d 1123, 1129 (Pa. 2018), citing Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780 (Pa. 2000) and its progeny; see also Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1273 (Pa. 2007).16 Pennsylvania jurisprudence addressing ineffective assistance of __________________________________________

2026Thus, “[i]n cases involving ineffectiveness per se, [Section 9545](b)(1)(ii) is a limited extension of the one-year time requirement under circumstances when a petitioner has not had the review to which he [or she] was entitled due to a circumstance that was beyond his [or her] control.” Peterson, 192 A.3d at 1130 (emphasis added; original quotation marks omitted), quoting Bennett, 930 A.2d at 1273 . - 14 - J-A29021-25 Moreover, from our review of the Gamboa-Taylor and Bennett lines of cases, we are able to glean that, not only must the ineffectiveness cause the complete deprivation of appella

2026Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 596 Pa. 219 , 227 (2008)(citing Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 566 Pa. 323 , (Pa. 2001)); 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9545(b)(2).

2024See Johnston, supra; see also Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 98 (Pa. 2001) (rejecting attempt to invoke section 9545(b)(1)(ii) because appellant failed to offer evidence that he exercised due diligence in obtaining facts upon which claim was based).

2026As the Supreme Court has explained, a Brady violation may constitute governmental interference; however, an appellant may not “begin with a discussion of the merits of a Brady claim; rather [he] must begin with a discussion of why the instant petition was timely filed.” Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306, 310 (Pa. 2008). -8- J-S03012-26 To satisfy the newly discovered facts exception, a petitioner must plead and prove “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii

2026Brown sought allowance of appeal from this Court solely as to the Superior Court’s holding that Brown had failed to establish the newly discovered facts exception because 40 Commonwealth v. Brown, 308 A.3d 768 , 769 (Pa. 2023) (per curiam). 41 731 A.2d at 592 (“A claim which rests exclusively upon inadmissible hearsay is not of a type that would implicate the [newly discovered facts] exception to the timeliness requirement[.]”); see also Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1270 (citing Yarris for the proposition that “a claim based on inadmissible hearsay does not implicate” the newly di

2021See Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 352 (Pa. 2013) (“[T]o constitute facts which were unknown to a petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence, the information … must not be facts that were previously known but are now presented through a newly discovered source.”), overruled on other grounds by, Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267 (Pa. 2020) (holding that there is no requirement, within the newly-discovered facts exception, that the information must not be of public record).

2018The PCRA court agreed, largely based upon our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339 (Pa. 2013). -6- J-S46003-18 In Edmiston, the petitioner attempted to satisfy the newly- discovered-facts exception by relying upon a report from the National Academy of Science (“NAS”) indicating that there was no scientific support for finding a match by microscopic hair comparison analysis that is not also accompanied by mitochondrial DNA analysis.

2026Brown sought allowance of appeal from this Court solely as to the Superior Court’s holding that Brown had failed to establish the newly discovered facts exception because 40 Commonwealth v. Brown, 308 A.3d 768 , 769 (Pa. 2023) (per curiam). 41 731 A.2d at 592 (“A claim which rests exclusively upon inadmissible hearsay is not of a type that would implicate the [newly discovered facts] exception to the timeliness requirement[.]”); see also Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1270 (citing Yarris for the proposition that “a claim based on inadmissible hearsay does not implicate” the newly di

2026Brown sought allowance of appeal from this Court solely as to the Superior Court’s holding that Brown had failed to establish the newly discovered facts exception because 40 Commonwealth v. Brown, 308 A.3d 768 , 769 (Pa. 2023) (per curiam). 41 731 A.2d at 592 (“A claim which rests exclusively upon inadmissible hearsay is not of a type that would implicate the [newly discovered facts] exception to the timeliness requirement[.]”); see also Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1270 (citing Yarris for the proposition that “a claim based on inadmissible hearsay does not implicate” the newly di

2026Our Supreme Court has instructed that “the newly discovered fact exception does not require any merits analysis of the underlying claim, and application of the time-bar exception therefore does not necessitate proof of the elements of a claim of after-discovered evidence.” Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267 , 1286 (Pa. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Branthafer, 315 A.3d 113, 128 (Pa. Super. 2024) (noting that “the newly-discovered facts exception to the jurisdictional time-bar is distinct from an after-discovered evidence claim, which is a sub

2026“To invoke the newly-discovered facts exception, a petitioner must plead and prove facts that were unknown to the petitioner despite the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Branthafer, 315 A.3d 113, 128 (Pa. Super. 2024).

2025See Monaco, supra. As such, we cannot address the merits of Appellant’s PCRA petition unless he meets one of the timeliness exceptions set forth supra. In the case sub judice, Appellant suggests that he is entitled to the newly discovered facts exception set forth in Subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii).

2019This is “strictly enforced.” Id. -6- J-A17030-19 We have carefully reviewed Appellant’s petition together with the relevant materials in the record to determine whether Appellant has properly invoked the newly-discovered facts exception to the PCRA’s one-year time- bar.

2024See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 204 A.3d 524, 526-27 (Pa. Super. 2019) (finding the petitioner could not meet the newly discovered fact exception based on misconduct of a detective he read about in a news article, where he did “not explain how the facts regarding (the detective’s] civil judgments could not have been ascertained sooner by the -6- J-S03029-24 exercise of due diligence,” and where the petition was filed almost a year after the detective was found liable); Commonwealth v. Fleetwood, 242 A.3d 394 , at *3 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished [mem.]) (cited for persuasive value) (using the da

2024The newly discovered facts exception applies only where the defendant shows both that he did not know the facts upon which he bases his PCRA petition and that he could not have learned of those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii); Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 204 A.3d 524, 526 (Pa. Super. 2019).

2026See Commonwealth v. Reeves, 296 A.3d 1228, 1231 (Pa. Super. 2023) (general allegations of misconduct by district attorney’s office, unrelated to petitioner’s case, insufficient to demonstrate governmental interference). 17 ____________________________________________ 15 While Diaz invoked the newly discovered facts exception in his 2022 petition, the fact that he now asserts a governmental interference theory does not prevent his claim from being dismissed as previously litigated.

2025“Once jurisdiction is established, a PCRA petitioner can present a substantive after-discovered-evidence claim.” Commonwealth v. Reeves, 296 A.3d 1228, 1232 (Pa. Super. 2023); see also Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 627-29 (Pa. 2017) (explaining that the after-discovered evidence grounds for PCRA relief and the newly discovered facts exception to the PCRA’s time-bar are separate and distinct).

2025Accord Commonwealth v. Natividad, 200 A.3d 11, 29 (Pa. 2019) (concluding that claim raised promptly after the disclosure of material withheld by the Commonwealth satisfied the § 9545(b)(1)(i) and (ii) exceptions); Commonwealth v. Hart, 199 A.3d 475, 481 (Pa.Super. 2018) (concluding that Hart had invoked the newly-discovered facts exception as to letters withheld by the Commonwealth, as “Hart could not be expected to assume that the Commonwealth may not have been forthright when it -7- J-S05005-25 reassured him that no other correspondence existed”).

2021See Brief for Appellant, 12/23/15, at 12-13. -9- J-S32035-21 “A petitioner satisfies the newly-discovered facts exception when the petitioner pleads and proves that (1) the facts upon which the claim [is] predicated were unknown and (2) could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Hart, 199 A.3d 475, 481 (Pa. Super. 2018) (emphasis in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1272 (Pa. 2007)).

2024“If the petitioner alleges and proves these two components, then the PCRA court has jurisdiction over the claim under this subsection.” Bennett, supra (citing Commonwealth v. Lambert, 884 A.2d 848, 852 (Pa. 2005)).

2024Moreover, the newly-discovered facts exception codified at Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) “requires [a petitioner to allege and demonstrate that] the facts upon which the Brady claim is predicated were not previously known to the petitioner and could not -9- J-A08026-24 have been ascertained through due diligence.” Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d at 1268 , citing Commonwealth v. Lambert, 884 A.2d 848, 852 (Pa. 2005).5 We now address whether Appellant’s claims surrounding Standen’s cooperation agreement and the alleged police payment to Goldy (in that order) validly triggered the timeliness exceptions set forth at

2017This Court has held that, for purposes of the newly-discovered-facts exception, "information is not 'unknown' to a PCRA petitioner when the information was a matter of public record." Commonwealth v. Chester, 586 Pa. 468 , 895 A.2d 520, 523 (2006) (citing Commonwealth v. Lark, 560 Pa. 487 , 746 A.2d 585 , 588 n.4 (2000) (holding that the statistics which comprised a study of the Philadelphia criminal justice system were of public record and, therefore, that the information did not fall within the purview of the newly-discovered-facts exception)).

2017Yet, the Majority sub silentio has overruled this precedent as it applies to incarcerated pro se PCRA petitioners, thereby creating a status-based exception to this rule; an exception that, in my view, swallows nearly the entirety of the rule given that incarcerated pro se petitioners constitute the group of 2 This Court has held that, for purposes of the newly-discovered-facts exception, “information is not ‘unknown’ to a PCRA petitioner when the information was a matter of public record.” Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 523 (Pa. 2006) (citing Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d 585 , 588 n

2017Commonwealth v. Lopez, 51 A.3d 195, 199 (Pa. 2012); Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 523 (Pa. 2006).

2016Taylor, 67 A.3d at 1248 ; Com. v. Lopez, 51 A.3d 195, 196 (Pa. 2012) (information related to defense counsel's disciplinary issues was publicly available seven years before defendant's trial and 23 years before second PCRA petition; thus, newly-discovered facts exception did not apply); Feliciano, 69 A.3d at 1278 (information relating to suspension of trial counsel's license to practice law did not constitute a newly-discovered fact since information was publicly available 11 years before defendant filed PCRA petition).

2023See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091 , 1093 n.2 (Pa. 2010) (explaining that the 1995 amendments to the PCRA provided that a petitioner whose judgment of sentence became final on or before January 16, 1996, had a one-year grace period or until January 16, 1997, to file a first PCRA petition). -6- J-S32045-23 pertaining to McGuire, Appellant failed to demonstrate a fact that triggered the newly-discovered facts exception set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).

2016Any PCRA petition invoking one of these exceptions “shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2); Albrecht, 994 A.2d at 1094 . -3- J-S70036-16 Brown invokes the newly-discovered facts exception at 9545(b)(1)(ii),1 and argues that his counsel was ineffective at sentencing for failing to include information about his drug addiction and treatment in the pre- sentence investigation report (“PSI”).

2025To succeed in raising that exception, a petitioner must establish that: (1) “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown,” and (2) the facts “could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence[.]” Id. at § 9545(b)(1)(ii). “[T]he due diligence inquiry is fact-sensitive and dependent upon the circumstances presented.” Commonwealth v. Shiloh, 170 A.3d 553, 558 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

2022See id.; see also Commonwealth v. Shiloh, 170 A.3d 553, 558 (Pa. Super. 2017) (remanding for a determination concerning the PCRA’s newly discovered facts exception and explaining that the “due diligence inquiry” under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) is a fact-sensitive determination, dependent upon the circumstances presented).