obvious danger rule in Wyoming

11 Wyoming opinions name it 1 courts 1983–2017 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Wyoming courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

Case	Followed	Cited
O'DONNELL v. City of Caspergreen wyo · 1985 · cited in 4 Wyoming opinions naming this issue, 1986–1994 2 sentences 1989In O’Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278 (Wyo.1985), we addressed 1180 the impact of comparative negligence on the obvious danger rule, concluding that those situations wherein the obvious danger rule operates to negate a duty on behalf of the property owner — i.e., operates as an absolute bar to recovery — were narrowly limited to dangers presented by naturally existing conditions, particularly accumulations of ice and snow. 1989*In O’Donnell, 696 P.2d 1278 , we held that those situations in which the obvious danger rule operated to negate a duty on behalf of a defendant property owner or occupier were narrowly limited to dangers presented by naturally existing conditions and that otherwise the obviousness of the danger becomes a factor in apportioning negligence between a plaintiff and a defendant under our comparative negligence statute.	3	4
Sherman v. Platte Countygreen wyo · 1982 · cited in 4 Wyoming opinions naming this issue, 1983–2004 2 sentences 2004In Sherman v. Platte County, [ 642 P.2d 787 (Wyo.1982),] we stated there is the rule that no duty exists which requires either the removal of an obvious danger or a warning of its existence. 1986In O'Donnell v. City of Casper, Wyo., 696 P.2d 1278 (1985), we stated that the obvious-danger rule, as broadly formulated in Sherman v. Platte County, Wyo., 642 P.2d 787 (1982), did not survive the enactment of comparative negligence.	2	4
Brittain v. Boothgreen wyo · 1979 · cited in 3 Wyoming opinions naming this issue, 1985–2006 2 sentences 2006Id. at 1179 ; Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1361 (Wyo.1981); Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532, 534 (Wyo.1979). 2002Id. at 1179 ; Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1361 (Wyo. 1981); Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532, 534 (Wyo.1979).	2	3
Barnette v. Doylegreen wyo · 1981 · cited in 2 Wyoming opinions naming this issue, 2002–2006 2 sentences 2006Id. at 1179 ; Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1361 (Wyo.1981); Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532, 534 (Wyo.1979). 2002Id. at 1179 ; Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1361 (Wyo. 1981); Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532, 534 (Wyo.1979).	2	2
Eiselein v. K-Mart, Inc.green wyo · 1994 · cited in 2 Wyoming opinions naming this issue, 1996–2004 2 sentences 2004Eiselein , at 895. 1996Eiselein , at 895.	2	2
Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.green wyo · 1986 · cited in 2 Wyoming opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989 2 sentences 1989In Jones, 718 P.2d at 897-98 , we quoted from O’Donnell and noted the limited application of the “no duty” obvious danger rule: Under the obvious-danger rule, an owner of property has no duty to his invitees “to correct an obvious and known danger resulting from natural causes.” O’Donnell v. City of Casper, Wyo., 696 P.2d 1278, 1282 (1985); see also Note, The Obvious Danger Rule — A Qualified Adoption of Secondary Assumption of Risk Analysis, 21 Land & Water L.Rev. 251 (1986). 1989In Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 718 P.2d 890, 898 (Wyo.1986), we reaffirmed our holding in O’Donnell , stating that: [T]he obvious-danger rule does not apply when a dangerous condition is created by the owner or his servants. * * * Even if the danger was perfectly obvious to [the plaintiff], it is the function of the jury, under the comparative negligence statute, to compare his negligence with that of [the defendant].	1	2
Cervelli v. Gravesgreen wyo · 1983 · cited in 1 Wyoming opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985 2 sentences 1985In Cervelli v. Graves, Wyo., 661 P.2d 1032, 1039 (1983), the trial court instructed the jury, "`There is no liability for injuries from dangers that are obvious, reasonably apparent, or as well known to the person injured as they are to any other parties.'" We held that this statement was erroneous. 1985In Cervelli v. Graves, Wyo., 661 P.2d 1032, 1039 (1983), the trial court instructed the jury, “ ‘There is no liability for injuries from dangers that are obvious, reasonably apparent, or as well known to the person injured as they are to any other parties.’ ” We held that this statement was erroneous.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wyoming. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (9)

Case	Cited	Years
Pinnacle Bank v. Villa green wyo · 2004 2 sentences 2017We have also held that “no duty exists which requires either the removal of an obvious danger or a warning of its' existence.” Pinnacle Bank, 2004 WY 150, ¶ 6 , 100 P.3d at 1290 . [1Í17] The district court concluded that the accumulation of ice in this case was both obvious and natural, and granted summary judgment to the' School District on the 548 question of whether there was a duty. 2017We have also held that “no duty exists which requires either the removal of an obvious danger or a warning of its' existence.” Pinnacle Bank, 2004 WY 150, ¶ 6 , 100 P.3d at 1290 . [1Í17] The district court concluded that the accumulation of ice in this case was both obvious and natural, and granted summary judgment to the' School District on the 548 question of whether there was a duty.	1	2017–2017
Valance v. VI-Doug, Inc. green wyo · 2002 2 sentences 2002This is contrary to the holding in the case of Valance v. VI-Doug, Inc., 2002 WY 113 , 50 P.3d 697 (Wyo.2002). 2002This is contrary to the holding in the case of Valance v. VI-Doug, Inc., 2002 WY 113 , 50 P.3d 697 (Wyo.2002).	1	2002–2002
Ward v. K Mart Corp. green ill · 1990 2 sentences 1994The Illinois Supreme Court elaborated on the difference between duty and apportionment of fault, noting that allowing the obvious danger rule to act as a bar to recovery was not tantamount to “a resurrection of contributory negligence.” Ward, 143 Ill.Dec. at 295 , 554 N.E.2d at 230 . 1994The Illinois Supreme Court elaborated on the difference between duty and apportionment of fault, noting that allowing the obvious danger rule to act as a bar to recovery was not tantamount to “a resurrection of contributory negligence.” Ward, 143 Ill.Dec. at 295 , 554 N.E.2d at 230 .	1	1994–1994
State v. Carter green wyo · 1986 1 sentence 1986Nevertheless, the language as to the owner retaining limited control over the safety aspects of the individual contractor's performance is applicable here. [1] See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 , 101 S.Ct. 1137 , 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981), and State v. Carter, Wyo., 714 P.2d 1217 , 1222 n. 2 (1986), Urbigkit, J., dissenting.	1	1986–1986
McKee v. Pacific Power and Light Company green wyo · 1966 2 sentences 1986In McKee we had applied the obvious-danger rule to harm caused by electric wires, a man-made hazard. 417 P.2d at 427 . [1] I realize the Noonan case involved an injury caused by an instrumentality owned by the independent contractor, not the owner as here. 1986In McKee we had applied the obvious-danger rule to harm caused by electric wires, a man-made hazard. 417 P.2d at 427 .	1	1986–1986
Albernaz v. United States green scotus · 1981 2 sentences 1986Nevertheless, the language as to the owner retaining limited control over the safety aspects of the individual contractor's performance is applicable here. [1] See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 , 101 S.Ct. 1137 , 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981), and State v. Carter, Wyo., 714 P.2d 1217 , 1222 n. 2 (1986), Urbigkit, J., dissenting. 1986Nevertheless, the language as to the owner retaining limited control over the safety aspects of the individual contractor's performance is applicable here. [1] See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 , 101 S.Ct. 1137 , 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981), and State v. Carter, Wyo., 714 P.2d 1217 , 1222 n. 2 (1986), Urbigkit, J., dissenting.	1	1986–1986
Johnson v. Hawkins green wyo · 1981 2 sentences 1985Second is the rule that no duty exists to remove the natural accumulation of snow and ice. * * ” (Emphasis added.) In support of these two rules we cited Johnson v. Hawkins, Wyo., 622 P.2d 941 (1981); Bluejacket v. Carney, supra, and earlier cases. 1985Second is the rule that no duty exists to remove the natural accumulation of snow and ice. * *” (Emphasis added.) In support of these two rules we cited Johnson v. Hawkins, Wyo., 622 P.2d 941 (1981); Bluejacket v. Carney, supra, and earlier cases.	1	1985–1985
Bluejacket v. Carney green wyo · 1976 2 sentences 1985This court has not been consistent in its application of the obvious danger rule since comparative negligence. [3] In Bluejacket v. Carney, Wyo., 550 P.2d 494 (1976), plaintiff was a guest at defendant's resort cabin. 1985This court has not been consistent in its application of the obvious danger rule since comparative negligence. 3 In Bluejacket v. Carney, Wyo., 550 P.2d 494 (1976), plaintiff was a guest at defendant’s resort cabin.	1	1985–1985
Loney v. Laramie Auto Co. green wyo · 1927 2 sentences 1985Loney v. Laramie Auto Co., 36 Wyo. 339 , 255 P. 350 (1927); Chicago and Northwestern Ry. 1985Loney v. Laramie Auto Co., 36 Wyo. 339 , 255 P. 350 (1927); Chicago and Northwestern Ry.	1	1985–1985

Statutes the citing opinions construe

WY § Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109 (9)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

FL 22 (1980–2026) WY 11 (1983–2017) AR 7 (1990–2020) CA 5 (2008–2024) IL 3 (1980–1995) NV 3 (1997–2012)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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