77 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2025 22 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re WCgreen2 sentences2025“Under the common-design rule, if ‘two or more persons engage in a common criminal design or agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common design committed by one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the design or agreement and all are equally responsible for the consequences of the further acts.’ ” Id. (quoting In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 337 (1995)). 28 ¶ 81 Defendant argues that no rational trier of fact could find him accountable beyond a reasonable doubt for the offenses at issue, where the only evidence that defendant shared a common purpose with Richardson came 2025“The common-design rule provides that where two or more persons engage in a common design or agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common design committed by one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the design or agreement and all are equally responsible for the consequences of the further acts.” In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 337 (1995). | 18 | 34 |
People v. Fernandezgreen2 sentences2025“Under the common-design rule, if ‘two or more persons engage in a common criminal design or agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common design committed by one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the design or agreement and all are equally responsible for the consequences of the further acts.’ ” Id. (quoting In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 337 (1995)). 28 ¶ 81 Defendant argues that no rational trier of fact could find him accountable beyond a reasonable doubt for the offenses at issue, where the only evidence that defendant shared a common purpose with Richardson came 2024“A person intends, or acts intentionally or with intent, to accomplish a result or engage in conduct described by the statute defining the offense, when his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that result or engage in that conduct.” 720 ILCS 5/4-4 (West 2014). ¶ 33 “Under the common-design rule, if two or more persons engage in a common criminal design or agreement, any acts in furtherance of that common design committed by one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the design or agreement and all are equally responsible for the consequences of the further acts.” (In | 11 | 35 |
People v. Terrygreen2 sentences2018People v. Terry, 99 Ill. 2d 508, 515 (1984); People v. Kessler, 57 Ill. 2d 493, 496-97 (1974). ¶ 40 Under the common-design rule, if “two or more persons engage in a common criminal design or agreement, any acts in the furtherance thereof committed by one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the common design and all are equally responsible for the consequences of such further acts.” Kessler, 57 Ill. 2d at 496-97 . 1995(See People v. Stanceil (1992), 153 Ill. 2d 218, 234-35 (citing People v. Terry (1984), 99 Ill. 2d 508 , and People v. Allen (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 536 ).) The common-design rule provides that where two or more persons engage in a common criminal design or agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common design committed by one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the design or agreement and all are equally responsible for the consequences of the further acts. | 5 | 14 |
People v. Perezgreen2 sentences2024Id. ¶ 41 Further, under the common-design rule, where two or more people engage in a common criminal design or agreement, any acts in furtherance committed by one party are considered the 14 No. 1-21-1545 acts of all parties, and all are equally responsible for those further acts. 2024Id. ¶ 41 Further, under the common-design rule, where two or more people engage in a common criminal design or agreement, any acts in furtherance committed by one party are considered the 14 No. 1-21-1545 acts of all parties, and all are equally responsible for those further acts. | 4 | 8 |
People v. Coopergreen2 sentences2021Accountability under the common-design rule “need not be supported by words of agreement” and “may be drawn from the circumstances surrounding the commission of the unlawful conduct.” Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d at 435 . ¶ 29 The evidence at trial overwhelmingly established defendant’s guilt of burglary. 2018Here, the common-design element is relevant. ¶ 54 Under the common-design rule, if “two or more persons engage in a common criminal design or agreement, any acts in the furtherance of that common design committed by one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the design or agreement and all are equally responsible for the consequences of the further acts.” People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 434-35 (2000). | 4 | 5 |
People v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences2024“Evidence that a defendant voluntarily attached himself to a group bent on illegal acts with knowledge of its design supports an inference that he shared the common purpose ***.” In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 338 (1995). “[S]hared intent is not an element of the common-design rule.” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Phillips, 2014 IL App (4th) 120695, ¶ 48 . 2024This evidence, under the common-design rule, would permit the State to “prove the accused had the specific intent to promote or facilitate a crime.” People v. Phillips, 2014 IL App (4th) 120695, ¶ 43 (quoting People v. Houston, 258 Ill. | 3 | 10 |
People v. Rogersgreen2 sentences2021App. 3d 740, 752-53 , 636 N.E.2d 565, 574 (1992) (Greiman, P.J., specially concurring)). ¶ 69 As shown by the arguments in this case, our hopes have been dashed that the shared-intent requirement of the common-design rule has been killed. 2020App. 3d 740, 752-53 , 636 N.E.2d 565, 574 (1992) (Greiman, P.J., specially concurring)). ¶ 69 As shown by the arguments in this case, our hopes have been dashed that the shared- intent requirement of the common-design rule has been killed. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Batchelorgreen2 sentences2020A factfinder “may infer accountability from ‘the circumstances surrounding the perpetration of the unlawful conduct,’ including ‘the defendant’s presence during the commission of the offense, the defendant’s continued close affiliation with other offenders after the commission of the crime, the defendant’s failure to report the incident, and the defendant’s flight from the scene.’ ” People v. Doolan, 2016 IL App (1st) 141780, ¶ 43 (quoting People v. Batchelor, 171 Ill. 2d 367, 376 (1996)). ¶ 20 Here, the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the State sufficed to establish that defendan 2017Rather, the trier of fact may infer accountability from “the circumstances surrounding the perpetration of the unlawful conduct,” including “the defendant’s presence during the commission of the offense, the defendant’s continued close affiliation with other offenders after the commission of the crime, the defendant’s failure to report the incident, and the defendant’s flight from the scene.” People v. Batchelor, 171 Ill. 2d 367, 376 (1996). | 3 | 3 |
Brennan v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2008The first decision from this court to discuss the common-design rule was Brennan v. People, 15 Ill. 511 (1854). 2008The first decision from this court to discuss the common-design rule was Brennan v. People, 15 Ill. 511 (1854). | 2 | 6 |
People v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2023In other words, “ ‘[c]ommon design refers to a criminal scheme of which the crime charged is only a part.’ ” People v. Jones, 156 Ill. 2d 225, 239 (1993). 2023In other words, “ ‘[c]ommon design refers to a criminal scheme of which the crime charged is only a part.’ ” People v. Jones, 156 Ill. 2d 225, 239 (1993). | 2 | 4 |
The People v. Colegreen2 sentences2018See also People v. Fernandez, 2014 IL 115527, ¶ 13 ; In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 337 (1995); People v. J.H., 136 Ill. 2d 1 , 17 -8- (1990); Terry, 99 Ill. 2d at 514 ; People v. Cole, 30 Ill. 2d 375 (1964); People v. Marx, 291 Ill. 40, 48 (1919); Hamilton v. People, 113 Ill. 34 (1885). 2017See also People v. Fernandez , 2014 IL 115527 , ¶ 13, 379 Ill.Dec. 68 , 6 N.E.3d 145 ; In re W.C. , 167 Ill. 2d 307 , 337, 212 Ill.Dec. 563 , 657 N.E.2d 908 (1995) ; People v. J.H. , 136 Ill. 2d 1 , 17, 143 Ill.Dec. 889 , 554 N.E.2d 961 (1990) ; Terry , 99 Ill. 2d at 514 , 77 Ill.Dec. 442 , 460 N.E.2d 746 ; People v. Cole , 30 Ill. 2d 375 , 196 N.E.2d 691 (1964) ; People v. Marx , 291 Ill. 40 , 48, 125 N.E. 719 (1919) ; Hamilton v. People , 113 Ill. 34 (1885). | 2 | 4 |
The People v. Rybkagreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., People v. Rudecki, 309 Ill. 125, 129 , 140 N.E. 832, 833 (1923); Tarver, 381 Ill. at 416 , 45 N.E.2d at 632 ; People v. Rybka, 16 Ill. 2d 394, 405 , 158 N.E.2d 17, 22 (1959); People v. Torres, 19 Ill. 2d 497, 499 , 167 N.E.2d 412, 413 (1960); People v. Washington, 26 Ill. 2d 207, 209 , 186 N.E.2d 259, 261 (1962); People v. Cole, 30 Ill. 2d 375, 379 , 196 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1964); People v. Armstrong, 41 Ill. 2d 390, 399 , 243 N.E.2d 825, 830 (1968); People v. Hubbard, 55 Ill. 2d 142, 147-48 , 302 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1973); Kessler, 57 Ill. 2d at 497 , 315 N.E.2d at 32 ; People v. Terry, 2014See, e.g., People v. Rudecki, 309 Ill. 125, 129 , 140 N.E. 832, 833 (1923); Tarver, 381 Ill. at 416 , 45 N.E.2d at 632 ; People v. Rybka, 16 Ill. 2d 394, 405 , 158 N.E.2d 17, 22 (1959); People v. Torres, 19 Ill. 2d 497, 499 , 167 N.E.2d 412, 413 (1960); People v. Washington, 26 Ill. 2d 207, 209 , 186 N.E.2d 259, 261 (1962); People v. Cole, 30 Ill. 2d 375, 379 , 196 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1964); People v. Armstrong, 41 Ill. 2d 390, 399 , 243 N.E.2d 825, 830 (1968); People v. Hubbard, 55 Ill. 2d 142, 147-48 , 302 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1973); Kessler, 57 Ill. 2d at 497 , 315 N.E.2d at 32 ; People v. Terry, | 2 | 3 |
People v. Malcolmgreen2 sentences2021EPILOGUE ¶ 68 Although the Illinois Appellate Court has followed the supreme court’s guidance on legal accountability since the Fernandez decision (see, e.g., People v. Williams, 2016 IL App (1st) 133459, ¶¶ 45-48 , 64 N.E.3d 1086 ; People v. James, 2017 IL App (1st) 143391, ¶¶ 56-57 , 93 N.E.3d 626 ; People v. Cowart, 2017 IL App (1st) 113085-B , ¶¶ 38-40, 81 N.E.3d 1023 ; Ealy, 2019 IL App (1st) 161575, ¶¶ 31-33 ; People v. Malcolm, 2015 IL App (1st) 133406, ¶¶ 40, 43 , 39 N.E.3d 98 ), defendants continue to raise “the bogus shared-intent requirement of the common-design rule” (Phillips, 201 2021EPILOGUE ¶ 68 Although the Illinois Appellate Court has followed the supreme court’s guidance on legal accountability since the Fernandez decision (see, e.g., People v. Williams, 2016 IL App (1st) 133459, ¶¶ 45-48 , 64 N.E.3d 1086 ; People v. James, 2017 IL App (1st) 143391, ¶¶ 56-57 , 93 N.E.3d 626 ; People v. Cowart, 2017 IL App (1st) 113085-B , ¶¶ 38-40, 81 N.E.3d 1023 ; Ealy, 2019 IL App (1st) 161575, ¶¶ 31-33 ; People v. Malcolm, 2015 IL App (1st) 133406, ¶¶ 40, 43 , 39 N.E.3d 98 ), defendants continue to raise “the bogus shared-intent requirement of the common-design rule” (Phillips, 201 | 2 | 2 |
People v. Dennisgreen2 sentences2014Just as the felony-murder doctrine "seeks to deter persons from committing forcible felonies by holding them responsible for murder if a death results," the common-design rule "seeks to deter persons from intentionally aiding or encouraging the commission of offenses." People v. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87, 105 , 692 N.E.2d 325, 335 (1998). ¶ 46 Defendant's argument that the State was required to prove that he shared Grimes's intent to fire the rifle illustrates the erroneous conflation of two distinct bases for proving legal accountability: (1) shared intent (sometimes referred to as "specific int 2014Just as the felony-murder doctrine "seeks to deter persons from committing forcible felonies by holding them responsible for murder if a death results," the common-design rule "seeks to deter persons from intentionally aiding or encouraging the commission of offenses." People v. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87, 105 , 692 N.E.2d 325, 335 (1998). ¶ 46 Defendant's argument that the State was required to prove that he shared Grimes's intent to fire the rifle illustrates the erroneous conflation of two distinct bases for proving legal accountability: (1) shared intent (sometimes referred to as "specific int | 2 | 2 |
The PEOPLE v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., People v. Rudecki, 309 Ill. 125, 129 , 140 N.E. 832, 833 (1923); Tarver, 381 Ill. at 416 , 45 N.E.2d at 632 ; People v. Rybka, 16 Ill. 2d 394, 405 , 158 N.E.2d 17, 22 (1959); People v. Torres, 19 Ill. 2d 497, 499 , 167 N.E.2d 412, 413 (1960); People v. Washington, 26 Ill. 2d 207, 209 , 186 N.E.2d 259, 261 (1962); People v. Cole, 30 Ill. 2d 375, 379 , 196 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1964); People v. Armstrong, 41 Ill. 2d 390, 399 , 243 N.E.2d 825, 830 (1968); People v. Hubbard, 55 Ill. 2d 142, 147-48 , 302 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1973); Kessler, 57 Ill. 2d at 497 , 315 N.E.2d at 32 ; People v. Terry, 2014See, e.g., People v. Rudecki, 309 Ill. 125, 129 , 140 N.E. 832, 833 (1923); Tarver, 381 Ill. at 416 , 45 N.E.2d at 632 ; People v. Rybka, 16 Ill. 2d 394, 405 , 158 N.E.2d 17, 22 (1959); People v. Torres, 19 Ill. 2d 497, 499 , 167 N.E.2d 412, 413 (1960); People v. Washington, 26 Ill. 2d 207, 209 , 186 N.E.2d 259, 261 (1962); People v. Cole, 30 Ill. 2d 375, 379 , 196 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1964); People v. Armstrong, 41 Ill. 2d 390, 399 , 243 N.E.2d 825, 830 (1968); People v. Hubbard, 55 Ill. 2d 142, 147-48 , 302 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1973); Kessler, 57 Ill. 2d at 497 , 315 N.E.2d at 32 ; People v. Terry, | 2 | 2 |
The PEOPLE v. Armstrong (Sumlin)green2 sentences2014See, e.g., People v. Rudecki, 309 Ill. 125, 129 , 140 N.E. 832, 833 (1923); Tarver, 381 Ill. at 416 , 45 N.E.2d at 632 ; People v. Rybka, 16 Ill. 2d 394, 405 , 158 N.E.2d 17, 22 (1959); People v. Torres, 19 Ill. 2d 497, 499 , 167 N.E.2d 412, 413 (1960); People v. Washington, 26 Ill. 2d 207, 209 , 186 N.E.2d 259, 261 (1962); People v. Cole, 30 Ill. 2d 375, 379 , 196 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1964); People v. Armstrong, 41 Ill. 2d 390, 399 , 243 N.E.2d 825, 830 (1968); People v. Hubbard, 55 Ill. 2d 142, 147-48 , 302 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1973); Kessler, 57 Ill. 2d at 497 , 315 N.E.2d at 32 ; People v. Terry, 2014See, e.g., People v. Rudecki, 309 Ill. 125, 129 , 140 N.E. 832, 833 (1923); Tarver, 381 Ill. at 416 , 45 N.E.2d at 632 ; People v. Rybka, 16 Ill. 2d 394, 405 , 158 N.E.2d 17, 22 (1959); People v. Torres, 19 Ill. 2d 497, 499 , 167 N.E.2d 412, 413 (1960); People v. Washington, 26 Ill. 2d 207, 209 , 186 N.E.2d 259, 261 (1962); People v. Cole, 30 Ill. 2d 375, 379 , 196 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1964); People v. Armstrong, 41 Ill. 2d 390, 399 , 243 N.E.2d 825, 830 (1968); People v. Hubbard, 55 Ill. 2d 142, 147-48 , 302 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1973); Kessler, 57 Ill. 2d at 497 , 315 N.E.2d at 32 ; People v. Terry, | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Hubbardgreen | 2 | 2 |
| The PEOPLE v. Torresgreen | 2 | 2 |
People v. Rudeckigreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., People v. Rudecki, 309 Ill. 125, 129 , 140 N.E. 832, 833 (1923); Tarver, 381 Ill. at 416 , 45 N.E.2d at 632 ; People v. Rybka, 16 Ill. 2d 394, 405 , 158 N.E.2d 17, 22 (1959); People v. Torres, 19 Ill. 2d 497, 499 , 167 N.E.2d 412, 413 (1960); People v. Washington, 26 Ill. 2d 207, 209 , 186 N.E.2d 259, 261 (1962); People v. Cole, 30 Ill. 2d 375, 379 , 196 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1964); People v. Armstrong, 41 Ill. 2d 390, 399 , 243 N.E.2d 825, 830 (1968); People v. Hubbard, 55 Ill. 2d 142, 147-48 , 302 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1973); Kessler, 57 Ill. 2d at 497 , 315 N.E.2d at 32 ; People v. Terry, 2014See, e.g., People v. Rudecki, 309 Ill. 125, 129 , 140 N.E. 832, 833 (1923); Tarver, 381 Ill. at 416 , 45 N.E.2d at 632 ; People v. Rybka, 16 Ill. 2d 394, 405 , 158 N.E.2d 17, 22 (1959); People v. Torres, 19 Ill. 2d 497, 499 , 167 N.E.2d 412, 413 (1960); People v. Washington, 26 Ill. 2d 207, 209 , 186 N.E.2d 259, 261 (1962); People v. Cole, 30 Ill. 2d 375, 379 , 196 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1964); People v. Armstrong, 41 Ill. 2d 390, 399 , 243 N.E.2d 825, 830 (1968); People v. Hubbard, 55 Ill. 2d 142, 147-48 , 302 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1973); Kessler, 57 Ill. 2d at 497 , 315 N.E.2d at 32 ; People v. Terry, | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Walstongreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Lenleygreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Williamsgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Martingreen | 2 | 2 |
People v. Kesslergreen2 sentences2025“A common design can -10- 1-23-0943 be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the perpetration of the unlawful conduct.” People v. Petrov, 2023 IL App (1st) 160498 , ¶ 96. ¶ 31 People v. Kessler, 57 Ill. 2d 493 (1974), provides a textbook application of the common- design rule. 2023People v. Perez, 189 Ill. 2d 254, 267 (2000). ¶ 77 Although factually unrelated, People v. Kessler, 57 Ill. 2d 493 (1974), is a “textbook application of the common-design rule.” Fernandez, 2014 IL 115527, ¶ 14 . | 1 | 16 |
People v. Marxgreen2 sentences2018See also People v. Fernandez, 2014 IL 115527, ¶ 13 ; In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 337 (1995); People v. J.H., 136 Ill. 2d 1 , 17 -8- (1990); Terry, 99 Ill. 2d at 514 ; People v. Cole, 30 Ill. 2d 375 (1964); People v. Marx, 291 Ill. 40, 48 (1919); Hamilton v. People, 113 Ill. 34 (1885). 2017See also People v. Fernandez , 2014 IL 115527 , ¶ 13, 379 Ill.Dec. 68 , 6 N.E.3d 145 ; In re W.C. , 167 Ill. 2d 307 , 337, 212 Ill.Dec. 563 , 657 N.E.2d 908 (1995) ; People v. J.H. , 136 Ill. 2d 1 , 17, 143 Ill.Dec. 889 , 554 N.E.2d 961 (1990) ; Terry , 99 Ill. 2d at 514 , 77 Ill.Dec. 442 , 460 N.E.2d 746 ; People v. Cole , 30 Ill. 2d 375 , 196 N.E.2d 691 (1964) ; People v. Marx , 291 Ill. 40 , 48, 125 N.E. 719 (1919) ; Hamilton v. People , 113 Ill. 34 (1885). | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Stancielgreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Houstongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. McCoygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Taylorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wheelergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Doolangreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Gilliamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hamilton v. People
green
2 sentences2014Such being the case, whatever was done by one, in contemplation of law was done by all, and all are therefore equally responsible." Id. at 37-38 . ¶ 53 In the almost 130 years since Hamilton, the supreme court has repeatedly rejected - 17 - shared intent as an element of the common-design rule. 2014Such being the case, whatever was done by one, in contemplation of law was done by all, and all are therefore equally responsible.” Id. at 37-38 . ¶ 53 In the almost 130 years since Hamilton, the supreme court has repeatedly rejected shared intent as an element of the common-design rule. | 4 | 2014–2018 |
The People v. Tarver
green
2 sentences2014See, e.g., People v. Rudecki, 309 Ill. 125, 129 , 140 N.E. 832, 833 (1923); Tarver, 381 Ill. at 416 , 45 N.E.2d at 632 ; People v. Rybka, 16 Ill. 2d 394, 405 , 158 N.E.2d 17, 22 (1959); People v. Torres, 19 Ill. 2d 497, 499 , 167 N.E.2d 412, 413 (1960); People v. Washington, 26 Ill. 2d 207, 209 , 186 N.E.2d 259, 261 (1962); People v. Cole, 30 Ill. 2d 375, 379 , 196 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1964); People v. Armstrong, 41 Ill. 2d 390, 399 , 243 N.E.2d 825, 830 (1968); People v. Hubbard, 55 Ill. 2d 142, 147-48 , 302 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1973); Kessler, 57 Ill. 2d at 497 , 315 N.E.2d at 32 ; People v. Terry, 2014See, e.g., People v. Rudecki, 309 Ill. 125, 129 , 140 N.E. 832, 833 (1923); Tarver, 381 Ill. at 416 , 45 N.E.2d at 632 ; People v. Rybka, 16 Ill. 2d 394, 405 , 158 N.E.2d 17, 22 (1959); People v. Torres, 19 Ill. 2d 497, 499 , 167 N.E.2d 412, 413 (1960); People v. Washington, 26 Ill. 2d 207, 209 , 186 N.E.2d 259, 261 (1962); People v. Cole, 30 Ill. 2d 375, 379 , 196 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1964); People v. Armstrong, 41 Ill. 2d 390, 399 , 243 N.E.2d 825, 830 (1968); People v. Hubbard, 55 Ill. 2d 142, 147-48 , 302 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1973); Kessler, 57 Ill. 2d at 497 , 315 N.E.2d at 32 ; People v. Terry, | 4 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Phillips
green
2 sentences2021Here, the evidence supports defendant’s accountability under the common-design rule, where defendant agreed in her statement that she knew Brown might shoot Carothers and admitted that she knew Brown would do something “bad.” ¶ 76 Additionally, our supreme court in Fernandez overruled People v. Phillips, 2012 IL App (1st) 101923 , which relied on a “misunderstanding” of Taylor to hold that a defendant was not culpable for a shooting where he intended to help someone commit a crime against the victim but did not know the person possessed a firearm. 2014Id. ¶ 21. ¶ 48 The Fernandez court specifically overruled Phillips, 2012 IL App (1st) 101923 , which the Johnson court relied upon. | 3 | 2014–2021 |
People v. Walls
green
2 sentences2024People v. Fernandez, 2014 IL 115527, ¶ 13 ; Walls, 2022 IL App (1st) 200167, ¶ 20 . 2024People v. Fernandez, 2014 IL 115527, ¶ 13 ; Walls, 2022 IL App (1st) 200167, ¶ 20 . | 2 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2023Here, defendant claims that the trial court’s answer “invited the jury to come up with any offense that it believed [defendant] committed or planned to commit, and convict [defendant] of first degree murder under that theory.” We do not find this argument persuasive. ¶ 73 Under the common-design rule, to hold a defendant accountable for another’s conduct, the evidence must demonstrate that a defendant “attache[d] himself to a group bent on illegal acts with knowledge of its design.” People v. Jackson, 2020 IL App (4th) 170036, ¶ 49 . “ ‘With knowledge of its design’ means only that a person wh 2023Here, defendant claims that the trial court’s answer “invited the jury to come up with any offense that it believed [defendant] committed or planned to commit, and convict [defendant] of first degree murder under that theory.” We do not find this argument persuasive. ¶ 73 Under the common-design rule, to hold a defendant accountable for another’s conduct, the evidence must demonstrate that a defendant “attache[d] himself to a group bent on illegal acts with knowledge of its design.” People v. Jackson, 2020 IL App (4th) 170036, ¶ 49 . “ ‘With knowledge of its design’ means only that a person wh | 2 | 2022–2023 |
People v. James
green
2 sentences2021EPILOGUE ¶ 68 Although the Illinois Appellate Court has followed the supreme court’s guidance on legal accountability since the Fernandez decision (see, e.g., People v. Williams, 2016 IL App (1st) 133459, ¶¶ 45-48 , 64 N.E.3d 1086 ; People v. James, 2017 IL App (1st) 143391, ¶¶ 56-57 , 93 N.E.3d 626 ; People v. Cowart, 2017 IL App (1st) 113085-B , ¶¶ 38-40, 81 N.E.3d 1023 ; Ealy, 2019 IL App (1st) 161575, ¶¶ 31-33 ; People v. Malcolm, 2015 IL App (1st) 133406, ¶¶ 40, 43 , 39 N.E.3d 98 ), defendants continue to raise “the bogus shared-intent requirement of the common-design rule” (Phillips, 201 2021EPILOGUE ¶ 68 Although the Illinois Appellate Court has followed the supreme court’s guidance on legal accountability since the Fernandez decision (see, e.g., People v. Williams, 2016 IL App (1st) 133459, ¶¶ 45-48 , 64 N.E.3d 1086 ; People v. James, 2017 IL App (1st) 143391, ¶¶ 56-57 , 93 N.E.3d 626 ; People v. Cowart, 2017 IL App (1st) 113085-B , ¶¶ 38-40, 81 N.E.3d 1023 ; Ealy, 2019 IL App (1st) 161575, ¶¶ 31-33 ; People v. Malcolm, 2015 IL App (1st) 133406, ¶¶ 40, 43 , 39 N.E.3d 98 ), defendants continue to raise “the bogus shared-intent requirement of the common-design rule” (Phillips, 201 | 2 | 2020–2021 |
People v. Ealy
green
2 sentences2021EPILOGUE ¶ 68 Although the Illinois Appellate Court has followed the supreme court’s guidance on legal accountability since the Fernandez decision (see, e.g., People v. Williams, 2016 IL App (1st) 133459, ¶¶ 45-48 , 64 N.E.3d 1086 ; People v. James, 2017 IL App (1st) 143391, ¶¶ 56-57 , 93 N.E.3d 626 ; People v. Cowart, 2017 IL App (1st) 113085-B , ¶¶ 38-40, 81 N.E.3d 1023 ; Ealy, 2019 IL App (1st) 161575, ¶¶ 31-33 ; People v. Malcolm, 2015 IL App (1st) 133406, ¶¶ 40, 43 , 39 N.E.3d 98 ), defendants continue to raise “the bogus shared-intent requirement of the common-design rule” (Phillips, 201 2020EPILOGUE ¶ 68 Although the Illinois Appellate Court has followed the supreme court’s guidance on legal accountability since the Fernandez decision (see, e.g., People v. Williams, 2016 IL App (1st) 133459, ¶¶ 45-48 , 64 N.E.3d 1086 ; People v. James, 2017 IL App (1st) 143391, ¶¶ 56-57 , 93 N.E.3d 626 ; People v. Cowart, 2017 IL App (1st) 113085-B , ¶¶ 38-40, 81 N.E.3d 1023 ; Ealy, 2019 IL App (1st) 161575, ¶¶ 31-33 ; People v. Malcolm, 2015 IL App (1st) 133406, ¶¶ 40, 43 , 39 N.E.3d 98 ), defendants continue to raise “the bogus shared-intent requirement of the common- design rule” (Phillips, 20 | 2 | 2020–2021 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences2021EPILOGUE ¶ 68 Although the Illinois Appellate Court has followed the supreme court’s guidance on legal accountability since the Fernandez decision (see, e.g., People v. Williams, 2016 IL App (1st) 133459, ¶¶ 45-48 , 64 N.E.3d 1086 ; People v. James, 2017 IL App (1st) 143391, ¶¶ 56-57 , 93 N.E.3d 626 ; People v. Cowart, 2017 IL App (1st) 113085-B , ¶¶ 38-40, 81 N.E.3d 1023 ; Ealy, 2019 IL App (1st) 161575, ¶¶ 31-33 ; People v. Malcolm, 2015 IL App (1st) 133406, ¶¶ 40, 43 , 39 N.E.3d 98 ), defendants continue to raise “the bogus shared-intent requirement of the common-design rule” (Phillips, 201 2021EPILOGUE ¶ 68 Although the Illinois Appellate Court has followed the supreme court’s guidance on legal accountability since the Fernandez decision (see, e.g., People v. Williams, 2016 IL App (1st) 133459, ¶¶ 45-48 , 64 N.E.3d 1086 ; People v. James, 2017 IL App (1st) 143391, ¶¶ 56-57 , 93 N.E.3d 626 ; People v. Cowart, 2017 IL App (1st) 113085-B , ¶¶ 38-40, 81 N.E.3d 1023 ; Ealy, 2019 IL App (1st) 161575, ¶¶ 31-33 ; People v. Malcolm, 2015 IL App (1st) 133406, ¶¶ 40, 43 , 39 N.E.3d 98 ), defendants continue to raise “the bogus shared-intent requirement of the common-design rule” (Phillips, 201 | 2 | 2020–2021 |
People v. J.H.
green
2 sentences2018See also People v. Fernandez, 2014 IL 115527, ¶ 13 ; In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 337 (1995); People v. J.H., 136 Ill. 2d 1 , 17 -8- (1990); Terry, 99 Ill. 2d at 514 ; People v. Cole, 30 Ill. 2d 375 (1964); People v. Marx, 291 Ill. 40, 48 (1919); Hamilton v. People, 113 Ill. 34 (1885). 2017See also People v. Fernandez , 2014 IL 115527 , ¶ 13, 379 Ill.Dec. 68 , 6 N.E.3d 145 ; In re W.C. , 167 Ill. 2d 307 , 337, 212 Ill.Dec. 563 , 657 N.E.2d 908 (1995) ; People v. J.H. , 136 Ill. 2d 1 , 17, 143 Ill.Dec. 889 , 554 N.E.2d 961 (1990) ; Terry , 99 Ill. 2d at 514 , 77 Ill.Dec. 442 , 460 N.E.2d 746 ; People v. Cole , 30 Ill. 2d 375 , 196 N.E.2d 691 (1964) ; People v. Marx , 291 Ill. 40 , 48, 125 N.E. 719 (1919) ; Hamilton v. People , 113 Ill. 34 (1885). | 2 | 2017–2018 |
People v. Hudson
green
2 sentences2014By setting out to commit a crime with Grimes, defendant rendered himself legally accountable for Grimes's shooting of Maclin. ¶ 45 Like the felony-murder doctrine, under which a defendant may be liable for first degree murder even when his cofelon is killed by a police officer (People v. Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d 392 , 856 N.E.2d 1078 (2006)) or when a resisting victim accidentally kills an innocent bystander (People v. Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d 462 , 687 N.E.2d 973 (1997)), the common-design rule provides harsh medicine for those who willingly join with others to engage in criminal acts. 2014By setting out to commit a crime with Grimes, defendant rendered himself legally accountable for Grimes's shooting of Maclin. ¶ 45 Like the felony-murder doctrine, under which a defendant may be liable for first degree murder even when his cofelon is killed by a police officer (People v. Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d 392 , 856 N.E.2d 1078 (2006)) or when a resisting victim accidentally kills an innocent bystander (People v. Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d 462 , 687 N.E.2d 973 (1997)), the common-design rule provides harsh medicine for those who willingly join with others to engage in criminal acts. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Lowery
green
2 sentences2014By setting out to commit a crime with Grimes, defendant rendered himself legally accountable for Grimes's shooting of Maclin. ¶ 45 Like the felony-murder doctrine, under which a defendant may be liable for first degree murder even when his cofelon is killed by a police officer (People v. Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d 392 , 856 N.E.2d 1078 (2006)) or when a resisting victim accidentally kills an innocent bystander (People v. Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d 462 , 687 N.E.2d 973 (1997)), the common-design rule provides harsh medicine for those who willingly join with others to engage in criminal acts. 2014By setting out to commit a crime with Grimes, defendant rendered himself legally accountable for Grimes's shooting of Maclin. ¶ 45 Like the felony-murder doctrine, under which a defendant may be liable for first degree murder even when his cofelon is killed by a police officer (People v. Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d 392 , 856 N.E.2d 1078 (2006)) or when a resisting victim accidentally kills an innocent bystander (People v. Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d 462 , 687 N.E.2d 973 (1997)), the common-design rule provides harsh medicine for those who willingly join with others to engage in criminal acts. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| In Re AR green | 2 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Allen green | 2 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Petrov green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Hancock green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Garcia green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Rebollar-Vergara green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| People v. Salazar green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Taylor green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| People v. Homes green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Marshall green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Foster green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Hoard green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Larson green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Clay green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Moreno green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Esser v. Tripodi neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Cross v. Church neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| The People v. Hill green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| People v. Kriston neutral | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Miranda v. Arizona green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.