77 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Thompkinsred2 sentences2016“Under this standard of review, the appellate court weighs the evidence in order to determine whether the trier-of-fact ‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ” Id. {¶ 40} Unlike the sufficiency-of-evidence standard of review, a reviewing court does not construe the evidence most strongly in favor of the prosecution when using a manifest-weight standard of review. 2005Id. at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). {¶ 6} Under the sufficiency of evidence standard, an appellate court must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, if believed, "would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259 , paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional amendment on other grounds in State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89 . "`The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essen | 2 | 12 |
State v. Martingreen2 sentences2013No. 13-97-09, *2 (Sept. 17, 1997). {¶36} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1981), paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶37} On the other hand, in determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, “‘[weigh] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, c 2005Id. at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). {¶ 6} Under the sufficiency of evidence standard, an appellate court must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, if believed, "would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259 , paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional amendment on other grounds in State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89 . "`The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essen | 1 | 4 |
State v. Messengergreen2 sentences2022Franklin No. 19AP-879], 2021-Ohio-2044 , 174 N.E.3d 425, ¶ 45 , the Tenth District Court of Appeals determined that a challenge to the state's proof relative to the defendant's claim of self-defense is not subject to a review under the sufficiency of evidence standard and instead applied a ‘manifest weight of the evidence’ review. 2022Franklin No. 19AP-879], 2021-Ohio-2044 , 174 N.E.3d 425, ¶ 45 , the Tenth District Court of Appeals determined that a challenge to the state's proof relative to the defendant's claim of self-defense is not subject to a review under the sufficiency of evidence standard and instead applied a ‘manifest weight of the evidence’ review. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Harrisgreen1 sentence2025For example, in State v. Harris, the Sixth District upheld a sufficiency of evidence challenge to menacing when the victim testified that “[s]he was scared that she would be physically harmed by appellant when he pointed a gun at her and announced he would shoot her.” 2024-Ohio-1804, ¶ 25, 31 (6th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Golstongreen1 sentence2015State v. Golston, 71 Ohio St.3d 224, 226 (1994), citing State v. Wilson, 41 Ohio St.2d 236 (1975) and State v. Berndt, 29 Ohio St.3d 3 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2002In Schlee , we set forth the following test when reviewing a sufficiency of evidence challenge: "whether after viewing the probative evidence and the inference drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Id . at 13; see, also, State v. Williams (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 569 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Apanovitchgreen1 sentence1998A defendant need not demonstrate that after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, there would not have been enough left to convict. * * * One does not show a Brady violation by demonstrating that some of the inculpatory evidence should have been excluded, but by showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. "`Third, we note that * * * once a reviewing court applying Bagley has found constitutional error there is no need for further harmless error revie | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jenks
red
2 sentences2023State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 . {¶94} In contrast to the sufficiency of evidence analysis, when reviewing a weight of the evidence argument, the appellate court reviews the entire record, weighing the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts of evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. 2021State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 . {¶26} As opposed to the sufficiency of evidence analysis, when reviewing a weight of the evidence argument, the appellate court reviews the entire record, weighing the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts of evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and Richland County, Case No. 2020 CA 00038 9 created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. | 52 | 1999–2023 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2009We will first address the telecommunications-harassment conviction. {¶ 6} As to reviewing the trial court’s decision under the sufficiency-of-evidence standard, “[a]n appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average *629 mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259 , 574 N.E.2d 492 , paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional amendment on oth 2009The Bridgeman standard must be viewed in light of the sufficiency of evidence test set forth in State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259 , at paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional amendment on other grounds in State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 89 . | 9 | 2005–2011 |
State v. Bridgeman
green
2 sentences2012R. 29(A), a court shall not order an entry of judgment of acquittal if the evidence is such that reasonable minds can reach different conclusions as to whether each material element of a crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bridgeman, 55 Ohio St.2d 261 (1978), syllabus. {¶10} This court has previously found that the Bridgeman standard “must be viewed in light of the sufficiency of evidence test * * *.” State v. Foster, 3d Dist. 2008R. 29(A) provides that a court must order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of a charged offense "if the evidence in insufficient to *Page 5 sustain a conviction of such offense[.]" However, "a court shall not order an entry of judgment of acquittal if the evidence is such that reasonable minds can reach different conclusions as to whether each material element of a crime has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Bridgeman (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 261 , 381 N.E.2d 184 , syllabus. {¶ 10} The Bridgeman standard must be viewed in light of the sufficiency of evidence test set forth in S | 3 | 2001–2012 |
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences2006Rather, the sufficiency of evidence test "gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307 , 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 . 2006Rather, the sufficiency of evidence test "gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307 , 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 . | 3 | 2005–2006 |
Kyles v. Whitley
green
2 sentences1999A ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result is accordingly shown when the * * * evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial * * *.’ “ * * * Bagley materiality * * * is not a sufficiency of evidence test. * * * One does not show [materiality] by demonstrating that some of the inculpatory evidence should have been excluded, but by showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id., 514 U.S. at 434-435 , 115 S.Ct. at 1566 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 506 . 1999A ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result is accordingly shown when the * * * evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial * * *.’ “ * * * Bagley materiality * * * is not a sufficiency of evidence test. * * * One does not show [materiality] by demonstrating that some of the inculpatory evidence should have been excluded, but by showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id., 514 U.S. at 434-435 , 115 S.Ct. at 1566 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 506 . | 3 | 1997–1999 |
State v. Hansen
green
2 sentences2015Seneca No. 13-12-42, 2013-Ohio-1735, ¶ 35 , quoting State v. Foster, 3d Dist. 2014Seneca No. 13-12-42, 2013-Ohio-1735, ¶ 35 , quoting State v. Foster, 3d Dist. | 2 | 2014–2015 |
State v. Knepley
neutral
2 sentences2013No. 7-11-02, 2012-Ohio-406, ¶ 23 , quoting State v. Foster, 3d Dist. 2012No. 7-11-02, 2012-Ohio-406, ¶ 23 , quoting State v. Foster, 3d Dist. | 2 | 2012–2013 |
United States v. Bagley
green
2 sentences2002A `reasonable probability' of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression `undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.' Bagley , 473 U.S. at 678 , 105 S.Ct. at 3381 . {¶ 61} "The second aspect of Bagley materiality bearing emphasis here is that it is not a sufficiency of evidence test. 1998A "reasonable probability" of a different result is accordingly shown when the Government's evidentiary suppression "undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial." Bagley , 473 U.S. at 678 * * *. "`The second aspect of Bagley materiality bearing emphasis here is that it is not a sufficiency of evidence test. | 2 | 1998–2002 |
State v. Messenger
green
1 sentence2023In Messenger, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4562 , the Supreme Court of Ohio recently addressed the issue of whether self-defense claims are subject to review under a sufficiency of evidence standard on direct appeal. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Robinson
green
1 sentence2020"In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law, '[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' " State v. Robinson, 124 Ohio St.3d 76 , 2009-Ohio- 5937, ¶ 34, quoting Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 52} When reviewing a case under a sufficiency of evidence standard, we do not weigh witnesses' credibility but presume that the state's wit | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Woullard
green
1 sentence2016State v. Woullard, 158 Ohio App.3d 31 , 2004-Ohio- 3395, 813 N.E. 2d 964 (2d Dist.). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Wilson
green
1 sentence2015State v. Golston, 71 Ohio St.3d 224, 226 (1994), citing State v. Wilson, 41 Ohio St.2d 236 (1975) and State v. Berndt, 29 Ohio St.3d 3 (1987). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Berndt
green
1 sentence2015State v. Golston, 71 Ohio St.3d 224, 226 (1994), citing State v. Wilson, 41 Ohio St.2d 236 (1975) and State v. Berndt, 29 Ohio St.3d 3 (1987). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Edwards, Unpublished Decision (8-2-2004)
green
1 sentence2009State v. Edwards , 3d Dist. *Page 11 No. 9-03-63, 2004-Ohio-4015 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Lovejoy
green
2 sentences2009Lovejoy, 79 Ohio St.3d at 449 , 683 N.E.2d 1112 . 2009Lovejoy, 79 Ohio St.3d at 449 , 683 N.E.2d 1112 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Thomas
green
2 sentences2007State v. Thomas (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 79 , 80 , 24 O.O.3d 150 , 434 N.E.2d 1356 . 2007State v. Thomas (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 79 , 80 , 24 O.O.3d 150 , 434 N.E.2d 1356 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Gaul
green
1 sentence2006State v. Gaul (1997), 117 Ohio App.3d 839 . {¶ 75} In the Gaul case, the state of Ohio had prosecuted the county treasurer for dereliction of duty on three different bases: that he violated his fiduciary duty to safeguard public funds; that he failed to properly monitor his deputies; and that he failed to maintain and properly manage documents evidencing the county's investments. {¶ 76} With respect to the first basis, the court held the fiduciary duty to preserve public monies was merely implied, not expressed, by applicable law: {¶ 77} "[t]hese fiduciary duties to preserve public moneys cann | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Rudd v. General Motors Corp.
green
1 sentence2006Rudd further explained the federal rule: {¶ 34} “[T]his sufficiency-of-basis inquiry is formally quite distinct from the sufficiency-of-evidence inquiry involved in summary-judgment analysis, that is, Rule 702 mandates a determination of whether the expert had sufficient evidence (evidence which itself may or may not be admissible) to support his or her testimony, not a determination of whether that testimony standing alone provides sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable fact-finder to find for the plaintiff on an issue of substantive law.” Rudd, 127 F.Supp.2d at 1337 . {¶ 35} When an exper | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Wolfe
green
1 sentence2004State v. Wolfe (1988), 51 Ohio App.3d 215 , 216 . {¶ 17} The relevant inquiry when addressing a sufficiency of evidence claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Rohde v. Farmer
green
2 sentences1995It has been said that the weight of the evidence standard and the sufficiency of evidence standard are synonymous, e.g., Rohde v. Farmer (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 82 , 52 O.O.2d 376 , 262 N.E.2d 685 . 1995It has been said that the weight of the evidence standard and the sufficiency of evidence standard are synonymous, e.g., Rohde v. Farmer (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 82 , 52 O.O.2d 376 , 262 N.E.2d 685 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.