exceptions to sovereign immunity in Pennsylvania

2021Dean v. Dep’t of Transp., 751 A.2d 1130, 1132 (Pa. 2000).8 However, “because of the clear intent to insulate the government from liability, the exceptions to sovereign immunity must be strictly construed.” Cowell, 883 A.2d at 709 (emphasis added).

2018Relying upon Snyder 's "absence of lighting" language, this Court held the Commonwealth immune, ruling that "the Commonwealth's failure to erect a guardrail on the highway is not encompassed by the real estate exception... [because] the absence of a guardrail cannot be said to be a dangerous condition of the real estate that resulted in a reasonably foreseeable injury." Id. at 1134 . "[K]eeping in mind that the exceptions to sovereign immunity are to be narrowly construed," and ignoring the fact that the embankment that caused the injury was on Commonwealth realty, the Dean Majority reasoned t

2026In this case, Flitter’s claim “is neither one for damages arising out of a negligent act[,] nor within the purview of the exceptions to sovereign immunity which may impose liability.” Valley Gypsum Company, Inc. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 581 A.2d 707, 710 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990).

2024This Court affirmed, explaining that “an action of replevin for personal property, as hereinabove set forth, is neither one for damages arising out of a negligent act nor within the purview of the exceptions to sovereign immunity which may impose liability.” Id. at 710 .

2025See Mullin v. Dep’t of Transp., 870 A.2d 773, 786 (Pa. 2005) (“We reach our determination today keeping in mind that the exceptions to sovereign immunity are to be narrowly construed and that the General Assembly can correct any misinterpretation of the immunity provisions by amending the statute so as to explicitly waive immunity . . . .”).

2024PLCB’s Brief at 15 (citing Mullin v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp., 870 A.2d 773, 779 (Pa. 2005) (“Because of the clear intent to insulate the government from liability, the exceptions to sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed.”)).

2023Because the General Assembly’s intent in the Act is to shield government from liability except as specifically provided in the statutes, see U.S. Venture, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 255 A.3d 321 (Pa. 2021), “the exceptions to sovereign immunity must be strictly construed and narrowly interpreted[.]” Casteel v. Tinkey, 151 A.3d 261, 273 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).

2023Because the General Assembly’s intent in the Act is to shield government from liability except as specifically provided in the statutes, see U.S. Venture, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 255 A.3d 321 (Pa. 2021), “the exceptions to sovereign immunity must be strictly construed and narrowly interpreted[.]” Casteel v. Tinkey, 151 A.3d 261, 273 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).

2021Dean v. Dep’t of Transp., 751 A.2d 1130, 1132 (Pa. 2000).8 However, “because of the clear intent to insulate the government from liability, the exceptions to sovereign immunity must be strictly construed.” Cowell, 883 A.2d at 709 (emphasis added).

2021Because we must narrowly construe the exceptions to sovereign immunity, see Cowell, 883 A.2d at 709 , we decline to extend the real estate exception to a situation where the alleged dangerous condition did not derive or originate from Commonwealth-owned realty and was located outside of DOT’s right-of-way.

2010Mannella v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 982 A.2d 130, 132 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).

2010Mannella v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 982 A.2d 130, 132 (Pa.Cmwlth.2009).

1993As we examine the statutory meaning of the term “operation” and apply it to the facts in the instant case, we are mindful of the fact that the exceptions to sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed “given the expressed legislative intent to insulate political subdivisions from tort liability.” Love v. City of Philadelphia, 518 Pa. 370, 374 , 543 A.2d 531, 532 (1988) (quoting Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 514 Pa. 351, 361 , 523 A.2d 1118, 1123 (1987)).

1993As we examine the statutory meaning of the term “operation” and apply it to the facts in the instant case, we are mindful of the fact that the exceptions to sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed “given the expressed legislative intent to insulate political subdivisions from tort liability.” Love v. City of Philadelphia, 518 Pa. 370, 374 , 543 A.2d 531, 532 (1988) (quoting Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 514 Pa. 351, 361 , 523 A.2d 1118, 1123 (1987)).

2014“A plaintiff seeking to prevail in a negligence action against the Commonwealth must demonstrate that [the] claim is one that, if proven, would satisfy the common law requirements for a negligence claim and that one of the exceptions to sovereign immunity applies.” Lambert v. Katz, 8 A.3d 409, 417 (Pa. Commw.

2013Cowell, 883 A.2d at 708 (emphasis added). “[A] plaintiff seeking to prevail in a negligence action against the Commonwealth must demonstrate that [his] claim is one that, if proven, would satisfy the common law requirements for a negligence claim and that one of the exceptions to sovereign immunity applies.” Lambert, 8 A.3d at 417 . [I]n order to prevail in a negligence action under common law, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff; (2) that duty was breached; (3) the breach resulted in the plaintiffs injury; and (4) the plaintiff suffered an

2022Paluch v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 175 A.3d 433, 438 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).

2022Section 8501 of the Judicial Code defines “Commonwealth party” as “[a] Commonwealth agency and any employee thereof, but only with respect to an act within the scope of his office or employment.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8501. “[DOT] has been recognized as a Commonwealth agency for purposes of the Sovereign Immunity Act.” Mullin v. Dep’t of Transp., 870 A.2d 773 , 779 n.4 (Pa. 2005). 7 “Because of our General Assembly’s clear intent to insulate government from exposure to tort liability, courts must strictly construe the exceptions to sovereign immunity.” Manning v. Dep’t of Transp., 144 A.3d 252, 256 (Pa

2021Gallagher v. Bureau of Corr., 545 A.2d 981, 984 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (en banc), appeal denied, 554 A.2d 511 (Pa. 1989). 16 In their motion for summary judgment and brief in support, Appellees likewise acknowledged that the personal property exception was the only possible exception applicable herein.

2020See, e.g., Bollinger, 552 A.2d at 360 (holding that a trial court’s order denying a public school’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of statutory immunity was not separable from and collateral to the underlying negligence action, where factual issues remained regarding the applicability of the real property exception to immunity); Gwiszcz v. City of Philadelphia, 550 A.2d 880, 881-82 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (concluding that a trial court’s order denying a motion for summary judgment filed by the Department of Transportation, which contended that the plaintiff failed to state a claim within

2020See, e.g., Bollinger, 552 A.2d at 360 (holding that a trial court’s order denying a public school’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of statutory immunity was not separable from and collateral to the underlying negligence action, where factual issues remained regarding the applicability of the real property exception to immunity); Gwiszcz v. City of Philadelphia, 550 A.2d 880, 881-82 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (concluding that a trial court’s order denying a motion for summary judgment filed by the Department of Transportation, which contended that the plaintiff failed to state a claim within

2020This Court addressed similar claims in Youst v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 739 A.2d 625, 627 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999), wherein landowners filed an action against the Department in this Court’s original jurisdiction raising claims for nuisance under Section 13 of the SWMA and seeking an order requiring the Department to maintain its storm water pipes.

2019Compare Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 292 (Pa. 1994) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 8550), with Kull v. Guisse, 81 A.3d 148 , 154 n.5 (Pa. Commw. 2013). 10 The exceptions to sovereign immunity include: vehicle liability; medical-professional liability; care, custody, or control of personal property; Commonwealth real estate, highways, and sidewalks; potholes and other dangerous conditions; care, custody, or control of animals; liquor store sales; National Guard activities; and toxoids and vaccines. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(1)–(9). [J-106-2018] - 15 (d) if force is intentionally used by the [empl

2019Compare Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 292 (Pa. 1994) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 8550), with Kull v. Guisse, 81 A.3d 148 , 154 n.5 (Pa. Commw. 2013). 10 The exceptions to sovereign immunity include: vehicle liability; medical-professional liability; care, custody, or control of personal property; Commonwealth real estate, highways, and sidewalks; potholes and other dangerous conditions; care, custody, or control of animals; liquor store sales; National Guard activities; and toxoids and vaccines. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(1)–(9). [J-106-2018] - 15 (d) if force is intentionally used by the [empl

2018Ray v. Pa. State Police, 654 A.2d 140, 141 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995); Pickering v. Sacavage, 642 A.2d 555, 560 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994).9 We first consider whether Mr. Caraballo’s appeal should be quashed because he did not serve his Statement on the trial court and, therefore, waived all of the issues raised therein.

2018Ray v. Pa. State Police, 654 A.2d 140, 141 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995); Pickering v. Sacavage, 642 A.2d 555, 560 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994).9 We first consider whether Mr. Caraballo’s appeal should be quashed because he did not serve his Statement on the trial court and, therefore, waived all of the issues raised therein.

2016See, e.g., Stein v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 989 A.2d 80, 84-85 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010); Crockett v. Edinboro University, 811 A.2d 1094, 1096 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). 11 Commonwealth with respect to the same, and that the failure to provide evaluation and treatment services to Tinkey constitutes negligence per se.

2016See, e.g., Stein v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 989 A.2d 80, 84-85 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010); Crockett v. Edinboro University, 811 A.2d 1094, 1096 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). .

2016See, e.g., Stein v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 989 A.2d 80, 84-85 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010); Crockett v. Edinboro University, 811 A.2d 1094, 1096 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). 11 Commonwealth with respect to the same, and that the failure to provide evaluation and treatment services to Tinkey constitutes negligence per se.

2016See, e.g., Stein v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 989 A.2d 80, 84-85 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010); Crockett v. Edinboro University, 811 A.2d 1094, 1096 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). .

2016The exceptions to sovereign immunity must be strictly construed because “the clear intent of the legislature is to insulate the government from exposure to tort liability.” Clark v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 962 A.2d 692, 694 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).

2016Dean, 751 A.2d at 1132 ; Mosley, 842 A.2d at 475 .

2016Mosley, 842 A.2d at 476-77 (transportation authority was immune from liability despite driver violation of its rules prohibiting deviation from authorized routes); Warrick, 709 A.2d at 426-27 (transportation authority was immune from liability despite driver violation of its operating procedure).

2016Mosley, 842 A.2d at 476-77 (transportation authority was immune from liability despite driver violation of its rules prohibiting deviation from authorized routes); Warrick, 709 A.2d at 426-27 (transportation authority was immune from liability despite driver violation of its operating procedure).