10 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1958–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
University of Florida v. McLarthygreen2 sentences2012Section 440.28, provides that an application for modification is required to be filed within two years “after the date copies of an order rejecting a claim are mailed to the parties.” See § 440.28, Fla. Stat. (2003); see also Univ. of Fla. v. McLarthy, 483 So.2d 723, 726 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (explaining application for modification must be filed within two years after entry of order rejecting claim, or, if award is granted, within two years after last payment pursuant to order). 1995Unlike the limitations period for filing a claim provided in section 440.19, Florida Statutes, the limitations period for modification of orders provided in section 440.28, Florida Statutes, is jurisdictional and is not an affirmative defense that may be waived by the parties. [1] Budget Luxury Inns, Inc. v. Boston, 407 So.2d 997 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), rev. denied, 415 So.2d 1359 (Fla. 1982); University of Florida v. McLarthy, 483 So.2d 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). | 1 | 2 |
Walter Denson & Son v. Nelsongreen1 sentence2004See, e.g., Jones v. Ludman Corp., 190 So.2d 760, 761-62 (Fla.1966) (noting that it could not ignore the explicit provision in section 440.28 by which a determination becomes final unless “modified upon petition filed within the specified time after the last payment of compensation”); Horton v. M & M Luncheonteria, Inc., 123 So.2d 332, 332 (Fla.1960) (“It is true that § 440.28 ... authorizes modification of compensation orders under § 440.28 ... provided application therefore is made within two years of the date of such order and other provisions of the statute are complied with.”); Walter Dens | 1 | 1 |
Horton v. M & M Luncheonteria, Inc.green1 sentence2004See, e.g., Jones v. Ludman Corp., 190 So.2d 760, 761-62 (Fla.1966) (noting that it could not ignore the explicit provision in section 440.28 by which a determination becomes final unless “modified upon petition filed within the specified time after the last payment of compensation”); Horton v. M & M Luncheonteria, Inc., 123 So.2d 332, 332 (Fla.1960) (“It is true that § 440.28 ... authorizes modification of compensation orders under § 440.28 ... provided application therefore is made within two years of the date of such order and other provisions of the statute are complied with.”); Walter Dens | 1 | 1 |
Kroll v. Steinfeldt-Thompson Co.green1 sentence2004See, e.g., Jones v. Ludman Corp., 190 So.2d 760, 761-62 (Fla.1966) (noting that it could not ignore the explicit provision in section 440.28 by which a determination becomes final unless “modified upon petition filed within the specified time after the last payment of compensation”); Horton v. M & M Luncheonteria, Inc., 123 So.2d 332, 332 (Fla.1960) (“It is true that § 440.28 ... authorizes modification of compensation orders under § 440.28 ... provided application therefore is made within two years of the date of such order and other provisions of the statute are complied with.”); Walter Dens | 1 | 1 |
US Casualty Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.green1 sentence2003They differed only in the number rating assigned. [2] Section 440.25(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1951), provided in pertinent part: "The order rejecting the claim or making the award (referred to in this chapter as a compensation order), together with a statement of the findings of fact and other matter pertinent to the questions at issue, shall be filed in the office of the commission at Tallahassee ...." (emphasis added). [3] The competent substantial evidence rule, so familiar to the workers' compensation bar and bench, was stated in United States Casualty Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 55 So.2 | 1 | 1 |
Curry v. Miami Dolphins, Ltd.green1 sentence2003Even in cases which must be resolved upon a true appraisal of testimony of medical experts, the deputy commissioner's findings of facts should be upheld unless there is no competent, substantial evidence, which accords with logic and reason, to sustain them. [4] Chapter 79-312, section 1, Laws of Florida, abolished the Industrial Relations Commission and transferred all appeals pending before the Commission to the First District Court of Appeal effective October 1, 1979, and provided that after September 30, 1979, review of any order of a deputy commissioner entered under chapter 440 would be | 1 | 1 |
Poorman v. Muncy & Bartle Paintinggreen1 sentence2003Even in cases which must be resolved upon a true appraisal of testimony of medical experts, the deputy commissioner's findings of facts should be upheld unless there is no competent, substantial evidence, which accords with logic and reason, to sustain them. [4] Chapter 79-312, section 1, Laws of Florida, abolished the Industrial Relations Commission and transferred all appeals pending before the Commission to the First District Court of Appeal effective October 1, 1979, and provided that after September 30, 1979, review of any order of a deputy commissioner entered under chapter 440 would be | 1 | 1 |
Dean v. McLeodgreen1 sentence1986See Dean v. McLeod, 270 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1972). | 1 | 1 |
Austin Co. v. Lindenbergergreen1 sentence1984Such new order shall not affect any compensation previously paid, except that an award increasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the date of the injury, and, if any part of the compensation due or to become due is unpaid, an award decreasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the date of the injury, and any payment made prior thereto in excess of such decreased rate shall be deducted from any unpaid compensation, in such manner and by such method as may be determined by the deputy commissioner. [2] East Manor Medical Care Center v. Stevens, 437 So.2d 721, 723 (F | 1 | 1 |
East Manor Medical Care Center v. Stevensgreen1 sentence1984Such new order shall not affect any compensation previously paid, except that an award increasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the date of the injury, and, if any part of the compensation due or to become due is unpaid, an award decreasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the date of the injury, and any payment made prior thereto in excess of such decreased rate shall be deducted from any unpaid compensation, in such manner and by such method as may be determined by the deputy commissioner. [2] East Manor Medical Care Center v. Stevens, 437 So.2d 721, 723 (F | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kimbrell v. Paige
green
1 sentence2007Section 440.28, Florida Statutes (1997), does allow any party in interest to file a petition for modification "on the ground of a change in condition or because of a mistake in a determination of fact." This petition, however, must be filed "prior to 2 years after the date of the last payment of compensation pursuant to the compensation order the party seeks to modify, or at any time prior to 2 years after the date copies of an order rejecting a claim are mailed to the parties. . . ." Id. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Budget Luxury Inns, Inc. v. Boston
green
1 sentence1995Unlike the limitations period for filing a claim provided in section 440.19, Florida Statutes, the limitations period for modification of orders provided in section 440.28, Florida Statutes, is jurisdictional and is not an affirmative defense that may be waived by the parties. [1] Budget Luxury Inns, Inc. v. Boston, 407 So.2d 997 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), rev. denied, 415 So.2d 1359 (Fla. 1982); University of Florida v. McLarthy, 483 So.2d 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Ford v. Alexander Cabinet Co.
neutral
1 sentence1986Id. at 1052 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Cheathem v. Fruit Bowl, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence1984Such new order shall not affect any compensation previously paid, except that an award increasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the date of the injury, and, if any part of the compensation due or to become due is unpaid, an award decreasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the date of the injury, and any payment made prior thereto in excess of such decreased rate shall be deducted from any unpaid compensation, in such manner and by such method as may be determined by the deputy commissioner. [2] East Manor Medical Care Center v. Stevens, 437 So.2d 721, 723 (F | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Mahler v. Lauderdale Lakes National Bank
green
1 sentence1984Such new order shall not affect any compensation previously paid, except that an award increasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the date of the injury, and, if any part of the compensation due or to become due is unpaid, an award decreasing the compensation rate may be made effective from the date of the injury, and any payment made prior thereto in excess of such decreased rate shall be deducted from any unpaid compensation, in such manner and by such method as may be determined by the deputy commissioner. [2] East Manor Medical Care Center v. Stevens, 437 So.2d 721, 723 (F | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Hall v. Seaboard Maritime Corporation
green
1 sentence1960In Hall v. Seaboard Maritime Corporation, Fla.App., 104 So.2d 384, 387 , the District Court correctly stated: “ * * * As we construe it, this section was intended to apply to those cases in which by reason of a lack of evidence the Commission has not had an opportunity to properly determine the issues arising out of a claim— * * * ” In the instant case there is no doubt the commission lacked “the most persuasive bit of evidence” i. e. the repair slip. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Gravel Products Corporation v. McManigal
green
1 sentence1958Ass'n v. Sheppeard, D.C. 1938, 42 F. Supp. 669 ; See: Gravel Products Corporation v. McManigal, D.C. 1936, 14 F. Supp. 414 . [8] Stansfield v. Lykes Bros. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Sonny Boy's Fruit Co. v. Compton
green
1 sentence1958"Upon their own initiative or upon application of any party in interest, on the ground of a change in condition or because of a mistake in a determination of fact the commission may at any time prior to two years after the date of the last payment of compensation pursuant to any compensation order, or at any time prior to two years after the date copies of an order rejecting a claim are mailed to the parties at the last known address of each, review a compensation case * * * and * * issue a new compensation order which may terminate, continue, reinstate, increase or decrease such compensation, | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Texas Employers' Ins. v. Sheppeard
green
1 sentence1958Ass'n v. Sheppeard, D.C. 1938, 42 F. Supp. 669 ; See: Gravel Products Corporation v. McManigal, D.C. 1936, 14 F. Supp. 414 . [8] Stansfield v. Lykes Bros. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.