76 Pennsylvania opinions name it 7 courts 1999–2026 22 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McCauslin v. Reliance Finance Co.green2 sentences2023In remanding the case for further proceedings, this Court made the following observations: (1) there should be “a sense of -8- J-A15045-23 proportionality between an award of damages [under the UTPCPL] and an award of attorney’s fees,” and (2) whether plaintiff has pursued other theories of recovery in addition to a UTPCPL claim “should [be] given consideration” in arriving at an appropriate award of fees. 751 A.2d at 685–686. 2023Co., 751 A.2d 683 (Pa. Super. 2000)], this Court held that prior to awarding counsel fees to a plaintiff on a UTPCPL claim, the defendant must have “a fair opportunity to address” the legitimacy of the claim. | 4 | 7 |
Krishnan v. Cutler Group, Inc.green2 sentences2025Furthermore, this Court has recognized that in the context of construction warranties, “[i]t is the failure to honor the warranty, not necessarily the issuance of the warranty that triggers liability and generates a UTPCPL claim.” Krishnan v. Cutler Group, Inc., 171 A.3d 856, 886 (Pa. Super. 2017) (emphasis in original; citation omitted). - 11 - J-A06007-25 As a preliminary matter, we observe Appellants’ contention that the trial court erred in determining expert testimony was required to sustain their negligence claim. 2025Furthermore, this Court has recognized that in the context of construction warranties, “[i]t is the failure to honor the warranty, not necessarily the issuance of the warranty that triggers liability and generates a UTPCPL claim.” Krishnan v. Cutler Group, Inc., 171 A.3d 856, 886 (Pa. Super. 2017) (emphasis in original; citation omitted). - 11 - J-A06007-25 As a preliminary matter, we observe Appellants’ contention that the trial court erred in determining expert testimony was required to sustain their negligence claim. | 4 | 5 |
Debbs v. Chrysler Corp.green2 sentences2004In Debts v. Chrysler Corp., 810 A.2d 137, 156-57 (Pa. Super. 2002). 2004Summary judgment based on the need for proof of individual reliance for UTPCPL claim (as set forth in Debbs v. Chrysler, 810 A.2d 137 (Pa. Super. 2002)), was denied by the Honorable Gene Cohen on the following basis: “In the instant case, there can be no doubt as to the materiality of the alleged defect. | 3 | 4 |
Morse, J. v. Fisher Asset Managementgreen2 sentences2020“A UTPCPL claim is subject to the 6-year statute of limitations[.]” Morse v. Fisher Asset Management, LLC, 206 A.3d 521, 526 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing 42 Pa.C.S § 5527(6)). - 14 - J-A03035-20 This Court’s review of Appellees’ Second Amended Complaint indicates that Appellees pleaded a HICPA claim,19 but that they did not specifically plead that Master Force had charged them an additional $2,000 for the installation of gutters and gutter covers, or that this resulted in Master Force’s violation of 73 P.S. § 517.9(8)(iii). 2020“A UTPCPL claim is subject to the 6-year statute of limitations[.]” Morse v. Fisher Asset Management, LLC, 206 A.3d 521, 526 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing 42 Pa.C.S § 5527(6)). - 14 - J-A03035-20 This Court’s review of Appellees’ Second Amended Complaint indicates that Appellees pleaded a HICPA claim,19 but that they did not specifically plead that Master Force had charged them an additional $2,000 for the installation of gutters and gutter covers, or that this resulted in Master Force’s violation of 73 P.S. § 517.9(8)(iii). | 3 | 3 |
Boehm, R. v. Riversource Life Insurancegreen2 sentences2023Moreover, “there should be ‘a sense of proportionality between an award of damages [under the UTPCPL] and an award of attorney's fees,’ and whether plaintiff has pursued other theories of recovery in addition to a UTPCPL claim ‘should [be] given consideration’ in arriving at an appropriate award of fees.” Id. (citing Neal v. Bavarian Motors, 882 A.2d 1022, 1031 (Pa. Super. 2005)). 2023Moreover, “there should be ‘a sense of proportionality between an award of damages [under the UTPCPL] and an award of attorney's fees,’ and whether plaintiff has pursued other theories of recovery in addition to a UTPCPL claim ‘should [be] given consideration’ in arriving at an appropriate award of fees.” Id. (citing Neal v. Bavarian Motors, 882 A.2d 1022, 1031 (Pa. Super. 2005)). | 2 | 5 |
Neal v. Bavarian Motors, Inc.green2 sentences2023Moreover, “there should be ‘a sense of proportionality between an award of damages [under the UTPCPL] and an award of attorney's fees,’ and whether plaintiff has pursued other theories of recovery in addition to a UTPCPL claim ‘should [be] given consideration’ in arriving at an appropriate award of fees.” Id. (citing Neal v. Bavarian Motors, 882 A.2d 1022, 1031 (Pa. Super. 2005)). 2023Moreover, “there should be ‘a sense of proportionality between an award of damages [under the UTPCPL] and an award of attorney's fees,’ and whether plaintiff has pursued other theories of recovery in addition to a UTPCPL claim ‘should [be] given consideration’ in arriving at an appropriate award of fees.” Id. (citing Neal v. Bavarian Motors, 882 A.2d 1022, 1031 (Pa. Super. 2005)). | 2 | 3 |
Bell v. Parkway Mortgage, Inc. (In Re Bell)green2 sentences2021The UTPCPL also gives trial courts discretion to award a plaintiff “up to three times the actual damages sustained” as well as “costs and reasonable attorney fees.” Jbid However, neither the statute’s treble damages provision nor its costs and attorney’s fees provision is triggered until a plaintiff prevails on his or her UTPCPL claim, which requires, as an element, proof of the “actual damages sustained.” See, Krishnan v. Cutler Grp., Inc., 171 A.3d 856, 871 (Pa. Super. 2017) (The UTPCPL “authorizes the trial judge to grant a successful litigant an award for ... reasonable attorney fees, and 2021However, neither the statute’s treble damages provision nor its costs and attorney’s fees provision is triggered until a plaintiff prevails on his or her UTPCPL claim, which requires, as an element, proof of the “actual damages sustained.” See, Krishnan v. Cutler Grp., Inc., 171 A.3d 856, 871 (Pa. Super. 2017) (The UTPCPL “authorizes the trial judge to grant a successful litigant an award for ... reasonable attorney fees, and costs{.]”); accord, In re Bell, 314 B.R. 54, 60 (Bankr. | 2 | 2 |
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Comwlth. of PAgreen2 sentences2021After concluding Anadarko was engaged in trade and commerce when it purchased mineral rights through leases, the Commonwealth Court then concluded these lease transactions can give rise to a UTPCPL claim because Section 3 outlaws all “‘[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.’” Id. (quoting 73 P.S. § 201-3). 2021After concluding Anadarko was engaged in trade and commerce when it purchased mineral rights through leases, the Commonwealth Court then concluded these lease transactions can give rise to a UTPCPL claim because Section 3 outlaws all “‘[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.’” Id. (quoting 73 P.S. § 201-3). | 1 | 2 |
Yocca v. Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc.green2 sentences2015In holding that plaintiffs did not state a UTPCPL claim, the Supreme Court, citing Weinberg , concluded that a plaintiff in a private action under the UTPCPL “must show he justifiably relied on the defendant’s wrongful conduct or representation and that he suffered harm because of that reliance.” Yocca, 854 A.2d at 438 . 2015In holding that plaintiffs did not state a UTPCPL claim, the Supreme Court, citing Weinberg , concluded that a plaintiff in a private action under the UTPCPL “must show he justifiably relied on the defendant’s wrongful conduct or representation and that he suffered harm because of that reliance.” Yocca, 854 A.2d at 438 . | 1 | 2 |
Knight v. Springfield Hyundaigreen2 sentences2018Knight, 81 A.3d at 950 ; see Homeowner’s Brief, 659 MDA 2017, at 31, 34, 36-37 n.5; Contractor’s Brief, 659 MDA 2017, at 24-25; Order, 5/16/14, at 3, 5. - 33 - J-A04042-18 Judgment Entered. 2017See e.g., Knight v. Springfield Hyundai, 81 A.3d 940, 951 (Pa. Super. 2013) (determining that gist of action for UTPCPL claim was in tort and not breach of contract); Gabriel, 534 A.2d at 393-394 (discussing cases where Courts analyzed whether claim under the UTPCPL should be subject to the tort or breach of contract statute of limitations). | 1 | 2 |
Agliori v. Metropolitan Life Insurancegreen2 sentences2006Agliori, supra at 321 (emphasis in original). ¶ 27 In the case sub judice, Appellants argue that they, like the plaintiffs in Metz and Agliori , should have been awarded compensatory damages calculated in relation to the terms of the underlying transaction that gave rise to the UTPCPL violation. 2006Agliori, supra at 321 (emphasis in original). ¶ 27 In the case sub judice, Appellants argue that they, like the plaintiffs in Metz and Agliori , should have been awarded compensatory damages calculated in relation to the terms of the underlying transaction that gave rise to the UTPCPL violation. | 1 | 2 |
Patterson v. Chrysler Financial Co. (In Re Patterson)green2 sentences2026Without even identifying the subsection of the UTPCPL under which the spectator’s claims arose, the panel stated: eliminated the need to plead all of the elements of common law fraud[.]”); In re Patterson, 263 B.R. 82, 92 (Bankr. 2026Without even identifying the subsection of the UTPCPL under which the spectator’s claims arose, the panel stated: eliminated the need to plead all of the elements of common law fraud[.]”); In re Patterson, 263 B.R. 82, 92 (Bankr. | 1 | 1 |
Butler v. Illesgreen2 sentences2026Butler v. Illes, 747 A.2d 943, 944 (Pa.Super. 2000) (holding appellant waived claim where she failed to set forth adequate argument concerning her claim on appeal; appellant’s argument lacked meaningful substance and consisted of mere conclusory statements; appellant failed to cogently explain or even tenuously assert why trial court abused its discretion or made error of law). 2026Butler v. Illes, 747 A.2d 943, 944 (Pa.Super. 2000) (holding appellant waived claim where she failed to set forth adequate argument concerning her claim on appeal; appellant’s argument lacked meaningful substance and consisted of mere conclusory statements; appellant failed to cogently explain or even tenuously assert why trial court abused its discretion or made error of law). | 1 | 1 |
Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Szymanskigreen2 sentences2026See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Szymanski, 936 A.2d 87, 92-93 (Pa. Super. 2007). 2026See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Szymanski, 936 A.2d 87, 92-93 (Pa. Super. 2007). | 1 | 1 |
Sampathkumar, P. v. Chase Home Financegreen2 sentences2026In this court, Mirabella argues four bases for deeming his first post-trial motion timely filed: (1) he was not required to file a post-trial motion on the jury verdict when the UTPCPL claim was still pending; see Sampathkumar v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 241 A.3d 1122, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2020) (finding where a case is divided into jury and non-jury phases, an appellant can wait until disposition on both parts phases before filing post-trial motions); (2) the victim’s praecipe to enter judgment following the expiration of 120 days from judgment was premature because the court entered judgment only o 2026In this court, Mirabella argues four bases for deeming his first post-trial motion timely filed: (1) he was not required to file a post-trial motion on the jury verdict when the UTPCPL claim was still pending; see Sampathkumar v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 241 A.3d 1122, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2020) (finding where a case is divided into jury and non-jury phases, an appellant can wait until disposition on both parts phases before filing post-trial motions); (2) the victim’s praecipe to enter judgment following the expiration of 120 days from judgment was premature because the court entered judgment only o | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Burnsgreen2 sentences2026Id. at 311 (citing Burkholder, 607 A.2d at 749 ). 2026Id. at 311 (citing Burkholder, 607 A.2d at 749 ). | 1 | 1 |
Papalia v. Montour Auto Service Co.green2 sentences2026In this court, Mirabella argues four bases for deeming his first post-trial motion timely filed: (1) he was not required to file a post-trial motion on the jury verdict when the UTPCPL claim was still pending; see Sampathkumar v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 241 A.3d 1122, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2020) (finding where a case is divided into jury and non-jury phases, an appellant can wait until disposition on both parts phases before filing post-trial motions); (2) the victim’s praecipe to enter judgment following the expiration of 120 days from judgment was premature because the court entered judgment only o 2026In this court, Mirabella argues four bases for deeming his first post-trial motion timely filed: (1) he was not required to file a post-trial motion on the jury verdict when the UTPCPL claim was still pending; see Sampathkumar v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 241 A.3d 1122, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2020) (finding where a case is divided into jury and non-jury phases, an appellant can wait until disposition on both parts phases before filing post-trial motions); (2) the victim’s praecipe to enter judgment following the expiration of 120 days from judgment was premature because the court entered judgment only o | 1 | 1 |
Mammoccio v. 1818 Market Partnershipgreen2 sentences2026In this court, Mirabella argues four bases for deeming his first post-trial motion timely filed: (1) he was not required to file a post-trial motion on the jury verdict when the UTPCPL claim was still pending; see Sampathkumar v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 241 A.3d 1122, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2020) (finding where a case is divided into jury and non-jury phases, an appellant can wait until disposition on both parts phases before filing post-trial motions); (2) the victim’s praecipe to enter judgment following the expiration of 120 days from judgment was premature because the court entered judgment only o 2026In this court, Mirabella argues four bases for deeming his first post-trial motion timely filed: (1) he was not required to file a post-trial motion on the jury verdict when the UTPCPL claim was still pending; see Sampathkumar v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 241 A.3d 1122, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2020) (finding where a case is divided into jury and non-jury phases, an appellant can wait until disposition on both parts phases before filing post-trial motions); (2) the victim’s praecipe to enter judgment following the expiration of 120 days from judgment was premature because the court entered judgment only o | 1 | 1 |
Krebs v. United Refining Co. of Pennsylvaniagreen2 sentences2024See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Rule 1925(b) Statement … are waived.”); Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“No question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.”); Krebs, 893 A.2d at 797 (“We will not ordinarily consider any issue if it has not been set forth in or suggested by an appellate brief’s statement of questions involved, and any issue not raised in a statement of matters complained of on appeal is deemed waived.”) (citations omitted). 2024See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Rule 1925(b) Statement … are waived.”); Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“No question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.”); Krebs, 893 A.2d at 797 (“We will not ordinarily consider any issue if it has not been set forth in or suggested by an appellate brief’s statement of questions involved, and any issue not raised in a statement of matters complained of on appeal is deemed waived.”) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
El-Gharbaoui, A. v. Ajayi, A.green2 sentences2023El-Gharbaoui v. Ajayi, 260 A.3d 944, 962 (Pa. Super. 2021); see also 42 Pa. C.S. § 5527(b) (stating that, “[a]ny civil action or proceeding which is neither subject to another limitation specified in this subchapter nor excluded from the application of a period of limitation by section 5531 (relating to no limitation) must be commenced within six years”). 7 IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Brian and Virginia Kerslake and : William and Cheryl Wardle, : Appellants : : v. : No. 1342 C.D. 2021 : Sunoco Pipeline, L.P. and : Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. : ORDER AND NOW, this 18th day of M 2023El-Gharbaoui v. Ajayi, 260 A.3d 944, 962 (Pa. Super. 2021); see also 42 Pa. C.S. § 5527(b) (stating that, “[a]ny civil action or proceeding which is neither subject to another limitation specified in this subchapter nor excluded from the application of a period of limitation by section 5531 (relating to no limitation) must be commenced within six years”). 7 IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Brian and Virginia Kerslake and : William and Cheryl Wardle, : Appellants : : v. : No. 1342 C.D. 2021 : Sunoco Pipeline, L.P. and : Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. : ORDER AND NOW, this 18th day of M | 1 | 1 |
Valley Forge Towers South Condominium v. Ron-Ike Foam Insulators, Inc.green2 sentences2022Valley Forge Towers S. Condominium v. Ron-Ike Foam Insulators, Inc., 574 A.2d 641, 647 (Pa. Super. 1990). 2022Valley Forge Towers S. Condominium v. Ron-Ike Foam Insulators, Inc., 574 A.2d 641, 647 (Pa. Super. 1990). | 1 | 1 |
| Berg, D. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.green | 1 | 1 |
Bennett v. A.T. Masterpiece Homes at Broadsprings, LLCgreen2 sentences2021Masterpiece Homes at Broadsprings, LLC, 40 A.3d 145, 149 (Pa. Super. 2012) (affirming jury finding of UTPCPL violation); Neal v. Bavarian Motors, Inc., 882 A.2d 1022, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2005) (affirming jury finding of UTPCPL violation, but remanding for trial court to recalculate award of attorneys’ fees). 2021Masterpiece Homes at Broadsprings, LLC, 40 A.3d 145, 149 (Pa. Super. 2012) (affirming jury finding of UTPCPL violation); Neal v. Bavarian Motors, Inc., 882 A.2d 1022, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2005) (affirming jury finding of UTPCPL violation, but remanding for trial court to recalculate award of attorneys’ fees). | 1 | 1 |
| Richards, R. v. Ameriprise Financialgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Burke v. Yinglinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pettko v. Pennsylvania American Water Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Com. of PA Acting by AG Kathleen Kane v. Golden Gate National Senior Care LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gabriel v. O'HARAgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Prime Meats, Inc. v. Yochimgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Eiser v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Yelin v. Swartzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Hyundai Motor Americagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Mendezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Booze v. Allstate Insurance Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Croft v. P & W Foreign Car Service, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Taurino v. Ellengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committeegreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Milbournegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Price v. Chevrolet Motor Division of General Motors Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fazio v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America
green
2 sentences2026To prevail on a UTPCPL claim, “a plaintiff must then prove the following: 1) the defendant was engaged in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and 2) the transaction between plaintiff and defendant constituted trade or commerce within the meaning of the UTPCPL.” Id. (cleaned up). 2026To prevail on a UTPCPL claim, “a plaintiff must then prove the following: 1) the defendant was engaged in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and 2) the transaction between plaintiff and defendant constituted trade or commerce within the meaning of the UTPCPL.” Id. (cleaned up). | 4 | 2016–2026 |
Grimes v. Enterprise Leasing Co. of Philadelphia, LLC
green
2 sentences2018Significantly, with respect to the "ascertainable loss" element of a valid UTPCPL claim, our Supreme Court held: "[T]he mere acquisition of counsel would not suffice to satisfy the 'ascertainable loss' requirement." Grimes v. Enterprise Leasing Co. of Philadelphia, LLC , 629 Pa. 457 , 465, 105 A.3d 1188 , 1193 (2014). 2018Significantly, with respect to the "ascertainable loss" element of a valid UTPCPL claim, our Supreme Court held: "[T]he mere acquisition of counsel would not suffice to satisfy the 'ascertainable loss' requirement." Grimes v. Enterprise Leasing Co. of Philadelphia, LLC , 629 Pa. 457 , 465, 105 A.3d 1188 , 1193 (2014). | 2 | 2016–2018 |
Toy v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
green
2 sentences2012We also reject the Fazios’ reliance on Toy v. Metropolitan Life, 593 Pa. 20 , 928 A.2d 186 (2007) for the proposition that UTPCPL claims are solely grounded in common law fraud. 2012We also reject the Fazios’ reliance on Toy v. Metropolitan Life, 593 Pa. 20 , 928 A.2d 186 (2007) for the proposition that UTPCPL claims are solely grounded in common law fraud. | 2 | 2008–2012 |
Weinberg v. Sun Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2002Cf. Weinberg v. Sun Co., 565 Pa. 612 , 777 A.2d 442 (2001) (holding that private UTPCPL claim included individual questions of fact and could not be certified); Klemow v. Time Inc., 466 Pa. 189 , 197 n.17, 352 A.2d 12 , 16 n.17 (1976) (Because a showing of reliance, as required for a fraud action, “would normally vary from person to person, this cause of action is not generally appropriate for resolution in a plaintiff-class action.”). 2002Cf. Weinberg v. Sun Co., 565 Pa. 612 , 777 A.2d 442 (2001) (holding that private UTPCPL claim included individual questions of fact and could not be certified); Klemow v. Time Inc., 466 Pa. 189 , 197 n.17, 352 A.2d 12 , 16 n.17 (1976) (Because a showing of reliance, as required for a fraud action, “would normally vary from person to person, this cause of action is not generally appropriate for resolution in a plaintiff-class action.”). | 2 | 2002–2011 |
Burkholder v. Cherry
green
2 sentences2026Id. at 311 (citing Burkholder, 607 A.2d at 749 ). 2026Id. at 311 (citing Burkholder, 607 A.2d at 749 ). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Elkin v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pennsylvania
green
2 sentences2023Elkin, 420 A.2d at 377 . 2023Elkin, 420 A.2d at 377 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Richards v. Ameriprise Financial, Inc.
green
2 sentences2023Richards I, 152 A.3d at 1038-39 . 2023Richards I, 152 A.3d at 1038-39 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Umbelina v. Adams
green
2 sentences2023Umbelina v. Adams, 34 A.3d 151 , 159 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 47 A.3d 848 (Pa. 2012). 4 In a non-precedential decision, the Third Circuit affirmed on alternate grounds, holding that the plaintiff failed to allege justifiable reliance on an - 10 - J-A18006-22 In McLean v. Big Lots, 542 F.Supp.3d 343 (W.D.Pa. 2021), the Federal District Court dismissed a UTPCPL claim based on allegedly improper taxation of protective face masks. 2023Umbelina v. Adams, 34 A.3d 151 , 159 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 47 A.3d 848 (Pa. 2012). 4 In a non-precedential decision, the Third Circuit affirmed on alternate grounds, holding that the plaintiff failed to allege justifiable reliance on an - 10 - J-A18006-22 In McLean v. Big Lots, 542 F.Supp.3d 343 (W.D.Pa. 2021), the Federal District Court dismissed a UTPCPL claim based on allegedly improper taxation of protective face masks. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Danganan, J., Aplt. v. Guardian Protection Svc. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Yocca v. Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Baker v. FAMILY CREDIT COUNSELING COPR. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Commonwealth v. Tap Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Dixon, J. v. Northwestern Mutual green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Goda v. White Cliff Leasing Partnership green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Kern v. Lehigh Valley Hospital, Inc. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Grimes v. Enterprise Leasing Co. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Kaymark v. Bank of America, N.A. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Berg v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Jarzyna v. Home Properties, L.P. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Sewak v. Lockhart green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Toy v. Metropolitan Life Insurance green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Frey v. Smith green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Basile v. H & R BLOCK, INC. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Basile v. H & R BLOCK, INC. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| D'AMELIO v. Blue Cross of Lehigh Valley green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Klemow v. Time Incorporated green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Werwinski v. Ford Motor Company green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Smith v. Brink green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.