Jenkins claim (Georgia) · Go Syfert
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Jenkins claim in Georgia

10 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2021 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
In the Interest of A. R. B.green
gactapp · 1993 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
2 sentences

2021B., 209 Ga. App. 324, 326 (2) ( 433 SE2d 411 ) (1993) (physical precedent only).

2021B., 209 Ga. App. 324, 326 (2) ( 433 SE2d 411 ) (1993) (physical precedent only).

11
Murdock v. Perkinsgreen
ga · 1964 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011See Murdock v. Perkins, 219 Ga. 756, 758-759 (1) ( 135 SE2d 869 ) (1964).

2011See Murdock v. Perkins, 219 Ga. 756, 758-759 (1) ( 135 SE2d 869 ) (1964).

11
Hickey v. Kostas Chiropractic Clinics, P.A.green
gactapp · 2003 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
2 sentences

2006In considering Jenkins’ brief, “we are guided by the general rule that pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards than pleadings that are drafted by lawyers.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hickey v. Kostas Chiropractic Clinics, P.A., 259 Ga. App. 222, 223 ( 576 SE2d 614 ) (2003).

2006In considering Jenkins’ brief, “we are guided by the general rule that pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards than pleadings that are drafted by lawyers.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hickey v. Kostas Chiropractic Clinics, P.A., 259 Ga. App. 222, 223 ( 576 SE2d 614 ) (2003).

11
Tallent v. McKelveygreen
gactapp · 1962 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000We accordingly hold that the trial court erred in denying Jenkins’ motion for new trial. 2 Tallent v. McKelvey, 105 Ga. App. 660, 662 (3) ( 125 SE2d 65 ) (1962). 2.

2000We accordingly hold that the trial court erred in denying Jenkins’ motion for new trial. 2 Tallent v. McKelvey, 105 Ga. App. 660, 662 (3) ( 125 SE2d 65 ) (1962). 2.

11
Southern Electronics Distributors, Inc. v. Andersongreen
gactapp · 1998 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
2 sentences

1999The trial court found that Jenkins’ claim of constitutional violations was precluded by the doctrine of sovereign immunity; however, pretermitting the issue of sovereign immunity, the evidence does not support Jenkins’ claim that the Department violated her constitutional rights. “[A] judgment right for any reason will be affirmed.” Southern Electronics Distrib. v. Anderson, 232 Ga. App. 648, 650 (2) ( 502 SE2d 257 ) (1998).

1999The trial court found that Jenkins’ claim of constitutional violations was precluded by the doctrine of sovereign immunity; however, pretermitting the issue of sovereign immunity, the evidence does not support Jenkins’ claim that the Department violated her constitutional rights. “[A] judgment right for any reason will be affirmed.” Southern Electronics Distrib. v. Anderson, 232 Ga. App. 648, 650 (2) ( 502 SE2d 257 ) (1998).

11
Rogers v. Norvellgreen
gactapp · 1985 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
2 sentences

1987Held: 1. “[I]t is the general rule in the majority of states that in a legal malpractice action, the client has the burden of establishing three elements: (1) employment of the defendant attorney, (2) failure of the attorney to exercise ordinary care, skill and diligence, and (3) that such negligence was the proximate cause of damage to the plaintiff. [Cits.]” Rogers v. Norvell, 174 Ga. App. 453, 457 ( 330 SE2d 392 ).

1987Held: 1. “[I]t is the general rule in the majority of states that in a legal malpractice action, the client has the burden of establishing three elements: (1) employment of the defendant attorney, (2) failure of the attorney to exercise ordinary care, skill and diligence, and (3) that such negligence was the proximate cause of damage to the plaintiff. [Cits.]” Rogers v. Norvell, 174 Ga. App. 453, 457 ( 330 SE2d 392 ).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Dupree v. Keller Industries, Inc. green
gactapp · 1991
2 sentences

2013There is no finding by the Court of Appeals of a violation of any regulation, directive, or standard authorized by 15 USC § 6801 (b), to support Jenkins’s claim of the Bank’s negligence. 3 Compare McLain v. Mariner Health Care, 279 Ga. App. 410 ( 631 SE2d 435 ) (2006); Dupree v. Keller Industries, 199 Ga. App. 138 ( 404 SE2d 291 ) (1991).

2013There is no finding by the Court of Appeals of a violation of any regulation, directive, or standard authorized by 15 USC § 6801 (b), to support Jenkins’s claim of the Bank’s negligence. 3 Compare McLain v. Mariner Health Care, 279 Ga. App. 410 ( 631 SE2d 435 ) (2006); Dupree v. Keller Industries, 199 Ga. App. 138 ( 404 SE2d 291 ) (1991).

12013–2013
McLain v. Mariner Health Care, Inc. green
gactapp · 2006
2 sentences

2013There is no finding by the Court of Appeals of a violation of any regulation, directive, or standard authorized by 15 USC § 6801 (b), to support Jenkins’s claim of the Bank’s negligence. 3 Compare McLain v. Mariner Health Care, 279 Ga. App. 410 ( 631 SE2d 435 ) (2006); Dupree v. Keller Industries, 199 Ga. App. 138 ( 404 SE2d 291 ) (1991).

2013There is no finding by the Court of Appeals of a violation of any regulation, directive, or standard authorized by 15 USC § 6801 (b), to support Jenkins’s claim of the Bank’s negligence. 3 Compare McLain v. Mariner Health Care, 279 Ga. App. 410 ( 631 SE2d 435 ) (2006); Dupree v. Keller Industries, 199 Ga. App. 138 ( 404 SE2d 291 ) (1991).

12013–2013
In re D. H. green
ga · 2008
2 sentences

2008H., 283 Ga. 556 (1) ( 663 SE2d 139 ) (2008) (this Court had jurisdiction where the constitutional question was raised and distinctly ruled upon orally at the hearing). 1 Here, in accordance with OCGA § 5-6-34 (a), there is a final appealable judgment of conviction for Jenkins’ violation of OCGA § 42-1-12.

2008In re D.H., 283 Ga. 556 (1), 663 S.E.2d 139 (2008) (this Court had jurisdiction where the constitutional question was raised and distinctly ruled upon orally at the hearing). [1] Here, in accordance with OCGA § 5-6-34(a), there is a final appealable judgment of conviction for Jenkins' violation of OCGA § 42-1-12.

12008–2008
In Re DH green
ga · 2008
2 sentences

2008H., 283 Ga. 556 (1) ( 663 SE2d 139 ) (2008) (this Court had jurisdiction where the constitutional question was raised and distinctly ruled upon orally at the hearing). 1 Here, in accordance with OCGA § 5-6-34 (a), there is a final appealable judgment of conviction for Jenkins’ violation of OCGA § 42-1-12.

2008In re D.H., 283 Ga. 556 (1), 663 S.E.2d 139 (2008) (this Court had jurisdiction where the constitutional question was raised and distinctly ruled upon orally at the hearing). [1] Here, in accordance with OCGA § 5-6-34(a), there is a final appealable judgment of conviction for Jenkins' violation of OCGA § 42-1-12.

12008–2008
Housing Authority of Atlanta v. Parks green
gactapp · 1988
2 sentences

2003Housing Auth. of Atlanta v. Parks, 189 Ga. App. 97 ( 374 SE2d 842 ) (1988).

2003Housing Auth. of Atlanta v. Parks, 189 Ga. App. 97 ( 374 SE2d 842 ) (1988).

12003–2003
Hood v. Legg green
ga · 1925
2 sentences

1983In a per curiam decision in which two justices concurred, two concurred specially, and three dissented, the majority opinion applied the Jenkins analysis and held that the case under consideration was distinguishable because, in contrast to cases such as Jenkins, supra, and Hood v. Legg, 160 Ga. 620 ( 128 SE 891 ) (1925), in which the promissors had sold the goodwill of their businesses and had been compensated for it, Redmond was a buyer who had made his covenants not to compete in conjunction with the acquisition of an interest in Royal Ford.

1983In a per curiam decision in which two justices concurred, two concurred specially, and three dissented, the majority opinion applied the Jenkins analysis and held that the case under consideration was distinguishable because, in contrast to cases such as Jenkins, supra, and Hood v. Legg, 160 Ga. 620 ( 128 SE 891 ) (1925), in which the promissors had sold the goodwill of their businesses and had been compensated for it, Redmond was a buyer who had made his covenants not to compete in conjunction with the acquisition of an interest in Royal Ford.

11983–1983

Where else courts name it

OH 16 (1985–2025) TX 12 (1969–2020) CA 11 (1985–2024) MS 10 (1997–2018) GA 10 (1983–2021) FL 9 (1989–2024) AL 9 (2005–2013) WV 6 (1995–2020) MD 6 (2003–2015) IL 6 (1983–2018) LA 6 (2001–2017) IN 4 (1990–2018) MI 4 (1985–2018) MO 3 (1970–2012) WI 3 (2006–2014) DC 3 (1984–2009) HI 3 (2012–2017) KY 3 (2016–2020) UT 3 (2013–2013) NE 3 (2016–2020) DE 3 (1981–2010) NJ 3 (2001–2025) NY 3 (1990–2015) KS 2 (1973–2004) ME 2 (2001–2002) WA 2 (1978–2013) MA 2 (2002–2019)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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