10 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Turmangreen2 sentences2015We further held that “by telling jurors that it was for them to collectively determine what reasonable doubt meant, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jurors understood the instruction to allow a conviction based on proof less than a reasonable doubt.” Id. ¶ 28 (citing Turman, 2011 IL App (1st) 091019, ¶¶ 25, 27 ). ¶ 22 One year later, a panel of the First District different than the panel that decided Turman issued a contrary opinion. 2012See Turman, 2011 IL App (1st) 091019, ¶¶ 25, 27 ; Victor, 511 U.S. at 5, 22-23 . | 2 | 2 |
Victor v. Nebraskagreen2 sentences2022“Any instruction defining reasonable doubt violates a defendant’s due process rights only if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jurors understood the instruction to allow conviction upon proof less than beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 128 G. 2022Thus, the “significant doubt” instruction presented a risk “that the jurors understood the instruction to allow conviction upon proof less than beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. ¶ 18. ¶ 132 Although there appears to be no Illinois precedent discussing the specific phrase “significant doubt” in this context, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Victor, 511 U.S. 1 , provides some guidance. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2015See Johnson, 2013 IL App (1st) 111317 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Franklin
green
2 sentences2018On appeal, the appellate court found that the trial court’s instruction to potential jurors was constitutionally deficient because, “by telling jurors that it was for them to collectively determine what reasonable doubt meant, there [was] a reasonable likelihood that the jurors understood the instruction to allow a conviction based on proof less than a reasonable doubt.” Franklin, 2012 IL App (3d) 100618, ¶ 28 . 2017On appeal, the appellate court found that the trial court's instruction to potential jurors was constitutionally deficient because, "by telling jurors that it was for them to collectively determine what reasonable doubt meant, there [was] a reasonable likelihood that the jurors understood the instruction to allow a conviction based on proof less than a reasonable doubt." Franklin , 2012 IL App (3d) 100618 , ¶ 28, 361 Ill.Dec. 301 , 970 N.E.2d 1247 . | 2 | 2017–2018 |
People v. Downs
green
2 sentences2016The appellate court majority in Franklin held that this instruction "was constitutionally deficient because, by telling jurors that it was for them to collectively determine what reasonable doubt meant, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jurors understood the instruction to allow a conviction based on proof less than [beyond] a reasonable doubt." Id. ¶ 28. ¶ 67 However, in People v. Downs, 2015 IL 117934 , our supreme court recently found that the trial court's instructions to the jury that " '[w]e cannot give you a definition[;] it is your duty to - 29 - 1-13-0071, 1-13-0715 (Cons.) de 2016The appellate court majority in Franklin held that this instruction “was constitutionally deficient because, by telling jurors that it was for them to collectively determine what reasonable doubt meant, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jurors understood the instruction to allow a conviction based on proof less than [beyond] a reasonable doubt.” Id. ¶ 28. ¶ 63 However, in People v. Downs, 2015 IL 117934 , our supreme court recently found that the trial court’s instructions to the jury that “ ‘[w]e cannot give you a definition[;] it is your duty to define,’ ” was an “unquestionably corr | 2 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Thomas
green
1 sentence2015The appellate court majority in Franklin held that this instruction “was constitutionally deficient because, by telling jurors that it was for them to collectively determine what reasonable doubt meant, there is a reasonable -6- likelihood that the jurors understood the instruction to allow a conviction based on proof less than [beyond] a reasonable doubt.” Id. ¶ 28. ¶ 23 However, in People v. Thomas, 2014 IL App (2d) 121203 , the Second District retreated from its earlier reliance, in the case at bar, on Turman and Franklin. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Downs
green
1 sentence2014(The court then determined that the erroneous reasonable-doubt instruction constituted structural error (id. ¶ 23) and thus was cognizable as plain error (id. ¶ 28).) - 10 - 2014 IL App (2d) 121156 ¶ 27 Turman and Franklin focus on (1) the improper instruction that the jury is to collectively determine the meaning of reasonable doubt, and (2) the danger that the jury will convict a defendant on proof that did not meet the reasonable-doubt standard. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Sandstrom v. Montana
green
2 sentences1981In Sandstrom v. Montana (1979), 442 U.S. 510, 513 , 61 L. 1981In Sandstrom v. Montana (1979), 442 U.S. 510, 513 , 61 L. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.