coram nobis claim in Tennessee

2024Timely filing of a petition for the writ of error coram nobis “‘is an essential element of a coram nobis claim.’” Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 826 (quoting Harris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 141, 153 (Tenn. 2010) (Koch, J., concurring)).

2024App. Nov. 17, 2020) (determining that the petitioner exercised due diligence in pursuing coram nobis relief by filing the petition less than one year after discovering new evidence); see also Harris, 301 S.W.3d at 144 (stating that due process tolling was not warranted when the petitioner waited six years to present a coram nobis claim after learning about alibi evidence and waiting almost two years after learning - 16 - of third-party confession) (overruled on other grounds by Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 828 ); Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 830-31 (due process tolling is not warranted when the petitioner w

2026Compliance with the one-year statute of limitations is an “essential element of a coram nobis claim.” Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 828 .

2025However, Petitioner fails to expand upon how these references relate to his claims, and thus, we will limit our analysis to those claims supported by argument. -4- the one-year statute of limitations is an “essential element of a coram nobis claim.” Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 828 .

2018After the May 25, 2016 hearing but prior to the September 22, 2016 hearing, the Tennessee Supreme Court decided Frazier, 495 S.W.3d at 253, wherein it overturned Wlodarz, 361 S.W.3d at 503-04 , and held that “the coram nobis statute is not available as a procedural mechanism for collaterally attacking a guilty plea.” 1 Although the trial transcript was admitted as an exhibit during the coram nobis hearing on September 22, 2016, the trial transcript was not included in the record on appeal. 2 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). -2- On March 2, 2017, the trial court entered its ord

2017Wlodarz v. State, 361 S.W.3d 490, 506 (Tenn. 2012) abrogated on other grounds by Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246, 248 (Tenn. 2016).

2026Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100, 101 (Tenn. 2001) (summarizing the procedural history leading to the supreme court’s decision to remand for a coram nobis hearing). 6 983 S.W.2d at 673, n.17 (affirming this court’s enunciation of the three-part standard for newly discovered evidence). - 15 - Vasques and Workman make clear that more than “a reasonable basis” is required to justify a new trial under Rule 33(a).

2023The statute of limitations for filing a petition for writ of error coram nobis is one year, see T.C.A. § 27-7-103; Mixon, 983 S.W.2d at 670 , and “compliance with the timely filing requirement in Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-7-103 is an essential element of a coram nobis claim,” see Nunley v. State, 552 S.W.3d 800, 828 (Tenn. 2018) (citations omitted).

2026Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100, 101 (Tenn. 2001) (summarizing the procedural history leading to the supreme court’s decision to remand for a coram nobis hearing). 6 983 S.W.2d at 673, n.17 (affirming this court’s enunciation of the three-part standard for newly discovered evidence). - 15 - Vasques and Workman make clear that more than “a reasonable basis” is required to justify a new trial under Rule 33(a).

2010See Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Tenn. 2001) (stating that the principles of due process may preclude the use of the statute of limitations to bar a coram nobis claim).

2026Vasques, 221 S.W.3d at 525-28 ; Workman, 111 S.W.3d at 18 .

2013See id. (“If the defendant is ‘without fault’ in the sense that the exercise of reasonable diligence would not have led to a timely discovery of the new information, the trial judge must then consider both the evidence at trial and that offered at the coram nobis proceeding in order to determine whether the new evidence may have led to a different result.”).

2022Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 828 . “[B]efore a state may terminate a claim for failure to comply with procedural requirements such as statutes of limitations, due process requires that potential litigants be provided an opportunity for the presentation of claims at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Buford, 845 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Tenn. 1992); see also Workman, 41 S.W.3d 100, 102 (Tenn. 2001) (applying the holding in Buford, a post-conviction proceeding, to error coram nobis proceedings).

1995In its opinion, the Court first held that the coram nobis claim was barred by Tenn.Code Ann. 27-7-103 — the one-year statute of limitations applicable to such actions. 3 As to the post-conviction claim, the *299 Court determined the jury instructions did in fact violate Sandstrom and that, pursuant to this Court’s decision in Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn.1992), the post-conviction claim was not barred by Tenn. Code Ann. 40-30-102 — the three-year statute of limitations applicable to such claims. 4 However, the Court concluded that the Sandstrom error was harmless under the circumstan

2026Vasques, 221 S.W.3d at 525-28 ; Workman, 111 S.W.3d at 18 .

2017See State v. Workman, 111 S.W.3d 10, 18 (Tenn. Crim.

2016See Wilson, 367 S.W.3d at 234 ; see also Harris, 301 S.W.3d at 144-45 (holding that the State‟s failure to raise the untimeliness of the coram nobis petition as an issue on appeal does not preclude this court from determining whether the petition is barred by the statute of limitations); Cf. Harris, 301 S.W.3d at 153 & n.17 (Koch, J., concurring in part and concurring in result) (stating that the statute of limitations issue should no longer be characterized as an affirmative defense because compliance with the timely filing requirement is an essential element of a coram nobis claim).

2016Furthermore, Failure to raise the statute as an affirmative defense does not result in waiver “if the opposing party is given fair notice of the defense and an opportunity to rebut it” because “the purpose of the specific pleading requirement is to prevent a party from raising a defense at the last possible moment and thereby prejudicing the opposing party‟s opportunity to rebut the defense.” Wilson, 367 S.W.3d at 234 (quoting Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tenn. 1995)).

2022The coram nobis court was able to see and hear Mr. Williams’s testimony at the trial and the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing and was in the best position to evaluate his credibility. “[A]ppellate courts do not reassess credibility determinations.” Dellinger v. State, 279 S.W.3d 282, 292 (Tenn. 2009).

2019See State v. Hart, 911 S.W.2d 371, 375 (Tenn. Crim.

2018The appellant bears the burden of preparing an adequate record on appeal, see State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tenn. 1993), which includes the duty to “have prepared a transcript of such part of the evidence or proceedings as is necessary to convey a fair, accurate and complete account of what transpired with respect to those issues that are the bases of appeal.” Tenn. R.

2017Wlodarz v. State, 361 S.W.3d 490, 506 (Tenn. 2012) abrogated on other grounds by Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246, 248 (Tenn. 2016).

2016Furthermore, Failure to raise the statute as an affirmative defense does not result in waiver “if the opposing party is given fair notice of the defense and an opportunity to rebut it” because “the purpose of the specific pleading requirement is to prevent a party from raising a defense at the last possible moment and thereby prejudicing the opposing party‟s opportunity to rebut the defense.” Wilson, 367 S.W.3d at 234 (quoting Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tenn. 1995)).

2014However, in each situation, the post-conviction court accredited counsel’s testimony and determined that counsel’s decision was a valid trial strategy.1 This court has stated that “[w]hen reviewing trial counsel’s actions, this court should not use the benefit of hindsight to second-guess trial strategy and criticize counsel’s tactics.” Irick v. State, 973 S.W.2d 643, 652 (Tenn. Crim.

2011See State v. Lawson, 291 S.W.3d 864, 869-70 (Tenn. 2009).

2010Following the hearing, the coram nobis court determined that the Petitioner “fully litigated the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel due to an inadequate investigation in his post-conviction proceeding” and that his petition for a writ of error coram nobis was “nothing more than an attempt to litigate this issue again.” See Harris, 301 S.W.3d at 148 (“Harris II”) (quoting People v. Hyung Joon Kim, 202 P.3d 436, 447 (Cal. 2009) (holding that the writ of coram nobis is “not a ‘catch-all’ remedy that enables -10- convicted persons to ‘litigate and relitigate the propriety of their convicti

2009See Harris v. State, 102 S.W.3d 587, 593 (Tenn. 2003) (stating that “the State bears the burden of raising the bar of the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense”).