10 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1923–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Dureingreen2 sentences1940J. 92.) See, also, The State v. Durein, 70 Kan. 1, 9, 11 , 78 Pac. 152 .” (p. 120.) Moreover, in the instant case, the jury was not obliged to indulge in any presumption relative to the production of salt water by appellants nor concerning the fact that immediately after the deepening of their wells in 1935, salt water had come down Lost creek in substantial quantities. 1940J. 92.) See, also, The State v. Durein, 70 Kan. 1, 9, 11 , 78 Pac. 152 .” (p. 120.) Moreover, in the instant case, the jury was not obliged to indulge in any presumption relative to the production of salt water by appellants nor concerning the fact that immediately after the deepening of their wells in 1935, salt water had come down Lost creek in substantial quantities. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Jenkinsgreen2 sentences2026Cf. State v. Jenkins, 308 Kan. 545 , 559, 422 P.3d 72 (2018) ("If the court fails to suspend the proceedings and conduct a competency hearing, a retrospective hearing may rectify the error."); State v. Murray, 302 Kan. 478, 484-90 , 353 P.3d 1158 (2015) (affirming a district court's conclusion that a retrospective competency hearing was feasible). 2026Cf. State v. Jenkins, 308 Kan. 545 , 559, 422 P.3d 72 (2018) ("If the court fails to suspend the proceedings and conduct a competency hearing, a retrospective hearing may rectify the error."); State v. Murray, 302 Kan. 478, 484-90 , 353 P.3d 1158 (2015) (affirming a district court's conclusion that a retrospective competency hearing was feasible). | 1 | 2 |
O'Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc.green2 sentences2015See O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc., 294 Kan. 318, 361 , 277 P.3d 1062 (2012) (when party fails to object to adequacy of district court’s findings and conclusions, appellate court can presume district court found all facts necessary to support judgment). 2015See O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc., 294 Kan. 318, 361 , 277 P.3d 1062 (2012) (when party fails to object to adequacy of district court’s findings and conclusions, appellate court can presume district court found all facts necessary to support judgment). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lightseygreen2 sentences2015See People v. Lightsey, 54 Cal. 4th 668, 710 , 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 589 , 279 P.3d 1072 (2012) (the retrospective hearing must be a fair consideration of competence). 2015See People v. Lightsey, 54 Cal. 4th 668, 710 , 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 589 , 279 P.3d 1072 (2012) (the retrospective hearing must be a fair consideration of competence). | 1 | 1 |
Hutton Contracting Co. v. City of Coffeyvillegreen2 sentences2009In support of its position, Carrothers claims the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently found Kansas law applies this additional retrospective test, citing Hutton Contracting Co. v. City of Coffeyville, 487 F.3d 772 (10th Cir. 2007). 2009Instead, the court indicated Kansas courts have not definitely answered the question whether enforceability of a liquidated damages provision should be determined prospectively only or whether Kansas courts would also apply a retrospective analysis. 487 F.3d at 781 (“[O]ur review of Kansas cases finds no definitive discussion of whether Kansas courts would apply a supplemental retrospective analysis.”). | 1 | 1 |
Carrothers Construction Co. v. City of South Hutchinsongreen1 sentence2009See Carrothers, 39 Kan. | 1 | 1 |
Luminous Neon, Inc. v. Parscalegreen1 sentence2008See Luminous Neon, Inc. v. Parscale, 17 Kan. | 1 | 1 |
Consolidated Barb Wire Co. v. Stevensongreen2 sentences1928See, also, Wire Co. v. Stevenson, 71 Kan. 64 , 79 Pac. 1085 ; In re Moseley’s Estate, 100 Kan. 495 , 164 Pac. 1073 .) We quote at length from the opinion of a case in this court involving the change in this law made in 1917 reducing the period from three years to two years, which covers the same points raised in this case, and it is interesting to observe that the retrospective clause then in that law did not control the rights of litigants by attempting to limit the contest privilege to wills that were probated within two years prior to the taking effect of the new law, but the court held tha 1928See, also, Wire Co. v. Stevenson, 71 Kan. 64 , 79 Pac. 1085 ; In re Moseley’s Estate, 100 Kan. 495 , 164 Pac. 1073 .) We quote at length from the opinion of a case in this court involving the change in this law made in 1917 reducing the period from three years to two years, which covers the same points raised in this case, and it is interesting to observe that the retrospective clause then in that law did not control the rights of litigants by attempting to limit the contest privilege to wills that were probated within two years prior to the taking effect of the new law, but the court held tha | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Drope v. Missouri
green
2 sentences2026As this court recognized, the United States Supreme Court has tepidly described retrospective competency hearings as "inherent[ly] difficult[]." See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 183 , 95 S. Ct. 896 , 43 L. 2026As this court recognized, the United States Supreme Court has tepidly described retrospective competency hearings as "inherent[ly] difficult[]." See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 183 , 95 S. Ct. 896 , 43 L. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Murray
green
2 sentences2026Cf. State v. Jenkins, 308 Kan. 545 , 559, 422 P.3d 72 (2018) ("If the court fails to suspend the proceedings and conduct a competency hearing, a retrospective hearing may rectify the error."); State v. Murray, 302 Kan. 478, 484-90 , 353 P.3d 1158 (2015) (affirming a district court's conclusion that a retrospective competency hearing was feasible). 2026Cf. State v. Jenkins, 308 Kan. 545 , 559, 422 P.3d 72 (2018) ("If the court fails to suspend the proceedings and conduct a competency hearing, a retrospective hearing may rectify the error."); State v. Murray, 302 Kan. 478, 484-90 , 353 P.3d 1158 (2015) (affirming a district court's conclusion that a retrospective competency hearing was feasible). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Ford
green
2 sentences2018Ford , 302 Kan. at 471 -72 , 353 P.3d 1143 . 2018Ford , 302 Kan. at 471 -72 , 353 P.3d 1143 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Davis
green
1 sentence2015Nevertheless, in Davis, 281 Kan. at 181 , we held that “under certain circumstances the State may rectify the error by a retrospective competency hearing.” The first step in analyzing whether a particular case is one of the “certain circumstances” requires a determination as to whether a retrospective competency hearing is feasible—i.e., whether the available evidence is such that a retrospective hearing could be meaningful. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Unified School District No. 315 v. DeWerff
green
1 sentence2009App. 2d 77 , Syl. ¶ 3, 626 P.2d 1206 (1981). *757 But Carrothers promotes an additional retrospective analysis by which to judge the reasonableness of this liquidated damages provision. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Nagle
neutral
2 sentences1928See, also, Wire Co. v. Stevenson, 71 Kan. 64 , 79 Pac. 1085 ; In re Moseley’s Estate, 100 Kan. 495 , 164 Pac. 1073 .) We quote at length from the opinion of a case in this court involving the change in this law made in 1917 reducing the period from three years to two years, which covers the same points raised in this case, and it is interesting to observe that the retrospective clause then in that law did not control the rights of litigants by attempting to limit the contest privilege to wills that were probated within two years prior to the taking effect of the new law, but the court held tha 1928See, also, Wire Co. v. Stevenson, 71 Kan. 64 , 79 Pac. 1085 ; In re Moseley’s Estate, 100 Kan. 495 , 164 Pac. 1073 .) We quote at length from the opinion of a case in this court involving the change in this law made in 1917 reducing the period from three years to two years, which covers the same points raised in this case, and it is interesting to observe that the retrospective clause then in that law did not control the rights of litigants by attempting to limit the contest privilege to wills that were probated within two years prior to the taking effect of the new law, but the court held tha | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.