10 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 2008–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Richard Carrollgreen2 sentences2010If this Court (first) determines that a prosecutor engaged in.misconduct in closing argument, reversal is required where “the misconduct is ‘flagrant’ or if each of the following three conditions is satisfied: (1) Proof of defendant’s guilt is not overwhelming; (2) Defense counsel objected; and (3) The trial court failed to cure the error with a sufficient admonishment to the jury.” Matheney v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 599, 606 (Ky.2006) (emphasis in original) (citing Barnes v. Commonwealth, 91 S.W.3d 564, 568 (Ky.2002)); see also Barnes, 91 S.W.3d at 568 (adopting Sixth Circuit test); United 2010If this Court (first) determines that a prosecutor engaged in misconduct in closing argument, reversal is required where "the misconduct is `flagrant' or if each of the following three conditions is satisfied: (1) Proof of defendant's guilt is not overwhelming; (2) Defense counsel objected; and (3) The trial court failed to cure the error with a sufficient admonishment to the jury." Matheney v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 599, 606 (Ky.2006) (emphasis in original) (citing Barnes v. Commonwealth, 91 S.W.3d 564, 568 (Ky. 2002)); see also Barnes, 91 S.W.3d at 568 (adopting Sixth Circuit test); United | 3 | 3 |
Barnes v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2010If this Court (first) determines that a prosecutor engaged in.misconduct in closing argument, reversal is required where “the misconduct is ‘flagrant’ or if each of the following three conditions is satisfied: (1) Proof of defendant’s guilt is not overwhelming; (2) Defense counsel objected; and (3) The trial court failed to cure the error with a sufficient admonishment to the jury.” Matheney v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 599, 606 (Ky.2006) (emphasis in original) (citing Barnes v. Commonwealth, 91 S.W.3d 564, 568 (Ky.2002)); see also Barnes, 91 S.W.3d at 568 (adopting Sixth Circuit test); United 2010If this Court (first) determines that a prosecutor engaged in.misconduct in closing argument, reversal is required where “the misconduct is ‘flagrant’ or if each of the following three conditions is satisfied: (1) Proof of defendant’s guilt is not overwhelming; (2) Defense counsel objected; and (3) The trial court failed to cure the error with a sufficient admonishment to the jury.” Matheney v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 599, 606 (Ky.2006) (emphasis in original) (citing Barnes v. Commonwealth, 91 S.W.3d 564, 568 (Ky.2002)); see also Barnes, 91 S.W.3d at 568 (adopting Sixth Circuit test); United | 3 | 3 |
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Kathy Prichardgreen2 sentences2023We have often cited the rule of statutory interpretation that “the failure of the legislature to change a known judicial interpretation of a statute is extremely persuasive evidence of the true legislative intent.” Bloyer v. Commonwealth, 647 S.W.3d 219 , 225 (Ky. 2022); Kindred Healthcare v. Harper, 642 S.W.3d 672 , 684 (Ky. 2022); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Prichard, 532 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Ky. 2017); Hughes v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 850, 856 (Ky. 2002); Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Ky. 1996). 2023We have often cited the rule of statutory interpretation that “the failure of the legislature to change a known judicial interpretation of a statute is extremely persuasive evidence of the true legislative intent.” Bloyer v. Commonwealth, 647 S.W.3d 219 , 225 (Ky. 2022); Kindred Healthcare v. Harper, 642 S.W.3d 672 , 684 (Ky. 2022); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Prichard, 532 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Ky. 2017); Hughes v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 850, 856 (Ky. 2002); Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Ky. 1996). | 2 | 2 |
Hughes v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2023We have often cited the rule of statutory interpretation that “the failure of the legislature to change a known judicial interpretation of a statute is extremely persuasive evidence of the true legislative intent.” Bloyer v. Commonwealth, 647 S.W.3d 219 , 225 (Ky. 2022); Kindred Healthcare v. Harper, 642 S.W.3d 672 , 684 (Ky. 2022); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Prichard, 532 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Ky. 2017); Hughes v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 850, 856 (Ky. 2002); Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Ky. 1996). 2023We have often cited the rule of statutory interpretation that “the failure of the legislature to change a known judicial interpretation of a statute is extremely persuasive evidence of the true legislative intent.” Bloyer v. Commonwealth, 647 S.W.3d 219 , 225 (Ky. 2022); Kindred Healthcare v. Harper, 642 S.W.3d 672 , 684 (Ky. 2022); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Prichard, 532 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Ky. 2017); Hughes v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 850, 856 (Ky. 2002); Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Ky. 1996). | 2 | 2 |
Rye v. Weaselgreen2 sentences2023We have often cited the rule of statutory interpretation that “the failure of the legislature to change a known judicial interpretation of a statute is extremely persuasive evidence of the true legislative intent.” Bloyer v. Commonwealth, 647 S.W.3d 219 , 225 (Ky. 2022); Kindred Healthcare v. Harper, 642 S.W.3d 672 , 684 (Ky. 2022); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Prichard, 532 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Ky. 2017); Hughes v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 850, 856 (Ky. 2002); Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Ky. 1996). 2023We have often cited the rule of statutory interpretation that “the failure of the legislature to change a known judicial interpretation of a statute is extremely persuasive evidence of the true legislative intent.” Bloyer v. Commonwealth, 647 S.W.3d 219 , 225 (Ky. 2022); Kindred Healthcare v. Harper, 642 S.W.3d 672 , 684 (Ky. 2022); Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Prichard, 532 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Ky. 2017); Hughes v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 850, 856 (Ky. 2002); Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Ky. 1996). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Maneer Leongreen2 sentences2010The four factors to be considered in determining whether the prosecutor’s misconduct was “flagrant” are: “(1) whether the remarks tended to mislead the jury or to prejudice the accused; (2) whether they were isolated or extensive; (3) whether they were deliberately or accidentally placed before the jury; and (4) the strength of the evidence against the accused.” Carroll, 26 F.3d at 1385 (citing United States v. Leon, 534 F.2d 667, 679 (6th Cir.1976)). 2010The four factors to be considered in determining whether the prosecutor's misconduct was "flagrant" are: "(1) whether the remarks tended to mislead the jury or to prejudice the accused; (2) whether they were isolated or extensive; (3) whether they were deliberately or accidentally placed before the jury; and (4) the strength of the evidence against the accused." Carroll, 26 F.3d at 1385 (citing United States v. Leon, 534 F.2d 667, 679 (6th Cir.1976)). | 2 | 2 |
Hodge v. Haeberlingreen1 sentence2021We agree with the Sixth Circuit’s analysis of this issue as set out in United States v. Webber, 208 F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 2000), and Hodge v. Haeberlin, 579 F.3d 627, 639 (6th Cir. 2009), as it is consistent with the analysis of Kentucky’s then highest Court regarding the availability of a writ of coram nobis in Kinder v. Commonwealth, 269 S.W.2d 212, 213-14 (Ky. 1954).6 Webber explains that a defendant who wishes to testify despite counsel’s advice to the contrary must alert the court to his desire to testify or disagreement with counsel’s advice. | 1 | 1 |
Kinder v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2021We agree with the Sixth Circuit’s analysis of this issue as set out in United States v. Webber, 208 F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 2000), and Hodge v. Haeberlin, 579 F.3d 627, 639 (6th Cir. 2009), as it is consistent with the analysis of Kentucky’s then highest Court regarding the availability of a writ of coram nobis in Kinder v. Commonwealth, 269 S.W.2d 212, 213-14 (Ky. 1954).6 Webber explains that a defendant who wishes to testify despite counsel’s advice to the contrary must alert the court to his desire to testify or disagreement with counsel’s advice. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Vincent Webbergreen2 sentences2021We agree with the Sixth Circuit’s analysis of this issue as set out in United States v. Webber, 208 F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 2000), and Hodge v. Haeberlin, 579 F.3d 627, 639 (6th Cir. 2009), as it is consistent with the analysis of Kentucky’s then highest Court regarding the availability of a writ of coram nobis in Kinder v. Commonwealth, 269 S.W.2d 212, 213-14 (Ky. 1954).6 Webber explains that a defendant who wishes to testify despite counsel’s advice to the contrary must alert the court to his desire to testify or disagreement with counsel’s advice. 2021Webber, 208 F.3d at 551 . | 1 | 1 |
Matheney v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2010If this Court (first) determines that a prosecutor engaged in.misconduct in closing argument, reversal is required where “the misconduct is ‘flagrant’ or if each of the following three conditions is satisfied: (1) Proof of defendant’s guilt is not overwhelming; (2) Defense counsel objected; and (3) The trial court failed to cure the error with a sufficient admonishment to the jury.” Matheney v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 599, 606 (Ky.2006) (emphasis in original) (citing Barnes v. Commonwealth, 91 S.W.3d 564, 568 (Ky.2002)); see also Barnes, 91 S.W.3d at 568 (adopting Sixth Circuit test); United 2010If this Court (first) determines that a prosecutor engaged in misconduct in closing argument, reversal is required where "the misconduct is `flagrant' or if each of the following three conditions is satisfied: (1) Proof of defendant's guilt is not overwhelming; (2) Defense counsel objected; and (3) The trial court failed to cure the error with a sufficient admonishment to the jury." Matheney v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 599, 606 (Ky.2006) (emphasis in original) (citing Barnes v. Commonwealth, 91 S.W.3d 564, 568 (Ky. 2002)); see also Barnes, 91 S.W.3d at 568 (adopting Sixth Circuit test); United | 1 | 1 |
Maxie v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2008The standard of review for denial of a mistrial is whether the trial court abused its discretion .49 A trial court abuses its discretion only when "the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles .'°so For prosecutorial misconduct in a closing argument, this Court, in Barnes v. Commonwealth ,' adopted the Sixth Circuit's test from United States v. Carroll. 52 Under Barnes and Carroll, the first step is to determine whether the prosecutor's remarks were improper. 53 If the remarks were improper: [W]e reverse for prosecutorial misconduct i | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
GGNSC Louisville Hillcreek v. Estate of Robert C. Bramer
green
1 sentence2025However, given the trial court’s conclusion, it might reasonably be argued the same sentence is, in fact, a finding which has been adopted by the trial court. 1 It is clear from the onset of the Sixth Circuit’s analysis the final arbitration agreement in Bramer was unenforceable on its face: “The parties agree that the [final arbitration agreement] is unsigned.” Id. at 483 . -22- Regardless, closing portions of the order contain unmistakable findings made by the trial court. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
United States v. Steven Johnson
green
2 sentences2022In United States v. Johnson, 509 F. App’x 487 (6th Cir. 2012), the Sixth Circuit applied this rule in the context of a 911 call. 2022The Court held that a -9- caller’s statements made to the 911 operator’s questions were nontestimonial because the primary purpose of the questioning was “to enable police assistance in response to an ongoing emergency.” Id. at 494 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Julie Olden, Richard Hunter, Wilbur Bleau, and All Others Similarly Situated v. Lafarge Corp.
green
1 sentence2019As here, the putative class representative cited Olden, supra. However, Judge Heyburn, who authored Burkhead , found the Sixth Circuit's analysis was based on a faulty presumption, or at least one that could not be made in cases of this sort. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Miller v. Administrative Office of the Courts
green
1 sentence2011Office of the Courts, 448 F.3d 887 (6th Cir.2006). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Commonwealth v. English
green
1 sentence2008The standard of review for denial of a mistrial is whether the trial court abused its discretion .49 A trial court abuses its discretion only when "the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles .'°so For prosecutorial misconduct in a closing argument, this Court, in Barnes v. Commonwealth ,' adopted the Sixth Circuit's test from United States v. Carroll. 52 Under Barnes and Carroll, the first step is to determine whether the prosecutor's remarks were improper. 53 If the remarks were improper: [W]e reverse for prosecutorial misconduct i | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.