10 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 2009–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Batiste v. Stategreen2 sentences2026Applying the one-continuous-transaction rule, there was sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Willie was killed as part of the same continuous chain of events as the robbery. “[T]he jury properly was instructed on the one-continuous- transaction rule” and “was able to determine whether the killing and the robbery had occurred as part of a continuous chain of events.” Batiste, 121 So. 3d at 833 (¶35). 2025Mississippi follows the one-continuous-transaction doctrine to determine “whether the evidence establishes the requisite nexus between the killing and the underlying felony to constitute capital murder.” Batiste v. State, 121 So. 3d 808, 831 (Miss. 2013) (citing Gillett, 56 So. 3d at 492 ); see also Ronk, 172 So. 3d at 1129 . | 4 | 4 |
Turner v. Stategreen2 sentences2024That doctrine “applies to felony-murder cases and defines the causal nexus required between the killing and the underlying felony.” Evans v. State, 226 So. 3d 1, 35 (Miss. 2017) (citing Turner v. State, 732 So. 2d 937, 950 (Miss. 1999)). “[A] killing occurring while engaged in the commission of one of the enumerated felonies,” it says, “includes the actions of the defendant leading up to the felony, the attempted felony, and flight from the scene of the felony.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turner, 732 So. 2d at 950 ). 2024That doctrine “applies to felony-murder cases and defines the causal nexus required between the killing and the underlying felony.” Evans v. State, 226 So. 3d 1, 35 (Miss. 2017) (citing Turner v. State, 732 So. 2d 937, 950 (Miss. 1999)). “[A] killing occurring while engaged in the commission of one of the enumerated felonies,” it says, “includes the actions of the defendant leading up to the felony, the attempted felony, and flight from the scene of the felony.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turner, 732 So. 2d at 950 ). | 2 | 3 |
Newell v. Stategreen2 sentences2015“It is well settled that jury instructions generally are within the discretion of the trial court, so the standard of review for the denial of jury instructions is abuse of discretion.” Newell v. State, 49 So. 3d 66, 73 (Miss. 2010) (citing Davis v. State, 18 So. 3d 842, 847 (Miss. 2009) (internal citations omitted)). 2015“It is well settled that jury instructions generally are within the discretion of the trial court, so the standard of review for the denial of jury instructions is abuse of discretion.” Newell v. State, 49 So.3d 66, 73 (Miss.2010) (citing Davis v. State, 18 So.3d 842, 847 (Miss.2009) (internal citations omitted)). | 2 | 2 |
Davis v. Stategreen2 sentences2015“It is well settled that jury instructions generally are within the discretion of the trial court, so the standard of review for the denial of jury instructions is abuse of discretion.” Newell v. State, 49 So. 3d 66, 73 (Miss. 2010) (citing Davis v. State, 18 So. 3d 842, 847 (Miss. 2009) (internal citations omitted)). 2015“It is well settled that jury instructions generally are within the discretion of the trial court, so the standard of review for the denial of jury instructions is abuse of discretion.” Newell v. State, 49 So.3d 66, 73 (Miss.2010) (citing Davis v. State, 18 So.3d 842, 847 (Miss.2009) (internal citations omitted)). | 2 | 2 |
Rushing v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Even if the comment was improper, it would not constitute grounds for reversal unless “the natural and proba ble effect of the prosecuting attorney’s improper argument created unjust prejudice against the accused resulting in a decision influenced by prejudice.” McGilberry, 741 So.2d at 910 (quoting Rushing v. State, 711 So.2d 450, 455 (Miss.1998)). 2009Even if the comment was improper, it would not constitute grounds for reversal unless “the natural and probable effect of the prosecuting attorney’s improper argument created unjust prejudice against the accused resulting in a decision influenced by prejudice.” McGilberry, 741 So. 2d at 910 (quoting Rushing v. State, 711 So. 2d 450, 455 (Miss. 1998)). | 2 | 2 |
Ronk v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Mississippi follows the one-continuous-transaction doctrine to determine “whether the evidence establishes the requisite nexus between the killing and the underlying felony to constitute capital murder.” Batiste v. State, 121 So. 3d 808, 831 (Miss. 2013) (citing Gillett, 56 So. 3d at 492 ); see also Ronk, 172 So. 3d at 1129 . 2024Ronk I, 172 So. 3d at 1129 . ¶65. | 1 | 2 |
Pickle v. Stategreen1 sentence2025This doctrine holds that, “where the two crimes [e.g., murder and arson] are connected in a chain of events and occur as part of the res gestae, the crime of capital murder is sustained.” Pickle v. State, 345 So. 2d 623, 627 (Miss. 1977). | 1 | 1 |
Timothy Nelson Evans v. State of Mississippigreen1 sentence2024That doctrine “applies to felony-murder cases and defines the causal nexus required between the killing and the underlying felony.” Evans v. State, 226 So. 3d 1, 35 (Miss. 2017) (citing Turner v. State, 732 So. 2d 937, 950 (Miss. 1999)). “[A] killing occurring while engaged in the commission of one of the enumerated felonies,” it says, “includes the actions of the defendant leading up to the felony, the attempted felony, and flight from the scene of the felony.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turner, 732 So. 2d at 950 ). | 1 | 1 |
Fisher v. Stategreen1 sentence2015Fisher v. State, 481 So. 2d 203, 212 (Miss. 1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gillett v. State
green
1 sentence2025Mississippi follows the one-continuous-transaction doctrine to determine “whether the evidence establishes the requisite nexus between the killing and the underlying felony to constitute capital murder.” Batiste v. State, 121 So. 3d 808, 831 (Miss. 2013) (citing Gillett, 56 So. 3d at 492 ); see also Ronk, 172 So. 3d at 1129 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
1 sentence2024Still more, given our adherence to the one-continuous-transaction doctrine, there is no reasonable probability that 27 Dr. Lauridson’s testimony would have affected Ronk’s capital-murder conviction. (3) Ronk’s claim that counsel were ineffective for failing to impeach Dr. McGarry’s testimony about the carbon-monoxide level in Craite’s blood and her being burned alive is neither sufficient to surmount the bars nor satisfies the newly-discovered-evidence exception. ¶74. “[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations u | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2024And as the State notes, the GPMC Report flagged Craite’s 5.5 “CARBOXY HGB” result as “CH.” Though the meaning of “CH” is unclear, either the prosecution, Dr. McGarry, or both could have argued (as the State does here) that “CH” meant “Critical High.” And as discussed already, the GPMC Report was not the only evidence relevant to whether Craite was alive during the fire. (4) Ronk’s claim that the State suppressed material information about Dr. McGarry’s past is barred; his related ineffective-assistance-of-post- conviction counsel claim is insufficient to surmount the bars; and the newly-discov 2024And as the State notes, the GPMC Report flagged Craite’s 5.5 “CARBOXY HGB” result as “CH.” Though the meaning of “CH” is unclear, either the prosecution, Dr. McGarry, or both could have argued (as the State does here) that “CH” meant “Critical High.” And as discussed already, the GPMC Report was not the only evidence relevant to whether Craite was alive during the fire. (4) Ronk’s claim that the State suppressed material information about Dr. McGarry’s past is barred; his related ineffective-assistance-of-post- conviction counsel claim is insufficient to surmount the bars; and the newly-discov | 1 | 2024–2024 |
McGilberry v. State
green
1 sentence2013Even if the comment was improper, it would not constitute grounds for reversal unless “the natural and proba ble effect of the prosecuting attorney’s improper argument created unjust prejudice against the accused resulting in a decision influenced by prejudice.” McGilberry, 741 So.2d at 910 (quoting Rushing v. State, 711 So.2d 450, 455 (Miss.1998)). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.