10 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sullivan v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2021In reaching that conclusion, we stated that a trial by an “improperly constituted” jury was “so fundamentally flawed that the verdict [could] not stand,” with “a violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to have the verdict determined by twelve jurors constitut[ing] error per se” that was “not subject to harmless error analysis.” Id.; see also State v. Bindyke, 288 N.C. 608, 629 (1975) (holding that “[t]he presence of an alternate juror in the jury room at any time during the jury’s deliberations will void the trial”); State v. Bunning, 346 N.C. 253, 257 (1997) (awarding the defendant a 2021In reaching that conclusion, we stated that a trial by an “improperly constituted” jury was “so fundamentally flawed that the verdict [could] not stand,” with “a violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to have the verdict determined by twelve jurors constitut[ing] error per se” that was “not subject to harmless error analysis.” Id.; see also State v. Bindyke, 288 N.C. 608, 629 (1975) (holding that “[t]he presence of an alternate juror in the jury room at any time during the jury’s deliberations will void the trial”); State v. Bunning, 346 N.C. 253, 257 (1997) (awarding the defendant a | 2 | 2 |
Duncan v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2021In reaching that conclusion, we stated that a trial by an “improperly constituted” jury was “so fundamentally flawed that the verdict [could] not stand,” with “a violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to have the verdict determined by twelve jurors constitut[ing] error per se” that was “not subject to harmless error analysis.” Id.; see also State v. Bindyke, 288 N.C. 608, 629 (1975) (holding that “[t]he presence of an alternate juror in the jury room at any time during the jury’s deliberations will void the trial”); State v. Bunning, 346 N.C. 253, 257 (1997) (awarding the defendant a 2021In reaching that conclusion, we stated that a trial by an “improperly constituted” jury was “so fundamentally flawed that the verdict [could] not stand,” with “a violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to have the verdict determined by twelve jurors constitut[ing] error per se” that was “not subject to harmless error analysis.” Id.; see also State v. Bindyke, 288 N.C. 608, 629 (1975) (holding that “[t]he presence of an alternate juror in the jury room at any time during the jury’s deliberations will void the trial”); State v. Bunning, 346 N.C. 253, 257 (1997) (awarding the defendant a | 2 | 2 |
State v. Bunninggreen2 sentences2021In reaching that conclusion, we stated that a trial by an “improperly constituted” jury was “so fundamentally flawed that the verdict [could] not stand,” with “a violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to have the verdict determined by twelve jurors constitut[ing] error per se” that was “not subject to harmless error analysis.” Id.; see also State v. Bindyke, 288 N.C. 608, 629 (1975) (holding that “[t]he presence of an alternate juror in the jury room at any time during the jury’s deliberations will void the trial”); State v. Bunning, 346 N.C. 253, 257 (1997) (awarding the defendant a 2021In reaching that conclusion, we stated that a trial by an “improperly constituted” jury was “so fundamentally flawed that the verdict [could] not stand,” with “a violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to have the verdict determined by twelve jurors constitut[ing] error per se” that was “not subject to harmless error analysis.” Id.; see also State v. Bindyke, 288 N.C. 608, 629 (1975) (holding that “[t]he presence of an alternate juror in the jury room at any time during the jury’s deliberations will void the trial”); State v. Bunning, 346 N.C. 253, 257 (1997) (awarding the defendant a | 2 | 2 |
State v. Bindykegreen2 sentences2021In reaching that conclusion, we stated that a trial by an “improperly constituted” jury was “so fundamentally flawed that the verdict [could] not stand,” with “a violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to have the verdict determined by twelve jurors constitut[ing] error per se” that was “not subject to harmless error analysis.” Id.; see also State v. Bindyke, 288 N.C. 608, 629 (1975) (holding that “[t]he presence of an alternate juror in the jury room at any time during the jury’s deliberations will void the trial”); State v. Bunning, 346 N.C. 253, 257 (1997) (awarding the defendant a 2021In reaching that conclusion, we stated that a trial by an “improperly constituted” jury was “so fundamentally flawed that the verdict [could] not stand,” with “a violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to have the verdict determined by twelve jurors constitut[ing] error per se” that was “not subject to harmless error analysis.” Id.; see also State v. Bindyke, 288 N.C. 608, 629 (1975) (holding that “[t]he presence of an alternate juror in the jury room at any time during the jury’s deliberations will void the trial”); State v. Bunning, 346 N.C. 253, 257 (1997) (awarding the defendant a | 2 | 2 |
Rose v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2021In reaching that conclusion, we stated that a trial by an “improperly constituted” jury was “so fundamentally flawed that the verdict [could] not stand,” with “a violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to have the verdict determined by twelve jurors constitut[ing] error per se” that was “not subject to harmless error analysis.” Id.; see also State v. Bindyke, 288 N.C. 608, 629 (1975) (holding that “[t]he presence of an alternate juror in the jury room at any time during the jury’s deliberations will void the trial”); State v. Bunning, 346 N.C. 253, 257 (1997) (awarding the defendant a 2021In reaching that conclusion, we stated that a trial by an “improperly constituted” jury was “so fundamentally flawed that the verdict [could] not stand,” with “a violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to have the verdict determined by twelve jurors constitut[ing] error per se” that was “not subject to harmless error analysis.” Id.; see also State v. Bindyke, 288 N.C. 608, 629 (1975) (holding that “[t]he presence of an alternate juror in the jury room at any time during the jury’s deliberations will void the trial”); State v. Bunning, 346 N.C. 253, 257 (1997) (awarding the defendant a | 2 | 2 |
State v. Allengreen2 sentences2005Since a jury did not find the aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, this constitutes structural error, reversible per se, under State v. Allen, 359 N.C. 425, 444 , 615 S.E.2d 256, 267 (2005), and we must grant the defendant a new sentencing hearing. 2005Because a jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant “took advantage of a position of trust or confidence” to commit indecent liberties, and such error is structural error, reversible per se, under State v. Allen, supra, we must grant the defendant a new sentencing hearing. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Canadygreen2 sentences2003Id.; see also State v. Canady, 330 N.C. 398, 399-400 , 410 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (1991) (new sentencing hearing where only evidence of defendant’s prior convictions, an aggravating factor, was prosecutor’s statement to that effect); State v. Thompson, 309 N.C. 421, 424-25 , 307 S.E.2d 156, 159 (1983) (“We also agree . . . that the prosecuting attorney’s statement concerning a prior conviction . . . constituted insufficient evidence to support a finding of that prior conviction”). 2003Id.; see also State v. Canady, 330 N.C. 398, 399-400 , 410 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (1991) (new sentencing hearing where only evidence of defendant’s prior convictions, an aggravating factor, was prosecutor’s statement to that effect); State v. Thompson, 309 N.C. 421, 424-25 , 307 S.E.2d 156, 159 (1983) (“We also agree . . . that the prosecuting attorney’s statement concerning a prior conviction . . . constituted insufficient evidence to support a finding of that prior conviction”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2003Id.; see also State v. Canady, 330 N.C. 398, 399-400 , 410 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (1991) (new sentencing hearing where only evidence of defendant’s prior convictions, an aggravating factor, was prosecutor’s statement to that effect); State v. Thompson, 309 N.C. 421, 424-25 , 307 S.E.2d 156, 159 (1983) (“We also agree . . . that the prosecuting attorney’s statement concerning a prior conviction . . . constituted insufficient evidence to support a finding of that prior conviction”). 2003Id.; see also State v. Canady, 330 N.C. 398, 399-400 , 410 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (1991) (new sentencing hearing where only evidence of defendant’s prior convictions, an aggravating factor, was prosecutor’s statement to that effect); State v. Thompson, 309 N.C. 421, 424-25 , 307 S.E.2d 156, 159 (1983) (“We also agree . . . that the prosecuting attorney’s statement concerning a prior conviction . . . constituted insufficient evidence to support a finding of that prior conviction”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McKoy v. North Carolina
green
2 sentences2002Addressing this issue, the Court quoted the applicable standard from State v. Strickland, 307 N.C. 274 , 298 S.E.2d 645 ; noted that evidence from a State’s witness tended to show absence of premeditation and deliberation; held that the assignment of error was without merit; and found no prejudicial error in the guilt-innocence phase of the defendant’s trial, but awarded the defendant a new sentencing hearing for error under McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 , 108 L. 2002Addressing this issue, the Court quoted the applicable standard from State v. Strickland, 307 N.C. 274 , 298 S.E.2d 645 ; noted that evidence from a State’s witness tended to show absence of premeditation and deliberation; held that the assignment of error was without merit; and found no prejudicial error in the guilt-innocence phase of the defendant’s trial, but awarded the defendant a new sentencing hearing for error under McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 , 108 L. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Barnes
green
2 sentences2002Ed. 2d 473 (1998), in which the Court, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support submission of premeditated and deliberate murder and that the underlying felony merged with the murder for purposes of felony murder and could not be used as an aggravating circumstance, awarded the defendant a new sentencing hearing. *569 Although a life case, this Court’s discussion in State v. Blankenship, 337 N.C. 543 , 447 S.E.2d 727 (1994), overruled on other grounds by State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184 , 481 S.E.2d 44 , is instructive. 2002Ed. 2d 473 (1998), in which the Court, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support submission of premeditated and deliberate murder and that the underlying felony merged with the murder for purposes of felony murder and could not be used as an aggravating circumstance, awarded the defendant a new sentencing hearing. *569 Although a life case, this Court’s discussion in State v. Blankenship, 337 N.C. 543 , 447 S.E.2d 727 (1994), overruled on other grounds by State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184 , 481 S.E.2d 44 , is instructive. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Strickland
green
2 sentences2002Addressing this issue, the Court quoted the applicable standard from State v. Strickland, 307 N.C. 274 , 298 S.E.2d 645 ; noted that evidence from a State’s witness tended to show absence of premeditation and deliberation; held that the assignment of error was without merit; and found no prejudicial error in the guilt-innocence phase of the defendant’s trial, but awarded the defendant a new sentencing hearing for error under McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 , 108 L. 2002Addressing this issue, the Court quoted the applicable standard from State v. Strickland, 307 N.C. 274 , 298 S.E.2d 645 ; noted that evidence from a State’s witness tended to show absence of premeditation and deliberation; held that the assignment of error was without merit; and found no prejudicial error in the guilt-innocence phase of the defendant’s trial, but awarded the defendant a new sentencing hearing for error under McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 , 108 L. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Blankenship
red
2 sentences2002Ed. 2d 473 (1998), in which the Court, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support submission of premeditated and deliberate murder and that the underlying felony merged with the murder for purposes of felony murder and could not be used as an aggravating circumstance, awarded the defendant a new sentencing hearing. *569 Although a life case, this Court’s discussion in State v. Blankenship, 337 N.C. 543 , 447 S.E.2d 727 (1994), overruled on other grounds by State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184 , 481 S.E.2d 44 , is instructive. 2002Ed. 2d 473 (1998), in which the Court, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support submission of premeditated and deliberate murder and that the underlying felony merged with the murder for purposes of felony murder and could not be used as an aggravating circumstance, awarded the defendant a new sentencing hearing. *569 Although a life case, this Court’s discussion in State v. Blankenship, 337 N.C. 543 , 447 S.E.2d 727 (1994), overruled on other grounds by State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184 , 481 S.E.2d 44 , is instructive. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Lucas
green
2 sentences2001First, it held that section 15A-1340.16A was constitutional by requiring “the State [to] meet the requirements set out in Jones and Apprendi in order to apply the enhancement provisions of the statute.” Id. at 598 , 548 S.E.2d at 732 . 2001First, it held that section 15A-1340.16A was constitutional by requiring “the State [to] meet the requirements set out in Jones and Apprendi in order to apply the enhancement provisions of the statute.” Id. at 598 , 548 S.E.2d at 732 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Morgan v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1993In Morgan , the United States Supreme Court granted the defendant a new sentencing hearing because the trial court, during jury selection, would not ask the prospective jurors if they would “automatically vote to impose the death penalty no matter what the facts are[.]” Id. at —, 119 L. 1993In Morgan , the United States Supreme Court granted the defendant a new sentencing hearing because the trial court, during jury selection, would not ask the prospective jurors if they would “automatically vote to impose the death penalty no matter what the facts are[.]” Id. at —, 119 L. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Sumpter
green
2 sentences1990In State v. Sumpter, 318 N.C. 102 , 347 S.E.2d 396 (1986), the Court applied this principle and granted the defendant a new sentencing hearing where he was charged and convicted of taking indecent liberties with a minor, and the trial judge aggravated his sentence on the ground that the victim was very young. 1990In State v. Sumpter, 318 N.C. 102 , 347 S.E.2d 396 (1986), the Court applied this principle and granted the defendant a new sentencing hearing where he was charged and convicted of taking indecent liberties with a minor, and the trial judge aggravated his sentence on the ground that the victim was very young. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Goodman
green
2 sentences1983State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1 , 257 S.E.2d 569 (1979). 1983State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1 , 257 S.E.2d 569 (1979). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.