party in interest inquiry in Nebraska

2022If standing is challenged at the pleadings stage, before an eviden- tiary hearing and before any evidence outside of the pleadings is admitted, it is deemed a “‘facial challenge.’” 18 In consid- ering a facial challenge, a court will typically review only the pleadings to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to establish standing. 19 But when an issue of standing is presented and the court holds an evidentiary hear- ing and reviews evidence outside the pleadings, it is considered a “‘factual challenge.’” 20 When a factual challenge is made, the party opposing the motion

2021Group v. ConAgra Foods, 301 Neb. 38 , 917 N.W.2d 435 (2018). 7 See id. 8 See, Ryan v. Streck, Inc., ante p. 98, 958 N.W.2d 703 (2021); Schaeffer v. Frakes, 306 Neb. 904 , 947 N.W.2d 714 (2020). - 606 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports SID NO. 67 v. STATE Cite as 309 Neb. 600 conclusions couched as factual allegations or threadbare recit- als of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere con- clusory statements. 9 ANALYSIS We agree with the district court that the real party in interest doctrine is dispositive in this case.

2022CO. v. STEWART Cite as 311 Neb. 33 sought. 14 In this way, the real party in interest inquiry turns on the substantive law of the claim. 15 [6,7] The purpose of the real party in interest statute is to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons who have no right, title, or interest in the cause. 16 The question whether the party who commenced an action has standing and is therefore the real party in interest is jurisdictional, and because the requirement of standing is fundamental to a court’s exercise of jurisdiction, either a litigant or a court can raise the question of standing at any t

2022CO. v. STEWART Cite as 311 Neb. 33 sought. 14 In this way, the real party in interest inquiry turns on the substantive law of the claim. 15 [6,7] The purpose of the real party in interest statute is to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons who have no right, title, or interest in the cause. 16 The question whether the party who commenced an action has standing and is therefore the real party in interest is jurisdictional, and because the requirement of standing is fundamental to a court’s exercise of jurisdiction, either a litigant or a court can raise the question of standing at any t

2022Cite as 312 Neb. 606 [5-7] Nebraska’s real party in interest statute provides in part that “[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” 11 The purpose of that section is to pre- vent the prosecution of actions by persons who have no right, title, or interest in the cause. 12 The focus of the real party in interest inquiry is whether the party has standing to sue due to some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject matter of controversy. 13 The focus of our standing inquiry is not on whether the cla

2021Ed. 2d 558 (2019); Russell v. Franklin County, 306 Neb. 546 , 946 N.W.2d 648 (2020). 21 See, Russell, supra note 20 ; Cappel v. State, 298 Neb. 445 , 905 N.W.2d 38 (2017). 22 See, Estermann v. Bose, 296 Neb. 228 , 892 N.W.2d 857 (2017); Thompson v. Heineman, 289 Neb. 798 , 857 N.W.2d 731 (2015). 23 See Knick, supra note 20 . - 609 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports SID NO. 67 v. STATE Cite as 309 Neb. 600 contrary to SID 67’s allegations in the pleadings, a dedication instrument could not have conveyed to it ownership of the roads at issue.

2021Group v. ConAgra Foods, 301 Neb. 38 , 917 N.W.2d 435 (2018). 7 See id. 8 See, Ryan v. Streck, Inc., ante p. 98, 958 N.W.2d 703 (2021); Schaeffer v. Frakes, 306 Neb. 904 , 947 N.W.2d 714 (2020). - 606 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports SID NO. 67 v. STATE Cite as 309 Neb. 600 conclusions couched as factual allegations or threadbare recit- als of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere con- clusory statements. 9 ANALYSIS We agree with the district court that the real party in interest doctrine is dispositive in this case.

2021Group v. ConAgra Foods, 301 Neb. 38 , 917 N.W.2d 435 (2018). 7 See id. 8 See, Ryan v. Streck, Inc., ante p. 98, 958 N.W.2d 703 (2021); Schaeffer v. Frakes, 306 Neb. 904 , 947 N.W.2d 714 (2020). - 606 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports SID NO. 67 v. STATE Cite as 309 Neb. 600 conclusions couched as factual allegations or threadbare recit- als of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere con- clusory statements. 9 ANALYSIS We agree with the district court that the real party in interest doctrine is dispositive in this case.

2021Ed. 2d 558 (2019); Russell v. Franklin County, 306 Neb. 546 , 946 N.W.2d 648 (2020). 21 See, Russell, supra note 20 ; Cappel v. State, 298 Neb. 445 , 905 N.W.2d 38 (2017). 22 See, Estermann v. Bose, 296 Neb. 228 , 892 N.W.2d 857 (2017); Thompson v. Heineman, 289 Neb. 798 , 857 N.W.2d 731 (2015). 23 See Knick, supra note 20 . - 609 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports SID NO. 67 v. STATE Cite as 309 Neb. 600 contrary to SID 67’s allegations in the pleadings, a dedication instrument could not have conveyed to it ownership of the roads at issue.

2021Ed. 2d 558 (2019); Russell v. Franklin County, 306 Neb. 546 , 946 N.W.2d 648 (2020). 21 See, Russell, supra note 20 ; Cappel v. State, 298 Neb. 445 , 905 N.W.2d 38 (2017). 22 See, Estermann v. Bose, 296 Neb. 228 , 892 N.W.2d 857 (2017); Thompson v. Heineman, 289 Neb. 798 , 857 N.W.2d 731 (2015). 23 See Knick, supra note 20 . - 609 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports SID NO. 67 v. STATE Cite as 309 Neb. 600 contrary to SID 67’s allegations in the pleadings, a dedication instrument could not have conveyed to it ownership of the roads at issue.

2021Group v. ConAgra Foods, 301 Neb. 38 , 917 N.W.2d 435 (2018). 7 See id. 8 See, Ryan v. Streck, Inc., ante p. 98, 958 N.W.2d 703 (2021); Schaeffer v. Frakes, 306 Neb. 904 , 947 N.W.2d 714 (2020). - 606 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports SID NO. 67 v. STATE Cite as 309 Neb. 600 conclusions couched as factual allegations or threadbare recit- als of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere con- clusory statements. 9 ANALYSIS We agree with the district court that the real party in interest doctrine is dispositive in this case.

2021Group v. ConAgra Foods, 301 Neb. 38 , 917 N.W.2d 435 (2018). 7 See id. 8 See, Ryan v. Streck, Inc., ante p. 98, 958 N.W.2d 703 (2021); Schaeffer v. Frakes, 306 Neb. 904 , 947 N.W.2d 714 (2020). - 606 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports SID NO. 67 v. STATE Cite as 309 Neb. 600 conclusions couched as factual allegations or threadbare recit- als of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere con- clusory statements. 9 ANALYSIS We agree with the district court that the real party in interest doctrine is dispositive in this case.

2021Group v. ConAgra Foods, 301 Neb. 38 , 917 N.W.2d 435 (2018). 7 See id. 8 See, Ryan v. Streck, Inc., ante p. 98, 958 N.W.2d 703 (2021); Schaeffer v. Frakes, 306 Neb. 904 , 947 N.W.2d 714 (2020). - 606 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports SID NO. 67 v. STATE Cite as 309 Neb. 600 conclusions couched as factual allegations or threadbare recit- als of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere con- clusory statements. 9 ANALYSIS We agree with the district court that the real party in interest doctrine is dispositive in this case.

2021I, § 21, “[t]he property of no per- son shall be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation therefor.” And the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as applied to the states by the 14th Amendment, similarly requires the State to pay “just compensation” when it takes “private property . . . for public use.” 23 [12] Applying the real party in interest doctrine to this case, the district court dismissed this action upon finding that 17 See Valley Boys, supra note 11 . 18 See id. 19 See John P. Lenich, Nebraska Civil Procedure § 6:2 (2021). 20 See, Knick v. Tp. of Scott, Pennsylva

2021I, § 21, “[t]he property of no per- son shall be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation therefor.” And the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as applied to the states by the 14th Amendment, similarly requires the State to pay “just compensation” when it takes “private property . . . for public use.” 23 [12] Applying the real party in interest doctrine to this case, the district court dismissed this action upon finding that 17 See Valley Boys, supra note 11 . 18 See id. 19 See John P. Lenich, Nebraska Civil Procedure § 6:2 (2021). 20 See, Knick v. Tp. of Scott, Pennsylva

2021Ed. 2d 558 (2019); Russell v. Franklin County, 306 Neb. 546 , 946 N.W.2d 648 (2020). 21 See, Russell, supra note 20 ; Cappel v. State, 298 Neb. 445 , 905 N.W.2d 38 (2017). 22 See, Estermann v. Bose, 296 Neb. 228 , 892 N.W.2d 857 (2017); Thompson v. Heineman, 289 Neb. 798 , 857 N.W.2d 731 (2015). 23 See Knick, supra note 20 . - 609 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports SID NO. 67 v. STATE Cite as 309 Neb. 600 contrary to SID 67’s allegations in the pleadings, a dedication instrument could not have conveyed to it ownership of the roads at issue.

2021Ed. 2d 558 (2019); Russell v. Franklin County, 306 Neb. 546 , 946 N.W.2d 648 (2020). 21 See, Russell, supra note 20 ; Cappel v. State, 298 Neb. 445 , 905 N.W.2d 38 (2017). 22 See, Estermann v. Bose, 296 Neb. 228 , 892 N.W.2d 857 (2017); Thompson v. Heineman, 289 Neb. 798 , 857 N.W.2d 731 (2015). 23 See Knick, supra note 20 . - 609 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports SID NO. 67 v. STATE Cite as 309 Neb. 600 contrary to SID 67’s allegations in the pleadings, a dedication instrument could not have conveyed to it ownership of the roads at issue.

2020Cite as 306 Neb. 928 party in interest . . . .” 21 The purpose of that section is to pre- vent the prosecution of actions by persons who have no right, title, or interest in the cause. 22 The focus of the real party in interest inquiry is whether the party has standing to sue due to some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject matter of controversy. 23 If there has been a valid and complete assignment of rights, then the assignee is the real party in interest. 24 If an assignment is invalid, then the purported assignor remains the

2016We disagree. [12-14] Nebraska’s real party in interest statute provides that “[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest . . . . ”29 The purpose of that section is to pre- vent the prosecution of actions by persons who have no right, title, or interest in the cause.30 The focus of the real party in interest inquiry is whether the party has standing to sue due to some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.31 The purpose of the inquiry is to determine whether the party has

2016We disagree. [12-14] Nebraska’s real party in interest statute provides that “[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest . . . . ”29 The purpose of that section is to pre- vent the prosecution of actions by persons who have no right, title, or interest in the cause.30 The focus of the real party in interest inquiry is whether the party has standing to sue due to some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.31 The purpose of the inquiry is to determine whether the party has

2016We disagree. [12-14] Nebraska’s real party in interest statute provides that “[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest . . . . ”29 The purpose of that section is to pre- vent the prosecution of actions by persons who have no right, title, or interest in the cause.30 The focus of the real party in interest inquiry is whether the party has standing to sue due to some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.31 The purpose of the inquiry is to determine whether the party has

2015So, the meaning 2 See Gibbs Cattle Co. v. Bixler, 285 Neb. 952 , 831 N.W.2d 696 (2013). 3 See DMK Biodiesel v. McCoy, 290 Neb. 286 , 859 N.W.2d 867 (2015). 4 Id. 5 Brief for appellee at 9. 6 Manon v. Orr, 289 Neb. 484 , 856 N.W.2d 106 (2014). 7 See Polk County v. Wombacher, 229 Neb. 239 , 426 N.W.2d 266 (1988). - 14 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 291 Nebraska R eports FISHER v. HEIRS & DEVISEES OF T.D.

2015So, the meaning 2 See Gibbs Cattle Co. v. Bixler, 285 Neb. 952 , 831 N.W.2d 696 (2013). 3 See DMK Biodiesel v. McCoy, 290 Neb. 286 , 859 N.W.2d 867 (2015). 4 Id. 5 Brief for appellee at 9. 6 Manon v. Orr, 289 Neb. 484 , 856 N.W.2d 106 (2014). 7 See Polk County v. Wombacher, 229 Neb. 239 , 426 N.W.2d 266 (1988). - 14 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 291 Nebraska R eports FISHER v. HEIRS & DEVISEES OF T.D.

2015So, the meaning 2 See Gibbs Cattle Co. v. Bixler, 285 Neb. 952 , 831 N.W.2d 696 (2013). 3 See DMK Biodiesel v. McCoy, 290 Neb. 286 , 859 N.W.2d 867 (2015). 4 Id. 5 Brief for appellee at 9. 6 Manon v. Orr, 289 Neb. 484 , 856 N.W.2d 106 (2014). 7 See Polk County v. Wombacher, 229 Neb. 239 , 426 N.W.2d 266 (1988). - 14 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 291 Nebraska R eports FISHER v. HEIRS & DEVISEES OF T.D.

2015So, the meaning 2 See Gibbs Cattle Co. v. Bixler, 285 Neb. 952 , 831 N.W.2d 696 (2013). 3 See DMK Biodiesel v. McCoy, 290 Neb. 286 , 859 N.W.2d 867 (2015). 4 Id. 5 Brief for appellee at 9. 6 Manon v. Orr, 289 Neb. 484 , 856 N.W.2d 106 (2014). 7 See Polk County v. Wombacher, 229 Neb. 239 , 426 N.W.2d 266 (1988). - 14 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 291 Nebraska R eports FISHER v. HEIRS & DEVISEES OF T.D.

2014Section 30-3855(a) provides that “[w]hile a trust is revocable, rights of the beneficiaries are subject to the con- trol of, and the duties of the trustee are owed exclusively to, the settlor.” [9] Absent a statutory indication to the contrary, words in a statute will be given their ordinary meaning.8 And § 30-3855(a) 4 Countryside Co-op v. Harry A. Koch Co., 280 Neb. 795 , 790 N.W.2d 873 (2010). 5 Id. 6 Id. 7 Id. 8 Caniglia v. Caniglia, 285 Neb. 930 , 830 N.W.2d 207 (2013).

2014Section 30-3855(a) provides that “[w]hile a trust is revocable, rights of the beneficiaries are subject to the con- trol of, and the duties of the trustee are owed exclusively to, the settlor.” [9] Absent a statutory indication to the contrary, words in a statute will be given their ordinary meaning.8 And § 30-3855(a) 4 Countryside Co-op v. Harry A. Koch Co., 280 Neb. 795 , 790 N.W.2d 873 (2010). 5 Id. 6 Id. 7 Id. 8 Caniglia v. Caniglia, 285 Neb. 930 , 830 N.W.2d 207 (2013).

1988Neill v. McGinn, 175 Neb. 369 , 122 N.W.2d 65 (1963), *242 overruled on other grounds, Chlopek v. Schmall, 224 Neb. 78 , 396 N.W.2d 103 (1986).

1988Neill v. McGinn, 175 Neb. 369 , 122 N.W.2d 65 (1963), *242 overruled on other grounds, Chlopek v. Schmall, 224 Neb. 78 , 396 N.W.2d 103 (1986).

1988Neill v. McGinn, 175 Neb. 369 , 122 N.W.2d 65 (1963), *242 overruled on other grounds, Chlopek v. Schmall, 224 Neb. 78 , 396 N.W.2d 103 (1986).

1988Neill v. McGinn, 175 Neb. 369 , 122 N.W.2d 65 (1963), *242 overruled on other grounds, Chlopek v. Schmall, 224 Neb. 78 , 396 N.W.2d 103 (1986).