10 Nevada opinions name it 1 courts 1983–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nevada courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hansen v. Harrah'sgreen2 sentences2019See Dillard .Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Beckwith, 115 Nev. 372, 377 , 989 P.2d 882, 885 (1999) (holding that a different provision of the NIIA does not bar an employee from bringing a tortious constructive discharge claim because "NRS 616D.030 . . . does not affect the case law of tortious discharge against public policy"); Sands Regent v. Vctlgardson, 105 Nev, 436, 440, 777 P.2d 898, 900 (1989) (allowing employees to bring tortious constructive discharge claims "where the employer's conduct violates strong and compelling public policy"); Hansen v. Harrah's, 100 Nev. 60, 64 , 675 P.2d 394, 397 (198 2019See Dillard .Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Beckwith, 115 Nev. 372, 377 , 989 P.2d 882, 885 (1999) (holding that a different provision of the NIIA does not bar an employee from bringing a tortious constructive discharge claim because "NRS 616D.030 . . . does not affect the case law of tortious discharge against public policy"); Sands Regent v. Vctlgardson, 105 Nev, 436, 440, 777 P.2d 898, 900 (1989) (allowing employees to bring tortious constructive discharge claims "where the employer's conduct violates strong and compelling public policy"); Hansen v. Harrah's, 100 Nev. 60, 64 , 675 P.2d 394, 397 (198 | 2 | 2 |
Sands Regent v. Valgardsongreen2 sentences2019See Dillard .Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Beckwith, 115 Nev. 372, 377 , 989 P.2d 882, 885 (1999) (holding that a different provision of the NIIA does not bar an employee from bringing a tortious constructive discharge claim because "NRS 616D.030 . . . does not affect the case law of tortious discharge against public policy"); Sands Regent v. Vctlgardson, 105 Nev, 436, 440, 777 P.2d 898, 900 (1989) (allowing employees to bring tortious constructive discharge claims "where the employer's conduct violates strong and compelling public policy"); Hansen v. Harrah's, 100 Nev. 60, 64 , 675 P.2d 394, 397 (198 2019See Dillard .Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Beckwith, 115 Nev. 372, 377 , 989 P.2d 882, 885 (1999) (holding that a different provision of the NIIA does not bar an employee from bringing a tortious constructive discharge claim because "NRS 616D.030 . . . does not affect the case law of tortious discharge against public policy"); Sands Regent v. Vctlgardson, 105 Nev, 436, 440, 777 P.2d 898, 900 (1989) (allowing employees to bring tortious constructive discharge claims "where the employer's conduct violates strong and compelling public policy"); Hansen v. Harrah's, 100 Nev. 60, 64 , 675 P.2d 394, 397 (198 | 2 | 2 |
Dillard Department Stores, Inc. v. Beckwithgreen2 sentences2019See Dillard .Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Beckwith, 115 Nev. 372, 377 , 989 P.2d 882, 885 (1999) (holding that a different provision of the NIIA does not bar an employee from bringing a tortious constructive discharge claim because "NRS 616D.030 . . . does not affect the case law of tortious discharge against public policy"); Sands Regent v. Vctlgardson, 105 Nev, 436, 440, 777 P.2d 898, 900 (1989) (allowing employees to bring tortious constructive discharge claims "where the employer's conduct violates strong and compelling public policy"); Hansen v. Harrah's, 100 Nev. 60, 64 , 675 P.2d 394, 397 (198 2019See Dillard .Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Beckwith, 115 Nev. 372, 377 , 989 P.2d 882, 885 (1999) (holding that a different provision of the NIIA does not bar an employee from bringing a tortious constructive discharge claim because "NRS 616D.030 . . . does not affect the case law of tortious discharge against public policy"); Sands Regent v. Vctlgardson, 105 Nev, 436, 440, 777 P.2d 898, 900 (1989) (allowing employees to bring tortious constructive discharge claims "where the employer's conduct violates strong and compelling public policy"); Hansen v. Harrah's, 100 Nev. 60, 64 , 675 P.2d 394, 397 (198 | 2 | 2 |
Barjesteh v. Faye's Pub, Inc.green2 sentences2019See, e.g., Barjesteh v. Faye's Pub, Inc., 106 Nev. 120 , 787 P.2d 401 (1990) (treating Faye's Pub, the corporation, the same as Martin Schwartzer, a majority stockholder of the corporation, for purposes of NIIA immunity). 2019See, e.g., Barjesteh v. Faye's Pub, Inc., 106 Nev. 120 , 787 P.2d 401 (1990) (treating Faye's Pub, the corporation, the same as Martin Schwartzer, a majority stockholder of the corporation, for purposes of NIIA immunity). | 2 | 2 |
Meers v. Haughton Elevatorgreen2 sentences2006See NRS 616B.603; Meers v. Haughton Elevator, 101 Nev. 283 , 701 P.2d 1006 (1985) (describing the “normal work test,” which is used to determine whether NIIA immunity applies in the nonconstruction context). 2006See NRS 616B.603; Meers v. Haughton Elevator, 101 Nev. 283 , 701 P.2d 1006 (1985) (describing the “normal work test,” which is used to determine whether NIIA immunity applies in the nonconstruction context). | 1 | 3 |
Wood v. Safeway, Inc.green2 sentences2018Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724 , 729, 121 P.3d 1026 , 1029 (2005). 2018Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724 , 729, 121 P.3d 1026 , 1029 (2005). | 1 | 2 |
Oliver v. Barrick Goldstrike Minesgreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., Meers v. Haughton Elevator, 101 Nev. 283 , 285 n. 3, 701 P.2d 1006 , 1007 n. 3 (1985) (expressly noting that inquiry is different in non-construction situations). . . . ")). [24] Id. [25] Oliver v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, 111 Nev. 1338, 1349 , 905 P.2d 168, 175 (1995). [26] We note that, even though Commercial Consulting did not hire any subcontractors or independent contractors, it is nonetheless a "principal contractor" under NRS 616A.285's definition of a "principal contractor" as one who contracts to complete an entire project. 2006See, e.g., Meers v. Haughton Elevator, 101 Nev. 283 , 285 n. 3, 701 P.2d 1006 , 1007 n. 3 (1985) (expressly noting that inquiry is different in non-construction situations). . . . ")). [24] Id. [25] Oliver v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, 111 Nev. 1338, 1349 , 905 P.2d 168, 175 (1995). [26] We note that, even though Commercial Consulting did not hire any subcontractors or independent contractors, it is nonetheless a "principal contractor" under NRS 616A.285's definition of a "principal contractor" as one who contracts to complete an entire project. | 1 | 1 |
Tucker v. Action Equipment & Scaffold Co.green2 sentences2006NRS 616B.603 was formerly located at NRS 616.262. [23] See Tucker, 113 Nev. at 1356 n. 4, 951 P.2d at 1031 -32 n. 4 (recognizing that, under the now defunct control test and under the Meers test, whether a matter was construction or nonconstruction impacted the ease of determining whether a defendant was entitled to NIIA immunity as a statutory employer or co-employee, and citing Sims v. General Telephone & Electronics, 107 Nev. 516 , 529 n. 6, 815 P.2d 151 , 159 n. 6 (1991) ("In non-construction situations such as this case, however, this court has taken a much more fact-specific approach to 2006NRS 616B.603 was formerly located at NRS 616.262. [23] See Tucker, 113 Nev. at 1356 n. 4, 951 P.2d at 1031 -32 n. 4 (recognizing that, under the now defunct control test and under the Meers test, whether a matter was construction or nonconstruction impacted the ease of determining whether a defendant was entitled to NIIA immunity as a statutory employer or co-employee, and citing Sims v. General Telephone & Electronics, 107 Nev. 516 , 529 n. 6, 815 P.2d 151 , 159 n. 6 (1991) ("In non-construction situations such as this case, however, this court has taken a much more fact-specific approach to | 1 | 1 |
Sims v. General Telephone & Electronicsgreen2 sentences2006NRS 616B.603 was formerly located at NRS 616.262. [23] See Tucker, 113 Nev. at 1356 n. 4, 951 P.2d at 1031 -32 n. 4 (recognizing that, under the now defunct control test and under the Meers test, whether a matter was construction or nonconstruction impacted the ease of determining whether a defendant was entitled to NIIA immunity as a statutory employer or co-employee, and citing Sims v. General Telephone & Electronics, 107 Nev. 516 , 529 n. 6, 815 P.2d 151 , 159 n. 6 (1991) ("In non-construction situations such as this case, however, this court has taken a much more fact-specific approach to 2006NRS 616B.603 was formerly located at NRS 616.262. [23] See Tucker, 113 Nev. at 1356 n. 4, 951 P.2d at 1031 -32 n. 4 (recognizing that, under the now defunct control test and under the Meers test, whether a matter was construction or nonconstruction impacted the ease of determining whether a defendant was entitled to NIIA immunity as a statutory employer or co-employee, and citing Sims v. General Telephone & Electronics, 107 Nev. 516 , 529 n. 6, 815 P.2d 151 , 159 n. 6 (1991) ("In non-construction situations such as this case, however, this court has taken a much more fact-specific approach to | 1 | 1 |
Heitman v. Bank of Las Vegasgreen2 sentences2005Ronquillo-Nino's statements taken as a whole do not imply what Doe avers, that Ronquillo-Nino preyed upon Doe because of her mental infirmities. [37] 866 S.W.2d 690 (Tex.Ct.App.1993); cf. Heitman v. Bank of Las Vegas, 87 Nev. 201, 203 , 484 P.2d 572, 573 (1971) (holding that when an employee is shot because of a personal grudge, animosity or other personal motivation having nothing to do with her employment, the NIIA does not bar the suit, but when an employee is injured merely because she happened to be at work when the incident occurred, the NIIA covers the circumstances (citing McColl v. Sc 2005Ronquillo-Nino's statements taken as a whole do not imply what Doe avers, that Ronquillo-Nino preyed upon Doe because of her mental infirmities. [37] 866 S.W.2d 690 (Tex.Ct.App.1993); cf. Heitman v. Bank of Las Vegas, 87 Nev. 201, 203 , 484 P.2d 572, 573 (1971) (holding that when an employee is shot because of a personal grudge, animosity or other personal motivation having nothing to do with her employment, the NIIA does not bar the suit, but when an employee is injured merely because she happened to be at work when the incident occurred, the NIIA covers the circumstances (citing McColl v. Sc | 1 | 1 |
Highlands Underwriters Insurance Co. v. McGrathgreen1 sentence2005Ronquillo-Nino's statements taken as a whole do not imply what Doe avers, that Ronquillo-Nino preyed upon Doe because of her mental infirmities. [37] 866 S.W.2d 690 (Tex.Ct.App.1993); cf. Heitman v. Bank of Las Vegas, 87 Nev. 201, 203 , 484 P.2d 572, 573 (1971) (holding that when an employee is shot because of a personal grudge, animosity or other personal motivation having nothing to do with her employment, the NIIA does not bar the suit, but when an employee is injured merely because she happened to be at work when the incident occurred, the NIIA covers the circumstances (citing McColl v. Sc | 1 | 1 |
SURETY MIDLAND INSURANCE COMPANY v. Stategreen1 sentence2000See Star v. Rabello, 97 Nev. 124, 125 , 625 P.2d 90, 91 (1981) (recognizing that the torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress and outrage are synonymous). 4 The dismissal of the negligent infliction of mental and physical damage claim is not being appealed. 5 Circus Circus also contends that the Employees’ second amended complaint violated NRCP 15(a) and the district court’s order because it stated the same claims for relief that were previously dismissed and also added three additional claims for relief without leave of court. | 1 | 1 |
Star v. Rabellogreen1 sentence2000See Star v. Rabello, 97 Nev. 124, 125 , 625 P.2d 90, 91 (1981) (recognizing that the torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress and outrage are synonymous). 4 The dismissal of the negligent infliction of mental and physical damage claim is not being appealed. 5 Circus Circus also contends that the Employees’ second amended complaint violated NRCP 15(a) and the district court’s order because it stated the same claims for relief that were previously dismissed and also added three additional claims for relief without leave of court. | 1 | 1 |
Leslie v. J. A. Tiberti Construction Co.green2 sentences1991In addition, this court has noted that “in the absence of a clearly established NIIA defense, summary judgment must be denied.” Leslie v. J. *529 A. Tiberti Construction, 99 Nev. 494, 498 , 664 P.2d 963, 965 (1983). 6 An application of these factors to the instant case reveals that the trial court properly concluded that a factual dispute exists as to whether GTE was Robert’s employer. 1991In addition, this court has noted that “in the absence of a clearly established NIIA defense, summary judgment must be denied.” Leslie v. J. *529 A. Tiberti Construction, 99 Nev. 494, 498 , 664 P.2d 963, 965 (1983). 6 An application of these factors to the instant case reveals that the trial court properly concluded that a factual dispute exists as to whether GTE was Robert’s employer. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nevada. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bassett Furniture Industries, Inc. v. McReynolds
green
2 sentences2000Id. at 286 , 701 P.2d at 1007 (quoting Bassett Furniture Industries, Inc. v. McReynolds, 224 S.E.2d 323 (Va. 1976)). 1997Rather, this court invoked the “normal work” test used in other jurisdictions to determine whether the type of work a subcontractor does entitles it to NIIA immunity: “The test (except in cases where the work is obviously a subcontracted fraction of a main contract) is whether that indispensable activity is, in that business, normally carried on through employees rather than independent contractors.” Id. at 286 , 701 P.2d at 1007 (quoting Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc. v. McReynolds, 224 S.E.2d 323 (Va. 1976)). | 2 | 1997–2000 |
Williams v. Cottonwood Cove Development Co.
green
2 sentences2018Thus, Mirage had to affirmatively assert NIIA immunity unless the Malitas's had "reasonable notice and an opportunity to respond," Williams, 96 Nev. at 860 , 619 P.2d at 1221 , "and prejudice [would] not follow." Ivory Ranch, Inc., 101 Nev. at 473 , 705 P.2d at 675 . 2018Thus, Mirage had to affirmatively assert NIIA immunity unless the Malitas's had "reasonable notice and an opportunity to respond," Williams, 96 Nev. at 860 , 619 P.2d at 1221 , "and prejudice [would] not follow." Ivory Ranch, Inc., 101 Nev. at 473 , 705 P.2d at 675 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Ivory Ranch, Inc. v. Quinn River Ranch, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018Thus, Mirage had to affirmatively assert NIIA immunity unless the Malitas's had "reasonable notice and an opportunity to respond," Williams, 96 Nev. at 860 , 619 P.2d at 1221 , "and prejudice [would] not follow." Ivory Ranch, Inc., 101 Nev. at 473 , 705 P.2d at 675 . 2018Thus, Mirage had to affirmatively assert NIIA immunity unless the Malitas's had "reasonable notice and an opportunity to respond," Williams, 96 Nev. at 860 , 619 P.2d at 1221 , "and prejudice [would] not follow." Ivory Ranch, Inc., 101 Nev. at 473 , 705 P.2d at 675 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Harris v. Rio Hotel & Casino, Inc.
green
2 sentences2006I would reverse the district court’s summary judgment and remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings. 113 Nev. 1349, 1356 , 951 P.2d 1027, 1031 (1997). 117 Nev. 482 , 25 P.3d 206 (2001). 2006I would reverse the district court’s summary judgment and remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings. 113 Nev. 1349, 1356 , 951 P.2d 1027, 1031 (1997). 117 Nev. 482 , 25 P.3d 206 (2001). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Cummings v. United Resort Hotels, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005App.1972)). [41] E.g., South Carolina State Hosp., 328 S.E.2d at 655 ; Wright, 133 S.E.2d at 41 ; cf. Cummings, 85 Nev. at 27 , 449 P.2d at 248 . [42] Marin, 488 S.W.2d at 863 ; cf. Heitman, 87 Nev. at 203-04 , 484 P.2d at 573 ; McColl, 73 Nev. at 230 , 315 P.2d at 809 . [43] In light of Safeway's argument that it is immune from suit under the NIIA for Ronquillo-Nino's workplace sexual assault, it will be estopped from arguing that her injuries are not covered under a workers' compensation claim. 2005App.1972)). [41] E.g., South Carolina State Hosp., 328 S.E.2d at 655 ; Wright, 133 S.E.2d at 41 ; cf. Cummings, 85 Nev. at 27 , 449 P.2d at 248 . [42] Marin, 488 S.W.2d at 863 ; cf. Heitman, 87 Nev. at 203-04 , 484 P.2d at 573 ; McColl, 73 Nev. at 230 , 315 P.2d at 809 . [43] In light of Safeway's argument that it is immune from suit under the NIIA for Ronquillo-Nino's workplace sexual assault, it will be estopped from arguing that her injuries are not covered under a workers' compensation claim. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Villanueva v. Astroworld, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005Ronquillo-Nino's statements taken as a whole do not imply what Doe avers, that Ronquillo-Nino preyed upon Doe because of her mental infirmities. [37] 866 S.W.2d 690 (Tex.Ct.App.1993); cf. Heitman v. Bank of Las Vegas, 87 Nev. 201, 203 , 484 P.2d 572, 573 (1971) (holding that when an employee is shot because of a personal grudge, animosity or other personal motivation having nothing to do with her employment, the NIIA does not bar the suit, but when an employee is injured merely because she happened to be at work when the incident occurred, the NIIA covers the circumstances (citing McColl v. Sc 2005Ronquillo-Nino's statements taken as a whole do not imply what Doe avers, that Ronquillo-Nino preyed upon Doe because of her mental infirmities. [37] 866 S.W.2d 690 (Tex.Ct.App.1993); cf. Heitman v. Bank of Las Vegas, 87 Nev. 201, 203 , 484 P.2d 572, 573 (1971) (holding that when an employee is shot because of a personal grudge, animosity or other personal motivation having nothing to do with her employment, the NIIA does not bar the suit, but when an employee is injured merely because she happened to be at work when the incident occurred, the NIIA covers the circumstances (citing McColl v. Sc | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Commercial Standard Insurance Company v. Marin
green
1 sentence2005App.1972)). [41] E.g., South Carolina State Hosp., 328 S.E.2d at 655 ; Wright, 133 S.E.2d at 41 ; cf. Cummings, 85 Nev. at 27 , 449 P.2d at 248 . [42] Marin, 488 S.W.2d at 863 ; cf. Heitman, 87 Nev. at 203-04 , 484 P.2d at 573 ; McColl, 73 Nev. at 230 , 315 P.2d at 809 . [43] In light of Safeway's argument that it is immune from suit under the NIIA for Ronquillo-Nino's workplace sexual assault, it will be estopped from arguing that her injuries are not covered under a workers' compensation claim. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
McColl v. Scherer
green
2 sentences2005Ronquillo-Nino's statements taken as a whole do not imply what Doe avers, that Ronquillo-Nino preyed upon Doe because of her mental infirmities. [37] 866 S.W.2d 690 (Tex.Ct.App.1993); cf. Heitman v. Bank of Las Vegas, 87 Nev. 201, 203 , 484 P.2d 572, 573 (1971) (holding that when an employee is shot because of a personal grudge, animosity or other personal motivation having nothing to do with her employment, the NIIA does not bar the suit, but when an employee is injured merely because she happened to be at work when the incident occurred, the NIIA covers the circumstances (citing McColl v. Sc 2005Ronquillo-Nino's statements taken as a whole do not imply what Doe avers, that Ronquillo-Nino preyed upon Doe because of her mental infirmities. [37] 866 S.W.2d 690 (Tex.Ct.App.1993); cf. Heitman v. Bank of Las Vegas, 87 Nev. 201, 203 , 484 P.2d 572, 573 (1971) (holding that when an employee is shot because of a personal grudge, animosity or other personal motivation having nothing to do with her employment, the NIIA does not bar the suit, but when an employee is injured merely because she happened to be at work when the incident occurred, the NIIA covers the circumstances (citing McColl v. Sc | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Doe v. South Carolina State Hospital
green
1 sentence2005App.1972)). [41] E.g., South Carolina State Hosp., 328 S.E.2d at 655 ; Wright, 133 S.E.2d at 41 ; cf. Cummings, 85 Nev. at 27 , 449 P.2d at 248 . [42] Marin, 488 S.W.2d at 863 ; cf. Heitman, 87 Nev. at 203-04 , 484 P.2d at 573 ; McColl, 73 Nev. at 230 , 315 P.2d at 809 . [43] In light of Safeway's argument that it is immune from suit under the NIIA for Ronquillo-Nino's workplace sexual assault, it will be estopped from arguing that her injuries are not covered under a workers' compensation claim. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
EMPLOYERS INSURANCE CO. v. Wright
green
1 sentence2005App.1972)). [41] E.g., South Carolina State Hosp., 328 S.E.2d at 655 ; Wright, 133 S.E.2d at 41 ; cf. Cummings, 85 Nev. at 27 , 449 P.2d at 248 . [42] Marin, 488 S.W.2d at 863 ; cf. Heitman, 87 Nev. at 203-04 , 484 P.2d at 573 ; McColl, 73 Nev. at 230 , 315 P.2d at 809 . [43] In light of Safeway's argument that it is immune from suit under the NIIA for Ronquillo-Nino's workplace sexual assault, it will be estopped from arguing that her injuries are not covered under a workers' compensation claim. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Weaver v. Shell Oil Company
green
2 sentences1983Weaver v. Shell Oil Co., 91 Nev. 324, 328 , 535 P.2d 787 (1975). 1983Weaver v. Shell Oil Co., 91 Nev. 324, 328 , 535 P.2d 787 (1975). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.