memorandum rule in New York

2001The trial court also properly refused to charge the jury on plaintiffs alleged comparative fault, since General Municipal Law § 205-e remains a strict liability statute (see, Warner v Adelphi Univ., 240 AD2d 730 [2d Dept]; Dubois v Vanderwalker, 245 AD2d 758, 760-761 [3d Dept]), and properly charged the jury with the correct standard of care under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104.

1994Petitioner’s contention that Supreme Court erred in finding that the memorandum was not a rule or regulation under State Administrative Procedure Act § 102 because respondents classified the memorandum as an advisory opinion (see, People v Cull, 10 NY2d 123, 126 ), is rejected.

1993The law is settled that a binder agreement such as the memorandum at bar may satisfy the Statute of Frauds and thus be subject to specific performance where it identifies the parties, describes the subject property, recites all essential terms of a complete agreement, and is signed by the party to be charged (see, Engle v Lipcross, Inc., 153 AD2d 603, 605 ; Ramos v Lido Home Sales Corp., 148 AD2d 598 ; Tamir v Greenberg, 119 AD2d 665 ).

1993Moreover, the essential terms which must be set forth for the binder to be enforceable include those terms customarily encountered in transactions of this nature (see, Taibi v American Banknote Co., 135 AD2d 810, 811 ).

1993The law is settled that a binder agreement such as the memorandum at bar may satisfy the Statute of Frauds and thus be subject to specific performance where it identifies the parties, describes the subject property, recites all essential terms of a complete agreement, and is signed by the party to be charged (see, Engle v Lipcross, Inc., 153 AD2d 603, 605 ; Ramos v Lido Home Sales Corp., 148 AD2d 598 ; Tamir v Greenberg, 119 AD2d 665 ).

1993The law is settled that a binder agreement such as the memorandum at bar may satisfy the Statute of Frauds and thus be subject to specific performance where it identifies the parties, describes the subject property, recites all essential terms of a complete agreement, and is signed by the party to be charged (see, Engle v Lipcross, Inc., 153 AD2d 603, 605 ; Ramos v Lido Home Sales Corp., 148 AD2d 598 ; Tamir v Greenberg, 119 AD2d 665 ).

1934In the case of Eschenbrenner v. Gude Brothers ( 202 App. Div. 752 ). the court in a memorandum states that the privilege of inspection and discovery in cases of this character is given to plaintiff almost as a matter of right.

1928The changes that have occurred in this State as to the law relative to trusts for charitable and religious purposes; the varying decisions from the case of Williams v. Williams ( 8 N. Y. 525 ) to the decision in the case of Tilden v. Green (130 id. 29); and the subsequent enactment of the Charitable Uses Act, now section 12 of the Personal Property Law and section 113 of the Real Property Law, have been so often thoroughly and exhaustively discussed that it is unnecessary to incumber this memorandum with an analysis or citation of the various phases of the numerous cases involving such trusts.

1924In holding the underwriters liable the court said: “ The rule of law is now well settled that, under an insurance upon an article free from average, if by reason of the perils insured against, it is placed in such a condition, that in consequence of inevitable deterioration or decay, it cannot be carried to the port of destination, but will necessarily, before the completion of the voyage, be wholly destroyed, and it is accordingly sold, at an intermediate port, this will constitute a total loss within the true intent and meaning of the memorandum clause.” Williams v. Smith (supra) is another

1907Earl v. Campbell, 14 How.

1885Co., 9 Hun, 383 ; S. C., 78 N. Y., 400 .) The question as to what constitutes an absolute total loss, has generally arisen in England, on the use of the phrase by underwriters in the memorandum clause, in which the articles therein mentioned are “warranted free from average imless general.” (Arnold on Ins., vol.’ 2, p. 1020.) In this country insurers to express the same degree of limitation, on their liability, use the same words, or those of equivalent meaning, as in the policy before us, viz: “Against actual total loss only.” These words have the ■same legal operation and alike qualify the i

1859The law in this State is settled, that there can be no recovery in case of loss of memorandum articles, when any portion thereof arrives in specie at the port of destination, although possessing no value there. ( Maggrath v. Church, 1 Caines, 196 ; Leroy v. Gouverneur, 1 John., 226 ; Wadsworth v. Pacific Insurance Co., 4 Wend., 33 .) While any portion of such articles remains in specie, capable of being transported to the terminus of the voyage, and within the control of the assured, he cannot recover for a total destruction of a portion of the property, or for the loss of value, however serio

1859The law in this State is settled, that there can be no recovery in case of loss of memorandum articles, when any portion thereof arrives in specie at the port of destination, although possessing no value there. ( Maggrath v. Church, 1 Caines, 196 ; Leroy v. Gouverneur, 1 John., 226 ; Wadsworth v. Pacific Insurance Co., 4 Wend., 33 .) While any portion of such articles remains in specie, capable of being transported to the terminus of the voyage, and within the control of the assured, he cannot recover for a total destruction of a portion of the property, or for the loss of value, however serio