proof offered hearing in New York

10 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1931–2012 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

Case	Followed	Cited
People v. Johnsongreen ny · 2008 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012 1 sentence 2012Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the proof offered at the hearing, showing that he failed to meaningfully participate in and complete sex offender treatment and denied that he had victimized the children depicted in the pornographic images he possessed, provided clear and convincing evidence that he was at an increased risk to re-offend (see Correction Law § I68-0; see generally People v Johnson, 11 NY3d 416, 420 [2008]).	1	1
People v. Asaregreen nyappdiv · 2009 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010 1 sentence 2010Accordingly, the County Court properly granted the motion of the People of the State of New York for an upward departure of his risk level designation from a level two to a level three sex offender (see People v Turpeau, 68 AD3d 1083 [2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 705 [2010]; People v Walker, 67 AD3d 760, 761 [2009]).	1	1
Malach v. Cheng Lung Chuanggreen nycivct · 2002 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 1 sentence 2006“As is” means that the buyer is purchasing the property “in the condition that it actually exists and not in the condition as it was represented.” (Malach v Cheng Lung Chuang, 194 Misc 2d 651, 660 [Civ Ct, Richmond County 2002].) Even if this court were to find that a cause of action existed for an alleged misrepresentation contained in the PCDS, the proof offered at the hearing failed to prove that the sellers’ negative answer to the question of any known material defects was, in fact, false.	1	1
Great Neck Pennysaver, Inc. v. Central Nassau Publications, Inc.green nyappdiv · 1978 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 1980–1980 1 sentence 1980The order of October 9, 1979 was clear and the proof offered at the hearing sustained the determination of Special Term that the respondent Schachenmayr violated its provisions and, therefore, disobeyed a lawful mandate of the court (Judiciary Law, § 753, subd A, par 3) and was guilty of civil contempt by "conduct [that] was calculated to, or actually did, defeat, impair, impede, or prejudice the rights or remedies” of the complaint in a pending civil proceeding (Matter of Morris Cramer Bowling v Cramer, 38 AJD2d 774; see, also, Great Neck Pennysaver v Central Nassau Pub., 65 AD2d 616 ).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (19)

Case	Cited	Years
People v. Turpeau green nyappdiv · 2009 2 sentences 2012Accordingly, the County Court properly granted the petition of the People of the State of New York for an upward departure of his risk level classification to the extent of modifying his risk level classification from a level one to a level two sex offender (see People v Turpeau, 68 AD3d 1083 [2009]). 2010Accordingly, the County Court properly granted the motion of the People of the State of New York for an upward departure of his risk level designation from a level two to a level three sex offender (see People v Turpeau, 68 AD3d 1083 [2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 705 [2010]; People v Walker, 67 AD3d 760, 761 [2009]).	2	2010–2012
People v. Clark green ny · 2010 1 sentence 2010Accordingly, the County Court properly granted the motion of the People of the State of New York for an upward departure of his risk level designation from a level two to a level three sex offender (see People v Turpeau, 68 AD3d 1083 [2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 705 [2010]; People v Walker, 67 AD3d 760, 761 [2009]).	1	2010–2010
People v. McKinney green ny · 1969 1 sentence 1980This proof, offered by the defendant, made the intent element equivocal and subject to proof of other crimes, to negate the proof offered by the defense of lack of intent (see People v McKinney, 24 NY2d 180, 184-185 ).	1	1980–1980
People v. Dales green ny · 1955 1 sentence 1980To counteract this defendant’s evidence, the probative value of the proof of other crimes outweighs the possible prejudice to the defendant (People v Allweiss, 48 NY2d 40 ; People v Dales, 309 NY 97 ), and the trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing such proof (People v Santarelli, 49 NY2d 241 ; People v Shields, 46 NY2d 764 ).	1	1980–1980
People v. Shields green ny · 1978 1 sentence 1980To counteract this defendant’s evidence, the probative value of the proof of other crimes outweighs the possible prejudice to the defendant (People v Allweiss, 48 NY2d 40 ; People v Dales, 309 NY 97 ), and the trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing such proof (People v Santarelli, 49 NY2d 241 ; People v Shields, 46 NY2d 764 ).	1	1980–1980
People v. Santarelli green ny · 1980 1 sentence 1980To counteract this defendant’s evidence, the probative value of the proof of other crimes outweighs the possible prejudice to the defendant (People v Allweiss, 48 NY2d 40 ; People v Dales, 309 NY 97 ), and the trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing such proof (People v Santarelli, 49 NY2d 241 ; People v Shields, 46 NY2d 764 ).	1	1980–1980
People v. Allweiss green ny · 1979 1 sentence 1980To counteract this defendant’s evidence, the probative value of the proof of other crimes outweighs the possible prejudice to the defendant (People v Allweiss, 48 NY2d 40 ; People v Dales, 309 NY 97 ), and the trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing such proof (People v Santarelli, 49 NY2d 241 ; People v Shields, 46 NY2d 764 ).	1	1980–1980
Feldman v. Feldman green nyappdiv · 1974 1 sentence 1976The proof offered at the hearing on plaintiff’s motion to change custody failed to show that any harm to the child would result if he remained in defendant’s custody; nor did it reveal defendant to be an unfit custodial parent (see Mantell v Mantell, 45 AD2d 918 ; Matter of Feldman v Feldman, 45 AD2d 320 ).	1	1976–1976
State Division of Human Rights v. Buffalo Board of Education green nyappdiv · 1974 1 sentence 1976The proof offered at the hearing on plaintiff’s motion to change custody failed to show that any harm to the child would result if he remained in defendant’s custody; nor did it reveal defendant to be an unfit custodial parent (see Mantell v Mantell, 45 AD2d 918 ; Matter of Feldman v Feldman, 45 AD2d 320 ).	1	1976–1976
Rosati v. Grenis neutral nyappdiv · 1975 1 sentence 1976The change in circumstances which would justify a transfer of custody does not mean a change for the better on the part of the noncustodial parent (Macari v Macari, 50 AD2d 818 ).	1	1976–1976
Geelan v. . Southern Boulevard Rd. Co. of New York City neutral ny · 1917 1 sentence 1968The proof offered at the hearing failed to show that any harm to the children would result if they remained in plaintiff’s custody; nor did it reveal plaintiff to be an unfit custodian (Lester v. Lester, 178 App. Div. 205 , affd. 222 N. Y. 546 ; Matter of Jackson v. Woodner, 19 Mise 2d 594). Ño circumstances were established to warrant needless shuttling back and forth of the children {Matter of Lang v. Lang, 9 A D 2d 401, affd. 7 N Y 2d 1029).	1	1968–1968
Lester v. Lester neutral nyappdiv · 1917 1 sentence 1968The proof offered at the hearing failed to show that any harm to the children would result if they remained in plaintiff’s custody; nor did it reveal plaintiff to be an unfit custodian (Lester v. Lester, 178 App. Div. 205 , affd. 222 N. Y. 546 ; Matter of Jackson v. Woodner, 19 Mise 2d 594). Ño circumstances were established to warrant needless shuttling back and forth of the children {Matter of Lang v. Lang, 9 A D 2d 401, affd. 7 N Y 2d 1029).	1	1968–1968
Lisenba v. California green scotus · 1942 1 sentence 1966The defense contends that the statements are inadmissible because they are the product of police methods, that not only were they reprehensible, but that the defendants’ constitutional rights were violated; that the statements were not voluntary, but were obtained by depriving the defendants of due process of law (Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 ; Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 ; Stroble v. California, 343 U. S. 181 ; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560 ; Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219 ).	1	1966–1966
Stroble v. California green scotus · 1952 1 sentence 1966The defense contends that the statements are inadmissible because they are the product of police methods, that not only were they reprehensible, but that the defendants’ constitutional rights were violated; that the statements were not voluntary, but were obtained by depriving the defendants of due process of law (Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 ; Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 ; Stroble v. California, 343 U. S. 181 ; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560 ; Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219 ).	1	1966–1966
Payne v. Arkansas green scotus · 1958 1 sentence 1966The defense contends that the statements are inadmissible because they are the product of police methods, that not only were they reprehensible, but that the defendants’ constitutional rights were violated; that the statements were not voluntary, but were obtained by depriving the defendants of due process of law (Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 ; Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 ; Stroble v. California, 343 U. S. 181 ; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560 ; Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219 ).	1	1966–1966
Malinski v. New York green scotus · 1945 1 sentence 1966The defense contends that the statements are inadmissible because they are the product of police methods, that not only were they reprehensible, but that the defendants’ constitutional rights were violated; that the statements were not voluntary, but were obtained by depriving the defendants of due process of law (Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 ; Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 ; Stroble v. California, 343 U. S. 181 ; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560 ; Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219 ).	1	1966–1966
Jackson v. Denno green scotus · 1964 1 sentence 1966The defense contends that the statements are inadmissible because they are the product of police methods, that not only were they reprehensible, but that the defendants’ constitutional rights were violated; that the statements were not voluntary, but were obtained by depriving the defendants of due process of law (Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 ; Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 ; Stroble v. California, 343 U. S. 181 ; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560 ; Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219 ).	1	1966–1966
In re the Estate of Lichtblau neutral nysurct · 1933 1 sentence 1955As a result there is no jurisdiction in this court to compel delivery of any assets which constituted partnership property (Matter of Lichtblau, 146 Misc. 278 ; Matter of Katz, 63 N. Y.	1	1955–1955
People v. . Becker green ny · 1915 1 sentence 1931(People v. Becker, 215 N. Y. 126 ; People v. Eng Hing and Lee Dock, 212 id. 373; People v. Patrick, 182 id. 131, 177.) The defendant in Ms affidavits and' by the proof offered at the hearing on tMs motion, has failed to establish any presumption that any additional evidence now available to the defendant, if produced at another trial would change the verdict.	1	1931–1931

Where else courts name it

TN 18 (1997–2024) NY 10 (1931–2012) NC 7 (1993–2008) CA 6 (2008–2025)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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