six-factor test in Ohio

2002Recently, we have employed the six-factor test used in United States v. Shabazz (C.A. 5, 1993), 993 F.2d 431 , to assess the voluntary nature of consent.

2000Recently, we have employed the six-factor test used in United States v. Shabazz (C.A.5, 1993), 993 F.2d 431 , to assess the voluntary nature of consent.

2008The Plain Dealer v. Ohio Dept. of Ins. , 80 Ohio St.3d 513 , 524-525 , 1997-Ohio-75 , 687 N.E.2d 661 , the Supreme Court of Ohio established a six-factor test for determining whether information constitutes a trade secret pursuant to R.C. 1333.61 (D): "(1) The extent to which the information is known outside the business; (2) the extent to which it is known to those inside the business, i.e. , by the employees; (3) the precautions taken by the holder of the trade secret to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the savings effected and the value to the holder in having the information as ag

2008The Plain Dealer v. Ohio Dept. of Ins. , 80 Ohio St.3d 513 , 524-525 , 1997-Ohio-75 , 687 N.E.2d 661 , the Supreme Court of Ohio established a six-factor test for determining whether information constitutes a trade secret pursuant to R.C. 1333.61 (D): "(1) The extent to which the information is known outside the business; (2) the extent to which it is known to those inside the business, i.e. , by the employees; (3) the precautions taken by the holder of the trade secret to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the savings effected and the value to the holder in having the information as ag

2019Sartini v. Yost, 96 Ohio St. 3d 37 , 2002-Ohio- 3317, 770 N.E.2d 584 . {¶35} The Ohio Supreme Court set forth a six factor test to determine whether the denial of a motion to continue constitutes an abuse of discretion.

2019Sartini v. Yost, 96 Ohio St. 3d 37 , 2002-Ohio- 3317, 770 N.E.2d 584 . {¶35} The Ohio Supreme Court set forth a six factor test to determine whether the denial of a motion to continue constitutes an abuse of discretion.

2023The second is under State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St. 2d 65 , 423 N.E.2d 1078 (1981) which lays out a six-factor test to guide a trial court’s general decision to grant or deny any continuance. {¶14} In State v. Parson, the Ohio Supreme Court has articulated a three factor test to govern a trial court’s exercise of discretion in imposing sanctions for discovery violations committed by the state: (1) whether the prosecution’s failure to disclose was a willful violation of Crim.R. 16, (2) whether foreknowledge of the evidence would have benefited the accused, 5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS and

2023The second is under State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St. 2d 65 , 423 N.E.2d 1078 (1981) which lays out a six-factor test to guide a trial court’s general decision to grant or deny any continuance. {¶14} In State v. Parson, the Ohio Supreme Court has articulated a three factor test to govern a trial court’s exercise of discretion in imposing sanctions for discovery violations committed by the state: (1) whether the prosecution’s failure to disclose was a willful violation of Crim.R. 16, (2) whether foreknowledge of the evidence would have benefited the accused, 5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS and

2008Water Mgt., Inc. v. Stayanchi (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 83 , 15 OBR 186 , 472 N.E.2d 715 , paragraph one of the syllabus.

2008Water Mgt., Inc. v. Stayanchi (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 83 , 15 OBR 186 , 472 N.E.2d 715 , paragraph one of the syllabus.

2008The Plain Dealer v. Ohio Dept. of Ins. , 80 Ohio St.3d 513 , 524-525 , 1997-Ohio-75 , 687 N.E.2d 661 , the Supreme Court of Ohio established a six-factor test for determining whether information constitutes a trade secret pursuant to R.C. 1333.61 (D): "(1) The extent to which the information is known outside the business; (2) the extent to which it is known to those inside the business, i.e. , by the employees; (3) the precautions taken by the holder of the trade secret to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the savings effected and the value to the holder in having the information as ag

2008The Plain Dealer v. Ohio Dept. of Ins. , 80 Ohio St.3d 513 , 524-525 , 1997-Ohio-75 , 687 N.E.2d 661 , the Supreme Court of Ohio established a six-factor test for determining whether information constitutes a trade secret pursuant to R.C. 1333.61 (D): "(1) The extent to which the information is known outside the business; (2) the extent to which it is known to those inside the business, i.e. , by the employees; (3) the precautions taken by the holder of the trade secret to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the savings effected and the value to the holder in having the information as ag

2008The Plain Dealer v. Ohio Dept. of Ins. , 80 Ohio St.3d 513 , 524-525 , 1997-Ohio-75 , 687 N.E.2d 661 , the Supreme Court of Ohio established a six-factor test for determining whether information constitutes a trade secret pursuant to R.C. 1333.61 (D): "(1) The extent to which the information is known outside the business; (2) the extent to which it is known to those inside the business, i.e. , by the employees; (3) the precautions taken by the holder of the trade secret to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the savings effected and the value to the holder in having the information as ag

2004Id., citing In re Jane Doe 1 (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 135 . {¶ 19} Arguing that husband's separate property had been transmuted, wife urges this Court to apply a six-factor test set forth in Kuehn v. Kuehn (1988), 55 Ohio App.3d 245 , to determine whether transmutation has occurred.

2004Id., citing In re Jane Doe 1 (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 135 . {¶ 19} Arguing that husband's separate property had been transmuted, wife urges this Court to apply a six-factor test set forth in Kuehn v. Kuehn (1988), 55 Ohio App.3d 245 , to determine whether transmutation has occurred.

2004Id., citing In re Jane Doe 1 (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 135 . {¶ 19} Arguing that husband's separate property had been transmuted, wife urges this Court to apply a six-factor test set forth in Kuehn v. Kuehn (1988), 55 Ohio App.3d 245 , to determine whether transmutation has occurred.

1998The factors to be considered are: "(1) the voluntariness of the defendant's custodial status; (2) the presence of coercive police procedures; (3) the extent and level of the defendant's cooperation with the police; (4) the defendant's awareness of his right to refuse to consent; (5) the defendant's education and intelligence; and (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found." Id. at 438 , quoting from United States v. Olivier-Becerril (5th Cir. 1988), 861 F.2d 424 , 426 .