10 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Cooeygreen2 sentences2015See also State v. Cooey, 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 26 , 544 N.E2d 895 (1989) (“The Wilcox rule is based on a mistrust of the ability of psychiatry to accurately ‘fine-tune’ degrees of capacity among offenders who are sane - i.e., who have the minimal capacity to act voluntarily.”). {¶35} This prohibition typically relates to psychiatric testimony proffered to disprove a mental state (unrelated to the affirmative defense of insanity). 2015See also State v. Cooey, 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 26 , 544 N.E2d 895 (1989) (“The Wilcox rule is based on a mistrust of the ability of psychiatry to accurately ‘fine-tune’ degrees of capacity among offenders who are sane - i.e., who have the minimal capacity to act voluntarily.”). {¶35} This prohibition typically relates to psychiatric testimony proffered to disprove a mental state (unrelated to the affirmative defense of insanity). | 4 | 5 |
State v. Wilcoxgreen2 sentences1994Fourth Assignment of Error “The trial court erred to the prejudice of the defendant by refusing to allow expert testimony that the defendant’s underlying psychological condition in combination with several other stressors diminished her capacity to form the requisite mental state necessary for conviction of the crime of felonious assault, State v. Wilcox (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 182 [ 24 O.O.3d 284 , 436 N.E.2d 523 ], to the contrary notwithstanding.” Defendant also asserts in her supplemental brief the following related assignment of error: “The Wilcox rule is unconstitutional as applied or, at 1994Fourth Assignment of Error “The trial court erred to the prejudice of the defendant by refusing to allow expert testimony that the defendant’s underlying psychological condition in combination with several other stressors diminished her capacity to form the requisite mental state necessary for conviction of the crime of felonious assault, State v. Wilcox (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 182 [ 24 O.O.3d 284 , 436 N.E.2d 523 ], to the contrary notwithstanding.” Defendant also asserts in her supplemental brief the following related assignment of error: “The Wilcox rule is unconstitutional as applied or, at | 1 | 3 |
State v. MacDonaldgreen1 sentence2025Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantees an accused this same right.” State v. Hughes, 86 Ohio St.3d 424 , 425 1999-Ohio-118 , citing State v. MacDonald, 48 Ohio St.2d 66, 68 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Brummett, Unpublished Decision (1-28-2004)green1 sentence2025As of the date Wilcox filed his motion to dismiss, the record does not reflect he had complied with either the trial court’s June 16, 2023 order or the State’s motion for reciprocal discover. {¶14} “Under 2945.72(D), the speedy trial period can be tolled for ‘[a]ny period of delay occasioned by the neglect or improper act of the accused.’” State v. Bradley, 2005- Ohio-6572, ¶ 27 (11th Dist.) “Courts in Ohio have repeatedly held that when the State lawfully requests reciprocal discovery from the defendant and the defendant fails to comply, the speedy trial time remains tolled and is charged to | 1 | 1 |
State v. Saxon, Unpublished Decision (9-23-2004)green1 sentence2025As of the date Wilcox filed his motion to dismiss, the record does not reflect he had complied with either the trial court’s June 16, 2023 order or the State’s motion for reciprocal discover. {¶14} “Under 2945.72(D), the speedy trial period can be tolled for ‘[a]ny period of delay occasioned by the neglect or improper act of the accused.’” State v. Bradley, 2005- Ohio-6572, ¶ 27 (11th Dist.) “Courts in Ohio have repeatedly held that when the State lawfully requests reciprocal discovery from the defendant and the defendant fails to comply, the speedy trial time remains tolled and is charged to | 1 | 1 |
Hagood v. Gailgreen2 sentences2024See Hagood v. Gail, 105 Ohio App.3d 780, 790-791 , 664 N.E.2d 1373 (11th Dist.1995); and Spencer 7 Case No. 2023-P-0059 v. Kiowa Developing Co., 9th Dist. 2024See Hagood v. Gail, 105 Ohio App.3d 780, 790-791 , 664 N.E.2d 1373 (11th Dist.1995); and Spencer 7 Case No. 2023-P-0059 v. Kiowa Developing Co., 9th Dist. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Scheffergreen2 sentences2011(Citing United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 , ---- - ----, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 1263-64, 140 ). 2011(Citing United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 , ---- - ----, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 1263-64, 140 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hughes
green
1 sentence2025Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantees an accused this same right.” State v. Hughes, 86 Ohio St.3d 424 , 425 1999-Ohio-118 , citing State v. MacDonald, 48 Ohio St.2d 66, 68 (1976). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Hughes
green
1 sentence2025Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantees an accused this same right.” State v. Hughes, 86 Ohio St.3d 424 , 425 1999-Ohio-118 , citing State v. MacDonald, 48 Ohio St.2d 66, 68 (1976). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Moine
green
2 sentences2013In State v. Moine, 72 Ohio App.3d 584 (9th Dist.1991), we held that the defendant was not entitled to raise the issue of involuntariness/unconsciousness because R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) is a strict liability offense. 2013In State v. Moine, 72 Ohio App.3d 584 (9th Dist.1991), we held that the defendant was not entitled to raise the issue of involuntariness/unconsciousness because R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) is a strict liability offense. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Carrie C. Wong v. Christine Money, Warden Attorney General of the State of Ohio
green
2 sentences2011(T. at 19). {¶58} The application of the Wilcox rule in the case at bar has not “significantly undermined fundamental elements of the accused's defense.” United States v. Wong (6th Cir 1998), 142 F.3d 313, 325 . 2011(T. at 19). {¶58} The application of the Wilcox rule in the case at bar has not “significantly undermined fundamental elements of the accused's defense.” United States v. Wong (6th Cir 1998), 142 F.3d 313, 325 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Wong
green
1 sentence2003We therefore hold that a defendant may not offer expert psychiatric testimony unrelated to the insanity defense * * * to show that, due to mental illness, intoxication, or any other reason, he lacked the mental capacity to form the specific mental state required for a particular crime or degree of crime." Cooey , at 26. {¶ 72} Moreover, in State v. Wong (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 39 , the Fourth Appellate District performed a thorough survey of whether exclusion of psychiatric testimony on the issue of mens rea or specific intent violates a defendant's constitutional rights. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Rhodes
green
2 sentences1994While it is true that reasonable provocation is an affirmative defense which the defendant has the burden of establishing at trial, see State v. Rhodes (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 613 , 590 N.E.2d 261 , appellant’s argument must still be rejected. 1994While it is true that reasonable provocation is an affirmative defense which the defendant has the burden of establishing at trial, see State v. Rhodes (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 613 , 590 N.E.2d 261 , appellant’s argument must still be rejected. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Freeman
neutral
2 sentences1990In State v. Wilcox (1974), 40 Ohio App. 2d 380 , at paragraph two of the syllabus, the court held: "A person may not be convicted of speeding solely upon evidence obtained from a radar speed-meter device mounted in a moving patrol car in the absence of (1) expert testimony with respect to construction of the device and its method of operation with respect to its ability to differentiate the speed of a vehicle approaching the moving patrol car from the opposite direction from the combined speed at which the two vehicles are moving toward each other, and (2) evidence that the device is in good c 1990In State v. Wilcox (1974), 40 Ohio App. 2d 380 , at paragraph two of the syllabus, the court held: "A person may not be convicted of speeding solely upon evidence obtained from a radar speed-meter device mounted in a moving patrol car in the absence of (1) expert testimony with respect to construction of the device and its method of operation with respect to its ability to differentiate the speed of a vehicle approaching the moving patrol car from the opposite direction from the combined speed at which the two vehicles are moving toward each other, and (2) evidence that the device is in good c | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Colby
green
2 sentences1990In State v. Wilcox (1974), 40 Ohio App. 2d 380 , at paragraph two of the syllabus, the court held: "A person may not be convicted of speeding solely upon evidence obtained from a radar speed-meter device mounted in a moving patrol car in the absence of (1) expert testimony with respect to construction of the device and its method of operation with respect to its ability to differentiate the speed of a vehicle approaching the moving patrol car from the opposite direction from the combined speed at which the two vehicles are moving toward each other, and (2) evidence that the device is in good c 1990In State v. Wilcox (1974), 40 Ohio App. 2d 380 , at paragraph two of the syllabus, the court held: "A person may not be convicted of speeding solely upon evidence obtained from a radar speed-meter device mounted in a moving patrol car in the absence of (1) expert testimony with respect to construction of the device and its method of operation with respect to its ability to differentiate the speed of a vehicle approaching the moving patrol car from the opposite direction from the combined speed at which the two vehicles are moving toward each other, and (2) evidence that the device is in good c | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Doles
green
2 sentences1990In accord Kirtland Hills v. Logan (1984), 21 Ohio App. 3d 67 ; State v. Doles (1980), 70 Ohio App. 2d 35 . 1990In accord Kirtland Hills v. Logan (1984), 21 Ohio App. 3d 67 ; State v. Doles (1980), 70 Ohio App. 2d 35 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Village of Kirtland Hills v. Logan
neutral
2 sentences1990In accord Kirtland Hills v. Logan (1984), 21 Ohio App. 3d 67 ; State v. Doles (1980), 70 Ohio App. 2d 35 . 1990In accord Kirtland Hills v. Logan (1984), 21 Ohio App. 3d 67 ; State v. Doles (1980), 70 Ohio App. 2d 35 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Wilcox
green
2 sentences1990In State v. Wilcox (1974), 40 Ohio App. 2d 380 , at paragraph two of the syllabus, the court held: "A person may not be convicted of speeding solely upon evidence obtained from a radar speed-meter device mounted in a moving patrol car in the absence of (1) expert testimony with respect to construction of the device and its method of operation with respect to its ability to differentiate the speed of a vehicle approaching the moving patrol car from the opposite direction from the combined speed at which the two vehicles are moving toward each other, and (2) evidence that the device is in good c 1990In State v. Wilcox (1974), 40 Ohio App. 2d 380 , at paragraph two of the syllabus, the court held: "A person may not be convicted of speeding solely upon evidence obtained from a radar speed-meter device mounted in a moving patrol car in the absence of (1) expert testimony with respect to construction of the device and its method of operation with respect to its ability to differentiate the speed of a vehicle approaching the moving patrol car from the opposite direction from the combined speed at which the two vehicles are moving toward each other, and (2) evidence that the device is in good c | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.