government interference exception in Pennsylvania

2026See Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 955 (Pa. 2018) (holding that, for the government interference exception to apply, a petitioner “is required to show that but for the interference of a government actor he could not have filed his claim earlier”); see also -5- J-S03045-26 Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008) (explaining that the exception requires the petitioner to plead that the facts upon which the claim is predicated were not previously known to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained through due diligence).

2025Our Supreme Court has explained that the government interference exception requires a petition to “plead and prove the failure to previously raise the claim was the result of interference by government officials, and the information could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008) (emphasis added).6 Here, Appellant’s arguments regarding the timeliness exceptions are interrelated – (1) the government interfered with Appellant’s ability to present any PCRA claims because it failed to produce the preliminary hearin

2026See Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 955 (Pa. 2018) (holding that, for the government interference exception to apply, a petitioner “is required to show that but for the interference of a government actor he could not have filed his claim earlier”); see also -5- J-S03045-26 Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008) (explaining that the exception requires the petitioner to plead that the facts upon which the claim is predicated were not previously known to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained through due diligence).

2026See Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 955 (Pa. 2018) (holding that, for the government interference exception to apply, a petitioner “is required to show that but for the interference of a government actor he could not have filed his claim earlier”); see also Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d -7- J-S42041-25 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008) (explaining that the exception requires the petitioner to plead that the facts upon which the claim is predicated were not previously known to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained through due diligence).

2026Government Interference Timeliness Exception To establish the government interference exception, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), “a petitioner must plead and prove (1) the failure to previously raise the claim was the result of interference by government officials and (2) the petitioner could not have obtained the information earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Vinson, 249 A.3d 1197, 1205 (Pa. Super. 2021).

2026The governmental interference exception invoked by Appellant requires the petitioner to prove that “the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i); see also Commonwealth v. Vinson, 249 A.3d 1197, 1205 (Pa. Super. 2021) (explaining that to establish the government interference exception under Section 9545(b)(1)(i), “a petitioner must plead and prove (1) the failure to pre

2026See Stokes, 959 A.2d at 310 (concluding that the appellant failed to prove the government interference exception because he “never asserted that the prosecution (or anyone else) prevented him from gaining access to these files in the 12 years between the date his direct appeal was decided and the date he ultimately sought the files.”).

2026As the Supreme Court has explained, a Brady violation may constitute governmental interference; however, an appellant may not “begin with a discussion of the merits of a Brady claim; rather [he] must begin with a discussion of why the instant petition was timely filed.” Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306, 310 (Pa. 2008). -8- J-S03012-26 To satisfy the newly discovered facts exception, a petitioner must plead and prove “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii

2023See Albrecht, 994 A.2d at 1095 ; see also Commonwealth v. Bankhead, 217 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. Super. 2019) (concluding that a prison lockdown did not qualify for the government interference exception to the PCRA time-bar where the lockdown did not involve the entire relevant time).

2023The government interference exception applies when “the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Id.

2023To invoke the court’s jurisdiction for an untimely PCRA petition, the petition must establish the existence of a “newly discovered fact.” -5- J-S02031-23 Government interference exception To establish the government interference exception, a petitioner is required to plead and prove that his “failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i); Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 5

2020The government interference exception requires a petitioner to prove that his “‘failure to raise the claim [or claims] previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim [or claims] in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States. . . .’” Chester, 895 A.2d at 523 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)) (emphasis and brackets in original).

2026See Commonwealth v. Smith, 194 A.3d 126, 133 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“Appellant is not entitled to an indefinite period to raise” a claim under the government interference exception to the time bar).

2024Lastly, as for Appellant’s assertion that the government interference exception applies, it is well-settled that, “[a]lthough a Brady violation may fall within the governmental interference exception, the petitioner must plead and prove that the failure to previously raise these claims was the result of interference by government officials, and that the information could not have - 11 - J-S31004-24 been obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 194 A.3d 126, 133 (Pa.Super. 2018).

2023Moreover, Appellant did not contend that “the conditions of his incarceration were illegal, as required to meet the governmental interference exception to PCRA’s timeliness requirement.” Commonwealth v. Rizvi, 166 A.3d 344, 348 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i).

2023Notably, a petition invoking this exception must now be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been filed, but the previous version of the statute granted petitioners only 60 days to bring the claim. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2); see also Commonwealth v. Rizvi, 166 A.3d 344 (Pa. Super. 2017) (holding that petitioner did not satisfy timeliness requirement of Section 9545(b)(2) in a government interference claim when he failed to explain why he waited approximately four years to seek relief).

2017See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(4) (“For purposes of this subchapter, ‘governmental officials' shall not include defense counsel, whether appointed or retained); Commonwealth v. Crews, 863 A.2d 498, 503 (Pa. 2004) (“It is well settled that the alleged ineffectiveness of all prior counsel, including the first PCRA counsel, does not fall within the governmental interference exception.”).

2015Thus, Vukich’s argument is without merit. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(4) (“For purposes of this subchapter, ‘governmental officials’ shall not include defense counsel, whether appointed or retained); Commonwealth v. Crews, 863 A.2d 498, 503 (Pa. 2004) (“It is well settled that the alleged ineffectiveness of all prior counsel, including the first PCRA counsel, does not fall within the governmental interference exception.”).

2024Derrickson, supra. Appellant argues, for the first time on appeal, that the reason these claims satisfy the government interference exception is that the Commonwealth “lost” his 1999 PCRA petition, thereby preventing his claims from being presented sooner.

2023See Derrickson, 923 A.2d at 468-69 .

2025“The proper question with respect to [the government interference] timeliness exception is ‘whether the government -6- J-S12019-25 interfered with [the a]ppellant’s ability to present his claim and whether [the a]ppellant was duly diligent in seeking the facts on which his claims are based.’” Commonwealth v. Chimenti, 218 A.3d 963, 975 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

2023In order to satisfy the government interference exception based on a Brady claim, “the petitioner must plead and prove the failure to previously raise the claim was the result of interference by government officials, and the information could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Chimenti, 218 A.3d 963, 975 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating that “[t]he proper question with respect to Subsection 9545(b)(1)(i)’s timeliness exception is whether the government interfered with [the a]ppellant’s ability to present his claim and

2023See Albrecht, 994 A.2d at 1095 .

2023See Albrecht, 994 A.2d at 1095 ; see also Commonwealth v. Bankhead, 217 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. Super. 2019) (concluding that a prison lockdown did not qualify for the government interference exception to the PCRA time-bar where the lockdown did not involve the entire relevant time).

2023See Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 526-527 (Pa. Super. 2007) (holding that the appellant’s attempt to invoke the government interference exception to the PCRA time-bar based upon a letter he received from an assistant district attorney was “tardy” and did not warrant relief because he received the letter 15 years prior).

2023See Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 526-527 (Pa. Super. 2007) (holding that the appellant’s attempt to invoke the government interference exception to the PCRA time-bar based upon a letter he received from an assistant district attorney was “tardy” and did not warrant relief because he received the letter 15 years prior).

2017Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1270-72 (Pa. 2007).

2014However, “a petitioner’s belief that he has uncovered a colorable claim of ineffectiveness by prior counsel does not entitle the petitioner to an exception to the [PCRA’s] timeliness requirements.” Commonwealth v. Crews, 863 A.2d 498, 503 (Pa. 2004) (citations omitted); see Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1272 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted).

2026He had to “plead and prove that the failure to previously raise these claims was the result of interference by government officials, and that the information could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 953 A.2d 1248, 1253 (Pa. 2006).

2018"Although a Brady violation may fall within the governmental interference exception, the petitioner must plead and prove that the failure to previously raise these claims was the result of interference by government officials, and that the information could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence." Commonwealth v. Hawkins , 598 Pa. 85 , 953 A.2d 1248 , 1253 (2006). *134 Appellant also asserts that his discovery of Jefferson's statement to police, as described in the Jefferson Affidavit, constitutes a newly-discovered fact for purposes of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), which

2026Commonwealth v. Velazquez, 216 A.3d 1146, 1149 (Pa.Super. 2019) (listing the three ineffectiveness prongs, including that a petitioner must prove any alleged ineffectiveness prejudiced him by establishing that “there is a reasonable probability the outcome of the proceedings would have been different”). 6 The trial court concluded Smith’s PCRA petition was untimely because he failed to satisfy the government interference exception.

2025See Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 789 A.2d 728, 731 (Pa. Super. 2001) (stating that “[n]either the court system nor the correctional system is obliged to educate or update prisoners concerning changes in case law.”).

2025See Commonwealth v. Martin, 205 A.3d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“this Court is bound by existing precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis and continues to follow controlling precedent as long as the decision has not been overturned by our Supreme Court.”).

2025He further contends that the evidence his counsel uncovered from his review of the transcripts from Mr. Figueroa’s criminal proceedings constitutes new evidence and that, pursuant to Davis, supra, he acted with the requisite due diligence to uncover.6 Id. at 50-56. ____________________________________________ 6 He also contends that Davis applies “with equal force to the [due diligence requirement] of the government interference exception.” Appellant’s Brief at 53. - 10 - J-A24021-25 In Davis, the appellant filed a facially untimely second PCRA petition claiming that, in 2008, he had discovere

2025Davis, 86 A.3d at 886, 888 .

2023See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i); Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 266 A.3d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2021).

2023See Commonwealth Brief at 5 (stating Appellant “did not meet his burden to establish the government interference exception because he cannot prove that the government kept him from raising this claim for 11 years when the information was available to him during trial.”); id. (stating “information [Appellant] found in the notes of testimony does not constitute a ‘new fact’ for purposes of the new fact exception to the timeliness requirements of the PCRA.”). -3- J-S13028-23 raised if the petition was not timely filed.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 17 (Pa. 2012).

2021With respect to the government interference exception, the ____________________________________________ reporting requirements are punitive in nature); Commonwealth v. Strafford, 194 A.3d 168, 173 (Pa. Super. 2018) (providing that SORNA “authorized courts to include periods of registration as part of a sentence”). -9- J-S11038-21 PCRA court noted that defense counsel is not considered a government official under the PCRA and therefore only his claims as to interference by the trial court would be cognizable under this timeliness exception.

2021See Hernandez, supra. -5- J-S48011-20 On appeal, Leach claims that the PCRA court should have concluded that her 2019 PCRA petition was timely because she established both the government interference exception and the newly discovered evidence exception.2 We consider each exception separately.