71 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2026 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brannon v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(e) states, “A sentencing error may not be raised on appeal unless the alleged error has first been brought to the attention of the lower tribunal: (1) at the time of sentencing; or (2) by motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b).” Even in the case of fundamental error, the Florida Supreme Court has held that “for defendants whose initial briefs were filed after the effective date of rule 2 3.800(b)(2), the failure to preserve a fundamental sentencing error by motion under rule 3.800(b) or by objection during the sentencing hearing 2025See Brannon v. State, 850 So. 2d 452, 456 (Fla. 2003) (holding that “the failure to preserve a fundamental sentencing error by motion under rule 3.800(b) or by objection during the sentencing hearing forecloses them from raising the error on direct appeal”). | 17 | 18 |
Maddox v. Stategreen2 sentences2025“In most cases, a fundamental sentencing error will be one that affects the determination of the length of the sentence such that the interests of justice will not be served if the error remains uncorrected.” Id. (quoting Maddox, 760 So. 2d at 100 ). 2025“In most cases, a fundamental sentencing error will be one that affects the determination of the length of the sentence such that the interests of justice will not be served if the error remains uncorrected.” Id. (quoting Maddox, 760 So. 2d at 100 ). | 14 | 27 |
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(e) states, “A sentencing error may not be raised on appeal unless the alleged error has first been brought to the attention of the lower tribunal: (1) at the time of sentencing; or (2) by motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b).” Even in the case of fundamental error, the Florida Supreme Court has held that “for defendants whose initial briefs were filed after the effective date of rule 2 3.800(b)(2), the failure to preserve a fundamental sentencing error by motion under rule 3.800(b) or by objection during the sentencing hearing 2021It is only because rule 3.800(b)(2) gives appellate counsel the tools needed to have sentencing errors corrected by the trial court— during the appeal—that we can preclude raising a fundamental sentencing error in the initial brief, as we did in Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 2008), and still comply with a defendant’s due process right to a meaningful appeal. | 4 | 5 |
Cromartie v. Stategreen2 sentences2019See Cromartie v. State , 70 So.3d 559 , 564 (Fla. 2011) ("In most cases, a fundamental sentencing error will be one that affects the determination of the length of the sentence such that the interests of justice will not be served if the error remains uncorrected."). 2019See Cromartie v. State , 70 So.3d 559 , 564 (Fla. 2011) ("In most cases, a fundamental sentencing error will be one that affects the determination of the length of the sentence such that the interests of justice will not be served if the error remains uncorrected."). | 2 | 3 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2006See Brannon v. State, 850 So.2d 452, 456 (Fla.2003) ("[T]he failure to preserve a fundamental sentencing error by motion under rule 3.800(b) or by objection during the sentencing hearing forecloses *594 [the appellant] from raising the error on direct appeal."); Jones v. State, 876 So.2d 642, 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) ("Sentencing errors are not reviewable on direct appeal unless they are preserved in the trial court, either by timely objection at sentencing or by a timely filed motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)."). 2006See Jones v. State, 876 So.2d 642, 644-45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (stating that a revocation of probation proceeding is merely an extension of the sentencing process and is, thus, subject to its preservation requirements and that sentencing errors are not reviewable on direct appeal unless they are preserved in the trial court by a contemporaneous objection at sentencing or by a motion timely filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)); see also Brannon v. State, 850 So.2d 452, 456 (Fla.2003) (holding that even a fundamental sentencing error cannot be raised on direct appeal if | 2 | 2 |
Sanders v. Stategreen2 sentences2002Bedford v. State, 633 So.2d 13 (Fla.1994); Sanders v. State, 698 So.2d 377, 378 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). 2002Bedford v. State, 633 So.2d 13 (Fla.1994); Sanders v. State, 698 So.2d 377, 378 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). | 2 | 2 |
Leonard v. Stategreen2 sentences2001See Leonard v. State, 760 So.2d 114 , 116 n. 4 (Fla.2000) (rejecting the state's argument "that Leonard ha[d] suffered no prejudice ... because [the challenged sentence was] to be served concurrently with other sentences that [we]re unchallenged"); State v. McKnight, 764 So.2d 574 , 574 n. 1 (Fla. 2000) (citing Leonard as "rejecting State's argument that a fundamental sentencing error should remain uncorrected simply because the erroneous sentence is to be served concurrently with other sentences that are not being challenged"). 2000NOTES [1] See also Leonard v. State, 760 So.2d 114, 116 (Fla.2000) (rejecting State's argument that a fundamental sentencing error should remain uncorrected simply because the erroneous sentence is to be served concurrently with other sentences that are not being challenged). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Mancinogreen2 sentences2000See State v. Mancino, 714 So.2d 429, 432 (Fla.1998). 2000See State v. Mancino, 714 So.2d 429, 432 (Fla.1998). | 2 | 2 |
Weiss v. Stategreen2 sentences2000See Weiss, 720 So.2d at 1115 ; Jordan, 728 So.2d at 753 . 2000See Weiss, 720 So.2d at 1115 ; Jordan, 728 So.2d at 753 . | 2 | 2 |
Sochor v. Stategreen2 sentences2000See Johnson, 616 So.2d at 3 ; see also Sochor, 619 So.2d at 290 . 2000See Johnson, 616 So.2d at 3 ; see also Sochor, 619 So.2d at 290 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2000See Johnson, 616 So.2d at 3 ; see also Sochor, 619 So.2d at 290 . 2000See Johnson, 616 So.2d at 3 ; see also Sochor, 619 So.2d at 290 . | 2 | 2 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2023This fact distinguishes the decisions of our sister courts in Johnson v. State, 9 So. 3d 640 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), and Stephens v. State, 974 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), upon which Richardson relies, which granted habeas corpus relief to correct a fundamental sentencing error that each court acknowledged should have been first recognized and corrected during the direct appeal. 2012Throughout the many years of appeals and writs, we confess, as we did in Johnson v. State, 9 So.3d 640 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), that we failed to perceive that a fundamental sentencing error occurred in Prince’s case. | 1 | 3 |
Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.111(e) & 3.800green2 sentences2005While improper habitualization previously constituted a fundamental sentencing error which could have been addressed absent preservation, Maddox v. State, 760 So.2d 89, 94 (Fla.2000), explained that after the January 1, 2001, effective date of the amendment to rule 3.800(b) promulgated by the Supreme Court' in’ Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.111(e) & 3.800 & Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h), 9.UO, & 9.600, 761 So.2d 1015 (Fla.1999), reh. granted, 761 So.2d 1025 , a sentencing issue that has not been raised in the trial court either by an objection at the sente 2001See Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.111(e) & 3.800 & Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h), 9.140 & 9.600 [ Amendments II ], 761 So.2d 1015, 1020 (Fla.1999) (amendments effective immediately on date of opinion), reh'g granted (Fla. Jan. 13, 2000). [1] Thus, the question squarely raised in this appeal is whether a defendant who files his appellate brief after the effective date of Amendments II may seek review on direct appeal of a fundamental sentencing error if no objection in the trial court was raised and no post-trial rule 3.800(b) motion was filed. | 1 | 3 |
Washington v. Stategreen2 sentences2003In Washington v. State, 814 So.2d 1187 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. dismissed, 831 So.2d 675 (Fla.2002), the reviewing court discovered a fundamental sentencing error in an Anders appeal. 2003In Washington v. State, 814 So.2d 1187 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. dismissed, 831 So.2d 675 (Fla.2002), the reviewing court discovered a fundamental sentencing error in an Anders appeal. | 1 | 2 |
Reynolds v. Stategreen2 sentences1987Turning to the question of fundamental error, Reynolds v. State, 429 So.2d 1331, 1333 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), specifically states: "An erroneous application of the three year mandatory minimum sentence would constitute a fundamental sentencing error." Accord, Lawson v. State, 400 So.2d 1053 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (unlawful imposition of three-year minimum sentences upon defendant constitutes fundamental error); Whitehead v. State, 446 So.2d 194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (improper imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence, because of its inherent potential of causing or requiring a defendant to be incarcer 1984Despite dicta in an earlier case suggesting that we leaned toward a contrary view ( Brown v. State, 358 So.2d 92 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)) the better rule would appear to be that improper imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence, because of its inherent potential of causing or requiring "a defendant to be incarcerated or restrained for a greater length of time than provided by law in the absence of ... sentencing error," Reynolds, 429 So.2d at 1333 , constitutes fundamental error. | 1 | 2 |
Glenn v. Stategreen1 sentence2024Generally, “when a sentence is within statutory limits, it is not subject to review by an appellate court.” Charles v. State, 204 So. 3d 63, 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting Howard v. State, 820 So. 2d 337, 339 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)). | 1 | 1 |
Howard v. Stategreen1 sentence2024Generally, “when a sentence is within statutory limits, it is not subject to review by an appellate court.” Charles v. State, 204 So. 3d 63, 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting Howard v. State, 820 So. 2d 337, 339 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)). | 1 | 1 |
JEHU ALEX COMPERE v. STATE OF FLORIDAgreen1 sentence2024A fundamental sentencing error is “one that affects the determination of the length of the sentence such that the interests of justice will not be served if the error remains uncorrected.” Compere v. State, 262 So. 3d 819, 822 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (quoting Maddox v. State, 760 So. 2d 89, 100 (Fla. 2000)). | 1 | 1 |
Anders v. Californiagreen1 sentence2019See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
Allende v. Stategreen1 sentence2013Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(e), in turn, provides that “[a] sentencing error may not be raised on appeal unless the alleged error has first been brought to the attention of the lower tribunal: (1) at the time of sentencing; or (2) by motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b).” In Brannon v. State, 850 So.2d 452, 456 (Fla.2003), the supreme court held that “for defendants whose initial briefs were filed after the effective date of rule 3.800(b)(2), the failure to preserve a fundamental sentencing error by motion under rule 3.800(b) or by objection during the s | 1 | 1 |
Ross v. Stategreen1 sentence2009See also Johnson v. State, 9 So.3d 640, 642 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (granting habeas corpus to correct a fundamental sentencing error although relief had previously been denied on numerous occasions); Ross v. State, 901 So.2d 252, 254 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (granting habeas corpus, even though an issue had been repeatedly raised and rejected, to correct manifest injustice where defendant did not receive the benefit of the same law as similarly-situated defendants). 2 . | 1 | 1 |
| Burdick v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gonzalez v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Singleton v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| CW v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harrell v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Page v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wesley v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lewis v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Waters v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Summersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bain v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Maddox v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Goss v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Basilieregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
O'RILEY v. State
green
2 sentences2023This fact distinguishes the decisions of our sister courts in Johnson v. State, 9 So. 3d 640 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), and Stephens v. State, 974 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), upon which Richardson relies, which granted habeas corpus relief to correct a fundamental sentencing error that each court acknowledged should have been first recognized and corrected during the direct appeal. 2009There the Second District recognized that it had failed to perceive on direct appeal “that a fundamental sentencing error had occurred” and that defendant “was deprived of a real opportunity to have his sentence reconsidered.” 974 So.2d at 457 . | 2 | 2009–2023 |
Harvey v. State
green
2 sentences2004In order to assuage concerns raised by the dissent in Harvey v. State, 848 So.2d 1060 (Fla.2003), that the court might embark upon the road of exception, the Brannon court stressed that all sentencing errors must be properly preserved or brought to the attention of the trial court first via a rule 3.800(b) motion. 2003In so holding, we must distinguish our decision in Harvey v. State, 848 So.2d 1060 (Fla.2003). | 2 | 2003–2004 |
Bedford v. State
green
2 sentences2002Bedford v. State, 633 So.2d 13 (Fla.1994); Sanders v. State, 698 So.2d 377, 378 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). 2002Bedford v. State, 633 So.2d 13 (Fla.1994); Sanders v. State, 698 So.2d 377, 378 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Jordan v. State
green
2 sentences2000See Weiss, 720 So.2d at 1115 ; Jordan, 728 So.2d at 753 . 2000See Weiss, 720 So.2d at 1115 ; Jordan, 728 So.2d at 753 . | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Greenhalgh v. State
green
2 sentences1992Greenhalgh v. State, 582 So.2d 107 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), presented the exact same substantive issue presented in this case, i.e., the habitual offender statute is inapplicable to life felonies, and in that case the court held that although the issue could have been litigated on plenary appeal, a sentence that exceeds the maximum allowed by statute constitutes fundamental error which can be raised at any time, citing Reynolds v. State . 1992Greenhalgh v. State, 582 So.2d 107 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), presented the exact same substantive issue presented in this case, i.e., the habitual offender statute is inapplicable to life felonies, and in that case the court held that although the issue could have been litigated on plenary appeal, a sentence that exceeds the maximum allowed by statute constitutes fundamental error which can be raised at any time, citing Reynolds v. State. | 2 | 1992–1992 |
Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Com'n
green
2 sentences1990Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm’n, 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla.1980). 1 Although Stites did not raise this latter issue, the appellate court may correct sua sponte a fundamental sentencing error which is apparent on the face of the record. 1982My final comments relate to the majority's view that the imposition of a three-year incarceration period as a special condition of probation is a fundamental sentencing error under Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Commission, 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 1981). | 2 | 1982–1990 |
Barlow v. State
neutral
1 sentence2025An allocution hearing has been defined as “an opportunity for the defendant to make an unsworn statement to mitigate the sentence . . . .” Barlow v. State, 784 So. 2d 482 , 483 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Mandri v. State
green
1 sentence2008Mandri, 813 So.2d at 65 , and Beck, 817 So.2d at 862 , recognized that the late filing of written departure reasons in response to a motion under rule 3.800(b)(2) does not hinder the defendant's ability to challenge the departure reasons in his direct appeal because motions under that rule must be filed and decided prior to the filing of the defendant's first brief on appeal. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Beck v. State
green
1 sentence2008Mandri, 813 So.2d at 65 , and Beck, 817 So.2d at 862 , recognized that the late filing of written departure reasons in response to a motion under rule 3.800(b)(2) does not hinder the defendant's ability to challenge the departure reasons in his direct appeal because motions under that rule must be filed and decided prior to the filing of the defendant's first brief on appeal. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Kiely v. State neutral | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Geri v. State green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Solomon v. State green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Otero v. State green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Booker v. State green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Winter v. State green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. McKnight green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Collins v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Locke v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Hodge v. State neutral | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Gilchrist v. State neutral | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Burch v. State neutral | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Hyden v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Adside v. State neutral | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Heird v. State neutral | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Thogode v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Pettway v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Harriel v. State green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Shieder v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Pettis v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Hough v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Cisnero v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Lawson v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Whitehead v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Stephens v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Brown v. State green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.