dependency hearing in Pennsylvania

2021As we previously explained, “[t]he petitioner bears the burden of proof in a dependency hearing, and must prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the child is presently without proper parental care or control; and (2) such care and control is not immediately available.” In re R.W.J., 826 A.2d 10, 14 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2018“The petitioner bears the burden of proof in a dependency hearing, and must prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the child is presently without proper parental care or control; and (2) such care and control is not immediately available.” In re R.W.J., 826 A.2d 10, 14 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2020She further argues that the trial court contributed to the violation of her rights by delaying the adjudication hearing for 30 days.12 The only remedy Mother requests for these alleged violations is vacatur of the dependency order and return of Child to her custody.13 ____________________________________________ 11 Moreover, the remedy for failure to hold the dependency hearing in a timely manner is “the automatic activation of the right of the child and its parents to the immediate release of the child from the state’s custody.” In re Kerr, 481 A.2d 1225, 1226 (Pa. Super. 1984).

2020She further argues that the trial court contributed to the violation of her rights by delaying the adjudication hearing for 30 days.12 The only remedy Mother requests for these alleged violations is vacatur of the dependency order and return of Child to her custody.13 ____________________________________________ 11Moreover, the remedy for failure to hold the dependency hearing in a timely manner is “the automatic activation of the right of the child and its parents to the immediate release of the child from the state’s custody.” In re Kerr, 481 A.2d 1225, 1226 (Pa. Super. 1984).

2007In the Interest of L.C., 900 A.2d at 381 . ¶ 11 This Court concluded that the grandmother did not have standing to participate in the dependency proceedings as she did not satisfy any of the criteria that defined a party to a hearing to adjudicate dependency; “she was not the parent or the legal custodian of the juvenile whose dependency was at issue; and her care and control of the juvenile were not in question.” Id. at 382 . ¶ 12 In In Interest of Michael Y., 365 Pa.Super. 488 , 530 A.2d 115 (1987), the great-grandmother who had provided care for her fourteen-year-old grandson all of his lif

2007In the Interest of L.C., 900 A.2d at 381 . ¶ 11 This Court concluded that the grandmother did not have standing to participate in the dependency proceedings as she did not satisfy any of the criteria that defined a party to a hearing to adjudicate dependency; “she was not the parent or the legal custodian of the juvenile whose dependency was at issue; and her care and control of the juvenile were not in question.” Id. at 382 . ¶ 12 In In Interest of Michael Y., 365 Pa.Super. 488 , 530 A.2d 115 (1987), the great-grandmother who had provided care for her fourteen-year-old grandson all of his lif

2022Thc primary focus of the court ordered services that CYS provides to Appellant is cannot be found dependent on the basis of lacking proper parental care and control. /re M.L., 562 Pa. 646 , 757 A.2d 849 (2000).

2017However, because 9 M.B. was in her grandparents’ safe custody at the time of the dependency hearing, she did not “lack a . . . guardian or other legal custodian who [could] provide [her] appropriate care” and, thus, there was not clear and convincing evidence that M.B. was a dependent child requiring the trial court’s immediate protection under the Juvenile Act.7 M.L., 757 A.2d at 851 .

1987See also Adoption of Michael J.C., supra. In a termination proceeding, the court must go one step further than in a dependency hearing under the Juvenile Act: “Any decision to remove the child from his home must be reconciled with the paramount purpose of preserving the unity of the family.” In Re Frank W.D., 315 Pa.Super. 510, 518 , 462 A.2d 708, 712 (1983) citing Interest of LaRue, 244 Pa.Super. 218 , 366 A.2d 1271 (1976); see 42 Pa.C.S.A. 6301(b)(1).

1987See also Adoption of Michael J.C., supra. In a termination proceeding, the court must go one step further than in a dependency hearing under the Juvenile Act: “Any decision to remove the child from his home must be reconciled with the paramount purpose of preserving the unity of the family.” In Re Frank W.D., 315 Pa.Super. 510, 518 , 462 A.2d 708, 712 (1983) citing Interest of LaRue, 244 Pa.Super. 218 , 366 A.2d 1271 (1976); see 42 Pa.C.S.A. 6301(b)(1).

2025We thus found that the grandmother did not satisfy any of the criteria to qualify as a party to a dependency hearing because “she was not the parent or the legal custodian of the juvenile whose dependency was at issue[] and her care and control of the juvenile were not in question.” Id.

2009In L.C., II , this Court identified the only three classes of individuals that are conferred standing to participate, introduce evidence, be heard on their own behalf, and cross-examine witnesses during a dependency hearing: "(1) the parents of the juvenile whose dependency status is at issue; (2) the legal custodian of the juvenile whose dependency status is at issue, or (3) the person whose care and control of the juvenile is in question." We further explained, "These categories logically stem from the fact ... the court has the authority to remove a [dependent] child from the custody of his

1994Compare In Interest of Michael Y., 365 Pa.Super. 488 , 530 A.2d 115 (1987) (A party at a dependency hearing has right to be apprised of right to counsel, and free counsel if indigent); In Interest of S.N.W., 362 Pa.Super. 295 , 524 A.2d 514 (1987) (Juvenile Act provides for the appointment of counsel for indigent parent in a dependency hearing); In re Hutchinson, 500 Pa. 152 , 454 A.2d 1008 (1982) (Right to effective counsel in involuntary commitment proceedings under § 304 of the Mental Health Procedures Act); Corra v. Coll, 305 Pa.Super. 179 , 451 A.2d 480 (1982) (Indigent defendants in civi

1994Compare In Interest of Michael Y., 365 Pa.Super. 488 , 530 A.2d 115 (1987) (A party at a dependency hearing has right to be apprised of right to counsel, and free counsel if indigent); In Interest of S.N.W., 362 Pa.Super. 295 , 524 A.2d 514 (1987) (Juvenile Act provides for the appointment of counsel for indigent parent in a dependency hearing); In re Hutchinson, 500 Pa. 152 , 454 A.2d 1008 (1982) (Right to effective counsel in involuntary commitment proceedings under § 304 of the Mental Health Procedures Act); Corra v. Coll, 305 Pa.Super. 179 , 451 A.2d 480 (1982) (Indigent defendants in civi

2020We also note that prior to the dependency hearing, Mother filed an Emergency Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus in our Supreme Court seeking the immediate release of Child from shelter care, which was denied on September 3, 2019. 12 As we have already addressed this contention in Part II, supra, we do not give it further consideration here. 13 “A question regarding whether a due process violation occurred is a question of law for which the standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is - 14 - J-A05042-20 “[T]he right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of o

2020We also note that prior to the dependency hearing, Mother filed an Emergency Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus in our Supreme Court seeking the immediate release of Child from shelter care, which was denied on September 3, 2019. 12 As we have already addressed this contention in Part II, supra, we do not give it further consideration here. 13“A question regarding whether a due process violation occurred is a question of law for which the standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is - 14 - J-A05042-20 “[T]he right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of on

2020R.R. at 309a-12a. ____________________________________________ 15 An error is not harmless and the appellant is entitled to a new hearing if, “in light of the record as a whole, an erroneous evidentiary ruling could potentially have affected the decision.” In re A.J.R.H., 188 A.3d 1157, 1170 (Pa. 2018) (addressing harmless error in the context of a termination of parental rights proceeding). - 16 - J-A29041-19 Further, Sergeant Egli observed the interview through a window and described H.C.’s disclosures based on his observations.

2020R.R. at 309a-12a. ____________________________________________ 15 An error is not harmless and the appellant is entitled to a new hearing if, “in light of the record as a whole, an erroneous evidentiary ruling could potentially have affected the decision.” In re A.J.R.H., 188 A.3d 1157, 1170 (Pa. 2018) (addressing harmless error in the context of a termination of parental rights proceeding). - 16 - J-A29042-19 Further, Sergeant Egli observed the interview through a window and described H.C.’s disclosures based on his observations.

2020We also note that prior to the dependency hearing, Mother filed an Emergency Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus in our Supreme Court seeking the immediate release of Child from shelter care, which was denied on September 3, 2019. 12 As we have already addressed this contention in Part II, supra, we do not give it further consideration here. 13 “A question regarding whether a due process violation occurred is a question of law for which the standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is - 14 - J-A05042-20 “[T]he right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of o

2020We also note that prior to the dependency hearing, Mother filed an Emergency Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus in our Supreme Court seeking the immediate release of Child from shelter care, which was denied on September 3, 2019. 12 As we have already addressed this contention in Part II, supra, we do not give it further consideration here. 13“A question regarding whether a due process violation occurred is a question of law for which the standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is - 14 - J-A05042-20 “[T]he right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of on

2015Interest of R.T., 592 A.2d at 59 (some citations omitted).6 ____________________________________________ 6 Recently, in Interest of L.Z., our Supreme Court reviewed the interrelationship between a dependency action under the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6375, and a finding of child abuse as defined under section 6303 of the CPSL, 23 Pa.C.S. 6303.

2015In accordance with the overarching purpose of the Juvenile Act “[t]o preserve the unity of the family whenever possible,” see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b)(1), “a child will only be declared dependent when he is presently without proper parental care and when such care is not immediately available.” In re R.T., [ 592 A.2d 55, 57 (Pa. Super. 1991)]; In re A.B., supra. The first stage requires the juvenile court to hear evidence on the dependency petition and determine whether the child is dependent pursuant to the standards set forth in section 6302. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(a).

2010(S.M.’s brief at 26.) S.M. relies on In re M.K., 431 Pa.Super. 198 , 636 A.2d 198, 200 (1994), appeal denied, 537 Pa. 633 , 642 A.2d 486 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 962 , 115 S.Ct. 423 , 130 L.Ed.2d 338 (1994), to support her argument that she should have had standing as the trial court’s dispositional order affected her rights by compelling her to cooperate with CYF, to provide a drug and alcohol evaluation, and to submit to random urine screens.

2010(S.M.’s brief at 26.) S.M. relies on In re M.K., 431 Pa.Super. 198 , 636 A.2d 198, 200 (1994), appeal denied, 537 Pa. 633 , 642 A.2d 486 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 962 , 115 S.Ct. 423 , 130 L.Ed.2d 338 (1994), to support her argument that she should have had standing as the trial court’s dispositional order affected her rights by compelling her to cooperate with CYF, to provide a drug and alcohol evaluation, and to submit to random urine screens.

2003This Court has held that “[t]he purpose of the ten day hearing requirement [of 42 Pa.C.S § 6335] [i]s to prevent the continued detention of a child without a hearing to determine whether the allegations in the petition [a]re true.” In Interest of S.N.W., 362 Pa.Super. 295 , 524 A.2d 514, 515 (1987), citing In re Kerr, 333 Pa.Super. 67 , 481 A.2d 1225, 1227 (1984); In re DelSignore, 249 Pa.Super. 149 , 375 A.2d 803, 807 (1977).

2003This Court has held that “[t]he purpose of the ten day hearing requirement [of 42 Pa.C.S § 6335] [i]s to prevent the continued detention of a child without a hearing to determine whether the allegations in the petition [a]re true.” In Interest of S.N.W., 362 Pa.Super. 295 , 524 A.2d 514, 515 (1987), citing In re Kerr, 333 Pa.Super. 67 , 481 A.2d 1225, 1227 (1984); In re DelSignore, 249 Pa.Super. 149 , 375 A.2d 803, 807 (1977).

2003The petitioner bears the burden of proof in a dependency hearing, and must prove by clear and convincing evidence that “(1) the child is presently without proper parental care or control; and (2) such care and control is not immediately available.” In the Interest of JOV, 454 Pa.Super. 630 , 686 A.2d 421, 422-23 (1996). ¶ 11 Pennsylvania law makes clear that a finding of dependency can be made on the basis of prognostic evidence and such evidence is sufficient to meet the strict burden of proof necessary to declare a child dependent.

2003The petitioner bears the burden of proof in a dependency hearing, and must prove by clear and convincing evidence that “(1) the child is presently without proper parental care or control; and (2) such care and control is not immediately available.” In the Interest of JOV, 454 Pa.Super. 630 , 686 A.2d 421, 422-23 (1996). ¶ 11 Pennsylvania law makes clear that a finding of dependency can be made on the basis of prognostic evidence and such evidence is sufficient to meet the strict burden of proof necessary to declare a child dependent.

1992See, e.g., Fallaro, supra, 364 Pa.Superior Ct. at 424, 528 A.2d at 230 (“[Cjourts must adhere to the procedures developed for resolution of the various problems which arise concerning the welfare of children.”); Leslie H., supra, 329 Pa.Superior Ct. at 457, 478 A.2d at 878 .

1992See, e.g., Fallaro, supra, 364 Pa.Superior Ct. at 424, 528 A.2d at 230 ("[C]ourts must adhere to the procedures developed for resolution of the various problems which arise concerning the welfare of children."); Leslie H., supra, 329 Pa.Superior Ct. at 457, 478 A.2d at 878 .

2021See id. at 1186 .

2017In re L.Z., 111 A.3d at 1185-86 .

2019This Court based this conclusion on the fact that the PCRA statute entitles an indigent defendant to counsel for his first PCRA petition, and our Supreme Court has acknowledged that "PCRA relief cannot stand unless the petitioner was afforded the assistance of counsel." Id. (quoting from Commonwealth v. Albrecht , 554 Pa. 31 , 720 A.2d 693 , 699 (1998) ). 2 Applying these principles to a dependency hearing, it is important to note that the Juvenile Act authorizes the appointment of counsel in dependency cases when a parent cannot afford counsel and appears at a hearing.

2019This Court based this conclusion on the fact that the PCRA statute entitles an indigent defendant to counsel for his first PCRA petition, and our Supreme Court has acknowledged that "PCRA relief cannot stand unless the petitioner was afforded the assistance of counsel." Id. (quoting from Commonwealth v. Albrecht , 554 Pa. 31 , 720 A.2d 693 , 699 (1998) ). 2 Applying these principles to a dependency hearing, it is important to note that the Juvenile Act authorizes the appointment of counsel in dependency cases when a parent cannot afford counsel and appears at a hearing.