manifestly erroneous standard in Illinois

2024See Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 384-85 (holding that the manifestly erroneous standard of review was not appropriate at the second stage of postconviction proceedings because the trial court had made no findings of fact or credibility determinations). ¶ 35 B.

2024See People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 333 (2009); People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 384-85 (1998) (“The manifestly erroneous standard represents the typical appellate standard of review for findings of fact made by a trial judge.”). ¶ 34 While the manifest error standard applies to the trial court’s decision to deny a postconviction petition following an evidentiary hearing (see Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 333 ), defendant is not challenging the court’s evaluation of his postconviction claims or its assessment of the third-stage evidence in this case.

2020The parties agree that our review should thus proceed under the manifestly erroneous standard, under which we would only disturb the circuit court’s ruling if we find “error which is clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.” People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368, 384-85 (1997).

2020The parties agree that our review should thus proceed under the manifestly erroneous standard, under which we would only disturb the circuit court’s ruling if we find “error which is clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.” People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368, 384-85 (1997).

2017People v. Childress, 191 Ill. 2d 168, 174 (2000). ¶ 22 We first address the defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in sustaining the State’s objection to the admission into evidence of Weiss’s notes of APD Leeming’s interview of -5- Nichols.

2016People v. Childress, 191 Ill. 2d 168, 174 (2000). ¶ 22 We first address the defendant's argument that the trial court erred in sustaining the State's objection to the admission into evidence of Weiss's notes of APD Leeming's interview of Nichols.

2001See People v. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d 409, 447 , 662 N.E.2d 1328 (1996).

2001See People v. Oaks, 169 Ill. 2d 409, 447 , 662 N.E.2d 1328 (1996).

2000People v. Wright, 183 Ill. 2d 16, 21 (1998).

2000People v. Wright , 183 Ill. 2d 16, 21 , 697 N.E.2d 693, 695 (1998); People v. Gray , 305 Ill.

2024“Manifest error is clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.” Id. (citing People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56, 73 (2008)). ¶ 30 A defendant has a sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations.

2013People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56, 72 (2008).

2020People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 473 (2006).

2016Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 473 .

2000People v. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402, 411-12 (1998).

2000People v. Gonzalez , 184 Ill. 2d 402, 411-12 (1998).

2024When a postconviction petition has been denied following a third-stage evidentiary hearing, we review the circuit court’s “fact-finding and credibility determinations under the manifestly-erroneous standard.” People v. - 14 - No. 1-23-0882 Carballido, 2015 IL App (2d) 140760, ¶ 65 (citing Pendleton, 223 Ill. at 473).

2024See People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 333 (2009); People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 384-85 (1998) (“The manifestly erroneous standard represents the typical appellate standard of review for findings of fact made by a trial judge.”). ¶ 34 While the manifest error standard applies to the trial court’s decision to deny a postconviction petition following an evidentiary hearing (see Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 333 ), defendant is not challenging the court’s evaluation of his postconviction claims or its assessment of the third-stage evidence in this case.

2024See People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 333 (2009); People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 384-85 (1998) (“The manifestly erroneous standard represents the typical appellate standard of review for findings of fact made by a trial judge.”). ¶ 34 While the manifest error standard applies to the trial court’s decision to deny a postconviction petition following an evidentiary hearing (see Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 333 ), defendant is not challenging the court’s evaluation of his postconviction claims or its assessment of the third-stage evidence in this case.

2023Nonetheless, he knew that Campbell was not involved in defendant’s defense and possibly would have questioned her if he had known of the allegations. ¶ 71 Courts of review apply the manifestly erroneous standard to third-stage evidentiary hearings in recognition of “ ‘the understanding that the postconviction trial judge is able to observe and hear the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing and, therefore, occupies a position of advantage in a search for the truth which is infinitely superior to that of a tribunal where the sole guide is the printed record.’ ” People v. Brooks, 2021 IL App (4th)

2022See Hoffman v. Oland Firefighter’s Pension Bd., 2012 IL App (1st) 112120, ¶ 20 (manifest weight of the evidence standard applied to factual question of whether the Board’s termination decision, grounded on a doctor’s testimony that the plaintiff was never disabled, was proper) ¶ 48 We agree with the circuit court’s determination that these factual findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

2021“Manifest error is ‘clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.’ [People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 155 , 817 N.E.2d 524, 528 (2004).] Thus, a decision is manifestly erroneous when the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 98 , 996 N.E.2d 617 . ¶ 48 Reviewing courts apply the manifestly erroneous standard in recognition of “the understanding that the postconviction trial judge is able to observe and hear the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing and, therefore, occupies a position of advantage in a search for the truth which is infinitely superior to that

2021“Manifest error is ‘clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.’ [People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 155 , 817 N.E.2d 524, 528 (2004).] Thus, a decision is manifestly erroneous when the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 98 , 996 N.E.2d 617 . ¶ 48 Reviewing courts apply the manifestly erroneous standard in recognition of “the understanding that the postconviction trial judge is able to observe and hear the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing and, therefore, occupies a position of advantage in a search for the truth which is infinitely superior to that

2020See Aaron Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98 (stating that the “operative concern for the reviewing court” is still “whether the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into the defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffectiveness pursuant to a manifestly erroneous standard, which requires review of the trial court’s determination and if the allegations show possible neglect, requiring appointment of Krankel counsel).