9 Arizona opinions name it 1 courts 1988–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bishop v. State, Dept. of Correctionsgreen1 sentence2021See Bishop v. State Dep’t of Corr., 172 Ariz. 472 , 474–75 (App. 1992) (explaining there is no abuse of discretion in denying a proposed amendment if allowing such would be futile). 2 Because we affirm the dismissal of these claims based on Strojnik’s failure to serve a timely notice of claim, we need not address the merits of the other grounds relied upon by the court to dismiss his damages claims. 6 STROJNIK v. BRNOVICH, et al. | 1 | 1 |
Walk v. Ringgreen1 sentence2020See Walk, 202 Ariz. at 319 , ¶ 35 n.6. 12 HUMPHREY, et al. v. STATE Opinion of the Court Because Humphrey failed to file a timely notice of claim despite having the facts necessary to do so, his negligence claim against the State is barred.5 B. | 1 | 1 |
Hullett v. Cousingreen1 sentence2019A party is collaterally estopped from relitigating an issue when "an issue was actually litigated in a previous proceeding, there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, resolution of the issue was essential to the decision, a valid and final decision on the merits was entered, and there is common identity of parties." Hullett v. Cousin, 204 Ariz. 292, 297-98, ¶ 27 (2003). | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Pima Countygreen1 sentence2019A. Accrual of Humphrey’s Claim ¶21 Section 12-821.01(B) provides that accrual begins when “the damaged party realizes he or she has been damaged and knows or 10 HUMPHREY, et al. v. STATE Decision of the Court reasonably should know the cause, source, act, event, instrumentality, or condition that caused or contributed to the damage.” We have interpreted § 12-821.01(B) “as a codification of the discovery rule for determining when causes of action against public entities . . . accrue.” Thompson v. Pima County, 226 Ariz. 42, 46, ¶ 12 (App. 2010). | 1 | 1 |
City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.green1 sentence2010See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 218 Ariz. 172, 178, ¶ 5 , 219 P.3d 219 , 225 (App.2008) (purpose of limitations defense is to avoid defendants having to litigate stale claims). ¶ 20 In sum, the Estate timely asserted the assigned claim for medical expenses. | 1 | 1 |
Western Corrections Group, Inc. v. Tierneygreen2 sentences2005Group, Inc. v. Tierney, 208 Ariz. 583 , 585 ¶ 7, 96 P.3d 1070, 1072 (App.2004) (emphasis added). ¶8 Salerno admits that he did not present the State with a timely notice of his claim. 2005Group, Inc. v. Tierney, 208 Ariz. 583 , 585 ¶ 7, 96 P.3d 1070, 1072 (App.2004) (emphasis added). ¶8 Salerno admits that he did not present the State with a timely notice of his claim. | 1 | 1 |
Pritchard v. Stategreen2 sentences2005Pritchard v. State, 163 Ariz. 427, 432-33 , 788 P.2d 1178, 1183-84 (1990). ¶ 6 We begin by analyzing the superior court’s stated basis for dismissal, i.e., the statutory requirement that a person with a potential claim against a public employee must provide a timely notice of the claim to the relevant governmental entity: Persons who have claims against ... a public employee shall file claims with ... the public entity ... within one hundred eighty days after the cause of action accrues. 2005Pritchard v. State, 163 Ariz. 427, 432-33 , 788 P.2d 1178, 1183-84 (1990). ¶ 6 We begin by analyzing the superior court’s stated basis for dismissal, i.e., the statutory requirement that a person with a potential claim against a public employee must provide a timely notice of the claim to the relevant governmental entity: Persons who have claims against ... a public employee shall file claims with ... the public entity ... within one hundred eighty days after the cause of action accrues. | 1 | 1 |
Mulleneaux v. Stategreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., Mulleneaux v. State, 190 Ariz. 535, 540 , 950 P.2d 1156, 1161 (App.1997) (citing A.R.S. § 12-821.01). 2005See, e.g., Mulleneaux v. State, 190 Ariz. 535, 540 , 950 P.2d 1156, 1161 (App.1997) (citing A.R.S. § 12-821.01). | 1 | 1 |
City of Tucson v. Fleischmangreen2 sentences1999See, e.g., Norcor, 122 Ariz. at 543, 596 P.2d at 378; City of Tucson v. Fleisch-man, 152 Ariz. 269, 272 , 731 P.2d 634, 637 (App.1986). 1999See, e.g., Norcor, 122 Ariz. at 543, 596 P.2d at 378; City of Tucson v. Fleisch-man, 152 Ariz. 269, 272 , 731 P.2d 634, 637 (App.1986). | 1 | 1 |
Coconino Pulp and Paper Company v. Marvingreen2 sentences1992See Coconino Pulp & Paper Co. v. Marvin, 83 Ariz. 117 , 317 P.2d 550 (1957); Wilshire Mtg. 1992See Coconino Pulp & Paper Co. v. Marvin, 83 Ariz. 117 , 317 P.2d 550 (1957); Wilshire Mtg. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Creasy v. Coxon
green
2 sentences1988See A.R.S. § 12-821(A); Creasy v. Coxon, 156 Ariz. 145 , 750 P.2d 903 (App. 1987); Ariz.R.Civ.P. 4(d), 16 A.R.S. 1988See A.R.S. § 12-821(A); Creasy v. Coxon, 156 Ariz. 145 , 750 P.2d 903 (App. 1987); Ariz.R.Civ.P. 4(d), 16 A.R.S. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.