70 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1995–2025 25 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
West Colonial Enterprises, LLC v. City of East Orangegreen2 sentences2025The evidence presented, when viewed under the Brill standard “must be ‘sufficient to determine the value of the property under appeal, thereby establishing the existence of a debatable question as to the correctness of the assessment.’” West Colonial Enters, LLC v. East Orange City, 20 N.J. 2025The evidence presented, when viewed under the Brill standard “must be ‘sufficient to determine the value of the property under appeal, thereby establishing the existence of a debatable question as to the correctness of the assessment.’” West Colonial Enters, LLC v. East Orange City, 20 N.J. | 45 | 45 |
Lenal Properties, Inc. v. City of Jersey Citygreen2 sentences2025Tax 576, 579 (Tax 2003) (quoting Lenal Properties, Inc. v. City of Jersey City, 18 N.J. 2025Tax 576, 579 (Tax 2003) (quoting Lenal Properties, Inc. v. City of Jersey City, 18 N.J. | 43 | 43 |
Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of Americagreen2 sentences2023The merits shall be A-1936-21 22 addressed and decided in the first instance by the trial court in accordance with Rule 4:46-2 and the Brill standard based on the record presented. 142 N.J. at 540 . 2023The merits shall be A-1936-21 22 addressed and decided in the first instance by the trial court in accordance with Rule 4:46-2 and the Brill standard based on the record presented. 142 N.J. at 540 . | 2 | 9 |
Globe Motor Company v. Ilya Igdalev(074996)green2 sentences2019See Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 479-80 (2016); Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. 2019See Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 479-80 (2016); Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. | 2 | 2 |
Petro-Lubricant Testing Labs., Inc. v. Adelmangreen2 sentences2019Petro-Lubricant Testing Labs., Inc. v. Adelman, 233 N.J. 236, 256-57 (2018). 2019Petro-Lubricant Testing Labs., Inc. v. Adelman, 233 N.J. 236, 256-57 (2018). | 1 | 1 |
Wayne Davis v. Brickman Landscaping (071310)green2 sentences2019Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 405 (2014); Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. 2019Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 405 (2014); Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. | 1 | 1 |
McGrogan v. Tillgreen2 sentences2018In order to succeed in a legal malpractice claim a plaintiff must show, "(1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship creating a duty of care by the defendant attorney, (2) the breach of that duty by the defendant, and (3) proximate causation of the damages claimed by the plaintiff." McGrogan v. Till, 167 N.J. 414, 425 (2001). 2018In order to succeed in a legal malpractice claim a plaintiff must show, "(1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship creating a duty of care by the defendant attorney, (2) the breach of that duty by the defendant, and (3) proximate causation of the damages claimed by the plaintiff." McGrogan v. Till, 167 N.J. 414, 425 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squadgreen2 sentences2017Consequently, plaintiffs contend the trading records "demonstrate the opposite of what they have stated" in moving for summary judgment. 122 A-0963-12T1 Considering that the matter was disposed of by way of summary judgment, and considering that we, too, are obligated to apply the Brill standard, see, e.g., Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 584 (2012), we conclude there are genuine factual disputes that precluded summary judgment. 2017Consequently, plaintiffs contend the trading records "demonstrate the opposite of what they have stated" in moving for summary judgment. 122 A-0963-12T1 Considering that the matter was disposed of by way of summary judgment, and considering that we, too, are obligated to apply the Brill standard, see, e.g., Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 584 (2012), we conclude there are genuine factual disputes that precluded summary judgment. | 1 | 1 |
Deborah Townsend v. Noah Pierre (072357)green2 sentences2017See Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 59 (2015); Gil v. Clara Maass Med. 2017See Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 59 (2015); Gil v. Clara Maass Med. | 1 | 1 |
Kelly v. County of Monmouthgreen2 sentences2008The Brill standard requires a judge "to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 540 , 666 A. 2d 146 ; see also Kelly v. County of Monmouth, 380 N.J.Super. 552, 557 , 883 A. 2d 411 (App.Div.2005). 2008The Brill standard requires a judge "to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 540 , 666 A. 2d 146 ; see also Kelly v. County of Monmouth, 380 N.J.Super. 552, 557 , 883 A. 2d 411 (App.Div.2005). | 1 | 1 |
Serrano v. Serranogreen2 sentences2004See id. at 459, 843 A. 2d 358 (mentioning a herniated disc as an example of a serious and permanent injury). 2004See id. at 459, 843 A. 2d 358 (mentioning a herniated disc as an example of a serious and permanent injury). | 1 | 1 |
Fluehr v. City of Cape Maygreen2 sentences2003Nevertheless, the majority was convinced that "in light of the Brill standard ... the alleged negligence of the lifeguards is too remotely or insignificantly related to plaintiff's accident, so that in a legal sense, the alleged fault of the lifeguards does not constitute `a cause of the accident.'" 159 N.J. at 544 , 732 A. 2d at 1041 (internal citation omitted). 2003Nevertheless, the majority was convinced that "in light of the Brill standard ... the alleged negligence of the lifeguards is too remotely or insignificantly related to plaintiff's accident, so that in a legal sense, the alleged fault of the lifeguards does not constitute `a cause of the accident.'" 159 N.J. at 544 , 732 A. 2d at 1041 (internal citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.green2 sentences2000Under the Brill test the essential question is “ ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’ ” Id. at 533 , 666 A.2d 146 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 , 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 214 (1986)). 2000Under the Brill test the essential question is “ ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’ ” Id. at 533 , 666 A.2d 146 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 , 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 214 (1986)). | 1 | 1 |
Norman v. Selective Ins. Co.green2 sentences1998See Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 540 , 666 A. 2d 146 ; see Norman, supra, 249 N.J.Super. at 109 , 592 A. 2d 24 ("[I]f the fact finder can reasonably draw or reject an inference or if conflicting inferences can be drawn from a given set of facts, the issue is one of fact, and summary judgment is inappropriate."). 1998See Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 540 , 666 A. 2d 146 ; see Norman, supra, 249 N.J.Super. at 109 , 592 A. 2d 24 ("[I]f the fact finder can reasonably draw or reject an inference or if conflicting inferences can be drawn from a given set of facts, the issue is one of fact, and summary judgment is inappropriate."). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance v. Boylan
green
2 sentences2010Prudential Property Ins. v. Boylan, 307 N.J.Super. 162, 167 , 704 A. 2d 597 (App.Div), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 , 713 A. 2d 499 (1998). [ Agurto v. Guhr, 381 N.J.Super. 519, 525 , 887 A. 2d 159 (App.Div.2005).] The principles for construction of the insurance policy at issue here are likewise well-established: Generally, the insured has the burden "to bring the claim within the basic terms of the policy." Where the language of a policy supports two reasonable meanings, one favorable to the insurer and one favorable to the insured, the interpretation supporting coverage will be applied. 2010Prudential Property Ins. v. Boylan, 307 N.J.Super. 162, 167 , 704 A. 2d 597 (App.Div), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 , 713 A. 2d 499 (1998). [ Agurto v. Guhr, 381 N.J.Super. 519, 525 , 887 A. 2d 159 (App.Div.2005).] The principles for construction of the insurance policy at issue here are likewise well-established: Generally, the insured has the burden "to bring the claim within the basic terms of the policy." Where the language of a policy supports two reasonable meanings, one favorable to the insurer and one favorable to the insured, the interpretation supporting coverage will be applied. | 3 | 2005–2010 |
Reid v. Reid
green
2 sentences2010Prudential Property Ins. v. Boylan, 307 N.J.Super. 162, 167 , 704 A. 2d 597 (App.Div), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 , 713 A. 2d 499 (1998). [ Agurto v. Guhr, 381 N.J.Super. 519, 525 , 887 A. 2d 159 (App.Div.2005).] The principles for construction of the insurance policy at issue here are likewise well-established: Generally, the insured has the burden "to bring the claim within the basic terms of the policy." Where the language of a policy supports two reasonable meanings, one favorable to the insurer and one favorable to the insured, the interpretation supporting coverage will be applied. 2010Prudential Property Ins. v. Boylan, 307 N.J.Super. 162, 167 , 704 A. 2d 597 (App.Div), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 , 713 A. 2d 499 (1998). [ Agurto v. Guhr, 381 N.J.Super. 519, 525 , 887 A. 2d 159 (App.Div.2005).] The principles for construction of the insurance policy at issue here are likewise well-established: Generally, the insured has the burden "to bring the claim within the basic terms of the policy." Where the language of a policy supports two reasonable meanings, one favorable to the insurer and one favorable to the insured, the interpretation supporting coverage will be applied. | 3 | 2005–2010 |
Agurto v. Guhr
green
2 sentences2010Prudential Property Ins. v. Boylan, 307 N.J.Super. 162, 167 , 704 A. 2d 597 (App.Div), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 , 713 A. 2d 499 (1998). [ Agurto v. Guhr, 381 N.J.Super. 519, 525 , 887 A. 2d 159 (App.Div.2005).] The principles for construction of the insurance policy at issue here are likewise well-established: Generally, the insured has the burden "to bring the claim within the basic terms of the policy." Where the language of a policy supports two reasonable meanings, one favorable to the insurer and one favorable to the insured, the interpretation supporting coverage will be applied. 2010Prudential Property Ins. v. Boylan, 307 N.J.Super. 162, 167 , 704 A. 2d 597 (App.Div), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 , 713 A. 2d 499 (1998). [ Agurto v. Guhr, 381 N.J.Super. 519, 525 , 887 A. 2d 159 (App.Div.2005).] The principles for construction of the insurance policy at issue here are likewise well-established: Generally, the insured has the burden "to bring the claim within the basic terms of the policy." Where the language of a policy supports two reasonable meanings, one favorable to the insurer and one favorable to the insured, the interpretation supporting coverage will be applied. | 2 | 2009–2010 |
Vc v. Mjb
green
2 sentences2001It is the child’s best interest that is preeminent as it would be if two legal parents were in a conflict over custody and visitation. [ 163 N.J. at 227 , 748 A.2d 539 (citation omitted).] We have little doubt that the Court contemplates careful review of claims of psychological parenthood, and that while a complaint that alleges the four prongs of the V.C./Wisconsin test confers prima facie standing and will withstand a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, it is not immune to a motion for summary judgment— without appointment of an expert or conduct of a plenary hearing — when the certificatio 2001It is the child’s best interest that is preeminent as it would be if two legal parents were in a conflict over custody and visitation. [ 163 N.J. at 227 , 748 A.2d 539 (citation omitted).] We have little doubt that the Court contemplates careful review of claims of psychological parenthood, and that while a complaint that alleges the four prongs of the V.C./Wisconsin test confers prima facie standing and will withstand a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, it is not immune to a motion for summary judgment— without appointment of an expert or conduct of a plenary hearing — when the certificatio | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Lehmann v. Toys 'R' US, Inc.
green
2 sentences2004Lehmann v. Toys `R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 604 , 626 A. 2d 445 (1993). [A] hostile work environment discrimination claim cannot be established by epithets or comments which are `merely offensive.' An employment discrimination law such as the LAD is not intended to be "a `general civility' code" for conduct in the workplace.... "[D]iscourtesy or rudeness should not be confused with racial [or ethnic] harassment," and "a lack of racial [or ethnic] sensitivity does not, alone, amount to actionable harassment." Thus, "simple teasing," offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely ser 2004Lehmann v. Toys `R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 604 , 626 A. 2d 445 (1993). [A] hostile work environment discrimination claim cannot be established by epithets or comments which are `merely offensive.' An employment discrimination law such as the LAD is not intended to be "a `general civility' code" for conduct in the workplace.... "[D]iscourtesy or rudeness should not be confused with racial [or ethnic] harassment," and "a lack of racial [or ethnic] sensitivity does not, alone, amount to actionable harassment." Thus, "simple teasing," offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely ser | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Heitzman v. Monmouth County
green
2 sentences2004Lehmann v. Toys `R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 604 , 626 A. 2d 445 (1993). [A] hostile work environment discrimination claim cannot be established by epithets or comments which are `merely offensive.' An employment discrimination law such as the LAD is not intended to be "a `general civility' code" for conduct in the workplace.... "[D]iscourtesy or rudeness should not be confused with racial [or ethnic] harassment," and "a lack of racial [or ethnic] sensitivity does not, alone, amount to actionable harassment." Thus, "simple teasing," offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely ser 2004Lehmann v. Toys `R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 604 , 626 A. 2d 445 (1993). [A] hostile work environment discrimination claim cannot be established by epithets or comments which are `merely offensive.' An employment discrimination law such as the LAD is not intended to be "a `general civility' code" for conduct in the workplace.... "[D]iscourtesy or rudeness should not be confused with racial [or ethnic] harassment," and "a lack of racial [or ethnic] sensitivity does not, alone, amount to actionable harassment." Thus, "simple teasing," offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely ser | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Brown v. United States Stove Co.
green
2 sentences1999Viewing those facts in light of the Brill standard convinces us that the alleged negligence of the lifeguards is too remotely or insignificantly related to plaintiff's accident, so that in a legal sense, the alleged fault of the lifeguards does not constitute "a cause of [the] accident, . . . [but] simply presents the condition under which the injury was received." Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 172 , 484 A. 2d 1234 (1984). 1999Viewing those facts in light of the Brill standard convinces us that the alleged negligence of the lifeguards is too remotely or insignificantly related to plaintiff's accident, so that in a legal sense, the alleged fault of the lifeguards does not constitute "a cause of [the] accident, . . . [but] simply presents the condition under which the injury was received." Brown v. United States Stove Co., 98 N.J. 155, 172 , 484 A. 2d 1234 (1984). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.