Ruff test in Ohio

2021Miami No. 2013-CA-44, 2014-Ohio-5803, ¶ 15 . *** We reach the same conclusion under the Ruff standard, which the Ohio Supreme Court applied in Earley.

2021Miami No. 2013-CA-44, 2014-Ohio-5803, ¶ 15 . *** We reach the same conclusion under the Ruff standard, which the Ohio Supreme Court applied in Earley.

2024See R.C. 2941.25; State v. Earley, 2015-Ohio-4615 , ¶ 18 (“[t]he allied-offense statute, R.C. 2941.25, concerns the merger of convictions,” and, “[b]y applying R.C. 2941.25, courts determine whether a defendant can be convicted of multiple offenses” [emphasis in original]). {¶29} Finally, although Cass baldly asserts that “[o]ther combinations of Cass’ eight counts of convictions [sic] could satisfy the Ruff test,” he fails to elaborate any further.

2024See R.C. 2941.25; State v. Earley, 2015-Ohio-4615 , ¶ 18 (“[t]he allied-offense statute, R.C. 2941.25, concerns the merger of convictions,” and, “[b]y applying R.C. 2941.25, courts determine whether a defendant can be convicted of multiple offenses” [emphasis in original]). {¶29} Finally, although Cass baldly asserts that “[o]ther combinations of Cass’ eight counts of convictions [sic] could satisfy the Ruff test,” he fails to elaborate any further.

2024Compare State v. Saxton, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-925, 2019-Ohio-5257, ¶ 41 (arguing that the appellate court “need not engage in the Ruff analysis because R.C. 2925.11, the possession statute, indicates -26- Case Nos. 1-23-17, 1-23-18 and 1-23-19 a legislative intent to calibrate the punishment for the offense based on the aggregate drug weight”). {¶51} Typically, “‘where two statutory provisions proscribe the “same offense,” they are construed not to authorize cumulative punishments in the absence of a clear indication of contrary legislative intent.’” (Emphasis sic.) Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3

2024Compare State v. Saxton, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-925, 2019-Ohio-5257, ¶ 41 (arguing that the appellate court “need not engage in the Ruff analysis because R.C. 2925.11, the possession statute, indicates -26- Case Nos. 1-23-17, 1-23-18 and 1-23-19 a legislative intent to calibrate the punishment for the offense based on the aggregate drug weight”). {¶51} Typically, “‘where two statutory provisions proscribe the “same offense,” they are construed not to authorize cumulative punishments in the absence of a clear indication of contrary legislative intent.’” (Emphasis sic.) Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3

2021Id. at syllabus. {¶19} “‘Although Logan predates Ruff, Ohio courts continue to apply the guidelines set forth in Logan in determining whether kidnapping and another offense were committed with a separate animus, in accordance with the third prong of the Ruff test.’” State v. Cook, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2016-G-0096, 2018-Ohio-788, ¶15 , quoting State v. Asadi-Ousley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104267, 2017-Ohio-7252, ¶47 , reopened on other grounds, citing State v. Armengau, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-679, 2017-Ohio- 4452, ¶125, State v. Williams, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13 MA 125, 2015-Ohio-4100,

2021Id. at syllabus. {¶19} “‘Although Logan predates Ruff, Ohio courts continue to apply the guidelines set forth in Logan in determining whether kidnapping and another offense were committed with a separate animus, in accordance with the third prong of the Ruff test.’” State v. Cook, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2016-G-0096, 2018-Ohio-788, ¶15 , quoting State v. Asadi-Ousley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104267, 2017-Ohio-7252, ¶47 , reopened on other grounds, citing State v. Armengau, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-679, 2017-Ohio- 4452, ¶125, State v. Williams, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13 MA 125, 2015-Ohio-4100,

2021Id. at syllabus. {¶19} “‘Although Logan predates Ruff, Ohio courts continue to apply the guidelines set forth in Logan in determining whether kidnapping and another offense were committed with a separate animus, in accordance with the third prong of the Ruff test.’” State v. Cook, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2016-G-0096, 2018-Ohio-788, ¶15 , quoting State v. Asadi-Ousley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104267, 2017-Ohio-7252, ¶47 , reopened on other grounds, citing State v. Armengau, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-679, 2017-Ohio- 4452, ¶125, State v. Williams, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13 MA 125, 2015-Ohio-4100,

2021Id. at syllabus. {¶19} “‘Although Logan predates Ruff, Ohio courts continue to apply the guidelines set forth in Logan in determining whether kidnapping and another offense were committed with a separate animus, in accordance with the third prong of the Ruff test.’” State v. Cook, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2016-G-0096, 2018-Ohio-788, ¶15 , quoting State v. Asadi-Ousley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104267, 2017-Ohio-7252, ¶47 , reopened on other grounds, citing State v. Armengau, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-679, 2017-Ohio- 4452, ¶125, State v. Williams, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13 MA 125, 2015-Ohio-4100,

2021"Although Logan predates Ruff, Ohio courts continue to apply the guidelines set forth in Logan in determining whether kidnapping and another offense were committed with a separate animus, in accordance with the third prong of the Ruff test." State v. Asadi-Ousley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104267, 2017-Ohio-7252, ¶47 . {¶ 21} The movement here was substantial.

2021"Although Logan predates Ruff, Ohio courts continue to apply the guidelines set forth in Logan in determining whether kidnapping and another offense were committed with a separate animus, in accordance with the third prong of the Ruff test." State v. Asadi-Ousley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104267, 2017-Ohio-7252, ¶47 . {¶ 21} The movement here was substantial.

2021Id. at syllabus. {¶19} “‘Although Logan predates Ruff, Ohio courts continue to apply the guidelines set forth in Logan in determining whether kidnapping and another offense were committed with a separate animus, in accordance with the third prong of the Ruff test.’” State v. Cook, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2016-G-0096, 2018-Ohio-788, ¶15 , quoting State v. Asadi-Ousley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104267, 2017-Ohio-7252, ¶47 , reopened on other grounds, citing State v. Armengau, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-679, 2017-Ohio- 4452, ¶125, State v. Williams, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13 MA 125, 2015-Ohio-4100,

2021Id. at syllabus. {¶19} “‘Although Logan predates Ruff, Ohio courts continue to apply the guidelines set forth in Logan in determining whether kidnapping and another offense were committed with a separate animus, in accordance with the third prong of the Ruff test.’” State v. Cook, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2016-G-0096, 2018-Ohio-788, ¶15 , quoting State v. Asadi-Ousley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104267, 2017-Ohio-7252, ¶47 , reopened on other grounds, citing State v. Armengau, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-679, 2017-Ohio- 4452, ¶125, State v. Williams, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13 MA 125, 2015-Ohio-4100,

2019State v. Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427 , 2013- Ohio-4982, 999 N.E.2d 661 , ¶ 18, citing State v. Mughni, 33 Ohio St.3d 65, 67 , 514 N.E.2d 870 (1987). {¶ 25} Under the Ruff test, we first address whether the offenses were “dissimilar in import”—i.e., whether the offenses involved separate victims or “separate and identifiable” harms.

2019State v. Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427 , 2013- Ohio-4982, 999 N.E.2d 661 , ¶ 18, citing State v. Mughni, 33 Ohio St.3d 65, 67 , 514 N.E.2d 870 (1987). {¶ 25} Under the Ruff test, we first address whether the offenses were “dissimilar in import”—i.e., whether the offenses involved separate victims or “separate and identifiable” harms.

2024E.g., State v. Byers, Cuyahoga App. No. 94922, 2011-Ohio-342 , ¶ 9 (“The ubiquitousness of cell phones is such that the mere possession of a cell phone is not ipso facto proof that it was used in drug trafficking.”)” Id. at ¶ 27, quoting State v. Dammons, 2011-Ohio-2908 (8th Dist.). {¶74} Applying that logic, the court in Olmstead “conclude[d] that the conduct underlying the possession of criminal tools was separate from the conduct underlying the possession of cocaine for the purposes of the Ruff analysis[.]” Id. at ¶ 29.

2018Cuyahoga Nos. 94878, 2011-Ohio-2908, ¶ 24 . {¶ 29} The conduct underlying the possession of criminal tools was, therefore, separate from the conduct underlying the sale and possession of drugs for the purposes of the Ruff analysis and we reject appellant's arguments regarding possession of criminal tools. {¶ 30} Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.

2022Id. {¶ 37} The Fourth District likewise expressed doubts about the Ruff test.

2022Id. {¶ 37} The Fourth District likewise expressed doubts about the Ruff test.

2021Id. at syllabus. {¶19} “‘Although Logan predates Ruff, Ohio courts continue to apply the guidelines set forth in Logan in determining whether kidnapping and another offense were committed with a separate animus, in accordance with the third prong of the Ruff test.’” State v. Cook, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2016-G-0096, 2018-Ohio-788, ¶15 , quoting State v. Asadi-Ousley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104267, 2017-Ohio-7252, ¶47 , reopened on other grounds, citing State v. Armengau, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-679, 2017-Ohio- 4452, ¶125, State v. Williams, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13 MA 125, 2015-Ohio-4100,

2021Id. at syllabus. {¶19} “‘Although Logan predates Ruff, Ohio courts continue to apply the guidelines set forth in Logan in determining whether kidnapping and another offense were committed with a separate animus, in accordance with the third prong of the Ruff test.’” State v. Cook, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2016-G-0096, 2018-Ohio-788, ¶15 , quoting State v. Asadi-Ousley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104267, 2017-Ohio-7252, ¶47 , reopened on other grounds, citing State v. Armengau, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-679, 2017-Ohio- 4452, ¶125, State v. Williams, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13 MA 125, 2015-Ohio-4100,

2021Thus, the same set of offenses might yield different results in different cases, “‘given that the statute instructs courts to examine a defendant’s conduct – an inherently subjective determination.’” Id. at ¶ 32, quoting State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2010-Ohio- 6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061 , ¶ 52 (plurality opinion). {¶ 32} In applying the Ruff analysis, rather than focusing on the various elements of each offense, courts consider three, separate factors: “the conduct, the animus, and the import.” Ruff at paragraph one of the syllabus.

2021Thus, the same set of offenses might yield different results in different cases, “‘given that the statute instructs courts to examine a defendant’s conduct – an inherently subjective determination.’” Id. at ¶ 32, quoting State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2010-Ohio- 6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061 , ¶ 52 (plurality opinion). {¶ 32} In applying the Ruff analysis, rather than focusing on the various elements of each offense, courts consider three, separate factors: “the conduct, the animus, and the import.” Ruff at paragraph one of the syllabus.

2020“Although Logan predates Ruff, Ohio courts continue to apply the guidelines set forth in Logan in determining whether kidnapping and another offense were committed with a separate animus, in accordance with the third prong of -8- the Ruff test.” State v. Sowers, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2018-CA-58, 2019-Ohio-649, ¶ 18 , citing State v. Armengau, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-679, 2017-Ohio-4452, ¶ 125 , citing State v. D.E.M., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-589, 2016-Ohio-5638, ¶ 143 ; State v. Williams, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13MA125, 2015-Ohio-4100, ¶ 18 ; State v. Stinnett, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 1

2020“Although Logan predates Ruff, Ohio courts continue to apply the guidelines set forth in Logan in determining whether kidnapping and another offense were committed with a separate animus, in accordance with the third prong of -8- the Ruff test.” State v. Sowers, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2018-CA-58, 2019-Ohio-649, ¶ 18 , citing State v. Armengau, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-679, 2017-Ohio-4452, ¶ 125 , citing State v. D.E.M., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-589, 2016-Ohio-5638, ¶ 143 ; State v. Williams, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13MA125, 2015-Ohio-4100, ¶ 18 ; State v. Stinnett, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 1

2025Id. {¶ 12} Applying the Ruff test to the facts here, we find that Coleman's convictions for aggravated robbery and abduction do not merge.

2025Id. {¶ 12} Applying the Ruff test to the facts here, we find that Coleman's convictions for aggravated robbery and abduction do not merge.

2025John, 2017-Ohio-4043 (11th Dist.), the Eleventh District wrote that under the first prong of the Ruff standard: “[g]ross sexual imposition and rape may, depending on the circumstances, be allied offenses of similar import.

2025John, 2017-Ohio-4043 (11th Dist.), the Eleventh District wrote that under the first prong of the Ruff standard: “[g]ross sexual imposition and rape may, depending on the circumstances, be allied offenses of similar import.

2024“However, where the statute creating the offense does not illuminate the General Assembly’s intent on whether multiple punishments should be imposed, we look to R.C. 2941.25 for guidance.” State v. Merz, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200152, 2021-Ohio-2093, ¶ 6 .

2024“However, where the statute creating the offense does not illuminate the General Assembly’s intent on whether multiple punishments should be imposed, we look to R.C. 2941.25 for guidance.” State v. Merz, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200152, 2021-Ohio-2093, ¶ 6 .

2024Compare State v. Saxton, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-925, 2019-Ohio-5257, ¶ 41 (arguing that the appellate court “need not engage in the Ruff analysis because R.C. 2925.11, the possession statute, indicates -26- Case Nos. 1-23-17, 1-23-18 and 1-23-19 a legislative intent to calibrate the punishment for the offense based on the aggregate drug weight”). {¶51} Typically, “‘where two statutory provisions proscribe the “same offense,” they are construed not to authorize cumulative punishments in the absence of a clear indication of contrary legislative intent.’” (Emphasis sic.) Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3

2024Compare State v. Saxton, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-925, 2019-Ohio-5257, ¶ 41 (arguing that the appellate court “need not engage in the Ruff analysis because R.C. 2925.11, the possession statute, indicates -26- Case Nos. 1-23-17, 1-23-18 and 1-23-19 a legislative intent to calibrate the punishment for the offense based on the aggregate drug weight”). {¶51} Typically, “‘where two statutory provisions proscribe the “same offense,” they are construed not to authorize cumulative punishments in the absence of a clear indication of contrary legislative intent.’” (Emphasis sic.) Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3