seriousness factors in Ohio

2024State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 36 . {¶31} R.C. 2929.12(A) grants the sentencing judge discretion “‘to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing.’” Foster at ¶ 37, quoting R.C. 2929.12(A). “[I]n exercising that discretion, the court shall consider, along with any other ‘relevant’ factors, the seriousness factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) and the recidivism factors in divisions (D) and (E) of R.C. 2929.12.” Id., quoting R.C. 2929.12(A).

2024State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 36 . {¶31} R.C. 2929.12(A) grants the sentencing judge discretion “‘to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing.’” Foster at ¶ 37, quoting R.C. 2929.12(A). “[I]n exercising that discretion, the court shall consider, along with any other ‘relevant’ factors, the seriousness factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) and the recidivism factors in divisions (D) and (E) of R.C. 2929.12.” Id., quoting R.C. 2929.12(A).

2008No. 2005-L-078, 2006-Ohio-2379 , at ¶ 14-15 , this court indicated that the Supreme Court of Ohio in Foster , supra, at ¶ 37 , stated the following with respect to R.C. 2929.12 : {¶ 38} "`"(* * *) R.C. 2929.12 , grants the sentencing judge discretion `to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing.' R.C. 2929.12 (A) directs that in exercising that discretion, the court shall consider, along with any other `relevant' factors, the seriousness factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) and the recidivism factors in divisions (D) and (E) of R.C. 2929.1

2008No. 2005-L-078, 2006-Ohio-2379 , at ¶ 14-15 , this court indicated that the Supreme Court of Ohio in Foster , supra, at ¶ 37 , stated the following with respect to R.C. 2929.12 : {¶ 12} "`"(* * *) R.C. 2929.12 , grants the sentencing judge discretion `to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing.' R.C. 2929.12 (A) directs that in exercising that discretion, the court shall consider, along with any other `relevant' factors, the seriousness factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) and the recidivism factors in divisions (D) and (E) of R.C. 2929.1

2023He further notes that the State had agreed that he could “override the seriousness factors” and that the State said “he is willing and determined to take the step to get into treatment.” (Appellant’s Brief at 9). {¶16} Although “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) permits an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence if it clearly and convincingly finds that ‘the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under’ certain specified statutory provisions[,] * * * R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 are not among the statutory provisions listed in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a).” State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242

2022“In exercising that discretion, the court shall consider, along with any other “‘relevant’” factors, the seriousness factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) and the recidivism factors in divisions (D) and (E) of R.C. 2929.12.” Watson at ¶ 25, quoting Foster at ¶ 37, quoting R.C. 2929.12(A). {¶48} With respect to our review of a felony sentence, this court is not permitted to “independently weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its judgment for that of 26 the trial court concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” State v. Jones, 163 Ohio S

2008Barger claims he shouldn't have been sentenced to prison at all and that his sentence is thus contrary to law. {¶ 9} Sentencing in this case occurred on February 5, 2007, almost one year after the Supreme Court's announcement of State v. Foster , 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470 , and State v. Mathis , 109 Ohio St.3d 54 , 2006-Ohio-855 , 846 N.E.2d 1 . {¶ 10} Those cases make clear that trial courts have full discretion to impose a sentence within the statutory range without the need for findings or reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive, or greater than minimum sentences —

2008Barger claims he shouldn't have been sentenced to prison at all and that his sentence is thus contrary to law. {¶ 9} Sentencing in this case occurred on February 5, 2007, almost one year after the Supreme Court's announcement of State v. Foster , 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470 , and State v. Mathis , 109 Ohio St.3d 54 , 2006-Ohio-855 , 846 N.E.2d 1 . {¶ 10} Those cases make clear that trial courts have full discretion to impose a sentence within the statutory range without the need for findings or reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive, or greater than minimum sentences —

2013The sanction for the violation of the community control sanction should be the sanction that is commensurate with the seriousness of the violation and adequately protects ‘the public from future crime by the offender and others.” Id. at 282-283 quoting Griffin & Katz, Ohio Felony Sentencing Law (2000 Ed.) 523–524, Sections T5.36.

2003The sanction for the violation of community control sanction should be the sanction that is commensurate with the seriousness of the violation and adequately protects `the public from future crime by the offender and others.'" McPherson , 142 Ohio App.3d at 433 , citing Griffin Katz, Ohio Felony Sentencing Law (2000 Ed.) 523-24, Sections T5.36. {¶ 20} In McPherson , we noted the trial court had failed to notify the defendant of the specific term of imprisonment that it would impose for a community control violation.

2011Appellant asserts that the trial court failed to consider, pursuant to the seriousness factors in R.C. 2929.12(B) and (C), the fact that he was unarmed and did not cause or expect to cause physical harm during the robbery. {¶ 8} “[TJrial courts have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer required to make findings or give their reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive, or more than the minimum sentences.” State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶100 . {¶ 9} When an appellate court reviews a trial court’s sentence, it

2011Appellant asserts that the trial court failed to consider, pursuant to the seriousness factors in R.C. 2929.12(B) and (C), the fact that he was unarmed and did not cause or expect to cause physical harm during the robbery. {¶ 8} “[TJrial courts have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer required to make findings or give their reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive, or more than the minimum sentences.” State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶100 . {¶ 9} When an appellate court reviews a trial court’s sentence, it

2005Id.; also see State v. Stapleton, Lawrence App. No. 03CA28, 2004-Ohio-1859, at ¶¶ 13-14 ; State v. Aguirre, Gallia App. No. 03CA5, 2003-Ohio-4909 , ¶¶ 46-47; State v. Canter (Dec. 27, 2001), Athens App. No. 01CA38. {¶ 15} After our review of the record in this case, we believe that the trial court gave careful consideration to the purposes of the felony sentencing laws, (R.C. 2929.11 ), as well as the seriousness factors, mitigating factors and recidivism factors (R.C. 2929.12 (B)).

2005Id.; also see State v. Stapleton, Lawrence App. No. 03CA28, 2004-Ohio-1859, at ¶¶ 13-14 ; State v. Aguirre, Gallia App. No. 03CA5, 2003-Ohio-4909 , ¶¶ 46-47; State v. Canter (Dec. 27, 2001), Athens App. No. 01CA38. {¶ 15} After our review of the record in this case, we believe that the trial court gave careful consideration to the purposes of the felony sentencing laws, (R.C. 2929.11 ), as well as the seriousness factors, mitigating factors and recidivism factors (R.C. 2929.12 (B)).

2004The Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted R.C. 2929.14 (B) to mean that "unless a court imposes the shortest term authorized on a felony offender who has never served a prison term, the record of the sentencing hearing must reflect that the court found that either or both of the two statutorily sanctioned reasons for exceeding the minimum term warranted the longer sentence." State v. Edmonson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 324 , 326 . {¶ 18} The seriousness factors the court must consider before imposing more than a minimum sentence include: "(1) The physical or mental injury suffered by the victim of the

2004R.C. 2929.14 (B)(2). {¶ 43} The Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted R.C. 2929.14 (B) to mean that "unless a court imposes the shortest term authorized on a felony offender who has never served a prison term, the record of the sentencing hearing must reflect that the court found that either or both of the two statutorily sanctioned reasons for exceeding the minimum term warranted the longer sentence." State v. Edmonson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 324 , 326 . {¶ 44} The seriousness factors the court must consider before imposing more than a minimum sentence include: "(1) The physical or mental injury s

2002Given the fact that Seymour was charged with raping his cousin, any evidence of a previous sexual liaison with a different cousin had to have been highly inflammatory. `The courts of this state have long recognized that evidence of other acts `carries the potential for the most virulent kind of prejudice for the accused.' Lewis , supra, at 41 , quoting State v. Snowden (1976), 49 Ohio App.2d 7 , 8." Id. at 6-9. {¶ 105} When assessing defense counsel's performance in State v. Johnson (Aug. 7, 1990), 10th Dist.

2002Given the fact that Seymour was charged with raping his cousin, any evidence of a previous sexual liaison with a different cousin had to have been highly inflammatory. `The courts of this state have long recognized that evidence of other acts `carries the potential for the most virulent kind of prejudice for the accused.' Lewis, supra, at 41 , quoting State v. Snowden (1976), 49 Ohio App.2d 7 , 8." Id. at 6-9. {¶ 105} When assessing defense counsel's performance in State v. Johnson (Aug. 7, 1990), 10th Dist.

2025Id. {¶36} As stated, R.C. 2929.11(A) requires the trial court to “be guided by” the three purposes of felony sentencing; it does not require the court to “consider” them.

2024We conclude that, although the trial court may not have correlated specific findings to factors with great specificity, as in Kennedy, supra, the court in the case at bar made the appropriate R.C. 2929.20(J)(1)(a) and (b) findings and justified its findings with analysis of the relevant R.C. 2929.12 factors. {¶28} Moreover, in determining a motion for judicial ATHENS, 23CA9 23 release, “the trial court [is] authorized to look beyond the seriousness factors and the recidivism factors in determining whether to exercise its discretion in favor of judicial release.” State v. Ledford, 2017-Ohio-149

2023(Emphasis added.) State v. Banas, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2019-L-049, 2019-Ohio-5053, ¶ 25 ; State v. Brown, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2020-L-052, 2020-Ohio-4642, ¶ 15 (declining to apply Polizzi and rejecting appellant’s argument that a court may not 8 consider an element of the offense to elevate the seriousness of the conduct under R.C. 2929.12(B)); State v. Russell, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2019-L-138, 2020-Ohio-3243, ¶ 75 .

2023(Emphasis added.) State v. Banas, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2019-L-049, 2019-Ohio-5053, ¶ 25 ; State v. Brown, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2020-L-052, 2020-Ohio-4642, ¶ 15 (declining to apply Polizzi and rejecting appellant’s argument that a court may not 8 consider an element of the offense to elevate the seriousness of the conduct under R.C. 2929.12(B)); State v. Russell, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2019-L-138, 2020-Ohio-3243, ¶ 75 .

2022As the court explained in Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), “the seriousness of the error claimed does not remove consideration of it from the ambit of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” To conclude otherwise, the court said, would be to create an exception to the rule “out of whole cloth,” id.

2022As the court explained in Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), “the seriousness of the error claimed does not remove consideration of it from the ambit of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” To conclude otherwise, the court said, would be to create an exception to the rule “out of whole cloth,” id.

2022He further claims that the trial court took a “one-sided view” of the “recidivism factors” and that the trial court “focus[ed] only on the seriousness factors.” Thus, while Cochran does not explicitly invoke R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, he effectively argues that his consecutive sentences are not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. {¶17} However, “the Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 do not apply to consecutive-sentencing review.” State v. Hiles, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-20-21, 2021-Ohio-1622, ¶ 18 , citing State v. Gwynne, 158 Ohio St.3d 279 , 20

2022He further claims that the trial court took a “one-sided view” of the “recidivism factors” and that the trial court “focus[ed] only on the seriousness factors.” Thus, while Cochran does not explicitly invoke R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, he effectively argues that his consecutive sentences are not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. {¶17} However, “the Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 do not apply to consecutive-sentencing review.” State v. Hiles, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-20-21, 2021-Ohio-1622, ¶ 18 , citing State v. Gwynne, 158 Ohio St.3d 279 , 20

2021It is well-established that “consideration of the appropriate factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 can be presumed unless the defendant affirmatively shows to the contrary.” State v. Clinton, 153 Ohio St.3d 422 , 2017-Ohio-9423 , 108 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 243 .

2021It is well-established that “consideration of the appropriate factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 can be presumed unless the defendant affirmatively shows to the contrary.” State v. Clinton, 153 Ohio St.3d 422 , 2017-Ohio-9423 , 108 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 243 .

2019State v. Hamilton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102870, 2016-Ohio-1376, ¶ 14 . {¶20} The seriousness factors are enumerated in R.C. 2929.12(B) and (C), which include factors such as the physical or mental harm suffered by the victim.