seriousness factors in Ohio

2024State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 36 . {¶31} R.C. 2929.12(A) grants the sentencing judge discretion “‘to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing.’” Foster at ¶ 37, quoting R.C. 2929.12(A). “[I]n exercising that discretion, the court shall consider, along with any other ‘relevant’ factors, the seriousness factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) and the recidivism factors in divisions (D) and (E) of R.C. 2929.12.” Id., quoting R.C. 2929.12(A).

2024State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 36 . {¶31} R.C. 2929.12(A) grants the sentencing judge discretion “‘to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing.’” Foster at ¶ 37, quoting R.C. 2929.12(A). “[I]n exercising that discretion, the court shall consider, along with any other ‘relevant’ factors, the seriousness factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) and the recidivism factors in divisions (D) and (E) of R.C. 2929.12.” Id., quoting R.C. 2929.12(A).

2008No. 2005-L-078, 2006-Ohio-2379 , at ¶ 14-15 , this court indicated that the Supreme Court of Ohio in Foster , supra, at ¶ 37 , stated the following with respect to R.C. 2929.12 : {¶ 38} "`"(* * *) R.C. 2929.12 , grants the sentencing judge discretion `to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing.' R.C. 2929.12 (A) directs that in exercising that discretion, the court shall consider, along with any other `relevant' factors, the seriousness factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) and the recidivism factors in divisions (D) and (E) of R.C. 2929.1

2008No. 2005-L-078, 2006-Ohio-2379 , at ¶ 14-15 , this court indicated that the Supreme Court of Ohio in Foster , supra, at ¶ 37 , stated the following with respect to R.C. 2929.12 : {¶ 12} "`"(* * *) R.C. 2929.12 , grants the sentencing judge discretion `to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing.' R.C. 2929.12 (A) directs that in exercising that discretion, the court shall consider, along with any other `relevant' factors, the seriousness factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) and the recidivism factors in divisions (D) and (E) of R.C. 2929.1

2023He further notes that the State had agreed that he could “override the seriousness factors” and that the State said “he is willing and determined to take the step to get into treatment.” (Appellant’s Brief at 9). {¶16} Although “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) permits an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence if it clearly and convincingly finds that ‘the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under’ certain specified statutory provisions[,] * * * R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 are not among the statutory provisions listed in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a).” State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242

2022“In exercising that discretion, the court shall consider, along with any other “‘relevant’” factors, the seriousness factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) and the recidivism factors in divisions (D) and (E) of R.C. 2929.12.” Watson at ¶ 25, quoting Foster at ¶ 37, quoting R.C. 2929.12(A). {¶48} With respect to our review of a felony sentence, this court is not permitted to “independently weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its judgment for that of 26 Case No. 2022-A-0012 the trial court concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” State

2008Barger claims he shouldn't have been sentenced to prison at all and that his sentence is thus contrary to law. {¶ 9} Sentencing in this case occurred on February 5, 2007, almost one year after the Supreme Court's announcement of State v. Foster , 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470 , and State v. Mathis , 109 Ohio St.3d 54 , 2006-Ohio-855 , 846 N.E.2d 1 . {¶ 10} Those cases make clear that trial courts have full discretion to impose a sentence within the statutory range without the need for findings or reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive, or greater than minimum sentences —

2008Barger claims he shouldn't have been sentenced to prison at all and that his sentence is thus contrary to law. {¶ 9} Sentencing in this case occurred on February 5, 2007, almost one year after the Supreme Court's announcement of State v. Foster , 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470 , and State v. Mathis , 109 Ohio St.3d 54 , 2006-Ohio-855 , 846 N.E.2d 1 . {¶ 10} Those cases make clear that trial courts have full discretion to impose a sentence within the statutory range without the need for findings or reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive, or greater than minimum sentences —

2024We conclude that, although the trial court may not have correlated specific findings to factors with great specificity, as in Kennedy, supra, the court in the case at bar made the appropriate R.C. 2929.20(J)(1)(a) and (b) findings and justified its findings with analysis of the relevant R.C. 2929.12 factors. {¶28} Moreover, in determining a motion for judicial ATHENS, 23CA9 23 release, “the trial court [is] authorized to look beyond the seriousness factors and the recidivism factors in determining whether to exercise its discretion in favor of judicial release.” State v. Ledford, 2017-Ohio-149

2017Id. {¶ 30} In addition, when addressing a motion for judicial release, " 'the trial court [is] authorized to look beyond the seriousness factors and the recidivism factors in determining whether to exercise its discretion in favor of judicial release.' " Ledford , 2017-Ohio-149 , 77 N.E.3d 479 at ¶ 17, quoting State v. Grilliot , 2d Dist.

2011Appellant asserts that the trial court failed to consider, pursuant to the seriousness factors in R.C. 2929.12(B) and (C), the fact that he was unarmed and did not cause or expect to cause physical harm during the robbery. {¶ 8} “[TJrial courts have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer required to make findings or give their reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive, or more than the minimum sentences.” State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶100 . {¶ 9} When an appellate court reviews a trial court’s sentence, it

2011Appellant asserts that the trial court failed to consider, pursuant to the seriousness factors in R.C. 2929.12(B) and (C), the fact that he was unarmed and did not cause or expect to cause physical harm during the robbery. {¶ 8} “[TJrial courts have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range and are no longer required to make findings or give their reasons for imposing maximum, consecutive, or more than the minimum sentences.” State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶100 . {¶ 9} When an appellate court reviews a trial court’s sentence, it

2005Id.; also see State v. Stapleton, Lawrence App. No. 03CA28, 2004-Ohio-1859, at ¶¶ 13-14 ; State v. Aguirre, Gallia App. No. 03CA5, 2003-Ohio-4909 , ¶¶ 46-47; State v. Canter (Dec. 27, 2001), Athens App. No. 01CA38. {¶ 15} After our review of the record in this case, we believe that the trial court gave careful consideration to the purposes of the felony sentencing laws, (R.C. 2929.11 ), as well as the seriousness factors, mitigating factors and recidivism factors (R.C. 2929.12 (B)).

2005Id.; also see State v. Stapleton, Lawrence App. No. 03CA28, 2004-Ohio-1859, at ¶¶ 13-14 ; State v. Aguirre, Gallia App. No. 03CA5, 2003-Ohio-4909 , ¶¶ 46-47; State v. Canter (Dec. 27, 2001), Athens App. No. 01CA38. {¶ 15} After our review of the record in this case, we believe that the trial court gave careful consideration to the purposes of the felony sentencing laws, (R.C. 2929.11 ), as well as the seriousness factors, mitigating factors and recidivism factors (R.C. 2929.12 (B)).

2004R.C. 2929.14 (B)(2). {¶ 43} The Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted R.C. 2929.14 (B) to mean that "unless a court imposes the shortest term authorized on a felony offender who has never served a prison term, the record of the sentencing hearing must reflect that the court found that either or both of the two statutorily sanctioned reasons for exceeding the minimum term warranted the longer sentence." State v. Edmonson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 324 , 326 . {¶ 44} The seriousness factors the court must consider before imposing more than a minimum sentence include: "(1) The physical or mental injury s

2004The Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted R.C. 2929.14 (B) to mean that "unless a court imposes the shortest term authorized on a felony offender who has never served a prison term, the record of the sentencing hearing must reflect that the court found that either or both of the two statutorily sanctioned reasons for exceeding the minimum term warranted the longer sentence." State v. Edmonson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 324 , 326 . {¶ 18} The seriousness factors the court must consider before imposing more than a minimum sentence include: "(1) The physical or mental injury suffered by the victim of the

2002Given the fact that Seymour was charged with raping his cousin, any evidence of a previous sexual liaison with a different cousin had to have been highly inflammatory. `The courts of this state have long recognized that evidence of other acts `carries the potential for the most virulent kind of prejudice for the accused.' Lewis, supra, at 41 , quoting State v. Snowden (1976), 49 Ohio App.2d 7 , 8." Id. at 6-9. {¶ 105} When assessing defense counsel's performance in State v. Johnson (Aug. 7, 1990), 10th Dist.

2002Given the fact that Seymour was charged with raping his cousin, any evidence of a previous sexual liaison with a different cousin had to have been highly inflammatory. `The courts of this state have long recognized that evidence of other acts `carries the potential for the most virulent kind of prejudice for the accused.' Lewis , supra, at 41 , quoting State v. Snowden (1976), 49 Ohio App.2d 7 , 8." Id. at 6-9. {¶ 105} When assessing defense counsel's performance in State v. Johnson (Aug. 7, 1990), 10th Dist.

2025Id. {¶36} As stated, R.C. 2929.11(A) requires the trial court to “be guided by” the three purposes of felony sentencing; it does not require the court to “consider” them.

2024We conclude that, although the trial court may not have correlated specific findings to factors with great specificity, as in Kennedy, supra, the court in the case at bar made the appropriate R.C. 2929.20(J)(1)(a) and (b) findings and justified its findings with analysis of the relevant R.C. 2929.12 factors. {¶28} Moreover, in determining a motion for judicial ATHENS, 23CA9 23 release, “the trial court [is] authorized to look beyond the seriousness factors and the recidivism factors in determining whether to exercise its discretion in favor of judicial release.” State v. Ledford, 2017-Ohio-149

2022As the court explained in Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), “the seriousness of the error claimed does not remove consideration of it from the ambit of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” To conclude otherwise, the court said, would be to create an exception to the rule “out of whole cloth,” id.

2022As the court explained in Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466 , 117 S.Ct. 1544 , 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), “the seriousness of the error claimed does not remove consideration of it from the ambit of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” To conclude otherwise, the court said, would be to create an exception to the rule “out of whole cloth,” id.

2022Union No. 14-20-21, 2021-Ohio-1622, ¶ 18 , citing State v. Gwynne, 158 Ohio St.3d 279 , 2019-Ohio-4761, ¶ 17 .

2022Union No. 14-20-21, 2021-Ohio-1622, ¶ 18 , citing State v. Gwynne, 158 Ohio St.3d 279 , 2019-Ohio-4761, ¶ 17 .

2021It is well-established that “consideration of the appropriate factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 can be presumed unless the defendant affirmatively shows to the contrary.” State v. Clinton, 153 Ohio St.3d 422 , 2017-Ohio-9423 , 108 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 243 .

2021It is well-established that “consideration of the appropriate factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 can be presumed unless the defendant affirmatively shows to the contrary.” State v. Clinton, 153 Ohio St.3d 422 , 2017-Ohio-9423 , 108 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 243 .

2019Knox No. 15CA7, 2015-Ohio-4155, ¶ 15 . {¶24} In the instant case, on the record at the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted it considered the purposes and principles of sentencing contained in R.C. 2929.11 and considered the seriousness factors of R.C. 2929.12.

2018State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516 , 2016-Ohio-1002 , 59 N.E.3d 1231 , ¶ 1. {¶35} Specifically, Johnson offers that the trial court did not consider that: (1) none of the seriousness factors listed under R.C. 2929.12(B) apply; (2) Johnson did not intend or expect to cause physical harm to person or property under R.C. 2929.12(C)(3); (3) his conduct was mitigated due to documented heart disease, high blood pressure, and kidney problems impacting his ability to work; and (4) Johnson’s last felony conviction was in 2001, 15 years earlier and he expressed sincere remorse at sentencing (R.C. 2929.

2018State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516 , 2016-Ohio-1002 , 59 N.E.3d 1231 , ¶ 1. {¶35} Specifically, Johnson offers that the trial court did not consider that: (1) none of the seriousness factors listed under R.C. 2929.12(B) apply; (2) Johnson did not intend or expect to cause physical harm to person or property under R.C. 2929.12(C)(3); (3) his conduct was mitigated due to documented heart disease, high blood pressure, and kidney problems impacting his ability to work; and (4) Johnson’s last felony conviction was in 2001, 15 years earlier and he expressed sincere remorse at sentencing (R.C. 2929.

2018Id. {¶6} This analysis, citing the seriousness factors, indicates we found the sentence was supported by the record.

2017Marion No. 9-04-67, 2005-Ohio-2246 . {¶ 19} We further noted that "due to the fundamental nature of the passage of time, it should go without saying that the seriousness factors contained in R.C. 2929.12(B) and (C) that the trial court balances at a defendant's sentencing hearing generally go unchanged -7- Clermont CA2016-05-028 when addressing a subsequent eligible offender's motion for judicial release." Ledford at ¶ 17 .

2017However, "when addressing such a motion, 'the trial court [is] authorized to look beyond the seriousness factors and the recidivism factors in determining whether to exercise its discretion in favor of judicial release.'" Id., quoting State v. Grilliot, 2d Dist.

2017State v. Wilson, 129 Ohio St.3d 214 , 2011-Ohio-2669 , 951 N.E.2d 381 , ¶ 31. {¶35} In determining the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing, R.C. 2929.12(A) instructs the felony sentencing court to consider the seriousness factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) and the recidivism factors set forth in divisions (D) and (E).

2017State v. Wilson, 129 Ohio St.3d 214 , 2011-Ohio-2669 , 951 N.E.2d 381 , ¶ 31. {¶35} In determining the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing, R.C. 2929.12(A) instructs the felony sentencing court to consider the seriousness factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) and the recidivism factors set forth in divisions (D) and (E).

2016C-110828 and C-110829, 2012-Ohio-3349, ¶ 24 . {¶52} As to the seriousness factors, Hendrix argues that none of the factors in R.C. 2929.12(B) apply to indicate that Hendrix’s crime was more serious than conduct normally constituting the offense, and that all four factors under R.C. 2929.12(C) apply to indicate that his offense was less serious than conduct normally constituting the offense.