70 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2025 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Leon E. Wintermyer, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Boardgreen2 sentences2007Wintermyer, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Marlowe), 571 Pa. 189 , 812 A.2d 478 (2002), and two decisions of this Court that considered whether the adjudicators below had violated the capricious disregard standard, Frog, Switch & Manufacturing Co. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 885 A.2d 655 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005) and Hinkle v. City of Philadelphia, Board of Pensions and Retirement, 881 A.2d 22 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005). 2007Wintermyer, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Marlowe), 571 Pa. 189 , 812 A.2d 478 (2002), and two decisions of this Court that considered whether the adjudicators below had violated the capricious disregard standard, Frog, Switch & Manufacturing Co. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 885 A.2d 655 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005) and Hinkle v. City of Philadelphia, Board of Pensions and Retirement, 881 A.2d 22 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005). | 7 | 15 |
Russell v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Boardgreen2 sentences1995The capricious disregard standard is the standard of review employed where the party with the burden of proof is the only party to present evidence, and that burdened party loses. 4 Russell v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Volkswagen of America), 121 Pa.Cmwlth. 436 , 550 A.2d 1364 (1988). 1995The capricious disregard standard is the standard of review employed where the party with the burden of proof is the only party to present evidence, and that burdened party loses. 4 Russell v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Volkswagen of America), 121 Pa.Cmwlth. 436 , 550 A.2d 1364 (1988). | 6 | 14 |
Riverwalk Casino, L.P. v. Pennsylvania Gaming Control Boardgreen2 sentences2016However, “under the capricious disregard standard, the agency’s determination is given great deference, and relief will be rarely warranted.” Riverwalk Casino, LP v. Pennsylvania Gaming Control Bd., 592 Pa. 505 , 926 A.2d 926, 929 (2007). 2016However, “under the capricious disregard standard, the agency’s determination is given great deference, and relief will be rarely warranted.” Riverwalk Casino, LP v. Pennsylvania Gaming Control Bd., 592 Pa. 505 , 926 A.2d 926, 929 (2007). | 3 | 3 |
Ward v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Boardgreen2 sentences2022The capricious disregard standard of review is “not to be applied in such a manner to intrude on the agency fact-finding role and discretionary decision-making authority.” Ward v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia), 966 A.2d 1159, 1164 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). 5 That said, we see no impediment to Dr. Davis resubmitting the bills on the appropriate forms, and with the required reports, as mandated by the regulations promulgated under the Act. 14 We do not agree that Claimant’s argument can be fairly characterized as one involving the WCJ’s capricious disregard of evidence. 2016The capricious disregard standard of review is “not to be applied in such a manner to intrude on the agency fact-finding role and discretionary decision-making authority.” Ward v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia), 966 A.2d 1159, 1164 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). | 2 | 2 |
Green v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Boardgreen2 sentences2017As we explained in Green v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (U.S. Airways), 28 A.3d 936, 940 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (Green I), “there is no requirement in the law that the WCJ’s decision be ‘well-reasoned’ in the sense that a reviewing court agrees with the reasoning offered; the requirement is that the decision be ‘reasoned’ within the meaning of Section 422(a) of the Act.” Furthermore, similar to the capricious disregard standard, discussed above, a WCJ is not required to address all evidence presented. 2016Green v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (U.S. Airways), 28 A.3d 936, 942 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). | 2 | 2 |
Hinkle v. City of Philadelphiagreen2 sentences2013Hinkle v. City of Philadelphia, 881 A.2d 22 , 27 n. 9 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005) (providing a detailed description of the proper application of the capricious disregard standard post-Wintermyer). 2007Wintermyer, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Marlowe), 571 Pa. 189 , 812 A.2d 478 (2002), and two decisions of this Court that considered whether the adjudicators below had violated the capricious disregard standard, Frog, Switch & Manufacturing Co. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 885 A.2d 655 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005) and Hinkle v. City of Philadelphia, Board of Pensions and Retirement, 881 A.2d 22 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005). | 1 | 6 |
Kirkwood v. UN. COMP. BD. OF REV.green2 sentences1995This Court in Kirkwood v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 106 Pa.Cmwlth. 92 , 525 A.2d 841 (1987), enunciated the underlying rational of the capricious disregard standard. 1995This Court in Kirkwood v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 106 Pa.Cmwlth. 92 , 525 A.2d 841 (1987), enunciated the underlying rational of the capricious disregard standard. | 1 | 6 |
Estate of McGovern v. Commonwealth, State Employees' Retirement Boardgreen2 sentences2002The Commonwealth Court’s capricious disregard standard represented a departure from previous Commonwealth Court cases that applied the decision of this Court in Estate of McGovern v. State Employees’ Retirement Board, 512 Pa. 377 , 517 A.2d 523 (1986). 2002The Commonwealth Court’s capricious disregard standard represented a departure from previous Commonwealth Court cases that applied the decision of this Court in Estate of McGovern v. State Employees’ Retirement Board, 512 Pa. 377 , 517 A.2d 523 (1986). | 1 | 5 |
Taliaferro v. Darby Tp. Zoning Hearing Bd.green2 sentences2022The [Commission’s] [D]ecision plainly demonstrates it did not deliberately ignore the testimony of [Troiani’s] experts, as evidenced by its express summation of their testimony.” Id. at 815 ; see R.R. at 315a-316a. 2022The express consideration and rejection of [] evidence, by [] definition, is not capricious disregard.” Taliaferro, 873 A.2d at 815-16 (reasoning that “application of the capricious disregard standard . . . [did not] warrant reversal” where “[t]he Board’s decision plainly demonstrate[d] it did not deliberately ignore the [disputed] testimony . . ., as evidenced by its express summation of [the] testimony”). | 1 | 2 |
Dana Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Boardgreen2 sentences2001Dana Corp. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Hollywood), 706 A.2d 396 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998). 1998On appeal this court agreed with Tomczak that the capricious disregard standard was applicable “because the claimant bore the burden of proof, the employer had presented no evidence on the medical questions involved, and yet the claimant was denied benefits,” Dana Corporation v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Hollywood), 706 A.2d 396, 398 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998). | 1 | 2 |
Station Square Gaming L.P. v. Pennsylvania Gaming Control Boardgreen2 sentences2011Id. at 237-38. 2011Id. at 237-38. | 1 | 1 |
DeBerry v. Board of Pensions & Retirement Municipal Pension Fundgreen2 sentences2005DeBerry v. Board of Pensions and Retirement Municipal Pension Fund, 137 Pa.Cmwlth. 235 , 585 A.2d 616, n. 2 (1991). [4] Here, even though Claimant had the burden of proof and did not prevail, both parties presented evidence. [5] Justice Saylor's opinion, joined by Justice Castille, has been understood to mean that the capricious disregard standard allows the court to make new facts based on the record stating: [A]gencies are not foreclosed from making affirmative factual findings in matters decided against the claimant. 2005DeBerry v. Board of Pensions and Retirement Municipal Pension Fund, 137 Pa.Cmwlth. 235 , 585 A.2d 616, n. 2 (1991). [4] Here, even though Claimant had the burden of proof and did not prevail, both parties presented evidence. [5] Justice Saylor's opinion, joined by Justice Castille, has been understood to mean that the capricious disregard standard allows the court to make new facts based on the record stating: [A]gencies are not foreclosed from making affirmative factual findings in matters decided against the claimant. | 1 | 1 |
Campbell v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Boardgreen2 sentences2001In Campbell v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Antietam Valley Animal Hospital), 705 A.2d 503 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998), this Court discussed the application of the capricious disregard standard stating: In utilizing the eapricious disregard standard, we first examine the record to determine whether the burdened party ... has met its burden as a matter of law; and, if not, we must affirm the agency’s decision as a correct legal conclusion. 2001See Campbell, 705 A.2d at 503 (where the burdened party presents sufficient evidence as a matter of law we must examine the basis for the adverse ruling); Acme Markets, 597 A.2d at 294 (the capricious disregard of competent evidence is the willful, deliberate disbelief of an apparently trustworthy witness); Farquhar v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Corning Glass), 515 Pa. 315 , 528 A.2d 580 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Acme Markets, Inc. v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (ANNETTE PILVALIS)green2 sentences2001See Campbell, 705 A.2d at 503 (where the burdened party presents sufficient evidence as a matter of law we must examine the basis for the adverse ruling); Acme Markets, 597 A.2d at 294 (the capricious disregard of competent evidence is the willful, deliberate disbelief of an apparently trustworthy witness); Farquhar v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Corning Glass), 515 Pa. 315 , 528 A.2d 580 (1987). 2001See Campbell, 705 A.2d at 503 (where the burdened party presents sufficient evidence as a matter of law we must examine the basis for the adverse ruling); Acme Markets, 597 A.2d at 294 (the capricious disregard of competent evidence is the willful, deliberate disbelief of an apparently trustworthy witness); Farquhar v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Corning Glass), 515 Pa. 315 , 528 A.2d 580 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Van Duser v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Reviewgreen2 sentences1999See Van Duser v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 164 Pa.Cmwlth. 96 , 642 A.2d 544 (1994). 1999See Van Duser v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 164 Pa.Cmwlth. 96 , 642 A.2d 544 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
| Hygrade Food Products v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rice v. A. Steiert & Sons, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Arena v. Packaging Systems Corp.
green
2 sentences1991In Arena v. Packaging Systems Corp., 510 Pa. 34 , 507 A.2d 18 (1986), cited by the majority, the Supreme Court reversed this Court’s application of the capricious disregard standard, concluding that application of that standard encroached upon the referee’s decision concerning the credibility of certain medical testimony. 1991In Arena v. Packaging Systems Corp., 510 Pa. 34 , 507 A.2d 18 (1986), cited by the majority, the Supreme Court reversed this Court’s application of the capricious disregard standard, concluding that application of that standard encroached upon the referee’s decision concerning the credibility of certain medical testimony. | 3 | 1991–2022 |
Sun Home Health Visiting Nurses v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
green
2 sentences2021Sun Home Health Visiting Nurses v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Noguchi), 815 A.2d 1156 , 1159 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). 17 Accordingly, the Commission’s Adjudication and Order is affirmed. 2021Sun Home Health Visiting Nurses v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Noguchi), 815 A.2d 1156 , 1159 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). 7 These credibility determinations will be upheld on appeal unless they were made arbitrarily or capriciously. | 3 | 2014–2021 |
Farquhar v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
green
2 sentences1993On the other hand, Employer, relying on Farquhar v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Coming Glass Works), 515 Pa. 315 , 528 A.2d 580 (1987), contends that because lacono failed to produce any medical evidence confirming an ongoing work-related disability, the capricious disregard standard applies. 3 We agree with lacono. 1993On the other hand, Employer, relying on Farquhar v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Coming Glass Works), 515 Pa. 315 , 528 A.2d 580 (1987), contends that because lacono failed to produce any medical evidence confirming an ongoing work-related disability, the capricious disregard standard applies. 3 We agree with lacono. | 3 | 1990–2001 |
Czap v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
green
2 sentences1999Czap v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Gunton Corp.), 137 Pa.Cmwlth. 612 , 587 A.2d 49 (Pa.Cmwlth.1990), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 527 Pa. 654 , 593 A.2d 425 (1991). [7] The instructions accompanying the wage survey directed respondents, among other things, not to provide data on publicly funded construction projects. 1993Id. *557 The proper standard of review to be applied to the board in situations where the party with the burden of proof is the only party to present evidence and loses is the capricious disregard standard. | 3 | 1993–1999 |
Iacono v. Worker's Compensation Appeal Board
green
2 sentences1994We recently reconsidered our varying standards of review in Iacono v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Chester Housing Authority), 155 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 234, 624 A.2d 814 (1993). 1 In Iacono , the WCAB reversed a referee’s denial of an employer’s termination petition, reasoning that because the employer was the only party to present medical evidence relating to the cause of the claimant’s disability, thereby presenting the only competent evidence on that issue, the capricious disregard standard applied. 1994We recently reconsidered our varying standards of review in Iacono v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Chester Housing Authority), 155 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 234, 624 A.2d 814 (1993). [1] In Iacono , the WCAB reversed a referee's denial of an employer's termination petition, reasoning that because the employer was the only party to present medical evidence relating to the cause of the claimant's disability, thereby presenting the only competent evidence on that issue, the capricious disregard standard applied. | 3 | 1994–1996 |
Iacono v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
green
2 sentences1996Iacono v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Chester Housing), 155 Pa.Cmwlth.234, 624 A.2d 814 (1993), affirmed, 536 Pa. 535 , 640 A.2d 408 (1994). 1996Iacono v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Chester Housing), 155 Pa.Cmwlth.234, 624 A.2d 814 (1993), affirmed, 536 Pa. 535 , 640 A.2d 408 (1994). | 2 | 1995–1996 |
Williams v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
green
1 sentence2024To meet the capricious disregard standard, that evidence must be competent and at least “apparently trustworthy.” Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Falkler v. Lower Windsor Township Zoning Hearing Board
green
1 sentence2024Id. (cf. Metal Green, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment, 266 A.3d 495 (Pa. 2021)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Wise v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review
green
1 sentence2021Wise, 111 A.3d at 1263 (quoting Hinkle, 881 A.2d at 27 (footnote omitted)). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Frog, Switch & Manufacturing Co. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
green
1 sentence2007Wintermyer, Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Marlowe), 571 Pa. 189 , 812 A.2d 478 (2002), and two decisions of this Court that considered whether the adjudicators below had violated the capricious disregard standard, Frog, Switch & Manufacturing Co. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 885 A.2d 655 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005) and Hinkle v. City of Philadelphia, Board of Pensions and Retirement, 881 A.2d 22 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Fraternal Order of Police v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board
green
2 sentences2002I do not share this concern because if substantial evidence exists to support the factual findings of the WCJ, the appellate tribunal should not delve into whether the WCJ capriciously disregarded “other evidence.” I also do not view this Court’s decision in Fraternal Order of Police v. PLRB, 557 Pa. 586 , 735 A.2d 96 (1999), as altering the capricious disregard standard. 2002I do not share this concern because if substantial evidence exists to support the factual findings of the WCJ, the appellate tribunal should not delve into whether the WCJ capriciously disregarded “other evidence.” I also do not view this Court’s decision in Fraternal Order of Police v. PLRB, 557 Pa. 586 , 735 A.2d 96 (1999), as altering the capricious disregard standard. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Victor's Jewelers v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
green
2 sentences1998Relying on Victor’s Jewelers v. Workmen’s Compensartion Appeal Board (Bergelson), 145 Pa.Cmwlth. 630, 604 A.2d 1127 (1992), the Board determined that the application of the capricious disregard standard was not proper, as ■ Claimant had testified regarding pain and weakness in his knee. 1998Relying on Victor’s Jewelers v. Workmen’s Compensartion Appeal Board (Bergelson), 145 Pa.Cmwlth. 630, 604 A.2d 1127 (1992), the Board determined that the application of the capricious disregard standard was not proper, as ■ Claimant had testified regarding pain and weakness in his knee. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Tomczak v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
green
2 sentences1998The Board concluded that the WCJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and affirmed. ■ On appeal to this Court, Employer argues that the Board erred by failing to apply the capricious disregard standard of review where Employer was the only party to present medical evidence regarding the cause of Claimant’s disability. 1 Employer maintains that our decision in Tomczak v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Pro-Aire Transport, Inc.), 150 Pa.Cmwlth. 431, 615 A.2d 993 (1992) is controlling and that the present case is distinguishable from Victor’s Jewelers . 1998The Board concluded that the WCJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and affirmed. ■ On appeal to this Court, Employer argues that the Board erred by failing to apply the capricious disregard standard of review where Employer was the only party to present medical evidence regarding the cause of Claimant’s disability. 1 Employer maintains that our decision in Tomczak v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Pro-Aire Transport, Inc.), 150 Pa.Cmwlth. 431, 615 A.2d 993 (1992) is controlling and that the present case is distinguishable from Victor’s Jewelers . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Mihok v. Department of Public Welfare
green
2 sentences1997In Wanamaker , we cited to numerous decisions, including Mihok v. Department of Public Welfare, 135 Pa.Cmwlth. 265 , 580 A.2d 905 (1990), 8 where we applied the capricious disregard standard. 1997In Wanamaker , we cited to numerous decisions, including Mihok v. Department of Public Welfare, 135 Pa.Cmwlth. 265 , 580 A.2d 905 (1990), 8 where we applied the capricious disregard standard. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Wanamaker v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board
neutral
2 sentences1997Russell This Court, however, applies the capricious disregard standard only when reviewing decisions of administrative agencies under the Law, Wanamaker v. Liquor Control Board, 148 Pa.Cmwlth. 541 , 611 A.2d 1368 (1992), and we have never extended it to a review of an appeal from an order of a court of common pleas. 1997Russell This Court, however, applies the capricious disregard standard only when reviewing decisions of administrative agencies under the Law, Wanamaker v. Liquor Control Board, 148 Pa.Cmwlth. 541 , 611 A.2d 1368 (1992), and we have never extended it to a review of an appeal from an order of a court of common pleas. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Morrissey v. Department of Highways green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Crenshaw v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Gallick v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Haney v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Meiler v. Commonwealth, Department of Banking neutral | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Long v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Barrett v. Otis Elevator Co. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.