successive rule in Florida

2023See Jimenez v. State, 997 So. 2d 1056, 1064 (Fla. 2008) (“To be considered timely filed as newly discovered evidence, the successive rule 3.851 motion was required to have been filed within one year of the date upon which the claim became discoverable through due diligence.”).

2021“To be considered timely filed as newly discovered evidence, the successive rule 3.851 motion was required to have been filed within one year of the date upon which the claim became discoverable through due diligence.” Jimenez v. State, 997 So. 2d 1056, 1064 (Fla. 2008), as revised on denial of reh’g (Sept. 29, 2008), as revised on denial of reh’g (Dec. 18, 2008).

2019See State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287, 291 (Fla. 2003) (“Collateral estoppel . . . precludes a defendant from rearguing in a successive rule 3.800 motion the same issue argued 1 Golden v. State, Case No.1D16-4420, 229 So. 3d 1224 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (table). in a prior motion.”); Carroll v. State, 192 So. 3d 525, 526-27 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (“The postconviction process does not exist simply to give prisoners something to do in order to help them pass the time as they serve their sentences, and every minute the courts are required to spend on meritless postconviction filings is time that cannot b

2015Collateral estoppel may bar a successive rule 3.800(a) motion where the “specific issue ... has already been decided on the merits.” Holton v. State, 51 So.3d 1164, 1165 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (citing State v. McBride, 848 So.2d 287, 290-91 (Fla.2003)).

2023The appropriate standard of review of “the circuit court’s decision to summarily deny a successive rule 3.851 motion [is] de novo, accepting the movant’s factual allegations as true to the extent they are not refuted by the record, and affirming the ruling if the record conclusively shows that the movant is entitled to no relief.” Id. at 1022–23 (quoting Walton v. State, 3 So. 3d 1000, 1005 (Fla. 2009)).

2023We review “the circuit court’s decision to summarily deny a successive rule 3.851 motion de novo, accepting the movant’s factual allegations as true to the extent they are not refuted by the record, and affirming the ruling if the record conclusively shows that the movant is entitled to no relief.” Walton v. State, 3 So. 3d 1000, 1005 (Fla. 2009).

2026See Howell v. State, 145 So. 3d 774, 775 (Fla. 2013).

2024When a newly discovered evidence claim is brought as a successive claim, the defendant must demonstrate an exception to the rule’s time limitations. 3 See Howell v. State, 145 So. 3d 774, 775 (Fla. 2013); Fla. R.

2020See Reed v. State, 116 So. 3d 260, 264 (Fla. 2013) (explaining -5- that a claim of newly discovered evidence must be brought within one year of the date on which the claim became discoverable through the exercise of due diligence). 2 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of Archer’s successive rule 3.851 motion.

2017Reed v. State, 116 So. 3d 260, 264 (2013).

2017P. 3.850(h)(2); Meyer v. State, 69 So. 3d 1037, 1038 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (reversing the summary denial of a successive rule 3.850 motion for trial court’s failure to attach to the denial order copies of the previous motion and denial order to demonstrate the successiveness of the motion).

2017P. 3.850(h)(2); Meyer v. State, 69 So.3d 1037, 1038 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (reversing the summary denial of a successive rule 3.850 motion for trial court’s failure to attach to the denial order copies of the previous motion and denial order to demonstrate the successiveness of the motion).

2015Collateral estoppel may bar a successive rule 3.800(a) motion where the “specific issue ... has already been decided on the merits.” Holton v. State, 51 So.3d 1164, 1165 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (citing State v. McBride, 848 So.2d 287, 290-91 (Fla.2003)).

2011See State v. McBride, 848 So.2d 287, 291 (Fla.2003); Fuston v. State, 764 So.2d 779, 779 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Holton v. State, 51 So.3d 1164, 1165 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

2014See Jimenez v. State, 997 So.2d 1056, 1072 (Fla.2008) (holding that a claim of factual innocence was not preserved for appeal where the defendant did not present this claim to the postconviction court during the successive rule 3.851 proceeding (quoting Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332, 338 (Fla.1982) (“[F]or an argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the *1184 specific contention asserted as legal ground for the objection, exception, or motion below.”))). 5 Further, Smith presents new arguments on appeal that were never presented to the postconviction court.

2008See Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332, 338 (Fla.1982) ("[F]or an argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the specific contention asserted as legal ground for the objection, exception, or motion below." (emphasis supplied)).

2008See Moore v. State, 820 So.2d 199, 205 (Fla.2002) (holding that a successive rule 3.850 motion can be denied if there is no reason why the issue could not have been raised in a previous motion); Scrambling v. State, 919 So.2d 671, 672 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (holding that rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief was procedurally barred as successive where the issue raised in the pending rule 3.850 motion was one that could or should have been raised in the earlier rule 3.850 motion).

2008See Moore v. State, 820 So.2d 199, 205 (Fla.2002) (holding that a successive rule 3.850 motion can be denied as an abuse of process where the defendant failed to raise the issue in his previous motion for postconviction relief without reason); Franklin v. State, 923 So.2d 1199, 1199 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (finding that the claims raised could have been raised in the defendant's first motion for postconviction relief, and were, therefore, procedurally barred).

2006See Isley v. State, 652 So.2d 409, 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (“Enough is enough.”); see also Britt v. State, 931 So.2d 209, 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (finding that defendant’s pro se filings had become frivolous, an abuse of process, and a waste of the taxpayers’ money); Glasco v. State, 914 So.2d 512, 512 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (recognizing frivolous collateral appeals clog the courts and hurt meritorious appeals by inviting sweeping rulings and by engendering judicial impatience with all defendants).

2006See Isley v. State, 652 So.2d 409, 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (“Enough is enough.”); see also Britt v. State, 931 So.2d 209, 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (finding that defendant’s pro se filings had become frivolous, an abuse of process, and a waste of the taxpayers’ money); Glasco v. State, 914 So.2d 512, 512 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (recognizing frivolous collateral appeals clog the courts and hurt meritorious appeals by inviting sweeping rulings and by engendering judicial impatience with all defendants).

2006See Isley v. State, 652 So.2d 409, 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (“Enough is enough.”); see also Britt v. State, 931 So.2d 209, 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (finding that defendant’s pro se filings had become frivolous, an abuse of process, and a waste of the taxpayers’ money); Glasco v. State, 914 So.2d 512, 512 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (recognizing frivolous collateral appeals clog the courts and hurt meritorious appeals by inviting sweeping rulings and by engendering judicial impatience with all defendants).

2006See Isley v. State, 652 So.2d 409, 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (“Enough is enough.”); see also Britt v. State, 931 So.2d 209, 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (finding that defendant’s pro se filings had become frivolous, an abuse of process, and a waste of the taxpayers’ money); Glasco v. State, 914 So.2d 512, 512 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (recognizing frivolous collateral appeals clog the courts and hurt meritorious appeals by inviting sweeping rulings and by engendering judicial impatience with all defendants).

2006See Isley v. State, 652 So.2d 409, 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (“Enough is enough.”); see also Britt v. State, 931 So.2d 209, 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (finding that defendant’s pro se filings had become frivolous, an abuse of process, and a waste of the taxpayers’ money); Glasco v. State, 914 So.2d 512, 512 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (recognizing frivolous collateral appeals clog the courts and hurt meritorious appeals by inviting sweeping rulings and by engendering judicial impatience with all defendants).

2006See Isley v. State, 652 So.2d 409, 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (“Enough is enough.”); see also Britt v. State, 931 So.2d 209, 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (finding that defendant’s pro se filings had become frivolous, an abuse of process, and a waste of the taxpayers’ money); Glasco v. State, 914 So.2d 512, 512 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (recognizing frivolous collateral appeals clog the courts and hurt meritorious appeals by inviting sweeping rulings and by engendering judicial impatience with all defendants).

2026Hitchcock v. State (Hitchcock IX), 226 So. 3d 216, 216-17 (Fla. 2017).

2026Pardo v. State, 108 So. 3d 558, 561 (Fla. 2012); see also Gaskin v. State, 218 So. 3d 399, 400 (Fla. 2017).

2026Pardo v. State, 108 So. 3d 558, 561 (Fla. 2012); see also Gaskin v. State, 218 So. 3d 399, 400 (Fla. 2017).

2023The declaration and resolution that Melton argues are newly discovered evidence largely rely on pre-2021 studies and, in fact, the declaration recognizes that in 2015 the majority of the neuroscientific community accepted that the human brain was not fully developed until late adolescence. “ ‘[N]ew opinions or research studies based on a compilation or analysis of previously existing data and scientific information’ are not generally considered newly discovered evidence.” Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94 , 99 (Fla. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Henry v. State, 125 So. 3d 745, 750 (Fl

2023The declaration and resolution that Melton argues are newly discovered evidence largely rely on pre-2021 studies and, in fact, the declaration recognizes that in 2015 the majority of the neuroscientific community accepted that the human brain was not fully developed until late adolescence. “ ‘[N]ew opinions or research studies based on a compilation or analysis of previously existing data and scientific information’ are not generally considered newly discovered evidence.” Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94 , 99 (Fla. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Henry v. State, 125 So. 3d 745, 750 (Fl

2022Discussing the effect of the concurrent sentences on the new law violations, the court explained: Under the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in McBride, the application of collateral estoppel to preclude a successive rule 3.800(a) motion does not constitute a manifest injustice where the trial court improperly denied the first rule 3.800 motion but, as a practical matter, the defendant’s total prison time would not be reduced if the illegal sentence was corrected imposed on the charge.” Adderly v. State, 958 So. 2d 997, 998 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (citing Ch. 06-270, § 1, Laws of Fla.). 2 because

2022See Parkhomchuck v. AIY, Inc., 338 So. 3d 397 , 400 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (“[I]f the appellants were dissatisfied with the trial court’s ruling on their first rule 1.540(b) motion, ‘their remedy was by appeal, not be [sic] filing successive motions to vacate containing the same general grounds or even new ones, which could have been raised in the first motion.’” (quoting Intercoastal Marina Towers, Inc. v. Suburban Bank, 506 So. 2d 1177, 1179 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987))). 2 Affirmed. 1 As Successor to the Bank of New York Mellon, as Successor to JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, as Trustee for

2022See Parkhomchuck v. AIY, Inc., 338 So. 3d 397 , 400 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (“[I]f the appellants were dissatisfied with the trial court’s ruling on their first rule 1.540(b) motion, ‘their remedy was by appeal, not be [sic] filing successive motions to vacate containing the same general grounds or even new ones, which could have been raised in the first motion.’” (quoting Intercoastal Marina Towers, Inc. v. Suburban Bank, 506 So. 2d 1177, 1179 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987))). 2 Affirmed. 1 As Successor to the Bank of New York Mellon, as Successor to JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, as Trustee for

2020Archer v. State (Archer II), 673 So. 2d 17, 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, Archer v. Florida, 519 U.S. 876 (1996).1 The successive rule 3.851 motion at issue in this appeal raised three claims, and Archer seeks relief from the circuit court’s denial of all three.

2019See State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287, 291 (Fla. 2003) (“Collateral estoppel . . . precludes a defendant from rearguing in a successive rule 3.800 motion the same issue argued 1 Golden v. State, Case No.1D16-4420, 229 So. 3d 1224 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (table). in a prior motion.”); Carroll v. State, 192 So. 3d 525, 526-27 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (“The postconviction process does not exist simply to give prisoners something to do in order to help them pass the time as they serve their sentences, and every minute the courts are required to spend on meritless postconviction filings is time that cannot b

2019See State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287, 291 (Fla. 2003) (“Collateral estoppel . . . precludes a defendant from rearguing in a successive rule 3.800 motion the same issue argued 1 Golden v. State, Case No.1D16-4420, 229 So. 3d 1224 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (table). in a prior motion.”); Carroll v. State, 192 So. 3d 525, 526-27 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (“The postconviction process does not exist simply to give prisoners something to do in order to help them pass the time as they serve their sentences, and every minute the courts are required to spend on meritless postconviction filings is time that cannot b

2018See, e.g., Huffman v. State, 192 So. 3d 687, 690-91 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (noting that "the doctrines of law of the case and collateral estoppel will not apply to preclude consideration of a successive rule 3.800(a) motion when doing so would result in a defendant serving a sentence that exceeds the sentence that could have been legally imposed").

2018See Wardlow v. State, 212 So. 3d 1091, 1094 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (granting the defendant’s successive rule 9.141 petition under Haygood II based on the manifest injustice doctrine); Page v. State, 201 So. 3d 207, 209 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (granting habeas corpus relief under Haygood II based on the manifest injustice doctrine where the appellate court had previously granted habeas corpus relief to similarly situated defendants, and where the appellate court had 17 previously dismissed Page’s prior ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim without elaboration).

2018Akins, 69 So. 3d at 268 ; see also Coleman v. State, 128 So. 3d 193, 194 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (rejecting the State’s argument that the law of the case doctrine barred the appellate court from reconsidering its prior denial of a habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, citing Akins). 16 the Florida Supreme Court’s disposition in Haygood II, or (ii) denied Marshall’s petition with an opinion or citiation to this Court’s Cubelo I decision, Marshall could have sought and obtained relief from the Florida Supreme Court.