Bowen motion in Georgia

2010“A trial court has the discretion to grant a mistrial or to give curative instructions, and this court will only interfere with that discretion when granting a mistrial is essential to the preservation of the right to fair trial.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hensley v. State, 300 Ga. App. 136, 137 ( 684 SE2d 673 ) (2009).

2010“A trial court has the discretion to grant a mistrial or to give curative instructions, and this court will only interfere with that discretion when granting a mistrial is essential to the preservation of the right to fair trial.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hensley v. State, 300 Ga. App. 136, 137 ( 684 SE2d 673 ) (2009).

2025See American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. Zeh, 312 Ga. 647, 653 (1) (c) ( 864 SE2d 422 ) (2021) (for the purposes of OCGA § 9-11-11.1 inquiry, “the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant”) (citation omitted); Rosser v. Clyatt, 348 Ga. App. 40, 43 (2) (b) ( 821 SE2d 140 ) (2018) (OCGA § 9-11-11.1 “contemplates a substantive, evidentiary determination of the plaintiff’s probability of prevailing on his claims[,]” and it “directs the court to consider supporting and opposing affidavits”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2025See American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. Zeh, 312 Ga. 647, 653 (1) (c) ( 864 SE2d 422 ) (2021) (for the purposes of OCGA § 9-11-11.1 inquiry, “the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant”) (citation omitted); Rosser v. Clyatt, 348 Ga. App. 40, 43 (2) (b) ( 821 SE2d 140 ) (2018) (OCGA § 9-11-11.1 “contemplates a substantive, evidentiary determination of the plaintiff’s probability of prevailing on his claims[,]” and it “directs the court to consider supporting and opposing affidavits”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2025Its essential elements are: “(1) the defendant’s negligent supply of false information to forseeable persons, known or unknown; (2) such person’s reasonable reliance upon that false information; and (3) economic injury proximately resulting from such reliance.” (Footnote omitted.) Hardaway Co. v. Parsons, Brnckerhoff, Quade & Douglas, 267 Ga. 424, 426 (1) ( 479 SE2d 727 ) (1997).

2025Its essential elements are: “(1) the defendant’s negligent supply of false information to forseeable persons, known or unknown; (2) such person’s reasonable reliance upon that false information; and (3) economic injury proximately resulting from such reliance.” (Footnote omitted.) Hardaway Co. v. Parsons, Brnckerhoff, Quade & Douglas, 267 Ga. 424, 426 (1) ( 479 SE2d 727 ) (1997).

2025See American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. Zeh, 312 Ga. 647, 653 (1) (c) ( 864 SE2d 422 ) (2021) (for the purposes of OCGA § 9-11-11.1 inquiry, “the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant”) (citation omitted); Rosser v. Clyatt, 348 Ga. App. 40, 43 (2) (b) ( 821 SE2d 140 ) (2018) (OCGA § 9-11-11.1 “contemplates a substantive, evidentiary determination of the plaintiff’s probability of prevailing on his claims[,]” and it “directs the court to consider supporting and opposing affidavits”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2025See American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. Zeh, 312 Ga. 647, 653 (1) (c) ( 864 SE2d 422 ) (2021) (for the purposes of OCGA § 9-11-11.1 inquiry, “the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendant”) (citation omitted); Rosser v. Clyatt, 348 Ga. App. 40, 43 (2) (b) ( 821 SE2d 140 ) (2018) (OCGA § 9-11-11.1 “contemplates a substantive, evidentiary determination of the plaintiff’s probability of prevailing on his claims[,]” and it “directs the court to consider supporting and opposing affidavits”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2012See Kuriatnyk v. Kuriatnyk, 286 Ga. 589, 590 ( 690 SE2d 397 ) (2010) (in pleadings, substance controls over nomenclature).

2012See Kuriatnyk v. Kuriatnyk, 286 Ga. 589, 590 ( 690 SE2d 397 ) (2010) (in pleadings, substance controls over nomenclature).

2004Bowdish v. Johns Creek Assoc., 200 Ga. App. 93, 96 ( 406 SE2d 502 ) (1991); Rogers v. deMonteguin, 193 Ga. App. 480, 482 ( 388 SE2d 10 ) (1989). 3.

2004Bowdish v. Johns Creek Assoc., 200 Ga. App. 93, 96 ( 406 SE2d 502 ) (1991); Rogers v. deMonteguin, 193 Ga. App. 480, 482 ( 388 SE2d 10 ) (1989). 3.

1995Since resolution of this genuine factual dispute was key to the parties’ opposing claims, a jury would not be authorized in awarding litigation expenses under OCGA § 13-6-11 based on Bowen’s claim that Fuel South “caused unnecessary trouble and expense.” See Latham v. Faulk, 265 Ga. 107, 108 (2) ( 454 SE2d 136 ), and Candler v. Wickes Lumber Co., 195 Ga. App. 239, 241 (1), 242 (b) ( 393 SE2d 99 ).

1995Since resolution of this genuine factual dispute was key to the parties’ opposing claims, a jury would not be authorized in awarding litigation expenses under OCGA § 13-6-11 based on Bowen’s claim that Fuel South “caused unnecessary trouble and expense.” See Latham v. Faulk, 265 Ga. 107, 108 (2) ( 454 SE2d 136 ), and Candler v. Wickes Lumber Co., 195 Ga. App. 239, 241 (1), 242 (b) ( 393 SE2d 99 ).

1995Since resolution of this genuine factual dispute was key to the parties’ opposing claims, a jury would not be authorized in awarding litigation expenses under OCGA § 13-6-11 based on Bowen’s claim that Fuel South “caused unnecessary trouble and expense.” See Latham v. Faulk, 265 Ga. 107, 108 (2) ( 454 SE2d 136 ), and Candler v. Wickes Lumber Co., 195 Ga. App. 239, 241 (1), 242 (b) ( 393 SE2d 99 ).

1995Since resolution of this genuine factual dispute was key to the parties’ opposing claims, a jury would not be authorized in awarding litigation expenses under OCGA § 13-6-11 based on Bowen’s claim that Fuel South “caused unnecessary trouble and expense.” See Latham v. Faulk, 265 Ga. 107, 108 (2) ( 454 SE2d 136 ), and Candler v. Wickes Lumber Co., 195 Ga. App. 239, 241 (1), 242 (b) ( 393 SE2d 99 ).