9 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 2006–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cox v. Mayan Lagoon Estates Ltd.green2 sentences2019To establish "a civil RICO claim, [Dixon] is required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that [BB&T] violated the RICO statute, OCGA § 16-14-4, that [he] has suffered injury, and that [BB&T's] violation of the RICO statute was the proximate cause of the injury." Cox v. Mayan Lagoon Estates Ltd., 319 Ga. App. 101 , 109 (2) (b), 734 S.E.2d 883 (2012) (citations omitted). 2019To establish "a civil RICO claim, [Dixon] is required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that [BB&T] violated the RICO statute, OCGA § 16-14-4, that [he] has suffered injury, and that [BB&T's] violation of the RICO statute was the proximate cause of the injury." Cox v. Mayan Lagoon Estates Ltd., 319 Ga. App. 101 , 109 (2) (b), 734 S.E.2d 883 (2012) (citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
I. A. Group, Ltd. Co. v. Rmnandco, Inc.green1 sentence2023A. Group, however, though fleetingly mentioning that the plaintiff alleged a civil RICO violation, never once mentions the words “conspire” or “conspiracy.” In fact, the decision specifically notes that it was not addressing whether damages may be apportioned under RICO, see id. at 464 (3), n. 6, and, in any in Division 1, the trial court clearly found that the complaint properly alleges, and therefore the defendants admitted through default, that Daniels and Veal were involved in a conspiracy. | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2023See Hill v. Johnson, 210 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 437 SE2d 801 ) (1993) (concluding that complaint allegations that defendants’ actions warranted the award of punitive damages, coupled with default judgment on liability, satisfied the requirement in OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (d) that a trier of fact first resolve from the evidence produced at trial whether an award of punitive damages shall be made). 2023See Hill v. Johnson, 210 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 437 SE2d 801 ) (1993) (concluding that complaint allegations that defendants’ actions warranted the award of punitive damages, coupled with default judgment on liability, satisfied the requirement in OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (d) that a trier of fact first resolve from the evidence produced at trial whether an award of punitive damages shall be made). | 1 | 1 |
Pollman v. Swangreen2 sentences2015Pollman v. Swan, 314 Ga. App. 5, 6 ( 723 SE2d 290 ) (2011). 2015Pollman v. Swan, 314 Ga. App. 5, 6 ( 723 SE2d 290 ) (2011). | 1 | 1 |
Buchanan County, Virginia v. Blankenshipgreen2 sentences2012Buchanan, supra, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 718 (II); Williams Gen. 2012Buchanan, supra, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 718 (II); Williams Gen. | 1 | 1 |
Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co.green2 sentences2011The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, id., and the United States Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting the argument that “first-party reliance” is necessary to sustain a civil RICO claim predicated on mail fraud. 2011Id. at 650-652 (III) (A). | 1 | 1 |
Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.green1 sentence2008See id. (cab companies’ illegal insurance scheme may serve as the basis for a civil RICO claim only if it is proven to be a “fraud amounting to theft” from the plaintiff driver); see also Anza, supra at 457-458 (II) (where a state tax authority was the victim of RICO defendants’ acts of tax evasion resulting in defendants’ inordinately low prices, plaintiff competitors could not show that those acts were the proximate cause of their economic injuries). | 1 | 1 |
Olukoya v. American Ass'n of Cab Companies, Inc.green1 sentence2008See id. (cab companies’ illegal insurance scheme may serve as the basis for a civil RICO claim only if it is proven to be a “fraud amounting to theft” from the plaintiff driver); see also Anza, supra at 457-458 (II) (where a state tax authority was the victim of RICO defendants’ acts of tax evasion resulting in defendants’ inordinately low prices, plaintiff competitors could not show that those acts were the proximate cause of their economic injuries). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Willis v. Allstate Insurance
green
1 sentence2023Resolving all doubts in favor of Hansford, see Zhong, 345 Ga. App. at 140 (2) (b), the definite and certain factual allegations in Hansford’s complaint, along with the fair inferences and conclusions of fact to be drawn from the allegations, see Willis, 321 Ga. App. at 497 , are sufficient to state a claim for a civil RICO violation and estop Veal from denying liability under the Georgia civil RICO statute. (c) Punitive damages. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Jones v. Zezzo
green
2 sentences2023See Nanoventions, 2023 Ga. App. LEXIS 367 , *5 (1); Jones, 162 Ga. App. at 283 . 2023Second, pretermitting whether Veal has forfeited any claim that the complaint fails to properly allege an entitlement to punitive damages following the striking of his answer and the entry of default judgment as a sanction for his discovery violations, see Nanoventions, 2023 Ga. App. LEXIS 367 , *5 (1); Jones, 162 Ga. App. at 283 , we conclude that Hansford’s complaint sets out factual allegations sufficient to support liability for punitive damages, and Veal’s default therefore precludes him from contesting liability for such 25 damages. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
First Data POS, Inc. v. Willis
green
2 sentences2014And in support of this argument, Davis relies on the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in First Data POS, Inc. v. Willis.26 In that case, the sellers of a corporation sued the buyers, alleging that the buyers’ pre-contractual misrepresentations amounted to theft by deception and, thus, a violation of the civil RICO Act.27 But our Supreme Court affirmed a grant of summary judgment dismissing the sellers’ civil RICO claim, holding that “[a]s a matter of law, a valid merger clause executed by two or more parties in an arm’s length transaction precludes any subsequent claim of deceit based upon 2014And in support of this argument, Davis relies on the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in First Data POS, Inc. v. Willis.26 In that case, the sellers of a corporation sued the buyers, alleging that the buyers’ pre-contractual misrepresentations amounted to theft by deception and, thus, a violation of the civil RICO Act.27 But our Supreme Court affirmed a grant of summary judgment dismissing the sellers’ civil RICO claim, holding that “[a]s a matter of law, a valid merger clause executed by two or more parties in an arm’s length transaction precludes any subsequent claim of deceit based upon | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Williams General Corp. v. Stone
green
2 sentences2006In Williams General Corp. v. Stone, 279 Ga. 428 ( 614 SE2d 758 ) (2005), we reversed the Court of Appeals’ determination of the appropriate burden of proof applicable to a civil RICO violation. 2006In Williams General Corp. v. Stone, 279 Ga. 428 ( 614 SE2d 758 ) (2005), we reversed the Court of Appeals’ determination of the appropriate burden of proof applicable to a civil RICO violation. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Stone v. Williams General Corp.
neutral
2 sentences2006Upon return of the case to the Court of Appeals, see Stone v. Williams General Corp., 275 Ga. App. 33 ( 619 SE2d 752 ) (2005), the Court of Appeals addressed appellees’ final claim of error: ‘Whether a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) conspiracy can exist between a corporation and its officer.” Reversing the judgment, the Court interpreted the statute so as to exclude corporations from direct liability for RICO violations. 2006Upon return of the case to the Court of Appeals, see Stone v. Williams General Corp., 275 Ga. App. 33 ( 619 SE2d 752 ) (2005), the Court of Appeals addressed appellees’ final claim of error: ‘Whether a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) conspiracy can exist between a corporation and its officer.” Reversing the judgment, the Court interpreted the statute so as to exclude corporations from direct liability for RICO violations. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.