constructive knowledge standard in Georgia

2016In Baker v. State, 257 Ga. 567 ( 361 SE2d 808 ) (1987), our Supreme Court rejected a constructive knowledge test for OCGA § 16-l-7(b) and held that the statute applies “only to such crimes which are actually known to the prosecuting officer actually handling the proceedings.” Id. at 568-69 (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original).

2016In Baker v. State, 257 Ga. 567 ( 361 SE2d 808 ) (1987), our Supreme Court rejected a constructive knowledge test for OCGA § 16-l-7(b) and held that the statute applies “only to such crimes which are actually known to the prosecuting officer actually handling the proceedings.” Id. at 568-69 (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original).

2021See Lindsey v. Ga. Bldg. 4 Auth., 235 Ga. App. 718, 720 (1) ( 509 SE2d 749 ) (1998) (no constructive knowledge of static defect of a single raised brick on landing because it was, by plaintiff’s “own admission, so difficult to detect”).

2021See Lindsey v. Ga. Bldg. 4 Auth., 235 Ga. App. 718, 720 (1) ( 509 SE2d 749 ) (1998) (no constructive knowledge of static defect of a single raised brick on landing because it was, by plaintiff’s “own admission, so difficult to detect”).

2016See Davis v. State, 287 Ga. App. 535, 536-37 ( 652 SE2d 177 ) (2007). 10 actually handling the proceedings.” Id. at 568-69 (citation and punctuation omitted, emphasis in original).

2016See Davis v. State, 287 Ga. App. 535, 536-37 ( 652 SE2d 177 ) (2007). 10 actually handling the proceedings.” Id. at 568-69 (citation and punctuation omitted, emphasis in original).

2016The defendant “bears the burden of affirmatively showing that the prosecuting attorney for the State who handled the first prosecution had actual knowledge of the facts supporting the charge allegedly subject to a plea in bar.” Nicely, 305 Ga. App. at 388 (1).

1998“In failure to warn cases, the duty to warn arises whenever the manufacturer knows or reasonably should know of the danger arising from the use of its product. [Cits.] An actual or constructive knowledge requirement is consonant with Georgia tort law in general, see, e.g., [cit.]; Kemp v. Rouse-Atlanta, 207 Ga. App. 876 ( 429 SE2d 264 ) (1993) (negligent hiring and/or retention), and is in accord with the position taken by foreign jurisdictions and legal treatises. [Cits.]; Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 402A, Comment j (seller is required to give warning ‘if he has knowledge, or by the applicat

1998“In failure to warn cases, the duty to warn arises whenever the manufacturer knows or reasonably should know of the danger arising from the use of its product. [Cits.] An actual or constructive knowledge requirement is consonant with Georgia tort law in general, see, e.g., [cit.]; Kemp v. Rouse-Atlanta, 207 Ga. App. 876 ( 429 SE2d 264 ) (1993) (negligent hiring and/or retention), and is in accord with the position taken by foreign jurisdictions and legal treatises. [Cits.]; Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 402A, Comment j (seller is required to give warning ‘if he has knowledge, or by the applicat

1994See, e.g., Cover, supra, 461 NE2d at 871 ; Hermes v. Pfizer, Inc., 848 F2d 66 (A) (5th Cir. 1988); see also Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 402A, Comment j (seller is required to give warning "if he has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge" of the danger, id. at p. 353); Prosser and Keeton, The Law of Torts (5th ed.), § 96 (2). 2.

1994See, e.g., Cover, supra, 461 NE2d at 871 ; Hermes v. Pfizer, Inc., 848 F2d 66 (A) (5th Cir. 1988); see also Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 402A, Comment j (seller is required to give warning "if he has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge" of the danger, id. at p. 353); Prosser and Keeton, The Law of Torts (5th ed.), § 96 (2). 2.

1987Instead, we will adopt the test suggested by the concurring opinion of Justice Weltner in McCannon v. State, 252 Ga. 515, 519 ( 315 SE2d 413 ) (1984), applying OCGA § *569 16-1-7 (b) "only to such crimes which are actually known to the prosecuting officer actually handling the proceedings." (Emphasis in original.) As noted by Justice Weltner, this construction will "obviate the possibility of a miscarriage of justice in cases where the commission of other crimes arising from the same conduct may not be within the actual knowledge of the prosecuting officer actually handling the prosecution." M

1987Instead, we will adopt the test suggested by the concurring opinion of Justice Weltner in McCannon v. State, 252 Ga. 515, 519 ( 315 SE2d 413 ) (1984), applying OCGA § *569 16-1-7 (b) "only to such crimes which are actually known to the prosecuting officer actually handling the proceedings." (Emphasis in original.) As noted by Justice Weltner, this construction will "obviate the possibility of a miscarriage of justice in cases where the commission of other crimes arising from the same conduct may not be within the actual knowledge of the prosecuting officer actually handling the prosecution." M

1987He relies on the following language from State v. Gilder, 145 Ga. App. 731, 732 ( 245 SE2d 3 ) (1978), affirmed 242 Ga. 285 ( 248 SE2d 659 ) (1978): "It is obvious from the face of the accusations and indictment that the dates of all offenses were the same and arose from the same conduct, and were or should have been known to the prosecutor at the time of the misdemeanor convictions." (Emphasis supplied.) Baker contends that the assistant solicitor should have known of the habitual violator charge, since Baker's arrest report was either in the solicitor's file or was available for his use.

1987He relies on the following language from State v. Gilder, 145 Ga. App. 731, 732 ( 245 SE2d 3 ) (1978), affirmed 242 Ga. 285 ( 248 SE2d 659 ) (1978): "It is obvious from the face of the accusations and indictment that the dates of all offenses were the same and arose from the same conduct, and were or should have been known to the prosecutor at the time of the misdemeanor convictions." (Emphasis supplied.) Baker contends that the assistant solicitor should have known of the habitual violator charge, since Baker's arrest report was either in the solicitor's file or was available for his use.

1986E.g., Hill v. Agnew, 202 Ga. 759, 760 (3) ( 44 SE2d 653 ) (1947); Jackson v. Jackson, 202 Ga. 634 (2a) ( 44 SE2d 250 ) (1947); J.

1986E.g., Hill v. Agnew, 202 Ga. 759, 760 (3) ( 44 SE2d 653 ) (1947); Jackson v. Jackson, 202 Ga. 634 (2a) ( 44 SE2d 250 ) (1947); J.