9 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 2006–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc.green2 sentences2024In determining whether a statement is capable of an innocent construction, the court in Chapski explained “a written or oral statement is to be considered in context, with the words and the implications therefrom given their natural and obvious meaning; if, as so construed, the statement may reasonably be innocently interpreted *** it cannot be actionable per se.” Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 Ill. 2d 344, 352 (1982). ¶ 47 To allege a defamation per quod claim, the plaintiff must plead “extrinsic circumstances [that] demonstrate an injurious meaning behind the statement.” Rivera v. Allstate Insu 2020Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 502 ; Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 90 . ¶ 43 By contrast, a defamation per quod claim is appropriate either (1) where the defamatory character of a statement is not apparent on its face, and extrinsic evidence is necessary to demonstrate its injurious meaning, or (2) where a statement is defamatory on its face but does not fall into the five categories of statements that are actionable per se. | 2 | 6 |
Chapski v. Copley Pressgreen1 sentence2024In determining whether a statement is capable of an innocent construction, the court in Chapski explained “a written or oral statement is to be considered in context, with the words and the implications therefrom given their natural and obvious meaning; if, as so construed, the statement may reasonably be innocently interpreted *** it cannot be actionable per se.” Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 Ill. 2d 344, 352 (1982). ¶ 47 To allege a defamation per quod claim, the plaintiff must plead “extrinsic circumstances [that] demonstrate an injurious meaning behind the statement.” Rivera v. Allstate Insu | 1 | 1 |
Rivera v. Allstate Insurance Co.green1 sentence2024In determining whether a statement is capable of an innocent construction, the court in Chapski explained “a written or oral statement is to be considered in context, with the words and the implications therefrom given their natural and obvious meaning; if, as so construed, the statement may reasonably be innocently interpreted *** it cannot be actionable per se.” Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 Ill. 2d 344, 352 (1982). ¶ 47 To allege a defamation per quod claim, the plaintiff must plead “extrinsic circumstances [that] demonstrate an injurious meaning behind the statement.” Rivera v. Allstate Insu | 1 | 1 |
Moriarty v. Greenegreen1 sentence2022“Only statements capable of being proven true or false are actionable; opinions are not.” Moriarty v. Greene, 315 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Kurczaba v. Pollockgreen1 sentence2021App. 3d 260, 266 (1977); see also Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 172 Ill. 2d 399, 416 (1996) (“A per quod action requires *** allegations of specific facts establishing the plaintiff’s special damages.”). ¶ 50 Here, plaintiffs’ sole allegation of special damages in counts II and III is that Allstate’s allegedly defamatory statements “have caused [p]laintiffs damages in their business and profession and made it impossible for them to achieve comparable employment in a highly competitive field.” Our decision in Kurczaba v. Pollock, 318 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Bruck v. Cincottagreen1 sentence2021We agree. ¶ 49 As discussed above, a defamation per quod claim requires plaintiffs to allege that they suffered actual damages of a pecuniary nature—special damages—because of a defamatory - 14 - statement. “[S]pecial damages must be alleged with particularity, and general allegations as to damages are insufficient.” Bruck v. Cincotta, 56 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Vanden Dorpelgreen1 sentence2021App. 3d 260, 266 (1977); see also Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 172 Ill. 2d 399, 416 (1996) (“A per quod action requires *** allegations of specific facts establishing the plaintiff’s special damages.”). ¶ 50 Here, plaintiffs’ sole allegation of special damages in counts II and III is that Allstate’s allegedly defamatory statements “have caused [p]laintiffs damages in their business and profession and made it impossible for them to achieve comparable employment in a highly competitive field.” Our decision in Kurczaba v. Pollock, 318 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Daniel Rivera v. Allstate Insurance Companygreen2 sentences2021Rivera v. Allstate Insurance Co., 907 F.3d 1031, 1039-41 (7th Cir. 2018) (Rivera I). 2021As the Seventh Circuit noted, the defamation per quod claim “predominated” over the FCRA claim in the district court and in the court of appeals (Rivera II, 913 F.3d at 612 ) and was a particular focus of Rivera I, 907 F.3d 1031 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schaffer v. Zekman
green
1 sentence2024Id. at 733 . ¶ 47 The court next considered whether the plaintiff stated a false-light claim, where the claim stemmed from the same statements supporting the plaintiff’s claim of defamation per quod. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Green v. Rogers
green
1 sentence2022Green, 234 Ill. 2d at 491-492 . ¶ 49 Furthermore, because defendant’s first statement concerning plaintiff’s erraticism was a nonactionable opinion, that statement also could not form the basis of a defamation per quod claim. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Tunca v. Painter
green
1 sentence2021Tunca, 2012 IL App (1st) 093384, ¶¶ 3-4 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Daniel Rivera v. Allstate Insurance Company
green
2 sentences2021Allstate pounced on the Seventh Circuit’s statement that “We note, moreover, that [plaintiffs] failed to identify any prospective employer that refused to hire them based on the 10-K or the Greffin memo, so they have not established that they suffered a concrete informational injury.” (Emphasis added.) See Rivera II, 913 F.3d at 617 . ¶ 20 Allstate also moved to dismiss all of plaintiffs’ claims under section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2018)). 2021As the Seventh Circuit noted, the defamation per quod claim “predominated” over the FCRA claim in the district court and in the court of appeals (Rivera II, 913 F.3d at 612 ) and was a particular focus of Rivera I, 907 F.3d 1031 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Tuite v. Corbitt
green
1 sentence2020Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 502 ; Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 90 . ¶ 43 By contrast, a defamation per quod claim is appropriate either (1) where the defamatory character of a statement is not apparent on its face, and extrinsic evidence is necessary to demonstrate its injurious meaning, or (2) where a statement is defamatory on its face but does not fall into the five categories of statements that are actionable per se. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.