9 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 2018–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bruns v. City of Centraliagreen2 sentences2022To answer this question, we utilize four factors: “(1) the reasonable foreseeability of the injury, (2) the likelihood of the injury, (3) the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and (4) the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant.” Bruns, 2014 IL 116998, ¶ 14 . ¶ 35 Before addressing the four duty factors, we reiterate that, in Hunt, 74 Ill. 2d at 209 , our supreme court stated that “[a]n independent contractor owes no duty to third persons to judge the plans, specifications or instructions which he has merely contracted to follow.” Id. 2020Bruns, 2014 IL 116998, ¶¶ 14, 19 ; see also Henderson v. Lofts at Lake Arlington Towne Condominium Ass’n, 2018 IL App (1st) 162744, ¶ 41 (noting that the existence of a duty in the face of a known or obvious condition is subject to the same analysis of a duty as is necessary in every claim of negligence, requiring analysis of the same four duty factors). | 2 | 2 |
Bucheleres v. Chicago Park Districtgreen2 sentences2018For example, in Buchereles , our supreme court held that the doctrine shielded the Chicago Park District from liability to individuals who dove into Lake Michigan, since the lake, "as a large body of water * * * presents open and obvious risks to lakefront patrons who dive from concrete seawalls into the lake." Id. at 455-56 , 216 Ill.Dec. 568 , 665 N.E.2d 826 . ¶ 41 However, "[t]he existence of an open or obvious danger is not an automatic bar to finding a legal duty on the part of the landowner. [Citation.] Rather, the existence of a duty in the face of a known or obvious condition is subjec 2018For example, in Buchereles , our supreme court held that the doctrine shielded the Chicago Park District from liability to individuals who dove into Lake Michigan, since the lake, "as a large body of water * * * presents open and obvious risks to lakefront patrons who dive from concrete seawalls into the lake." Id. at 455-56 , 216 Ill.Dec. 568 , 665 N.E.2d 826 . ¶ 41 However, "[t]he existence of an open or obvious danger is not an automatic bar to finding a legal duty on the part of the landowner. [Citation.] Rather, the existence of a duty in the face of a known or obvious condition is subjec | 2 | 2 |
Norskog v. Pfielgreen2 sentences2018Simpkins , 2012 IL 110662 , ¶ 20, 358 Ill.Dec. 613 , 965 N.E.2d 1092 ; see Norskog v. Pfiel , 197 Ill. 2d 60 , 84, 257 Ill.Dec. 899 , 755 N.E.2d 1 (2001) (parent/child); Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass'n , 195 Ill. 2d 210 , 234, 253 Ill.Dec. 632 , 745 N.E.2d 1166 (2000) (master/servant); see generally Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 316, 317 (1965) ; Restatement (Third) of Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 41 (2012). ¶ 77 The majority states that "this court has never recognized an affirmative duty to protect or control based upon consideration of the traditional four d 2018Simpkins , 2012 IL 110662 , ¶ 20, 358 Ill.Dec. 613 , 965 N.E.2d 1092 ; see Norskog v. Pfiel , 197 Ill. 2d 60 , 84, 257 Ill.Dec. 899 , 755 N.E.2d 1 (2001) (parent/child); Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass'n , 195 Ill. 2d 210 , 234, 253 Ill.Dec. 632 , 745 N.E.2d 1166 (2000) (master/servant); see generally Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 316, 317 (1965) ; Restatement (Third) of Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 41 (2012). ¶ 77 The majority states that "this court has never recognized an affirmative duty to protect or control based upon consideration of the traditional four d | 2 | 2 |
Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass'ngreen2 sentences2018Simpkins , 2012 IL 110662 , ¶ 20, 358 Ill.Dec. 613 , 965 N.E.2d 1092 ; see Norskog v. Pfiel , 197 Ill. 2d 60 , 84, 257 Ill.Dec. 899 , 755 N.E.2d 1 (2001) (parent/child); Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass'n , 195 Ill. 2d 210 , 234, 253 Ill.Dec. 632 , 745 N.E.2d 1166 (2000) (master/servant); see generally Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 316, 317 (1965) ; Restatement (Third) of Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 41 (2012). ¶ 77 The majority states that "this court has never recognized an affirmative duty to protect or control based upon consideration of the traditional four d 2018Simpkins , 2012 IL 110662 , ¶ 20, 358 Ill.Dec. 613 , 965 N.E.2d 1092 ; see Norskog v. Pfiel , 197 Ill. 2d 60 , 84, 257 Ill.Dec. 899 , 755 N.E.2d 1 (2001) (parent/child); Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass'n , 195 Ill. 2d 210 , 234, 253 Ill.Dec. 632 , 745 N.E.2d 1166 (2000) (master/servant); see generally Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 316, 317 (1965) ; Restatement (Third) of Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 41 (2012). ¶ 77 The majority states that "this court has never recognized an affirmative duty to protect or control based upon consideration of the traditional four d | 1 | 2 |
Marshall v. Burger King Corp.green2 sentences2021Id. ¶ 76 It was only after reaching this conclusion that the Marshall court considered the four duty factors. 2021Marshall, 222 Ill. 2d at 437, 441 . ¶ 77 The court first considered the reasonable foreseeability of the harm and the likelihood of the injury. | 1 | 1 |
Nelson v. Aurora Equipment Co.green1 sentence2021The court explained that by referring to those four factors, the defendants in that case “essentially asked [the court] to create an exemption from the duty of care that stems from the special relationship between a business invitor and invitee.” Id.; see also Nelson v. Aurora Equipment Co., 391 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Henderson v. Lofts at Lake Arlington Towne Condominium Associationgreen1 sentence2020Bruns, 2014 IL 116998, ¶¶ 14, 19 ; see also Henderson v. Lofts at Lake Arlington Towne Condominium Ass’n, 2018 IL App (1st) 162744, ¶ 41 (noting that the existence of a duty in the face of a known or obvious condition is subject to the same analysis of a duty as is necessary in every claim of negligence, requiring analysis of the same four duty factors). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Simpkins v. CSX Transportation
green
2 sentences2018Simpkins, 2012 IL 110662, ¶ 20 ; see Norskog v. Pfiel, 197 Ill. 2d 60, 84 (2001) (parent/child); Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass’n, 195 Ill. 2d 210, 234 (2000) (master/servant); see generally Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 316, 317 (1965); Restatement (Third) of Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 41 (2012). ¶ 77 The majority states that “this court has never recognized an affirmative duty to protect or control based upon consideration of the traditional four duty factors in the absence of a special relationship.” Supra ¶ 41 (citing Iseberg, 227 Ill. 2d at 98 ). 2018Simpkins , 2012 IL 110662 , ¶ 20, 358 Ill.Dec. 613 , 965 N.E.2d 1092 ; see Norskog v. Pfiel , 197 Ill. 2d 60 , 84, 257 Ill.Dec. 899 , 755 N.E.2d 1 (2001) (parent/child); Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass'n , 195 Ill. 2d 210 , 234, 253 Ill.Dec. 632 , 745 N.E.2d 1166 (2000) (master/servant); see generally Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 316, 317 (1965) ; Restatement (Third) of Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 41 (2012). ¶ 77 The majority states that "this court has never recognized an affirmative duty to protect or control based upon consideration of the traditional four d | 3 | 2018–2026 |
Park v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation
green
2 sentences2018Park , 2011 IL App (1st) 101283 , ¶ 13, 355 Ill.Dec. 882 , 960 N.E.2d 764 ; see also Bucheleres , 171 Ill. 2d at 456 , 216 Ill.Dec. 568 , 665 N.E.2d 826 ("Having affirmed the applicability of the open and obvious doctrine to the case at bar, we complete the analysis of duty by assessing the effect the open and obvious doctrine has on the traditional factors that are relevant to the courts' imposition of a duty."). 2018Park, 2011 IL App (1st) 101283, ¶ 13 ; see also Bucheleres, 171 Ill. 2d at 456 (“Having affirmed the applicability of the open and obvious doctrine to the case at bar, we complete the analysis of duty by assessing the effect the open and obvious doctrine has on the traditional factors that are relevant to the courts’ imposition of a duty.”). | 3 | 2018–2018 |
Iseberg v. Gross
green
2 sentences2018Simpkins , 2012 IL 110662 , ¶ 20, 358 Ill.Dec. 613 , 965 N.E.2d 1092 ; see Norskog v. Pfiel , 197 Ill. 2d 60 , 84, 257 Ill.Dec. 899 , 755 N.E.2d 1 (2001) (parent/child); Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass'n , 195 Ill. 2d 210 , 234, 253 Ill.Dec. 632 , 745 N.E.2d 1166 (2000) (master/servant); see generally Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 316, 317 (1965) ; Restatement (Third) of Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 41 (2012). ¶ 77 The majority states that "this court has never recognized an affirmative duty to protect or control based upon consideration of the traditional four d 2018Simpkins , 2012 IL 110662 , ¶ 20, 358 Ill.Dec. 613 , 965 N.E.2d 1092 ; see Norskog v. Pfiel , 197 Ill. 2d 60 , 84, 257 Ill.Dec. 899 , 755 N.E.2d 1 (2001) (parent/child); Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass'n , 195 Ill. 2d 210 , 234, 253 Ill.Dec. 632 , 745 N.E.2d 1166 (2000) (master/servant); see generally Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 316, 317 (1965) ; Restatement (Third) of Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 41 (2012). ¶ 77 The majority states that "this court has never recognized an affirmative duty to protect or control based upon consideration of the traditional four d | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Hunt v. Blasius
green
2 sentences2022To answer this question, we utilize four factors: “(1) the reasonable foreseeability of the injury, (2) the likelihood of the injury, (3) the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and (4) the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant.” Bruns, 2014 IL 116998, ¶ 14 . ¶ 35 Before addressing the four duty factors, we reiterate that, in Hunt, 74 Ill. 2d at 209 , our supreme court stated that “[a]n independent contractor owes no duty to third persons to judge the plans, specifications or instructions which he has merely contracted to follow.” Id. 2022To answer this question, we utilize four factors: “(1) the reasonable foreseeability of the injury, (2) the likelihood of the injury, (3) the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and (4) the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant.” Bruns, 2014 IL 116998, ¶ 14 . ¶ 35 Before addressing the four duty factors, we reiterate that, in Hunt, 74 Ill. 2d at 209 , our supreme court stated that “[a]n independent contractor owes no duty to third persons to judge the plans, specifications or instructions which he has merely contracted to follow.” Id. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Park v. NORTHEAST ILLINOIS REG. COMMUTER
green
2 sentences2018Park , 2011 IL App (1st) 101283 , ¶ 13, 355 Ill.Dec. 882 , 960 N.E.2d 764 ; see also Bucheleres , 171 Ill. 2d at 456 , 216 Ill.Dec. 568 , 665 N.E.2d 826 ("Having affirmed the applicability of the open and obvious doctrine to the case at bar, we complete the analysis of duty by assessing the effect the open and obvious doctrine has on the traditional factors that are relevant to the courts' imposition of a duty."). 2018Park , 2011 IL App (1st) 101283 , ¶ 13, 355 Ill.Dec. 882 , 960 N.E.2d 764 ; see also Bucheleres , 171 Ill. 2d at 456 , 216 Ill.Dec. 568 , 665 N.E.2d 826 ("Having affirmed the applicability of the open and obvious doctrine to the case at bar, we complete the analysis of duty by assessing the effect the open and obvious doctrine has on the traditional factors that are relevant to the courts' imposition of a duty."). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Simpkins v. CSX Transp., Inc.
green
1 sentence2018Simpkins , 2012 IL 110662 , ¶ 20, 358 Ill.Dec. 613 , 965 N.E.2d 1092 ; see Norskog v. Pfiel , 197 Ill. 2d 60 , 84, 257 Ill.Dec. 899 , 755 N.E.2d 1 (2001) (parent/child); Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass'n , 195 Ill. 2d 210 , 234, 253 Ill.Dec. 632 , 745 N.E.2d 1166 (2000) (master/servant); see generally Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 316, 317 (1965) ; Restatement (Third) of Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 41 (2012). ¶ 77 The majority states that "this court has never recognized an affirmative duty to protect or control based upon consideration of the traditional four d | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.