second paragraph instruction in Kansas

2021The second paragraph of the instruction is identical to the pattern instruction and stems from this court's approval of this language in State v. Llamas, 298 Kan. 246, 253 , 311 P.3d 399 (2013).

2021The second paragraph of the instruction is identical to the pattern instruction and stems from this court's approval of this language in State v. Llamas, 298 Kan. 246, 253 , 311 P.3d 399 (2013).

2016Kleypas' argument rests on principles we recognized in Kleypas I, when we said: "[T]he United States Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment requires two things of a death sentence: (1) The sentencer must not have unbridled discretion in determining the fate of the defendant, and (2) the defendant must be allowed to introduce any relevant mitigating evidence of his character or record or circumstances of the offense." 272 Kan. at 1036 (citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 , 107 S. Ct. 837 , 93 L.

2016Kleypas' argument rests on principles we recognized in Kleypas I, when we said: "[T]he United States Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment requires two things of a death sentence: (1) The sentencer must not have unbridled discretion in determining the fate of the defendant, and (2) the defendant must be allowed to introduce any relevant mitigating evidence of his character or record or circumstances of the offense." 272 Kan. at 1036 (citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 , 107 S. Ct. 837 , 93 L.

2016Kleypas' argument rests on principles we recognized in Kleypas I, when we said: "[T]he United States Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment requires two things of a death sentence: (1) The sentencer must not have unbridled discretion in determining the fate of the defendant, and (2) the defendant must be allowed to introduce any relevant mitigating evidence of his character or record or circumstances of the offense." 272 Kan. at 1036 (citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 , 107 S. Ct. 837 , 93 L.

2001The second paragraph of the instruction is taken from the notes of the PIK instruction, as well as the decision of State v. Green, 237 Kan. 146 , 697 P.2d 1305 (1985).

2001The second paragraph of the instruction is taken from the notes of the PIK instruction, as well as the decision of State v. Green, 237 Kan. 146 , 697 P.2d 1305 (1985).

2001Willis, 254 Kan. at 131 .

2001Willis, 254 Kan. at 131 . *1027 In Walton , the Arizona Supreme Court had defined the phrase "especially cruel" in its "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" aggravating factor as follows: "`A crime is committed in an especially cruel manner when the perpetrator inflicts mental anguish or physical abuse before the victim's death' and that `[m]ental anguish includes a victim's uncertainty as to his ultimate fate.'" 497 U.S. at 654.

1997The second paragraph of the instruction, “Intent, or lack of intent, is to be determined or inferred from all the evidence in the case,” is taken directly from PIK Crim. 3d 54.01-A. This is another way of stating the principle that “criminal intent may be shown by proof of the acts and conduct of the accused, and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.” State v. Lassley, 218 Kan. 758, 762-63 , 545 P.2d 383 (1976).

1997The second paragraph of the instruction, “Intent, or lack of intent, is to be determined or inferred from all the evidence in the case,” is taken directly from PIK Crim. 3d 54.01-A. This is another way of stating the principle that “criminal intent may be shown by proof of the acts and conduct of the accused, and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom.” State v. Lassley, 218 Kan. 758, 762-63 , 545 P.2d 383 (1976).

1986In State v. Robinson, Lloyd & Clark, 229 Kan. 301 , 624 P.2d 964 (1981), we discussed the history of PIK Crim. 2d 54.Q1 and its predecessor.

1986In State v. Robinson, Lloyd & Clark, 229 Kan. 301 , 624 P.2d 964 (1981), we discussed the history of PIK Crim. 2d 54.Q1 and its predecessor.

1972In the third and last paragraph of the instruction the circumstances under which a defendant can rely on entrapment were summed up as follows: “ ‘In other words a defendant can rely on the defense of entrapment when he is induced to commit a crime which he had no previous intention of committing, but cannot rely on the defense when he has a previous intention of committing a crime and is merely afforded the opportunity to complete the crime by the peace officer.’ ” (p. 441.) The Wheat instruction, as a definition of entrapment, was quoted with approval in State v. Hamrick, 206 Kan. 543 , 479 P

1972In the third and last paragraph of the instruction the circumstances under which a defendant can rely on entrapment were summed up as follows: “ ‘In other words a defendant can rely on the defense of entrapment when he is induced to commit a crime which he had no previous intention of committing, but cannot rely on the defense when he has a previous intention of committing a crime and is merely afforded the opportunity to complete the crime by the peace officer.’ ” (p. 441.) The Wheat instruction, as a definition of entrapment, was quoted with approval in State v. Hamrick, 206 Kan. 543 , 479 P

1903(The State v. Petteys, 65 Kan. 625 , 70 Pac. 588 .) It is therefore obvious that the second paragraph of the instruction quoted does not contain a complete and sufficient statement of the law, and if considered alone would necessarily be held erroneous.

1903(The State v. Petteys, 65 Kan. 625 , 70 Pac. 588 .) It is therefore obvious that the second paragraph of the instruction quoted does not contain a complete and sufficient statement of the law, and if considered alone would necessarily be held erroneous.