9 Maine opinions name it 1 courts 2000–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re David W.green2 sentences2022In David W., we concluded that [s]ince the hearing on the petition for a preliminary protection order was presided over by the same judge who presided at the final [hearing], the [parties] were adequately represented by counsel, and there was a full opportunity to examine the witnesses who testified at each hearing, it was well within the court’s discretion to take into consideration in its final . . . order testimony presented at the preliminary hearing. 568 A.2d at 515 (footnote omitted). 3 We have held that a child protection case is a unified proceeding and evidence presented at a summary 2000See In re David W., 568 A.2d 513, 515 (Me.1990). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Kristy Y.green2 sentences2014In re Kristy Y., 2000 ME 98, ¶¶ 1, 10 , 752 A.2d 166 . 2014Because there was no constitutional violation, we determined that there was “no authorized appeal from an order issued from a summary preliminary hearing” and concluded that “[ajppeal to this Court [was] barred by [section 4006], and appeal [was] not available by law under any other exception to the normal prudential judicial rule barring interlocutory appeals.” Id. [¶ 8] In In re Bailey M., we accepted a mother’s argument that the death-knell exception applied to her appeal from an order denying her motion to open her termination-of-parental-rights proceedings to the public after one of her c | 1 | 1 |
In Re Bailey M.green2 sentences2014Because there was no constitutional violation, we determined that there was “no authorized appeal from an order issued from a summary preliminary hearing” and concluded that “[ajppeal to this Court [was] barred by [section 4006], and appeal [was] not available by law under any other exception to the normal prudential judicial rule barring interlocutory appeals.” Id. [¶ 8] In In re Bailey M., we accepted a mother’s argument that the death-knell exception applied to her appeal from an order denying her motion to open her termination-of-parental-rights proceedings to the public after one of her c 2014Because there was no constitutional violation, we determined that there was “no authorized appeal from an order issued from a summary preliminary hearing” and concluded that “[ajppeal to this Court [was] barred by [section 4006], and appeal [was] not available by law under any other exception to the normal prudential judicial rule barring interlocutory appeals.” Id. [¶ 8] In In re Bailey M., we accepted a mother’s argument that the death-knell exception applied to her appeal from an order denying her motion to open her termination-of-parental-rights proceedings to the public after one of her c | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Perkinsgreen1 sentence2005See Thompson v. Perkins, 57 Me. 290, 292 (1869) (holding that a party “cannot except to a ruling made with his consent, however erroneous”). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Leona T.green1 sentence2001In re Leona T., 642 A.2d 166, 168 (Me. 1994) (emphasis added). [¶ 4] The mother was represented by counsel at the summary preliminary hearing. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Misty B.green2 sentences2000See In re Misty B., 2000 ME 67, ¶ 7 , 749 A.2d 754 . 2000See In re Misty B., 2000 ME 67, ¶ 7 , 749 A.2d 754 . | 1 | 1 |
Balian v. Board of Licensure in Medicinegreen2 sentences2000Balian v. Board of Licensure in Medicine, 1999 ME 8, ¶ 10 , 722 A.2d 364, 367 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976)); see also In re Kafia M., 1999 ME 195, ¶¶ 21-22 , 742 A.2d 919, 926-27 . [¶ 7] Applied to hearing processes where significant rights are at stake, due process requires: notice of the issues, 4 an opportunity to be heard, 5 the right to introduce evidence and present witnesses, 6 the right to respond to claims and evidence, 7 and an impartial factfinder. 8 [¶ 8] In these circumstances, the father has demonstrated no constitutional due process violati 2000Balian v. Board of Licensure in Medicine, 1999 ME 8, ¶ 10 , 722 A.2d 364, 367 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976)); see also In re Kafia M., 1999 ME 195, ¶¶ 21-22 , 742 A.2d 919, 926-27 . [¶ 7] Applied to hearing processes where significant rights are at stake, due process requires: notice of the issues, 4 an opportunity to be heard, 5 the right to introduce evidence and present witnesses, 6 the right to respond to claims and evidence, 7 and an impartial factfinder. 8 [¶ 8] In these circumstances, the father has demonstrated no constitutional due process violati | 1 | 1 |
Webb v. Haasgreen2 sentences2000See Webb v. Haas, 1999 ME 74, ¶ 5 , 728 A.2d 1261, 1264 (“The death knell exception permits an appeal from an interlocutory order where substantial rights of a party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment.”). [¶ 6] Due process is a flexible concept calling for “such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). 2000See Webb v. Haas, 1999 ME 74, ¶ 5 , 728 A.2d 1261, 1264 (“The death knell exception permits an appeal from an interlocutory order where substantial rights of a party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment.”). [¶ 6] Due process is a flexible concept calling for “such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Kafia M.green2 sentences2000Balian v. Board of Licensure in Medicine, 1999 ME 8, ¶ 10 , 722 A.2d 364, 367 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976)); see also In re Kafia M., 1999 ME 195, ¶¶ 21-22 , 742 A.2d 919, 926-27 . [¶ 7] Applied to hearing processes where significant rights are at stake, due process requires: notice of the issues, 4 an opportunity to be heard, 5 the right to introduce evidence and present witnesses, 6 the right to respond to claims and evidence, 7 and an impartial factfinder. 8 [¶ 8] In these circumstances, the father has demonstrated no constitutional due process violati 2000Balian v. Board of Licensure in Medicine, 1999 ME 8, ¶ 10 , 722 A.2d 364, 367 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976)); see also In re Kafia M., 1999 ME 195, ¶¶ 21-22 , 742 A.2d 919, 926-27 . [¶ 7] Applied to hearing processes where significant rights are at stake, due process requires: notice of the issues, 4 an opportunity to be heard, 5 the right to introduce evidence and present witnesses, 6 the right to respond to claims and evidence, 7 and an impartial factfinder. 8 [¶ 8] In these circumstances, the father has demonstrated no constitutional due process violati | 1 | 1 |
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen2 sentences2000Balian v. Board of Licensure in Medicine, 1999 ME 8, ¶ 10 , 722 A.2d 364, 367 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976)); see also In re Kafia M., 1999 ME 195, ¶¶ 21-22 , 742 A.2d 919, 926-27 . [¶ 7] Applied to hearing processes where significant rights are at stake, due process requires: notice of the issues, 4 an opportunity to be heard, 5 the right to introduce evidence and present witnesses, 6 the right to respond to claims and evidence, 7 and an impartial factfinder. 8 [¶ 8] In these circumstances, the father has demonstrated no constitutional due process violati 2000Balian v. Board of Licensure in Medicine, 1999 ME 8, ¶ 10 , 722 A.2d 364, 367 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976)); see also In re Kafia M., 1999 ME 195, ¶¶ 21-22 , 742 A.2d 919, 926-27 . [¶ 7] Applied to hearing processes where significant rights are at stake, due process requires: notice of the issues, 4 an opportunity to be heard, 5 the right to introduce evidence and present witnesses, 6 the right to respond to claims and evidence, 7 and an impartial factfinder. 8 [¶ 8] In these circumstances, the father has demonstrated no constitutional due process violati | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Isaiah B.
green
2 sentences2022In David W., we concluded that [s]ince the hearing on the petition for a preliminary protection order was presided over by the same judge who presided at the final [hearing], the [parties] were adequately represented by counsel, and there was a full opportunity to examine the witnesses who testified at each hearing, it was well within the court’s discretion to take into consideration in its final . . . order testimony presented at the preliminary hearing. 568 A.2d at 515 (footnote omitted). 3 We have held that a child protection case is a unified proceeding and evidence presented at a summary 2022In David W., we concluded that [s]ince the hearing on the petition for a preliminary protection order was presided over by the same judge who presided at the final [hearing], the [parties] were adequately represented by counsel, and there was a full opportunity to examine the witnesses who testified at each hearing, it was well within the court’s discretion to take into consideration in its final . . . order testimony presented at the preliminary hearing. 568 A.2d at 515 (footnote omitted). 3 We have held that a child protection case is a unified proceeding and evidence presented at a summary | 1 | 2022–2022 |
In re H.C.
green
2 sentences2020Additionally, like in In re H.C., the father’s substance abuse issues “were disclosed to the court throughout the child protection process, and [his] consent was not a departure from prior related decisions” in the proceedings, including his waiver of the right to a summary preliminary hearing, his agreement to the entry of a jeopardy order, and his agreement to the judicial review orders. 2013 ME 97, ¶ 16 , 82 A.3d 80 . 2020Additionally, like in In re H.C., the father’s substance abuse issues “were disclosed to the court throughout the child protection process, and [his] consent was not a departure from prior related decisions” in the proceedings, including his waiver of the right to a summary preliminary hearing, his agreement to the entry of a jeopardy order, and his agreement to the judicial review orders. 2013 ME 97, ¶ 16 , 82 A.3d 80 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In re Child of Sherri Y.
green
1 sentence2020The father has not demonstrated on appeal that he was unable “to grasp 8 the consequences of the [termination] proceeding,” In re Child of Sherri Y., 2019 ME 162, ¶ 15 , 221 A.3d 120 , or was otherwise “unable to reasonably understand the nature and consequences of [his] consent,” In re H.C., 2013 ME 97, ¶ 16 , 82 A.3d 80 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield
green
2 sentences2019Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield , 490 U.S. 30 , 60-61, 109 S.Ct. 1597 , 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989). 4 Evidence in the record indicates that a few days after the summary preliminary hearing, the child was placed with her current foster parents, one of whom is a member of the Passamaquoddy Tribe and, at the time of the child's placement, was thought to be a distant relative of the child. 2019Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield , 490 U.S. 30 , 60-61, 109 S.Ct. 1597 , 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989). 4 Evidence in the record indicates that a few days after the summary preliminary hearing, the child was placed with her current foster parents, one of whom is a member of the Passamaquoddy Tribe and, at the time of the child's placement, was thought to be a distant relative of the child. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Maine Education Ass'n v. Maine Community College System Board of Trustees
green
2 sentences2019Bd. of Trs., 2007 ME 70, ¶¶ 16-17 , 923 A.2d 914 . [¶17] Throughout the proceedings leading up to the jeopardy determination, the father consistently and explicitly maintained that he is the child’s father, and he sought and sometimes obtained relief in the form of rehabilitation and reunification services based solely on his status as the child’s parent.8 This is revealed in a number of aspects of the summary preliminary hearing process: • In a case management order entered prior to the hearing, the father did not challenge the court’s indication that paternity was not disputed; Although reha 2019Bd. of Trs., 2007 ME 70, ¶¶ 16-17 , 923 A.2d 914 . [¶17] Throughout the proceedings leading up to the jeopardy determination, the father consistently and explicitly maintained that he is the child’s father, and he sought and sometimes obtained relief in the form of rehabilitation and reunification services based solely on his status as the child’s parent.8 This is revealed in a number of aspects of the summary preliminary hearing process: • In a case management order entered prior to the hearing, the father did not challenge the court’s indication that paternity was not disputed; Although reha | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.