9 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2023 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Felgner v. Andersongreen2 sentences1991See Felgner v Anderson, 375 Mich 23, 54 ; 133 NW2d 136 (1965). 1991See Felgner v Anderson, 375 Mich 23, 54 ; 133 NW2d 136 (1965). | 2 | 2 |
Harrison v. Taylorgreen2 sentences1992Parker v Highland Park, Inc, 565 SW2d 512 (Tex, 1978); Woolston v Wells, 297 Or 548 ; 687 P2d 144 (1984); Cox v J C Penney Co, Inc, 741 SW2d 28 (Mo, 1987); Harrison v Taylor, 115 Idaho 588 ; 768 P2d 1321 (1989). 1992Parker v Highland Park, Inc, 565 SW2d 512 (Tex, 1978); Woolston v Wells, 297 Or 548 ; 687 P2d 144 (1984); Cox v J C Penney Co, Inc, 741 SW2d 28 (Mo, 1987); Harrison v Taylor, 115 Idaho 588 ; 768 P2d 1321 (1989). | 1 | 2 |
Vanderah v. Olahgreen2 sentences1990See, e.g., Vanderah v Olah, 387 Mich 643, 660 ; 199 NW2d 449 (1972). 1990See, e.g., Vanderah v Olah, 387 Mich 643, 660 ; 199 NW2d 449 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Quinlivan v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
green
2 sentences2023But we nowhere said that the obviousness of the danger was relevant to contributory negligence. 7 And again, because either a no-duty rule or a contributory negligence rule led to the same result, there was no need to specify the theoretical grounds for why the obviousness of the danger was relevant. injury to the invitee.” Quinlivan, 395 Mich at 261 . 2023But we nowhere said that the obviousness of the danger was relevant to contributory negligence. 7 And again, because either a no-duty rule or a contributory negligence rule led to the same result, there was no need to specify the theoretical grounds for why the obviousness of the danger was relevant. injury to the invitee.” Quinlivan, 395 Mich at 261 . | 5 | 1990–2023 |
Cox v. JC Penney Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences1992Parker v Highland Park, Inc, 565 SW2d 512 (Tex, 1978); Woolston v Wells, 297 Or 548 ; 687 P2d 144 (1984); Cox v J C Penney Co, Inc, 741 SW2d 28 (Mo, 1987); Harrison v Taylor, 115 Idaho 588 ; 768 P2d 1321 (1989). 1992Parker v Highland Park, Inc, 565 SW2d 512 (Tex, 1978); Woolston v Wells, 297 Or 548 ; 687 P2d 144 (1984); Cox v J C Penney Co, Inc, 741 SW2d 28 (Mo, 1987); Harrison v Taylor, 115 Idaho 588 ; 768 P2d 1321 (1989). | 2 | 1990–1992 |
Woolston v. Wells
green
2 sentences1992Parker v Highland Park, Inc, 565 SW2d 512 (Tex, 1978); Woolston v Wells, 297 Or 548 ; 687 P2d 144 (1984); Cox v J C Penney Co, Inc, 741 SW2d 28 (Mo, 1987); Harrison v Taylor, 115 Idaho 588 ; 768 P2d 1321 (1989). 1992Parker v Highland Park, Inc, 565 SW2d 512 (Tex, 1978); Woolston v Wells, 297 Or 548 ; 687 P2d 144 (1984); Cox v J C Penney Co, Inc, 741 SW2d 28 (Mo, 1987); Harrison v Taylor, 115 Idaho 588 ; 768 P2d 1321 (1989). | 2 | 1990–1992 |
Parker v. Highland Park, Inc.
green
2 sentences1992Parker v Highland Park, Inc, 565 SW2d 512 (Tex, 1978); Woolston v Wells, 297 Or 548 ; 687 P2d 144 (1984); Cox v J C Penney Co, Inc, 741 SW2d 28 (Mo, 1987); Harrison v Taylor, 115 Idaho 588 ; 768 P2d 1321 (1989). 1992Parker v Highland Park, Inc, 565 SW2d 512 (Tex, 1978); Woolston v Wells, 297 Or 548 ; 687 P2d 144 (1984); Cox v J C Penney Co, Inc, 741 SW2d 28 (Mo, 1987); Harrison v Taylor, 115 Idaho 588 ; 768 P2d 1321 (1989). | 2 | 1990–1992 |
Lugo v. Ameritech Corp., Inc.
red
2 sentences2012Because the open- and-obvious doctrine has been interpreted as establishing a no-duty rule, 1 and because the majority erroneously decided in Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512 ; 629 NW2d 384 (2001), that the special-aspects doctrine defines the sole exception to the open- and-obvious doctrine, today’s majority opinion means that only when those unexplained extenuating circumstances arise and force a person to confront an open and obvious hazard does the premises possessor suddenly acquire a duty to address the dangerous condition. 2012Because the open- and-obvious doctrine has been interpreted as establishing a no-duty rule, 1 and because the majority erroneously decided in Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512 ; 629 NW2d 384 (2001), that the special-aspects doctrine defines the sole exception to the open- and-obvious doctrine, today’s majority opinion means that only when those unexplained extenuating circumstances arise and force a person to confront an open and obvious hazard does the premises possessor suddenly acquire a duty to address the dangerous condition. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.
green
2 sentences1992It is relevant, rather, to the determination whether, given the existence of a duty, the defendant’s failure to. warn was the legal or proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injuries. 3 Products Liability, supra, § 33:23, pp 48-50. 16 Our jurisprudence recognizes the well-established rule that there is no duty to warn of dangers that are open and obvious. 17 We have also narrowed application of the no-duty rule to those cases involving "simple tools or products.” Owens v Allis-Chalmers Corp, 414 Mich 413, 425 ; 326 NW2d 372 (1982). 1992It is relevant, rather, to the determination whether, given the existence of a duty, the defendant’s failure to. warn was the legal or proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injuries. 3 Products Liability, supra, § 33:23, pp 48-50. 16 Our jurisprudence recognizes the well-established rule that there is no duty to warn of dangers that are open and obvious. 17 We have also narrowed application of the no-duty rule to those cases involving "simple tools or products.” Owens v Allis-Chalmers Corp, 414 Mich 413, 425 ; 326 NW2d 372 (1982). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Riddle v. McLouth Steel Products Corp.
green
2 sentences1991In Riddle v McLouth Steel Products Corp, 182 Mich App 259, 263-266 ; 451 NW2d 590 (1990), this Court held that the no-duty rule should be abolished in Michigan, stating in part: We believe that the no-duty rule, like assumption of the risk, should be abolished in Michigan. 1991In Riddle v McLouth Steel Products Corp, 182 Mich App 259, 263-266 ; 451 NW2d 590 (1990), this Court held that the no-duty rule should be abolished in Michigan, stating in part: We believe that the no-duty rule, like assumption of the risk, should be abolished in Michigan. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.