67 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1953–2023 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jamie Lynn Orr v. Mallory Morgangreen2 sentences2023“Mississippi’s standard for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is very high, ‘focusing specifically on the defendant’s conduct and not the plaintiff’s emotional condition.’” Orr v. Morgan, 230 So. 3d 368, 376 (¶18) (Miss. 2023“Mississippi’s standard for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is very high, focusing specifically on the defendant’s conduct and not the plaintiff’s emotional condition.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). “[T]he severity of the conduct at issue must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Weible v. Univ. of S. Miss., 89 So. 3d 51, 64 (¶41) (Miss. | 2 | 3 |
Robinson v. Hill City Oil Co., Inc.green2 sentences2017But Mississippi’s standard for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is very high, “focusing specifically on the defendant’s conduct and not the plaintiffs emotional condition.” Robinson, 2 So.3d at 668 (¶ 26) (citing Funderburk v. Johnson, 935 So.2d 1084, 1099 (¶ 40) (Miss. 2017But Mississippi’s standard for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is very high, “focusing specifically on the defendant’s conduct and not the plaintiff’s emotional condition.” Robinson, 2 So. 3d at 668 (¶26) (citing Funderburk v. Johnson, 935 So. 2d 1084, 1099 (¶40) (Miss. | 2 | 2 |
State Highway Com'n of Miss. v. Havardgreen2 sentences2023“Under this Mississippi rule[,] if an answer to an interrogatory regarding an expert witness who will testify at trial is deemed insufficient by opposing counsel, some means of notice of such insufficiency must be given to the opposing party in order to let them know that additional information is desired.” Id. (quoting State Highway Comm’n v. Havard, 508 So. 2d 1099, 1104 (Miss. 1987)). ¶31. 2023“Under this Mississippi rule[,] if an answer to an interrogatory regarding an expert witness who will testify at trial is deemed insufficient by opposing counsel, some means of notice of such insufficiency must be given to the opposing party in order to let them know that additional information is desired.” Id. (quoting State Highway Comm’n v. Havard, 508 So. 2d 1099, 1104 (Miss. 1987)). ¶31. | 2 | 2 |
C.D. Pulliam v. Alfa Insurance Companygreen2 sentences2020“To withstand summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must present sufficient proof to establish each element of each claim.” Pulliam I, 238 So. 3d at 624 (¶12) (citing Morton v. City of Shelby, 984 So. 2d 323, 330 (¶17) (Miss. 2020“To withstand summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must present sufficient proof to establish each element of each claim.” Pulliam I, 238 So. 3d at 624 (¶12) (citing Morton v. City of Shelby, 984 So. 2d 323, 330 (¶17) (Miss. | 2 | 2 |
Morton v. City of Shelbygreen2 sentences2020“To withstand summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must present sufficient proof to establish each element of each claim.” Pulliam I, 238 So. 3d at 624 (¶12) (citing Morton v. City of Shelby, 984 So. 2d 323, 330 (¶17) (Miss. 2020“To withstand summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must present sufficient proof to establish each element of each claim.” Pulliam I, 238 So. 3d at 624 (¶12) (citing Morton v. City of Shelby, 984 So. 2d 323, 330 (¶17) (Miss. | 2 | 2 |
Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinneygreen2 sentences2013Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 174, 109 S.Ct. 987 , 103 L.Ed.2d 146 (1989). 2013Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 174, 109 S.Ct. 987 , 103 L.Ed.2d 146 (1989). | 2 | 2 |
Eastline Corp. v. Marion Apartments, Ltd.green2 sentences2007This Court reversed the chancellor and reiterated a long-standing Mississippi principle that "a written contract can be orally modified." Id. ("An oral modification may be made even where the contract provides that modification must be in writing."). ¶ 34. 2006This Court reversed the chancellor and reiterated a long-standing Mississippi principle that “a written contract can be orally 18 modified.” Id. (“An oral modification may be made even where the contract provides that modification must be in writing.”). ¶34. | 2 | 2 |
McKee v. McKeegreen2 sentences2007In McKee v. McKee, 418 So.2d 764, 767 (Miss.1982), this Court stated that factors to be considered in an award of attorneys' fees included "the relative financial ability of the parties, the skill and standing of the attorney employed, the nature of the case and novelty and difficulty of the questions at issue, as well as the degree of responsibility involved in the management of the cause, the time and labor required, the usual and customary charge in the community, and the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case." Id. at 767 . 2007In McKee v. McKee, 418 So.2d 764, 767 (Miss.1982), this Court stated that factors to be considered in an award of attorneys' fees included "the relative financial ability of the parties, the skill and standing of the attorney employed, the nature of the case and novelty and difficulty of the questions at issue, as well as the degree of responsibility involved in the management of the cause, the time and labor required, the usual and customary charge in the community, and the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case." Id. at 767 . | 2 | 2 |
Glorioso v. YMCA of Jacksongreen2 sentences2004Further, even if MDOT had a duty to have the hay removed, the "Mississippi rule of law regarding independent, intervening causes more or less establishes an active/passive dichotomy." Glorioso v. Young Mens Christian Ass'n, 556 So.2d 293, 296 (Miss.1989). 2002Further, even if MDOT had a duty to have the hay removed, the “Mississippi rule of law regarding independent, intervening causes more or less establishes an active/passive dichotomy.” Glorioso v. Young Mens Christian Ass'n, 556 So. 2d 293, 296 (Miss. 1989). | 2 | 2 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences1997See generally, Johnson v. State, 529 So.2d 577, 587 (Miss. 1988). 1997See generally, Johnson v. State, 529 So.2d 577, 587 (Miss. 1988). | 2 | 2 |
Noatex Corp. v. King Construction of Houston, LLCgreen2 sentences2013Noatex Corp. v. King Constr. of Houston, LLC, 864 F.Supp.2d 478, 490 (N.D.Miss.2012) (holding that "Mississippi’s stop notice statute violates due process by authorizing what is in practical effect the prejudgment attachment of funds without prior notice and a hearing, or an acceptable post-seizure remedy.”). 2010Moreover, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held this statute is facially unconstitutional in Noatex Corp. v. King Constr. of Houston, LLC, 864 F. Supp. 2d 478 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that “Mississippi’s stop notice statute violates due process by authorizing what is in practical effect the prejudgment attachment of funds without prior notice and a hearing, or an acceptable post-seizure remedy.”). | 1 | 2 |
Croft v. Grand Casino Tunica, Inc.green1 sentence2023This Court explained in Croft v. Grand Casino Tunica Inc., 910 So. 2d 66, 75 (¶31) (Miss. | 1 | 1 |
Barber v. Barbergreen1 sentence2023Mississippi brief, our practice is to make a special effort to review the record for support for affirmance.” Id. (quoting Barber v. Barber, 608 So. 2d 1338, 1340 (Miss. 1992)). 7 Code Annotated section 93-11-65(1)(d) (Rev. 2013) provides: “The noncustodial parent’s liabilities for past education and necessary support and maintenance and other expenses are limited to a period of one (1) year next preceding the commencement of an action.” (Emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Weible v. University of Southern Mississippigreen1 sentence2023“Mississippi’s standard for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is very high, focusing specifically on the defendant’s conduct and not the plaintiff’s emotional condition.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). “[T]he severity of the conduct at issue must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Weible v. Univ. of S. Miss., 89 So. 3d 51, 64 (¶41) (Miss. | 1 | 1 |
Sabrina Lynn Welton v. Daniel Westmorelandgreen2 sentences2021In Giannaris v. Giannaris, 960 So. 2d 462, 468 (¶11) (Miss. 2007), the Mississippi Supreme Court held “that the mere moving of the custodial parent does not constitute a material change in circumstances for child custody modification purposes.” “Nor is the distance moved ‘dispositive as to whether a material change in circumstances has occurred; it is the effect the move has on the child and the custody arrangement that is dispositive.’” Welton v. Westmoreland, 180 So. 3d 738, 749 (¶34) (Miss. 2021In Giannaris v. Giannaris, 960 So. 2d 462, 468 (¶11) (Miss. 2007), the Mississippi Supreme Court held “that the mere moving of the custodial parent does not constitute a material change in circumstances for child custody modification purposes.” “Nor is the distance moved ‘dispositive as to whether a material change in circumstances has occurred; it is the effect the move has on the child and the custody arrangement that is dispositive.’” Welton v. Westmoreland, 180 So. 3d 738, 749 (¶34) (Miss. | 1 | 1 |
Giannaris v. Giannarisgreen2 sentences2021In Giannaris v. Giannaris, 960 So. 2d 462, 468 (¶11) (Miss. 2007), the Mississippi Supreme Court held “that the mere moving of the custodial parent does not constitute a material change in circumstances for child custody modification purposes.” “Nor is the distance moved ‘dispositive as to whether a material change in circumstances has occurred; it is the effect the move has on the child and the custody arrangement that is dispositive.’” Welton v. Westmoreland, 180 So. 3d 738, 749 (¶34) (Miss. 2021In Giannaris v. Giannaris, 960 So. 2d 462, 468 (¶11) (Miss. 2007), the Mississippi Supreme Court held “that the mere moving of the custodial parent does not constitute a material change in circumstances for child custody modification purposes.” “Nor is the distance moved ‘dispositive as to whether a material change in circumstances has occurred; it is the effect the move has on the child and the custody arrangement that is dispositive.’” Welton v. Westmoreland, 180 So. 3d 738, 749 (¶34) (Miss. | 1 | 1 |
| Bobby Leon Gibson v. Williams, Williams & Montgomery, P.A.green | 1 | 1 |
| Noatex Corp. v. King Construction of Houston, L.L.C.green | 1 | 1 |
| Funderburk v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stuart v. Burfordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hoerner v. First National Bank of Jacksongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Garner v. Hickmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Doe v. Stegallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lake Hillsdale Estates, Inc. v. Gallowaygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Haygood v. First Nat. Bank of New Albanygreen | 1 | 1 |
| prod.liab.rep.(cch)p 10,718 Earnest M. Gray, Jr. And Hughlene Gray v. The Manitowoc Company, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Garland MELTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEERE & COMPANY, Defendant-Appelleegreen | 1 | 1 |
| prod.liab.rep. (Cch) P 13,416 Billy H. Toney v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd., Etc.green | 1 | 1 |
| prod.liab.rep. (Cch) P 13,374 Myron Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Company and Caterpillar Industrial, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Dyer v. Russellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Majors v. Purnell's Pride, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Griffith v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hogan v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Daves v. Reedgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barham v. Nowellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Superior Car Rental, Inc. v. Roberts
green
2 sentences2007Id. 2006Id. | 2 | 2006–2007 |
Forrestine D. Lemaire, by and Through Her Conservator, Howard C. Lemaire, and Howard C. Lemaire v. United States
green
2 sentences1996A similar challenge was made in the federal case of LeMaire v. United States, 826 F.2d 949 (10th Cir.1987), when the plaintiff argued that the testimony of the defense's medical expert was "not competent because he failed to state his opinions in terms of a "reasonable degree of medical probability." Applying Colorado substantive law that a medical opinion is admissible if founded on reasonable medical probability, the federal court held the expert testimony admissible. 1996A similar challenge was made in the federal case of LeMaire v. United States, 826 F.2d 949 (10th Cir.1987), when the plaintiff argued that the testimony of the defense's medical expert was "not competent because he failed to state his opinions in terms of a "reasonable degree of medical probability." Applying Colorado substantive law that a medical opinion is admissible if founded on reasonable medical probability, the federal court held the expert testimony admissible. | 2 | 1993–1996 |
City of Jackson v. Lee
green
2 sentences1993The Mississippi rule was stated in City of Jackson v. Lee, 234 Miss. 502 , 106 So.2d 892 (1958): Governmental subdivisions are not liable for such fees in eminent domain proceedings unless the statute in express terms or necessary implications imposes such liability. 234 Miss. at 511 , 106 So.2d at 896 , cited in Hayes, 541 So.2d at 1026 . 1993The Mississippi rule was stated in City of Jackson v. Lee, 234 Miss. 502 , 106 So.2d 892 (1958): Governmental subdivisions are not liable for such fees in eminent domain proceedings unless the statute in express terms or necessary implications imposes such liability. 234 Miss. at 511 , 106 So.2d at 896 , cited in Hayes, 541 So.2d at 1026 . | 2 | 1989–1993 |
Nichols v. State
green
2 sentences1986The Mississippi rule was set out in Nichols v. State, 207 Miss. 291 , 42 So.2d 201 (1949) and Thames v. State, 221 Miss. 573 , 73 So.2d 134 (1954). 1986The Mississippi rule was set out in Nichols v. State, 207 Miss. 291 , 42 So.2d 201 (1949) and Thames v. State, 221 Miss. 573 , 73 So.2d 134 (1954). | 2 | 1970–1986 |
Thames v. State
green
2 sentences1986The Mississippi rule was set out in Nichols v. State, 207 Miss. 291 , 42 So.2d 201 (1949) and Thames v. State, 221 Miss. 573 , 73 So.2d 134 (1954). 1986The Mississippi rule was set out in Nichols v. State, 207 Miss. 291 , 42 So.2d 201 (1949) and Thames v. State, 221 Miss. 573 , 73 So.2d 134 (1954). | 2 | 1970–1986 |
State v. Worthen
green
2 sentences1986These cases followed State v. Worthen, 111 Iowa 267 , 82 N.W. 910 (1900), which stated: Some presumptions are to be indulged in against one who enters a building unbidden, at a late hour of night, else the burglar caught without boot might *1355 escape the penalties of the law. * * * People are not accustomed, in the nighttime, to enter homes of others, when asleep, with innocent purposes. 1986These cases followed State v. Worthen, 111 Iowa 267 , 82 N.W. 910 (1900), which stated: Some presumptions are to be indulged in against one who enters a building unbidden, at a late hour of night, else the burglar caught without boot might *1355 escape the penalties of the law. * * * People are not accustomed, in the nighttime, to enter homes of others, when asleep, with innocent purposes. | 2 | 1970–1986 |
Brown v. State
green
2 sentences1979The Mississippi rule regarding the inadmissibility of declarations against penal interest where the declarant is not available as a witness was announced in Brown v. State, 99 Miss. 719 , 55 So. 961 (1911). 1979The Mississippi rule regarding the inadmissibility of declarations against penal interest where the declarant is not available as a witness was announced in Brown v. State, 99 Miss. 719 , 55 So. 961 (1911). | 2 | 1975–1979 |
Chambers v. Mississippi
green
2 sentences1979Brown was not overruled in Chambers , for in the latter opinion the Court noted that `... we need not decide in this case whether, under other circumstances, it might serve some valid state purpose by excluding untrustworthy testimony.' 410 U.S. at 300 , 93 S.Ct. at 1048 . 1979Brown was not overruled in Chambers , for in the latter opinion the Court noted that `... we need not decide in this case whether, under other circumstances, it might serve some valid state purpose by excluding untrustworthy testimony.' 410 U.S. at 300 , 93 S.Ct. at 1048 . | 2 | 1975–1979 |
Henry v. Mississippi
green
2 sentences1972In the case of Henry v. State, 379 U.S. 443, 85 S.Ct. 564 , 13 L.Ed.2d 408 (1965), the United States Supreme Court stated that: “The Mississippi rule requiring contemporaneous objection to the introduction of illegal evidence clearly does serve a legitimate state interest. . . . ” 379 U.S. at 448 , 85 S.Ct. at 567 , 13 L.Ed.2d at 413 . 1972In the case of Henry v. State, 379 U.S. 443, 85 S.Ct. 564 , 13 L.Ed.2d 408 (1965), the United States Supreme Court stated that: “The Mississippi rule requiring contemporaneous objection to the introduction of illegal evidence clearly does serve a legitimate state interest. . . . ” 379 U.S. at 448 , 85 S.Ct. at 567 , 13 L.Ed.2d at 413 . | 2 | 1963–1972 |
Frederick A. Pettersen v. Audrey S. Pettersen
green
1 sentence2023Mississippi brief, our practice is to make a special effort to review the record for support for affirmance.” Id. (quoting Barber v. Barber, 608 So. 2d 1338, 1340 (Miss. 1992)). 7 Code Annotated section 93-11-65(1)(d) (Rev. 2013) provides: “The noncustodial parent’s liabilities for past education and necessary support and maintenance and other expenses are limited to a period of one (1) year next preceding the commencement of an action.” (Emphasis added). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Warren v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp.
green
2 sentences2023“Under this Mississippi rule[,] if an answer to an interrogatory regarding an expert witness who will testify at trial is deemed insufficient by opposing counsel, some means of notice of such insufficiency must be given to the opposing party in order to let them know that additional information is desired.” Id. (quoting State Highway Comm’n v. Havard, 508 So. 2d 1099, 1104 (Miss. 1987)). ¶31. 2023“Under this Mississippi rule[,] if an answer to an interrogatory regarding an expert witness who will testify at trial is deemed insufficient by opposing counsel, some means of notice of such insufficiency must be given to the opposing party in order to let them know that additional information is desired.” Id. (quoting State Highway Comm’n v. Havard, 508 So. 2d 1099, 1104 (Miss. 1987)). ¶31. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Rainer v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc.
green
1 sentence2023Mississippi’s standard for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is “very high” and focuses “on the defendant’s conduct and not the plaintiff’s emotional condition.” Id. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
American Life Ins. v. Hauer
green
2 sentences2020Unum’s duty in this case, as mentioned above, arises from the longstanding Mississippi principle that insurers owe a general duty of care to the insured or the beneficiary, independent of contractual obligations, “to use that degree of diligence and care with reference thereto which a reasonably prudent man would exercise in the transaction of his own business.” Cox, 299 So. 2d at 194 ; Hauer, 218 Miss. 560 , 67 So. 2d at 525-26 . 2020Unum’s duty in this case, as mentioned above, arises from the longstanding Mississippi principle that insurers owe a general duty of care to the insured or the beneficiary, independent of contractual obligations, “to use that degree of diligence and care with reference thereto which a reasonably prudent man would exercise in the transaction of his own business.” Cox, 299 So. 2d at 194 ; Hauer, 218 Miss. 560 , 67 So. 2d at 525-26 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
SECIRITY INSURANCE AGENCY, INC. v. Cox
green
1 sentence2020Unum’s duty in this case, as mentioned above, arises from the longstanding Mississippi principle that insurers owe a general duty of care to the insured or the beneficiary, independent of contractual obligations, “to use that degree of diligence and care with reference thereto which a reasonably prudent man would exercise in the transaction of his own business.” Cox, 299 So. 2d at 194 ; Hauer, 218 Miss. 560 , 67 So. 2d at 525-26 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| William T. Brantley v. City of Horn Lake, Mississippi red | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Brandon v. State green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Harrison v. State green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Quick Change Oil v. County Line Place green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Ladner v. Campbell green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| STATE HIGHWAY COM'N OF MISS. v. Hayes green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Leatherwood v. State green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Phillips v. Mississippi State Bar green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Carter v. Collins green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Strickland v. Washington green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| James Leroy Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation and Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., Defendants green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Thigpen v. Roberts green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| King v. Cook green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Monsanto Co. v. Cochran green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Mitchell v. Craft green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Carr v. State green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| May v. State green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Ladner green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Mississippi Wood Preserving Co. v. Rothschild green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Hudgins v. Tug Kevin Moran neutral | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Century Brick Corp. of America v. Carroll green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Collard v. Universal Automobile Insurance green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Employers Fire Insurance v. Speed green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hood green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Vanner v. Dalton neutral | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.