9 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2008At the same time, a distinction has developed in the Court of Appeals by which that court has required probable cause for traffic stops "made on the basis of a readily observed traffic violation," but reasonable suspicion for stops "based on an officer's mere suspicion that a traffic violation is being committed." State v. Young, 148 N.C.App. 462, 470-71 , 559 S.E.2d 814, 820-21 (Greene, J., concurring), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 355 N.C. 500 , 564 S.E.2d 233 (2002), quoted in State v. Wilson, 155 N.C.App. 89, 94 , 574 S.E.2d 93, 97-98 (2002), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. deni 2008At the same time, a distinction has developed in the Court of Appeals by which that court has required probable cause for traffic stops "made on the basis of a readily observed traffic violation," but reasonable suspicion for stops "based on an officer's mere suspicion that a traffic violation is being committed." State v. Young, 148 N.C.App. 462, 470-71 , 559 S.E.2d 814, 820-21 (Greene, J., concurring), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 355 N.C. 500 , 564 S.E.2d 233 (2002), quoted in State v. Wilson, 155 N.C.App. 89, 94 , 574 S.E.2d 93, 97-98 (2002), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. deni | 3 | 4 |
State v. McClendongreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., State v. McClendon, 130 N.C. 2002See, e.g., State v. McClendon, 130 N.C.App. 368, 374 , 502 S.E.2d 902, 906 (1998) (officer had probable cause to stop vehicle and issue citation for speeding and following too closely), affirmed, 350 N.C. 630 , 517 S.E.2d 128 (1999); State v. Hamilton, 125 N.C.App. 396, 399 , 481 S.E.2d 98, 100 (officer had probable cause to stop the vehicle for the purpose of issuing seat belt citations because he had observed that both the driver and the defendant were not wearing seat belts), disc. review denied, 345 N.C. 757 , 485 S.E.2d 302 (1997); see also N.C. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Barnhillgreen2 sentences2007State v. Barnhill, 166 N.C.App. 228, 231 , 601 S.E.2d 215, 217 (2004). 2005This Court has held that “[w]here an officer makes a traffic stop based on a readily observed traffic violation, such as speeding or running a red light, such a stop will be valid if it was supported by probable cause.” State v. Barnhill, 166 N.C. | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Chanthasouxatgreen2 sentences2008In accord with every federal circuit to consider this issue, we hold that reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected. 1 See id. at 396-97 (determining that reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard for a traffic stop based on a readily observed traffic violation); Willis, 431 F.3d at 714-15 (applying reasonable suspicion standard to a traffic stop based on readily observed traffic violations); Holeman v. City of New London, 425 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 2005) (determining that either 2008In accord with every federal circuit to consider this issue, we hold that reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected. [1] See id. at 396-97 (determining that reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard for a traffic stop based on a readily observed traffic violation); Willis, 431 F.3d at 714-15 (applying reasonable suspicion standard to a traffic stop based on readily observed traffic violations); Holeman v. City of New London, 425 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir.2005) (determining that eithe | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Ozbirngreen2 sentences2008Ed. 2d 853 (2002); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 2000) (determining that reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard for a traffic stop based on a readily observed traffic violation); United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1198-99 (10th Cir. 1999) (requiring either probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation had occurred). 2008In accord with every federal circuit to consider this issue, we hold that reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected. [1] See id. at 396-97 (determining that reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard for a traffic stop based on a readily observed traffic violation); Willis, 431 F.3d at 714-15 (applying reasonable suspicion standard to a traffic stop based on readily observed traffic violations); Holeman v. City of New London, 425 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir.2005) (determining that eithe | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Ramstadgreen2 sentences2008In accord with every federal circuit to consider this issue, we hold that reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected. 1 See id. at 396-97 (determining that reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard for a traffic stop based on a readily observed traffic violation); Willis, 431 F.3d at 714-15 (applying reasonable suspicion standard to a traffic stop based on readily observed traffic violations); Holeman v. City of New London, 425 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 2005) (determining that either 2008In accord with every federal circuit to consider this issue, we hold that reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected. [1] See id. at 396-97 (determining that reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard for a traffic stop based on a readily observed traffic violation); Willis, 431 F.3d at 714-15 (applying reasonable suspicion standard to a traffic stop based on readily observed traffic violations); Holeman v. City of New London, 425 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir.2005) (determining that eithe | 1 | 1 |
United States of America,plaintiff-Appellee v. Armando Lopez-Sotogreen2 sentences2008Ed. 2d 853 (2002); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 2000) (determining that reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard for a traffic stop based on a readily observed traffic violation); United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1198-99 (10th Cir. 1999) (requiring either probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation had occurred). 2008In accord with every federal circuit to consider this issue, we hold that reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected. [1] See id. at 396-97 (determining that reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard for a traffic stop based on a readily observed traffic violation); Willis, 431 F.3d at 714-15 (applying reasonable suspicion standard to a traffic stop based on readily observed traffic violations); Holeman v. City of New London, 425 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir.2005) (determining that eithe | 1 | 1 |
United States of America v. Curtis Dennis Callarmangreen2 sentences2008In accord with every federal circuit to consider this issue, we hold that reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected. 1 See id. at 396-97 (determining that reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard for a traffic stop based on a readily observed traffic violation); Willis, 431 F.3d at 714-15 (applying reasonable suspicion standard to a traffic stop based on readily observed traffic violations); Holeman v. City of New London, 425 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 2005) (determining that either 2008In accord with every federal circuit to consider this issue, we hold that reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected. [1] See id. at 396-97 (determining that reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard for a traffic stop based on a readily observed traffic violation); Willis, 431 F.3d at 714-15 (applying reasonable suspicion standard to a traffic stop based on readily observed traffic violations); Holeman v. City of New London, 425 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir.2005) (determining that eithe | 1 | 1 |
Holeman v. City of New Londongreen2 sentences2008In accord with every federal circuit to consider this issue, we hold that reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected. 1 See id. at 396-97 (determining that reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard for a traffic stop based on a readily observed traffic violation); Willis, 431 F.3d at 714-15 (applying reasonable suspicion standard to a traffic stop based on readily observed traffic violations); Holeman v. City of New London, 425 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 2005) (determining that either 2008In accord with every federal circuit to consider this issue, we hold that reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected. [1] See id. at 396-97 (determining that reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard for a traffic stop based on a readily observed traffic violation); Willis, 431 F.3d at 714-15 (applying reasonable suspicion standard to a traffic stop based on readily observed traffic violations); Holeman v. City of New London, 425 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir.2005) (determining that eithe | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Mark Lamond Willisgreen2 sentences2008In accord with every federal circuit to consider this issue, we hold that reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected. 1 See id. at 396-97 (determining that reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard for a traffic stop based on a readily observed traffic violation); Willis, 431 F.3d at 714-15 (applying reasonable suspicion standard to a traffic stop based on readily observed traffic violations); Holeman v. City of New London, 425 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 2005) (determining that either 2008In accord with every federal circuit to consider this issue, we hold that reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected. [1] See id. at 396-97 (determining that reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard for a traffic stop based on a readily observed traffic violation); Willis, 431 F.3d at 714-15 (applying reasonable suspicion standard to a traffic stop based on readily observed traffic violations); Holeman v. City of New London, 425 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir.2005) (determining that eithe | 1 | 1 |
State v. Younggreen2 sentences2008At the same time, a distinction has developed in the Court of Appeals by which that court has required probable cause for traffic stops "made on the basis of a readily observed traffic violation," but reasonable suspicion for stops "based on an officer's mere suspicion that a traffic violation is being committed." State v. Young, 148 N.C.App. 462, 470-71 , 559 S.E.2d 814, 820-21 (Greene, J., concurring), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 355 N.C. 500 , 564 S.E.2d 233 (2002), quoted in State v. Wilson, 155 N.C.App. 89, 94 , 574 S.E.2d 93, 97-98 (2002), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. deni 2008At the same time, a distinction has developed in the Court of Appeals by which that court has required probable cause for traffic stops "made on the basis of a readily observed traffic violation," but reasonable suspicion for stops "based on an officer's mere suspicion that a traffic violation is being committed." State v. Young, 148 N.C.App. 462, 470-71 , 559 S.E.2d 814, 820-21 (Greene, J., concurring), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 355 N.C. 500 , 564 S.E.2d 233 (2002), quoted in State v. Wilson, 155 N.C.App. 89, 94 , 574 S.E.2d 93, 97-98 (2002), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. deni | 1 | 1 |
Goodson v. Goodsongreen2 sentences2007However, "`irrelevant findings in a trial court's decision do not warrant a reversal of the trial court.'" Hernandez , at 305, 612 S.E.2d at 424 (citing Goodson v. Goodson, 145 N.C.App. 356, 360 , 551 S.E.2d 200, 204 (2001)). 2007However, "`irrelevant findings in a trial court's decision do not warrant a reversal of the trial court.'" Hernandez , at 305, 612 S.E.2d at 424 (citing Goodson v. Goodson, 145 N.C.App. 356, 360 , 551 S.E.2d 200, 204 (2001)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. McClendongreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., State v. McClendon, 130 N.C.App. 368, 374 , 502 S.E.2d 902, 906 (1998) (officer had probable cause to stop vehicle and issue citation for speeding and following too closely), affirmed, 350 N.C. 630 , 517 S.E.2d 128 (1999); State v. Hamilton, 125 N.C.App. 396, 399 , 481 S.E.2d 98, 100 (officer had probable cause to stop the vehicle for the purpose of issuing seat belt citations because he had observed that both the driver and the defendant were not wearing seat belts), disc. review denied, 345 N.C. 757 , 485 S.E.2d 302 (1997); see also N.C. 2002See, e.g., State v. McClendon, 130 N.C.App. 368, 374 , 502 S.E.2d 902, 906 (1998) (officer had probable cause to stop vehicle and issue citation for speeding and following too closely), affirmed, 350 N.C. 630 , 517 S.E.2d 128 (1999); State v. Hamilton, 125 N.C.App. 396, 399 , 481 S.E.2d 98, 100 (officer had probable cause to stop the vehicle for the purpose of issuing seat belt citations because he had observed that both the driver and the defendant were not wearing seat belts), disc. review denied, 345 N.C. 757 , 485 S.E.2d 302 (1997); see also N.C. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hamiltongreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., State v. McClendon, 130 N.C.App. 368, 374 , 502 S.E.2d 902, 906 (1998) (officer had probable cause to stop vehicle and issue citation for speeding and following too closely), affirmed, 350 N.C. 630 , 517 S.E.2d 128 (1999); State v. Hamilton, 125 N.C.App. 396, 399 , 481 S.E.2d 98, 100 (officer had probable cause to stop the vehicle for the purpose of issuing seat belt citations because he had observed that both the driver and the defendant were not wearing seat belts), disc. review denied, 345 N.C. 757 , 485 S.E.2d 302 (1997); see also N.C. 2002See, e.g., State v. McClendon, 130 N.C.App. 368, 374 , 502 S.E.2d 902, 906 (1998) (officer had probable cause to stop vehicle and issue citation for speeding and following too closely), affirmed, 350 N.C. 630 , 517 S.E.2d 128 (1999); State v. Hamilton, 125 N.C.App. 396, 399 , 481 S.E.2d 98, 100 (officer had probable cause to stop the vehicle for the purpose of issuing seat belt citations because he had observed that both the driver and the defendant were not wearing seat belts), disc. review denied, 345 N.C. 757 , 485 S.E.2d 302 (1997); see also N.C. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Wilson
neutral
2 sentences2008At the same time, a distinction has developed in the Court of Appeals by which that court has required probable cause for traffic stops "made on the basis of a readily observed traffic violation," but reasonable suspicion for stops "based on an officer's mere suspicion that a traffic violation is being committed." State v. Young, 148 N.C.App. 462, 470-71 , 559 S.E.2d 814, 820-21 (Greene, J., concurring), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 355 N.C. 500 , 564 S.E.2d 233 (2002), quoted in State v. Wilson, 155 N.C.App. 89, 94 , 574 S.E.2d 93, 97-98 (2002), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. deni 2008At the same time, a distinction has developed in the Court of Appeals by which that court has required probable cause for traffic stops "made on the basis of a readily observed traffic violation," but reasonable suspicion for stops "based on an officer's mere suspicion that a traffic violation is being committed." State v. Young, 148 N.C.App. 462, 470-71 , 559 S.E.2d 814, 820-21 (Greene, J., concurring), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 355 N.C. 500 , 564 S.E.2d 233 (2002), quoted in State v. Wilson, 155 N.C.App. 89, 94 , 574 S.E.2d 93, 97-98 (2002), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. deni | 3 | 2003–2008 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2016Pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 , 911 (1968), an officer may conduct a traffic stop if he or she has reasonable suspicion that "criminal activity may be afoot." This includes investigatory stops made on the basis of a readily observed traffic violation or an officer's suspicion that a violation is being committed. 2016Pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 , 911 (1968), an officer may conduct a traffic stop if he or she has reasonable suspicion that "criminal activity may be afoot." This includes investigatory stops made on the basis of a readily observed traffic violation or an officer's suspicion that a violation is being committed. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Styles
green
2 sentences2016State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412 , 415-16, 665 S.E.2d 438 , 440-41 (2008). 2016State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412 , 415-16, 665 S.E.2d 438 , 440-41 (2008). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Payne v. Smith, Warden
neutral
1 sentence2008At the same time, a distinction has developed in the Court of Appeals by which that court has required probable cause for traffic stops "made on the basis of a readily observed traffic violation," but reasonable suspicion for stops "based on an officer's mere suspicion that a traffic violation is being committed." State v. Young, 148 N.C.App. 462, 470-71 , 559 S.E.2d 814, 820-21 (Greene, J., concurring), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 355 N.C. 500 , 564 S.E.2d 233 (2002), quoted in State v. Wilson, 155 N.C.App. 89, 94 , 574 S.E.2d 93, 97-98 (2002), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. deni | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Cole v. Hopkins, Warden
neutral
1 sentence2008At the same time, a distinction has developed in the Court of Appeals by which that court has required probable cause for traffic stops "made on the basis of a readily observed traffic violation," but reasonable suspicion for stops "based on an officer's mere suspicion that a traffic violation is being committed." State v. Young, 148 N.C.App. 462, 470-71 , 559 S.E.2d 814, 820-21 (Greene, J., concurring), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 355 N.C. 500 , 564 S.E.2d 233 (2002), quoted in State v. Wilson, 155 N.C.App. 89, 94 , 574 S.E.2d 93, 97-98 (2002), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. deni | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Nelson v. United States
green
2 sentences2008In accord with every federal circuit to consider this issue, we hold that reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected. 1 See id. at 396-97 (determining that reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard for a traffic stop based on a readily observed traffic violation); Willis, 431 F.3d at 714-15 (applying reasonable suspicion standard to a traffic stop based on readily observed traffic violations); Holeman v. City of New London, 425 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 2005) (determining that either 2008In accord with every federal circuit to consider this issue, we hold that reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected. [1] See id. at 396-97 (determining that reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard for a traffic stop based on a readily observed traffic violation); Willis, 431 F.3d at 714-15 (applying reasonable suspicion standard to a traffic stop based on readily observed traffic violations); Holeman v. City of New London, 425 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir.2005) (determining that eithe | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Callarman v. United States
green
2 sentences2008In accord with every federal circuit to consider this issue, we hold that reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected. 1 See id. at 396-97 (determining that reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard for a traffic stop based on a readily observed traffic violation); Willis, 431 F.3d at 714-15 (applying reasonable suspicion standard to a traffic stop based on readily observed traffic violations); Holeman v. City of New London, 425 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 2005) (determining that either 2008In accord with every federal circuit to consider this issue, we hold that reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops, regardless of whether the traffic violation was readily observed or merely suspected. [1] See id. at 396-97 (determining that reasonable suspicion is the appropriate standard for a traffic stop based on a readily observed traffic violation); Willis, 431 F.3d at 714-15 (applying reasonable suspicion standard to a traffic stop based on readily observed traffic violations); Holeman v. City of New London, 425 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir.2005) (determining that eithe | 1 | 2008–2008 |
United States v. Salvador Delfin-Colina, A/K/A Salvador Delfin-Colinas, Salvador Delfin-Colina
green
1 sentence2008The consensus is to the contrary.... [T]he Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have all `construed Whren to require only that the police have "reasonable suspicion" to believe that a traffic law has been broken.'" 464 F.3d at 396 (quoting United States v. Willis, 431 F.3d 709, 723 (9th Cir.2005) (W. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Young
neutral
2 sentences2008At the same time, a distinction has developed in the Court of Appeals by which that court has required probable cause for traffic stops "made on the basis of a readily observed traffic violation," but reasonable suspicion for stops "based on an officer's mere suspicion that a traffic violation is being committed." State v. Young, 148 N.C.App. 462, 470-71 , 559 S.E.2d 814, 820-21 (Greene, J., concurring), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 355 N.C. 500 , 564 S.E.2d 233 (2002), quoted in State v. Wilson, 155 N.C.App. 89, 94 , 574 S.E.2d 93, 97-98 (2002), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. deni 2008At the same time, a distinction has developed in the Court of Appeals by which that court has required probable cause for traffic stops "made on the basis of a readily observed traffic violation," but reasonable suspicion for stops "based on an officer's mere suspicion that a traffic violation is being committed." State v. Young, 148 N.C.App. 462, 470-71 , 559 S.E.2d 814, 820-21 (Greene, J., concurring), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 355 N.C. 500 , 564 S.E.2d 233 (2002), quoted in State v. Wilson, 155 N.C.App. 89, 94 , 574 S.E.2d 93, 97-98 (2002), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. deni | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Hernandez
green
2 sentences2007However, “ ‘irrelevant findings in a trial court’s decision do not warrant a reversal of the trial court.’ ” Hernandez , at 305, 612 S.E.2d at 424 (citing Goodson v. Goodson, 145 N.C. 2007However, "`irrelevant findings in a trial court's decision do not warrant a reversal of the trial court.'" Hernandez , at 305, 612 S.E.2d at 424 (citing Goodson v. Goodson, 145 N.C.App. 356, 360 , 551 S.E.2d 200, 204 (2001)). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Barnhill
neutral
2 sentences2005App. 228, 231 , 601 S.E.2d 215, 217 , disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 191 , 607 S.E.2d 646 (2004) (emphasis added). 2005App. 228, 231 , 601 S.E.2d 215, 217 , disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 191 , 607 S.E.2d 646 (2004) (emphasis added). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Hill
neutral
1 sentence2002See, e.g., State v. McClendon, 130 N.C.App. 368, 374 , 502 S.E.2d 902, 906 (1998) (officer had probable cause to stop vehicle and issue citation for speeding and following too closely), affirmed, 350 N.C. 630 , 517 S.E.2d 128 (1999); State v. Hamilton, 125 N.C.App. 396, 399 , 481 S.E.2d 98, 100 (officer had probable cause to stop the vehicle for the purpose of issuing seat belt citations because he had observed that both the driver and the defendant were not wearing seat belts), disc. review denied, 345 N.C. 757 , 485 S.E.2d 302 (1997); see also N.C. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Gunter
green
1 sentence2002See, e.g., State v. McClendon, 130 N.C.App. 368, 374 , 502 S.E.2d 902, 906 (1998) (officer had probable cause to stop vehicle and issue citation for speeding and following too closely), affirmed, 350 N.C. 630 , 517 S.E.2d 128 (1999); State v. Hamilton, 125 N.C.App. 396, 399 , 481 S.E.2d 98, 100 (officer had probable cause to stop the vehicle for the purpose of issuing seat belt citations because he had observed that both the driver and the defendant were not wearing seat belts), disc. review denied, 345 N.C. 757 , 485 S.E.2d 302 (1997); see also N.C. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.