justice committed reversible error in Rhode Island

2010A Ineffective Assistance of Counsel “This Court has adopted the standard announced by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland, v. Washington, [ 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2062 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 * * * (1984)] when generally reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Rodrigues v. State, 985 A.2d 811 , 315 (R.I.2009) (quoting Powers v. State, 734 A.2d 508, 521-22 (R.I.1999)).

2010A Ineffective Assistance of Counsel “This Court has adopted the standard announced by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland, v. Washington, [ 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2062 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 * * * (1984)] when generally reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Rodrigues v. State, 985 A.2d 811 , 315 (R.I.2009) (quoting Powers v. State, 734 A.2d 508, 521-22 (R.I.1999)).

2005A trial justice may limit the cross-examination of a witness when that cross- *748 examination “border[s] on harassment.” Hazard, 745 A.2d at 756 ; see also State v. Wiley, 676 A.2d 321, 324 (R.I.1996) (holding that the “trial justice is afforded this discretionary latitude so that he or she may limit cross-examination on the basis of concerns of witness harassment”).

2004Limitation of Cross-Examination The defendant argues that the trial justice committed reversible error when he limited defense counsel’s cross-examination of “a critical state witness about two important issues.” The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 3 and article 1, section 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution 4 grant individuals accused of a crime the right to confront witnesses who testify against them. “[I]ncluded in the right to confront witnesses is the fundamental right of the criminal defendant to cross-examine his or her accusers.” State v. Hazard, 745

2012Highlighting certain evidence presented at trial, such as testimony regarding the alcohol and prescription drugs he had ingested, his intoxication, and his post-killing actions, Payette avers that his will “was so paralyzed by alcohol and drugs [that he was] incapable of forming any sane design to kill [the victim].” Thus, Payette asserts that the trial justice committed reversible error by denying his motion for a new trial. 1 Standard of Review “When deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial, ‘the trial justice acts as a thirteenth juror.’ ” State v. Pineda, 13 A.3d 623, 640

2012Highlighting certain evidence presented at trial, such as testimony regarding the alcohol and prescription drugs he had ingested, his intoxication, and his post-killing actions, Payette avers that his will “was so paralyzed by alcohol and drugs [that he was] incapable of forming any sane design to kill [the victim].” Thus, Payette asserts that the trial justice committed reversible error by denying his motion for a new trial. 1 Standard of Review “When deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial, ‘the trial justice acts as a thirteenth juror.’ ” State v. Pineda, 13 A.3d 623, 640

2006We are well aware of the fact that Rule 30 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that, in order to preserve the issue for appeal, a defendant must articulate an objection to the giving or omission of a particular jury instruction before the jury is excused to consider its verdict and must state with specificity the grounds for that objection. 19 See State v. Brown, 744 A.2d 831, 837 (R.I.2000); see also State v. Hanes, 783 A.2d 920, 924 (R.I.2001); State v. Pailin, 114 R.I. 725, 730 , 339 A.2d 253, 256 (1975) (rejecting defendant’s contention that the trial justice committ

2006We are well aware of the fact that Rule 30 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that, in order to preserve the issue for appeal, a defendant must articulate an objection to the giving or omission of a particular jury instruction before the jury is excused to consider its verdict and must state with specificity the grounds for that objection. 19 See State v. Brown, 744 A.2d 831, 837 (R.I.2000); see also State v. Hanes, 783 A.2d 920, 924 (R.I.2001); State v. Pailin, 114 R.I. 725, 730 , 339 A.2d 253, 256 (1975) (rejecting defendant’s contention that the trial justice committ

2005Regardless of whether a defendant raises the issue at trial, the trial justice “has a sua sponte obligation ‘to offer a limiting instruction when admitting evidence of other [uncharged] sexual acts.’ ” State v. Lamphere, 658 A.2d 900, 904 (R.I.1995) (quoting State v. Toole, 640 A.2d 965, 971 (R.I.1994)).

2005Regardless of whether a defendant raises the issue at trial, the trial justice "has a sua sponte obligation `to offer a limiting instruction when admitting evidence of other [uncharged] sexual acts.'" State v. Lamphere, 658 A.2d 900, 904 (R.I.1995) (quoting State v. Toole, 640 A.2d 965, 971 (R.I.1994)).

2012Hazard, 745 A.2d at 751 ; see also Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277-78 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ; Leland, 343 U.S. at 794 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 ; Sivo, 925 A.2d at 915 ; DelBonis, 862 A.2d at 765 .

2004Limitation of Cross-Examination The defendant argues that the trial justice committed reversible error when he limited defense counsel’s cross-examination of “a critical state witness about two important issues.” The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 3 and article 1, section 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution 4 grant individuals accused of a crime the right to confront witnesses who testify against them. “[I]ncluded in the right to confront witnesses is the fundamental right of the criminal defendant to cross-examine his or her accusers.” State v. Hazard, 745

2024We have also stated that “we will reverse a trial justice’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence only where it constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.” Id. (quoting State v. Clements, 83 A.3d 553, 561 (R.I. 2014)). - 13 - Discussion Voluntary Manslaughter Instruction On appeal, defendant argues that the trial justice committed reversible error by not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter.

2022This Court appreciates the sensitive nature of the controversy surrounding the issue of the right to abortion, and we acknowledge the genuine concerns of the parties and amici in this case.5 Facts and Travel In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the United States Supreme Court recognized that “the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision” and declared that “the word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.” Roe, 410 U.S. at 154, 158 .

2022This Court appreciates the sensitive nature of the controversy surrounding the issue of the right to abortion, and we acknowledge the genuine concerns of the parties and amici in this case.5 Facts and Travel In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the United States Supreme Court recognized that “the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision” and declared that “the word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.” Roe, 410 U.S. at 154, 158 .

2021Pettinato v. Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909, 913-14 (R.I. 1990).

2019See McEntee v. Davis , 861 A.2d 459 , 464 (R.I. 2004) (stating that the Court could not "conclude that the trial justice committed reversible error in making a factual determination of unilateral mistake").

2015We disagree. “[T]he function of a bill of particulars is to apprise a defendant of the evidentiary details establishing the facts of the offense when such facts have not been included in the indictment or information.” State v. Rivera, 987 A.2d 887, 904 (R.I.2010) (quoting State v. LaChapelle, 638 A.2d 525, 527 (R.I.1994)); see also Wayne R.

2015We disagree. “[T]he function of a bill of particulars is to apprise a defendant of the evidentiary details establishing the facts of the offense when such facts have not been included in the indictment or information.” State v. Rivera, 987 A.2d 887, 904 (R.I.2010) (quoting State v. LaChapelle, 638 A.2d 525, 527 (R.I.1994)); see also Wayne R.

2013A Standard of Review This Court will review de novo “questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact involving constitutional issues.” State v. Snell, 892 A.2d 108, 115 (R.I.2006) (citing State v. Campbell, 691 A.2d 564, 569 (R.I.1997)).

2013A Standard of Review This Court will review de novo “questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact involving constitutional issues.” State v. Snell, 892 A.2d 108, 115 (R.I.2006) (citing State v. Campbell, 691 A.2d 564, 569 (R.I.1997)).

2012II Standard of Review In reviewing a decree terminating parental rights, this Court will “examinee ] the record to determine whether legally competent evidence exists to support the findings of the trial justice.” In re Natalya G, 946 A.2d 198, 202 (R.I.2008); see also In re Caleb W., 990 A.2d 1225, 1228 (R.I.2010); In re Ariel N, 892 A.2d 80, 83 (R.I.2006).

2012II Standard of Review In reviewing a decree terminating parental rights, this Court will "examine[] the record to determine whether legally competent evidence exists to support the findings of the trial justice." In re Natalya C., 946 A.2d 198, 202 (R.I.2008); see also In re Caleb W., 990 A.2d 1225, 1228 (R.I.2010); In re Ariel N., 892 A.2d 80, 83 (R.I.2006).

2012See Diefenderfer, 970 A.2d at 30 . 5 Accordingly, under our established raise-or-waive rule, Cook is not entitled to pursue this issue on appeal. 6 We note that Cook relies on our holding in State v. Gaspar, 982 A.2d 140, 149 (R.I. 2009), a sexual-assault case, in which this Court held that the trial justice committed reversible error by admitting evidence of the defendant’s prior sexual activity.

2012II Standard of Review In reviewing a decree terminating parental rights, this Court will “examinee ] the record to determine whether legally competent evidence exists to support the findings of the trial justice.” In re Natalya G, 946 A.2d 198, 202 (R.I.2008); see also In re Caleb W., 990 A.2d 1225, 1228 (R.I.2010); In re Ariel N, 892 A.2d 80, 83 (R.I.2006).

2012II Standard of Review In reviewing a decree terminating parental rights, this Court will "examine[] the record to determine whether legally competent evidence exists to support the findings of the trial justice." In re Natalya C., 946 A.2d 198, 202 (R.I.2008); see also In re Caleb W., 990 A.2d 1225, 1228 (R.I.2010); In re Ariel N., 892 A.2d 80, 83 (R.I.2006).

2012Hazard, 745 A.2d at 751 ; see also Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277-78 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ; Leland, 343 U.S. at 794 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 ; Sivo, 925 A.2d at 915 ; DelBonis, 862 A.2d at 765 .

2012Hazard, 745 A.2d at 751 ; see also Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277-78 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ; Leland, 343 U.S. at 794 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 ; Sivo, 925 A.2d at 915 ; DelBonis, 862 A.2d at 765 .

2012II Standard of Review In reviewing a decree terminating parental rights, this Court will “examinee ] the record to determine whether legally competent evidence exists to support the findings of the trial justice.” In re Natalya G, 946 A.2d 198, 202 (R.I.2008); see also In re Caleb W., 990 A.2d 1225, 1228 (R.I.2010); In re Ariel N, 892 A.2d 80, 83 (R.I.2006).

2012II Standard of Review In reviewing a decree terminating parental rights, this Court will "examine[] the record to determine whether legally competent evidence exists to support the findings of the trial justice." In re Natalya C., 946 A.2d 198, 202 (R.I.2008); see also In re Caleb W., 990 A.2d 1225, 1228 (R.I.2010); In re Ariel N., 892 A.2d 80, 83 (R.I.2006).

2012When it seeks to terminate parental rights, “subsequent to presenting sufficient evidence to support [a finding of parental unfitness], DCYF must additionally demonstrate to the Family Court that it has made reasonable efforts to strengthen the parent-child relationship in accordance with the provisions of § 15-7-7(b)(1).” 14 In re Brooklyn M., 933 A.2d 1113, 1125 (R.I.2007); see also In re Steven D., 23 A.3d at 1156 ; In re Jose Luis R.H., 968 A.2d at 882 .

2012When it seeks to terminate parental rights, "subsequent to presenting sufficient evidence to support [a finding of parental unfitness], DCYF must additionally demonstrate to the Family Court that it has made reasonable efforts to strengthen the parent-child relationship in accordance with the provisions of § 15-7-7(b)(1)." [14] In re Brooklyn M., 933 A.2d 1113, 1125 (R.I.2007); see also In re Steven D., 23 A.3d at 1156 ; In re Jose Luis R.H., 968 A.2d at 882 .

2012When it seeks to terminate parental rights, “subsequent to presenting sufficient evidence to support [a finding of parental unfitness], DCYF must additionally demonstrate to the Family Court that it has made reasonable efforts to strengthen the parent-child relationship in accordance with the provisions of § 15-7-7(b)(1).” 14 In re Brooklyn M., 933 A.2d 1113, 1125 (R.I.2007); see also In re Steven D., 23 A.3d at 1156 ; In re Jose Luis R.H., 968 A.2d at 882 .

2012When it seeks to terminate parental rights, "subsequent to presenting sufficient evidence to support [a finding of parental unfitness], DCYF must additionally demonstrate to the Family Court that it has made reasonable efforts to strengthen the parent-child relationship in accordance with the provisions of § 15-7-7(b)(1)." [14] In re Brooklyn M., 933 A.2d 1113, 1125 (R.I.2007); see also In re Steven D., 23 A.3d at 1156 ; In re Jose Luis R.H., 968 A.2d at 882 .

2012Highlighting certain evidence presented at trial, such as testimony regarding the alcohol and prescription drugs he had ingested, his intoxication, and his post-killing actions, Payette avers that his will “was so paralyzed by alcohol and drugs [that he was] incapable of forming any sane design to kill [the victim].” Thus, Payette asserts that the trial justice committed reversible error by denying his motion for a new trial. 1 Standard of Review “When deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial, ‘the trial justice acts as a thirteenth juror.’ ” State v. Pineda, 13 A.3d 623, 640